People v. Munoz-Salgado ( 2016 )

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Appellate Court Date: 2016.10.26
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People v. Munoz-Salgado, 2016 IL App (2d) 140325Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption MUDY MUNOZ-SALGADO, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Second District
Docket No. 2-14-0325
Filed September 8, 2016
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County, No. 12-CF-2293; the
Review Hon. T. Clint Hull, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Thomas A. Lilien and Fletcher P. Hamill, both of State Appellate
Appeal Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.
Joseph H. McMahon, State’s Attorney, of St. Charles (Lawrence M.
Bauer, Joan M. Kripke, and Mary Beth Burns, all of State’s Attorneys
Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the
court, with opinion.
Justices Jorgensen and Spence concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Kane County, defendant, Mudy
Munoz-Salgado, was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS
5/11-1.30(a)(2) (West 2012)), aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(c) (West 2012)), and
unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3(a) (West 2012)). He was sentenced to concurrent prison
terms of seven years for aggravated criminal sexual assault and three years for each of the
other offenses. The alleged victim, J.L.,1 resides in another state and did not testify at trial.
However, the statements that she made to an emergency room nurse were admitted into
evidence. Defendant argues that admitting the statements into evidence violated his sixth
amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. Defendant also contends that the trial
court erred by ruling that the rape-shield statute (725 ILCS 5/115-7 (West 2014)) barred
evidence that J.L. reported engaging in sexual activity within 72 hours prior to the emergency
room examination. We affirm.
¶2 At trial, video from a surveillance camera at the Lexington Inn hotel in Elgin was
admitted into evidence and shown to the jury. The video showed that, at about 12 p.m. on
November 13, 2012, defendant approached J.L. in the first floor hallway, spoke with her,
took her by the wrist, and led her upstairs into a hotel room. A short time later, J.L. left the
room and walked downstairs. Minnie Cotton, a housekeeper at the hotel, testified that at
about noon she encountered a woman in the first floor hallway who was crying. The police
were summoned. Officers who spoke with J.L. at the hotel indicated that she was crying.
Based on what J.L. told the police, officers took defendant into custody after encountering
him in the hotel’s parking lot. An officer drove J.L. to the hospital. A search of the hotel
room that J.L. had been taken to led to the discovery of several condoms in their wrappers
and one empty wrapper.
¶3 Defendant was interviewed by police while in custody. An audio recording of part of the
interview was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. Defendant indicated that he
lived in Missouri but was working with a construction crew on a project in the Elgin area. He
had been staying at the hotel for about two weeks. Other members of the construction crew
were also staying there. Defendant was acquainted with J.L., who was, in his words,
“somebody’s woman in the crew.” About a month earlier, defendant had exchanged text
messages with J.L. and spoken with her on the telephone. They had arranged to meet in
Kansas City to have sex. J.L. told defendant to send her $200. Defendant sent her the money,
but she did not show up in Kansas City, and defendant did not see her again until November
13, 2012, when he encountered her at the hotel during his lunch break. He asked her why she
did not show up for the planned meeting in Kansas City. J.L. made reference to defendant
being married. Defendant asked J.L. whether she wanted to go to the hotel room with him.
She declined because she was going to see “her man” during lunch. At that point defendant
grabbed J.L.’s arm and told her to go up to his room. They got to the door, and J.L. started to
walk away while defendant was retrieving his key. He grabbed her and pulled her into the
room. Asked what he was thinking when this took place, defendant responded, “I was pretty
1
We note that, in his briefs, defendant uses the victim’s full name. It is our practice to refer to
victims of sex offenses by initials so as to protect their privacy. We strongly urge the parties to appeals
arising from sex-offense prosecutions to do the same.
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much thinking about my $200 and I was horny.” Defendant understood that J.L. did not want
to go into his room. When they got into the room, they had sex. J.L. said that defendant was
hurting her, but he did not stop.
¶4 Kristy Sheehan testified for the State that she was an emergency room nurse at Sherman
Hospital in Elgin. Her duties included performing sexual assault kits on patients who
reported having been sexually assaulted. A sexual assault kit contains swabs and containers
for the collection of evidence. Sheehan explained that medical personnel performing a sexual
assault kit “are trying to collect any kind of debris, semen, hair follicles, oral swabs, so any
DNA samples inside, and clothes.” Vaginal swabs and urine samples are also taken. On
cross-examination, Sheehan acknowledged that the primary purpose of a sexual assault kit is
to collect evidence. When a female patient reports a sexual assault, a gynecological
examination is performed. Medical personnel also look for bruising, bite marks, and other
signs of trauma.
¶5 Sheehan testified that on November 13, 2012, at about 3:30 p.m., she met with J.L. in a
treatment room. A police officer was present, but the officer left the treatment room before
Sheehan began her examination. J.L. was cooperative but anxious, and she became very
tearful when Sheehan started asking her questions. Sheehan testified, “Like any patient, I ask
what brought her in that day.” Sheehan also asked J.L. how long it had been since the alleged
sexual assault occurred and whether J.L. had taken a shower, removed any clothing, or gone
to the bathroom since it occurred. Sheehan explained that those questions were “[f]or the
collection of evidence.” Sheehan further testified, “We ask multiple questions of what had
happened, meaning, where, if there was any penetration, if so, where the penetration was.”
Sheehan testified that J.L. told her that defendant threw her face-down on a bed, held her
down, put on a condom, and, in Sheehan’s words, “forcefully put his penis inside her.” J.L.
indicated that, prior to the assault, defendant had dragged her by the wrist.
¶6 Sheehan observed bruising on J.L.’s wrist and a black scuff mark on her ankle. Sheehan
collected swabs from J.L. and was present when a physician collected a vaginal swab from
J.L. Sheehan testified that she observed spotting of blood in J.L.’s vaginal vault. Medically,
the presence of spotting blood indicated “[v]aginal trauma or force to the vaginal area.” On
cross-examination, Sheehan indicated that there were “many reasons why somebody could be
spotting.” She acknowledged that it was possible to have spotting with consensual sex “if it is
rough sex” or there was “little to no lubrication.”
¶7 Defendant testified that he had met J.L. while working on a construction job in
Milwaukee. J.L.’s boyfriend was on the construction crew. Thereafter, they spoke on the
telephone and exchanged text messages. They had planned to meet again and to have sex,
and defendant sent J.L. $200. J.L. did not show up for the meeting. Defendant also testified
that he had not actually gone to meet with J.L. He added, “I’m married, so it didn’t matter to
me so I changed my phone number.”
¶8 Defendant encountered J.L. again on November 13, 2012, at the Lexington Inn. He was
surprised to see her, and she appeared to be surprised to see him. J.L. was upset because
defendant had changed his phone number. Defendant asked J.L. to come to his hotel room.
He touched her hand but did not drag her or pull her up the stairs. J.L. was worried that
someone would see them. J.L. started to walk away. Defendant thought she was playing a
game, and he pulled her back. Once they were inside defendant’s room, defendant put on a
condom, and they had sex. At one point she said that defendant was hurting her, so they
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changed positions. J.L. never tried to push defendant away. She never screamed or yelled,
and she was not crying. After they were done, J.L. calmly left the room. Defendant denied
that he forced J.L. to have sex with him.
¶9 We first consider whether defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him was
violated. The sixth amendment’s confrontation clause provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.” U.S. Const., amend. VI. The right of confrontation applies to testimonial
evidence. Thus, “a testimonial statement of a witness who does not testify at trial is never
admissible unless (1) the witness is unavailable to testify, and (2) the defendant had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Stechley, 225 Ill. 2d
246, 279 (2007) (plurality opinion) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54
(2004)). In order to qualify as “testimonial,” a witness’s statement must be (1) made in a
solemn fashion and (2) intended to establish a particular fact. Id. at 281-82.
¶ 10 In Stechley, the parties disagreed as to whether the intent to establish a particular fact
must be that of the declarant (i.e., the witness) or of one eliciting the statement from the
declarant. A majority of the Stechley court concluded that the answer depends on whether the
witness’s statement was elicited through police interrogation.2 In doing so, the Stechley court
answered in the affirmative a question that the United States Supreme Court had reserved in
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823 n.2 (2006): whether statements to persons other than
law enforcement officers can be subject to the confrontation clause.
¶ 11 As noted in the plurality opinion in Stechley, 225 Ill. 2d at 267-68, Davis teaches that
statements “made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet
an ongoing emergency” are not testimonial. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. On the other hand,
statements are testimonial (and thus within the ambit of the confrontation clause) “when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant
to later criminal prosecution.” Id. A majority of the Stechley court agreed that, for
confrontation clause purposes, “police interrogation” is questioning by police “or those
whose ‘acts [are] acts of the police.’ ” Stechley, 225 Ill. 2d at 284 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at
823 n.2); id. at 330 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting, joined by Karmeier, J.). (We note that Davis
merely assumed, without deciding, that “police interrogation” includes questioning by those
acting on behalf of the police. Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2.)
¶ 12 In contrast, a majority of the Stechley court held that it is the declarant’s intent that
determines whether statements outside the context of police interrogation are testimonial.
The relevant question in that setting is whether the declarant intended to “ ‘bear testimony
against the accused.’ ” Stechley, 225 Ill. 2d at 291 (quoting United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d
662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004)). The declarant’s intent may be ascertained by asking whether a
reasonable person in his or her position “ ‘would anticipate his statement being used against
the accused in investigating and prosecuting the crime.’ ” Id. (quoting Cromer, 389 F.3d at
675). The United States Supreme Court has since held, however, that “a statement cannot fall
2
Although there was no majority opinion in Stechley, a majority of the members of the court were in
agreement on this point. Stechley, 225 Ill. 2d at 284, 289; id. at 330 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting, joined by
Karmeier, J.).
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within the Confrontation Clause unless its primary purpose was testimonial.” Ohio v. Clark,
576 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180 (2015). The Court drew no distinction between
statements obtained during police interrogation and statements obtained in other contexts.
Indeed, the statements at issue in Clark did not arise from police questioning; they were
made by a three-year-old to a preschool teacher who observed indications of possible child
abuse.
¶ 13 While declining to adopt a categorical rule that statements to individuals other than law
enforcement officers are beyond the reach of the confrontation clause, the Court observed
that “such statements are much less likely to be testimonial than statements to law
enforcement officers.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2181. The Court concluded that the teacher in
Clark elicited statements from the child primarily for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
child could safely be released to his guardian at the end of the school day. Id. at ___, 135 S.
Ct. at 2181. Because gathering evidence for prosecuting an offense was not the primary
purpose of the conversation between the teacher and the child, the child’s statements were
not testimonial. This was true despite the fact that the teacher was legally required to report
abuse to government authorities. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2182-83.
¶ 14 Here, defendant contends that, given the circumstances surrounding Sheehan’s
examination of J.L., “[a]ny reasonable person in [J.L.’s] position would have anticipated that
her statements would be used in a trial.” That alone, however, does not make the statements
testimonial. The record here shows that Sheehan conducted a physical examination with the
two-fold purpose of collecting physical evidence to assist in the investigation and possible
prosecution of a suspected crime and ensuring that J.L. received whatever medical attention
she needed. Attempting to draw a parallel with People v. Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d 441 (2007)
(which we will get to shortly), defendant argues that “[e]ven if some of [Sheehan’s] actions
were related to treating [J.L.], the bulk of them were related to gathering evidence on behalf
of the police.” But much of the examination was designed to collect purely physical evidence
that raises no confrontation clause concerns. The germane question is not whether Sheehan’s
actions, collectively, were for the primary purpose of gathering evidence but whether the
verbal exchanges she engaged in with J.L. were primarily for that purpose. We conclude that
they were not. A medical examination was clearly both necessary and appropriate to
ascertain whether J.L. suffered any injuries and whether treatment was necessary. The
examination properly entailed obtaining a history from the patient of the events leading her to
visit the emergency room.
¶ 15 In Spicer, the First District held that a sexual assault victim’s statement to an emergency
room doctor that she had been “raped and tied” was testimonial. Id. at 448. Relying on Davis,
the Spicer court reasoned that the statement did not occur during the course of an ongoing
emergency. (That conclusion rested, in part, on evidence that the victim had indicated that
she did not want medical attention and that the police waited for about seven hours before
taking her to the hospital.) The United States Supreme Court has since made clear, however,
that “whether an ongoing emergency exists is simply one factor *** that informs the ultimate
inquiry regarding the ‘primary purpose’ of an interrogation.” Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S.
344, 366 (2011); accord State v. Hill, 336 P.3d 1283, 1288 (Ariz. 2014) (“We cannot say ***
that a statement made in response to a question by a medical provider in connection with
non-emergent medical care necessarily is testimonial simply because the victim does not
require urgent medical attention.” (Emphasis in original.)).
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¶ 16 We also find no error in the trial court’s refusal to permit defendant to introduce evidence
that J.L. had engaged in sexual activity within 72 hours before Sheehan examined her.
Defendant sought to admit this evidence for the purpose of showing that the spotting of blood
that Sheehan observed was not necessarily related to J.L.’s encounter with defendant. The
trial court concluded that the evidence was inadmissible under the Illinois rape-shield statute,
which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“In prosecutions for *** aggravated criminal sexual assault *** the prior sexual
activity or the reputation of the alleged victim *** is inadmissible except (1) as
evidence concerning the past sexual conduct of the alleged victim *** with the
accused when this evidence is offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the
alleged victim *** consented to the sexual conduct with respect to which the offense
is alleged; or (2) when constitutionally required to be admitted.” 725 ILCS 5/115-7
(West 2014).
Defendant did not seek to admit evidence that he had a prior sexual relationship with J.L., so
the question is whether the admission of evidence that J.L. engaged in sexual activity with
someone other than defendant within 72 hours of the sexual assault examination was
constitutionally required.
¶ 17 The constitution affords a defendant the right to offer evidence that is “directly relevant
to matters at issue in the case, notwithstanding that it concern[s] the victim’s prior sexual
activity.” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Santos, 211 Ill. 2d 395, 405-06 (2004) (alleged
victim’s past sexual conduct was a collateral matter, so her prior inconsistent out-of-court
statements about that subject were not admissible for purposes of impeachment). “The
‘constitutionally required’ exception to the rape-shield statute ‘should be construed narrowly,
but also fairly.’ ” People v. Summers, 353 Ill. App. 3d 367, 374 (2004) (quoting Santos, 211
Ill. 2d at 416-17 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting)). In order to avoid harassing or humiliating
the complaining witness, “[m]inimally relevant evidence of prior sexual activity should not
be admitted.” Id. Indeed, evidence of the alleged victim’s history “is not ‘constitutionally
required to be admitted’ unless it would make a meaningful contribution to the fact-finding
enterprise.” People v. Maxwell, 2011 IL App (4th) 100434, ¶ 76 (quoting 725 ILCS
5/115-7(a) (West 2010)).
¶ 18 We will not disturb the trial court’s ruling to bar evidence under the rape-shield statute
unless the ruling was an abuse of discretion, “which ‘occurs where the trial court’s decision
is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable [citation] or where no reasonable person would agree
with the position adopted by the trial court.’ ” People v. Johnson, 2014 IL App (2d) 121004,
¶ 42 (quoting People v. Becker, 239 Ill. 2d 215, 234 (2010)). The trial court did not abuse its
discretion here. The evidence in question was not so relevant that its admission was
constitutionally required. Defendant admitted that he had sex with the victim. The theory of
defense was that the sex was consensual. Defendant was allowed to elicit testimony that the
spotting of blood that Sheehan observed could have been the result of rough sex or a lack of
lubrication but did not necessarily signify a lack of consent. The relevance of the spotting of
blood depends, then, on the jury inferring that it is less likely that rough sex is consensual. If
the jury were to draw that inference, however, J.L.’s recent prior sexual activity would be
relevant only to the extent that it was nonconsensual. In other words, to the extent that the
spotting of blood showed that J.L. was sexually assaulted, evidence of a prior sexual
encounter would not exonerate defendant unless the jury believed that the prior encounter
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was a sexual assault. There is no evidence of that, however. We fail to see how the evidence
defendant sought to admit would have made a meaningful contribution to the factfinding
enterprise.
¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.
As part of our judgment, we grant the State’s request that defendant be assessed $50 as costs
for this appeal. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2014); see also People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166,
179 (1978).
¶ 20 Affirmed.
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