State v. Cantrell , 2016 Ohio 7623 ( 2016 )

[Cite as State v. Cantrell, 2016-Ohio-7623.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 26975
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2015-CR-1567
:
JUSTAN B. CANTRELL : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 4th day of November, 2016.
...........
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by LYNNE R. NOTHSTINE, Atty. Reg. No. 0061560,
Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts
Building, P.O. Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
JIMMIE CHRISTON, Atty. Reg. No. 0038116, 131 North Ludlow Street, Suite 212,
Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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HALL, J.
{¶ 1} Justan Cantrell appeals from his conviction and sentence following a bench
trial on charges of aggravated burglary with a firearm specification and having a weapon
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while under disability.
{¶ 2} In his sole assignment of error, Cantrell challenges the legal sufficiency and
manifest weight of the evidence to support his aggravated-burglary conviction.1
{¶ 3} The record reflects that Cantrell’s convictions stemmed from his alleged
forced entry into the victim’s apartment armed with a handgun. At trial, the victim, Chatiya
Cranford, testified that she resided in the apartment with her young son. With regard to
the incident in question, Cranford stated that around 9:30 p.m. or so Cantrell’s girlfriend,
Becky Burns, opened the screen door and “came in” through the already-open front door.
According to Cranford, Cantrell also entered the apartment but did not himself open either
door. (Trial Tr. at 13-14). She clarified, however, that Cantrell did have to push the main
front door farther open to fit inside. (Id. at 14). Cranford testified that Cantrell was waiving
a handgun, pointing it at her, and threatening to kill her. (Id. at 14-15). Cantrell and Burns
accused Cranford of calling the police on him earlier that day. (Id.). They then exited
Cranford’s apartment, and Cantrell fired a shot outside. (Id. at 15-16).
{¶ 4} On cross examination, Cranford acknowledged that she had felony
convictions 14 or 15 years earlier for forgery and burglary. (Id. at 23-24). Cranford also
claimed another adult female, identified only as “Shiann,” was present in the apartment
when Cantrell entered. (Id. at 20, 24). Cranford additionally reiterated that her main front
door already was open, that Burns opened the screen door, and that Cantrell just “came
on in.” (Id. at 26). She also repeated her assertion that the main door was only partially
open and that Cantrell had to push it open farther to enter while Burns held the screen
1Although Cantrell’s actual assignment of error only references manifest weight, his
appellate brief appears to raise both issues. (See Appellant’s brief at 4, 6).
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door open. (Id. at 26-32). Defense counsel challenged Cranford on her testimony that the
main door was only “cracked” open and that Cantrell had to push it farther open, claiming
she never had made such an assertion before. (Id. at 34). On re-direct examination,
Cranford stated again that Cantrell physically had to move the “cracked open” front door
to enter her apartment. (Id. at 39-40).
{¶ 5} The next witness was neighbor Lillia Arnold. She testified that she lived
across the street from Cranford’s apartment. Arnold stated that she saw Cantrell open
Cranford’s screen door and enter Cranford’s apartment carrying a handgun. (Id. at 47).
She then saw him come back outside and fire a shot into the air before leaving. (Id.). On
cross examination, Arnold repeated her testimony that she saw Cantrell “grab the screen
door and walk in.” (Id. at 51). She added that the main front door already was open but
could not specify “how open it was.” (Id.). She agreed that the main door appeared to be
open enough “so he could walk right in.” (Id. at 52). Arnold estimated that the time was
around 10:00 p.m. She explained that it was dark outside but that she could see because
of the street lights. (Id.). She further stated that she had “no doubt” the handgun in
Cantrell’s possession was silver. (Id. at 53).
{¶ 6} The final witness was police officer Andrew Lane. He spoke with Cranford at
her apartment after the incident. He confirmed that Cranford’s apartment had two doors.
(Id. at 60). He also stated that he was unable to locate a shell casing in the dark outside
the apartment. (Id. at 61). He explained that some handguns, such as revolvers, require
the shell casing to be ejected manually. (Id. at 60). On cross examination, Lane confirmed
that his police report mentioned Cranford telling him Burns opened the screen door and
Cantrell walked in. (Id. at 62-63). He also testified that Cranford told him Cantrell’s
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handgun was black. (Id. at 63).
{¶ 7} After hearing the evidence, the trial court filed an October 22, 2015 “Verdict
and Judgment of Guilty.” (Doc. #61). With regard to the conflicting testimony, the trial
court found:
The Defendant entered Ms. Cranford’s apartment with force. The
Court believes Ms. Arnold’s testimony that she saw the Defendant opening
the screen door and enter Ms. Cranford’s apartment. The opening of a
closed, unlocked door constitutes force. [Citation omitted]. It is quite
possible that Ms. Cranford only saw the after effect of the Defendant
opening the screen door (Becky holding the screen door), since the front
door was only open a crack. Ms. Cranford testified to this fact both at the
trial and the Preliminary Hearing. Joint Exh. I, p. 31-32. Even if the Court
were to find that Becky in fact opened the unlocked screen door, letting the
Defendant in as a matador with a cape would waive a bull through, the
Defendant would have entered Ms. Cranford’s home by stealth. Stealth
means a “secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain
entrance into . . . a residence of another without permission.” [Citations
omitted]. The Defendant was not given permission to be in Ms. Cranford’s
apartment. He entered her apartment at night. The Defendant in this
scenario entered immediately after another person, Becky, used force to
open the door. He made use of that forced opening. It is reasonable that
Ms. Cranford would not expect the Defendant, whom she only knew as
Becky’s boyfriend, to enter her apartment at night without invitation.
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However, as the Court noted, it believes Ms. Arnold’s testimony that the
Defendant opened the screen door, meaning the Defendant used force to
enter Ms. Cranford’s apartment.
(Id. at 4-5).
{¶ 8} The trial court subsequently overruled a motion for reconsideration directed
toward its finding that Cantrell used force by opening the screen door himself. (Doc. # 67-
68, 73). The trial court sentenced Cantrell to an aggregate six-year prison term. (Doc.
#76).
{¶ 9} On appeal, Cantrell challenges the “force, stealth, or deception” element of
his aggravated-burglary conviction. The applicable statute, R.C. 2911.11(A), provides in
part that “[n]o person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in an occupied
structure * * *.” Cantrell argues that Cranford’s testimony fails to support a finding that he
trespassed by force and that the trial court’s alternative finding of stealth is not supported
by the record. 2 (Appellant’s brief at 4-5). Therefore, he asserts that his aggravated-
burglary conviction is based on legally insufficient evidence and/or is against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
{¶ 10} When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, he is arguing
that the State presented inadequate evidence on an element of the offense to sustain the
2 Cantrell also makes a passing assertion that the crime of aggravated burglary had to
be completed before he left the apartment. He notes that he fired his gun in the air after
leaving the apartment. (Appellant’s brief at 5). It is unclear whether Cantrell is attempting
to raise this issue as an argument on appeal, as it has nothing to do with his assigned
error or the remainder of his brief. In any event, the trial court did not rely on the gunshot
outside to support his aggravated-burglary conviction. Instead, it explicitly relied on
Cantrell’s act of menacing inside the apartment by pointing his handgun at Cranford and
threatening to kill her. (Doc. # 61 at 5). Cantrell’s brief does not address this aspect of the
trial court’s ruling.
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verdict as a matter of law. State v. Hawn, 138 Ohio App. 3d 449, 471, 741 N.E.2d 594 (2d
Dist.2000). “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine
whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 11} Our analysis is different when reviewing a manifest-weight argument. When
a conviction is challenged on appeal as being against the weight of the evidence, an
appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in
the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage
of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A judgment should be
reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence “only in the exceptional
case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Martin, 20
Ohio App. 3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶ 12} With the foregoing standards in mind, we conclude that Cantrell’s
aggravated-burglary conviction is supported by legally sufficient evidence and is not
against the weight of the evidence. As set forth above, the primary basis for the trial
court’s finding of a trespass by force was the testimony of Lillia Arnold. The trial court
found her testimony to be the most credible, noting that she had “no dog in this fight, and
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was simply an unfortunate witness of the events which unfolded at Ms. Cranford’s
apartment.” (Doc. # 61 at 3). The trial court specifically credited Arnold’s testimony “that
she saw the Defendant opening the screen door and enter Ms. Cranford’s apartment.”
(Id. at 4). This testimony was legally sufficient to establish the “force” element of
aggravated burglary. See, e.g., State v. McWilliams, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2000 CA 89,
2001 WL 1203395, *3 (Oct. 12, 2001) (recognizing that opening a closed but unlocked
door is sufficient to constitute the use of force).
{¶ 13} The trial court’s determination that Cantrell entered Cranford’s apartment
by force also is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. As the trier of fact, the
trial court was entitled to credit Arnold’s testimony that Cantrell opened the screen door
himself. Although it was not required to do so, the trial court, in its written decision, also
plausibly reconciled Arnold’s testimony with Cranford’s. After reviewing the record, we do
not find that the trial court clearly lost its way and created a miscarriage of justice in
determining that Cantrell entered Cranford’s apartment by force. The evidence does not
weigh heavily against that determination or Cantrell’s conviction. Finally, because the
evidence supports the trial court’s “force” determination, we need not address its
alternative finding that Cantrell entered the apartment by stealth.
{¶ 14} Based on the reasoning set forth above, we overrule Cantrell’s assignment
of error and affirm the judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court.
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DONOVAN, P.J., and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Mathias H. Heck
Lynne R. Nothstine
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Jimmie Christon
Hon. Michael W. Krumholtz