Commonwealth v. McLaine , 2016 Pa. Super. 239 ( 2016 )

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2016 PA Super 239COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
PATRICK JOSEPH MCLAINE
Appellant No. 213 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 11, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0000830-2012
BEFORE: OTT, J., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 07, 2016
Patrick Joseph McLaine (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed on December 11, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of
Northampton County after this Court remanded the matter for resentencing
as to the length of the probationary period, which took Appellant’s sentence
beyond the statutory maximum. On remand, the trial court remedied the
illegal sentence by eliminating the probationary period while retaining the
original upward departure sentence of six to twelve months’ incarceration for
third-degree misdemeanor theft by failure to make required disposition of
funds received.1 Appellant now contends his sentence is both illegal and the
product of the court’s abuse of sentencing discretion. We affirm.
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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We previously set forth the factual and procedural history of the case
as follows:
On January 11, 2013, a jury convicted McLaine and his co-
defendant, Robert J. Kearns,[ ] of theft by failure to make
required disposition of funds received.[ ] As will be discussed
below, the court ultimately sentenced McLaine to a term of six to
12 months’ incarceration, 12 months’ probation, a fine of
$2,500.00, and restitution in the amount of $832,460.00.
***
The facts and procedural history are as follows.[ ] McLaine and
Kearns were the two principals of a company known as Municipal
Energy Managers, Inc. (“MEM”). On July 2, 2007, McLaine and
Kearns entered into a written contract with the Township of
Bethlehem, a municipality in Northampton County (“Bethlehem
Township”). The contract provided MEM would act as an agent
for Bethlehem Township to facilitate the purchase of township
street lights from the public utility company, Pennsylvania Power
and Light (“PPL”)[, the purpose of which was to save the
township money by accessing a lower utility rate for municipal-
owned streetlights]. McLaine and Kearns drafted the contract
and determined the total cost to do all work necessary for
Bethlehem Township to purchase the street lights from PPL. A
price of $1,001,230.00 was to be used to pay any and all costs
of the purchase including, but not limited to, paying PPL for the
transfer of the street lights. The contract provided performance
was to occur within a period of 12 to 18 months, ending
anywhere between July 2, 2008 and January 2, 2009, and was
considered completed when ownership of the street lights was
transferred from PPL to the township. Additionally, the contract
stated the township would be receiving the lower utility rate by
January of 2009. For its services, MEM was to receive a five
percent commission of $50,060.00
To begin performance, MEM requested Bethlehem Township pay
them $832,460.00. On July 3, 2007, McLaine and Kearns
received a check in the requested amount. On July 5, 2007, the
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(Footnote Continued)
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 3927.
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check was deposited into a general corporate bank account in
the name of MEM, which McLaine and Kearns jointly controlled.[ ]
[With respect to the contract, there was no escrow requirement
that Bethlehem Township’s funds be held separately from the
rest of MEM’s other accounts. See N.T., 1/10/2013, at 162.]
In October 2007, McLaine and Kearns wrote checks from the
MEM general corporate account to themselves. Specifically, on
October 1, 2007, a check was made payable to Kearns for the
amount of $366,600.00. That same day, a check was issued to
McLaine in the amount of $499,945.000, as well as a second
check to McLaine in the amount of $109,059.00. All three
checks were signed by both defendants. At trial, McLaine and
Kearns testified these checks represented bonuses paid to
themselves.
On August 5, 2009, PPL sent a letter to Kearns, stating that it
had learned MEM was performing unauthorized work on its
streetlights. The letter identified Bethlehem Township as one of
the affected municipalities.
Despite receiving the funds, MEM did not contact PPL to initiate
the transfer of street lights until August 10, 2009, eight months
past the 18-month completion deadline, by sending a letter
announcing its intent to purchase the streetlights. On
September 17, 2009, PPL sent a letter to MEM, outlining the
estimated costs of the total project, which was to be
$271,180.00, well below MEM’s estimate of $1,001,230.00. The
letter also requested MEM make a deposit to PPL in the amount
of $22,525.00 in order to initiate the process of the light
transfer. McLaine and Kearns did not respond to PPL’s request
or make the payment. On October 5, 2009, MEM sent
Bethlehem Township an invoice for $131,438.00. The township
did not pay it.
In January of 2010, a grand jury investigation was conducted in
relation to this matter. On January 26, 2012, the grand jury
returned a presentment, recommending the arrest of McLaine
and Kearns on charges of theft by failure to make required
disposition of funds received, misapplication of entrusted
property, and criminal conspiracy.
A criminal complaint was then filed on February 16, 2012. As
noted above, the two men were tried together. The joint jury
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trial began on January 7, 2013. On January 11, 2013, the jury
found McLaine and Kearns guilty of theft by failure to make
required disposition of funds received, but not guilty of the other
two charges.
On April 12, 2013, and April 19, 2013, McLaine and Kearns,
respectively, were both sentenced to a term of 16 to 60 months’
incarceration, 60 months of probation, and restitution in the
amount of $832,460.00. The court graded the theft offense as a
third-degree felony pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 3903 (grading of
theft offenses) on the basis that the value of the theft was in
excess of $2,000.00.
On April 24, 2013, McLaine and Kearns filed motions challenging
the trial court’s grading of the offense as a third-degree felony
pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
They argued that the verdict slip could not support a felony
conviction because it did not require the jury to determine the
value of the property that gave rise to the convictions, i.e., the
commencement check issued by Bethlehem Township. The trial
court agreed and on May 31, 2013, granted the motion.
On June 4, 2013, the court re-sentenced McLaine and Kearns
with regard to the theft offense, grading it as a third-degree
misdemeanor, and ordered them to serve a term of six to 12
months’ incarceration, 60 months’ probation, a fine of
$2,500.00, and restitution in the amount of $832,460.00.
Subsequently, on June 13, 2013, McLaine and Kearns filed post-
sentence motions, including a motion for reconsideration of
sentence. On July 31, 2013, the trial court entered an order,
modifying their sentences to a consecutive period of probation of
12 months rather than 60 months. The remainders of their
sentences were not changed. [Appellant’s] appeal followed.
Commonwealth v. McLaine, No. 2600 EDA 2013, unpublished
memorandum at 1-6 (Pa.Super. filed November 13, 2015).
In addressing Appellant’s initial direct appeal, we rejected six issues
directed at his verdicts but agreed with his challenge to the legality of
sentence. As noted, supra, we determined Appellant’s aggregate two-year
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sentence, which included a one-year probationary tail, exceeded the
statutory maximum sentence of one-year applicable to a misdemeanor of
the third degree. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(b)(8). Accordingly, we vacated
judgment of sentence and remanded the matter “for re-sentencing as to the
length of the probationary period.” McLaine, at 40. We came to the same
decision and entered an identical order in Kearns’ appeal, as well.
At Appellant’s and Kearns’ resentencing hearing, the Commonwealth
argued for the reinstatement of a statutory maximum six to 12-month
sentence, but with no probationary tail, in accordance with this Court’s
memorandum decision. N.T., 12/11/15, at 5-6. The Commonwealth also
advised the court that it would object to any parole “because they’ve
[Kearns and Appellant] offered no restitution on this case whatsoever,
although they’ve been out and had that opportunity.” Id.
Counsel for Appellant suggested that our decision could be read as a
directive to eliminate either the probationary period or the sentence of
incarceration. Counsel also informed the court that he believed the
guidelines called for restorative sanctions without incarceration, and he
objected to a six to twelve-month sentence of incarceration despite
Appellant’s having “no prior record at all.” Id., at 8.2
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2
With an offense gravity score of one and a prior record score of zero, the
standard range applying to each of the defendants’ third-degree
misdemeanors was RS to RS, with an aggravated range of RS to three
months’ incarceration. N.T., 6/4/13, at 8. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 303.16(a).
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The Commonwealth responded:
First of all, I don’t believe the Superior Court at all addressed the
[trial court’s] decision to impose the maximum statutory offense
permitted by law. The whole appeal was based upon the
consecutive probation that went beyond the twelve months.
I think that [the trial court], you sat as the trial judge in this
case. We’re talking about hundreds of thousands of dollars that
were basically stolen by these two defendant. They have no
remorse. They’re appealing all over the state with the same
type of scheme that the jury found that they were involved with.
And this court is not bound by those guidelines when it’s an
egregious case. And I believe that you made a record on that,
and certainly can make a record again, to impose the sentence
that you intended, which was six to twelve months.
Id., at 9.
The court agreed with the Commonwealth that elimination of the
probationary tail would satisfy the directive of this Court. After announcing
that it was adopting the “previous records made in all respects” at the prior
sentencing hearing, the court imposed a six to 12-month sentence of
incarceration without any probationary tail. Id., at 10. On December 23,
2015, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion for reconsideration
challenging, inter alia, the discretionary aspects of his sentence. This timely
appeal followed.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review.
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(Footnote Continued)
Basic Sentencing Matrix (indicating M3 theft is with a prior record score of
zero is RS plus-or-minus three months.
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1. Whether, where the trial court initially found that no
aggravating factors existed and placed no sentencing
factors on the record, the trial unreasonably [sic]
sentenced Appellant outside of the aggravated range of
the sentencing guidelines?
Appellant’s brief at 7.
As Appellant raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his
sentence, we note the applicable standard of review is as follows.
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.
Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record,
that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law,
exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias
or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
***
When imposing sentence, a court is required to consider the
particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the
defendant. In considering these factors, the court should refer
to the defendant's prior criminal record, age, personal
characteristics and potential for rehabilitation.
Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760-61 (Pa.Super. 2014)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
An appellant is not entitled to the review of challenges to the
discretionary aspects of a sentence as of right. Rather, an appellant
challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this
Court's jurisdiction. We determine whether the appellant has invoked our
jurisdiction by considering the following four factors:
(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
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sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's brief
has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1006-07 (Pa.Super. 2014)
(some citations omitted).
The record reflects that Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and
that he preserved this issue by including it in his post-sentence motion for
reconsideration. Appellant has also included in his brief a statement
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). We now consider whether Appellant has
presented a substantial question for our review.
What constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 A.2d 1013 (Pa.Super.
2003). A substantial question exists “only when the appellant advances a
colorable argument that the sentencing judge's actions were either: (1)
inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary
to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.”
Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910 (Pa.Super. 2000). A claim that a
sentence is manifestly excessive might raise a substantial question if the
appellant's Rule 2119(f) statement sufficiently articulates the manner in
which the sentence imposed violates a specific provision of the Sentencing
Code or the norms underlying the sentencing process. Commonwealth v.
Mouzon, 571 Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002).
Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement presents the issue that “Appellant
was sentenced outside of the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines
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without sufficient justification from the court. . . . [W]hether a court
specified specific reasons for an aggravated range sentence is a substantial
question for review.” Appellant’s brief at 11 (citation omitted). Such a
challenge raises a substantial question for our review. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 8 (Pa.Super. 2002).
In reviewing the court’s exercise of sentencing discretion, we refer to
Griffin, where we recognized:
The sentencing court may, in an appropriate case, deviate from
the guidelines by fashioning a sentence which takes into account
the protection of the public, the rehabilitative needs of the
defendant, and the gravity of the particular offense as it relates
to the impact on the life of the victim and the community.
[Commonwealth v. Eby, 784 A.2d 204 (Pa.Super. 2001)] at
207. In doing so, the sentencing judge must state of record the
factual basis and specific reasons which compelled him or her to
deviate from the guideline ranges. Id. at 206. When evaluating
a claim of this type, it is necessary to remember that the
sentencing guidelines are advisory only. Id.Griffin, 804 A.2d at 7–8.
At the resentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the same six to
twelve-month sentence of incarceration it imposed previously in its amended
sentence based on a corrected guideline sheet, but it did so without
reiterating the specific reasons that it offered at the original hearing in
support of an upward departure sentence. Instead, the court stated that it
was incorporating “the previous records made in all respects.” N.T.
12/11/15, at 10.
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A review of the original sentencing hearing shows the court
acknowledged receiving a presentence investigation report and a guideline
statement. N.T., 4/12/13, at 2. The court heard family statements in
mitigation, Appellant’s remorseful allocution, and counsel’s presentation of
Appellant’s record of public and community service. Id., at 12-35.
A county commissioner addressed the court, reminding it that,
because of Appellant’s and Kearns’ theft and deliberate misrepresentations,
Bethlehem Township not only fails to own its streetlights as promised and
pays higher electric rates, as well, but also, as of 2013, has paid
$214,045.79 in interest payments on the $832,460 loan which the
defendants misappropriated. Id. at 36. The township, in fact, is scheduled
to make interest payments on the loan through 2027. Id. An additional
result of Appellant’s actions, according to the commissioner, was that the
township had cut its workforce and left thirteen open positions vacant
through 2012. Id., at 37.
The Commonwealth advised the court that it gave the defendants the
opportunity to make restitution in order to avoid prosecution, but Appellant
and Kearns made none. Id., at 8. Nor did the defendants offer any
restitution between their January verdicts and April sentencing hearing,
according to the prosecutor. Id., at 39. Future restitution also seemed
doubtful, the prosecutor concluded, given the defendants’ bankruptcy filings
and the defensive postures they assumed in various civil actions filed against
them, where they have made no offers of settlement. Id.- 10 -
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Prior to announcing sentence, the court noted that it received and read
ninety-four letters attesting to Appellant’s character, and it acknowledged
that the members of his community “have stepped up in substantial
measure” on his behalf, adding to the difficulty of this case. Id., at 41.
Nevertheless, the court felt justified in imposing a sentence of incarceration
given both the magnitude of the deception perpetrated and the substantial
economic burden assumed by tens of thousands of residents, particularly in
the absence of any restitution as of the date of sentencing. Id., at 42-43.
The notes of testimony from the original sentencing hearing
demonstrate that the court sentenced in adherence to the principles
discussed in Griffin. At the post-remand resentencing hearing, the court
specifically referenced the previous sentencing hearing record and
incorporated it for purposes of resentencing Appellant to the same six to
twelve-month sentence of incarceration minus a probationary period.
Accordingly, we reject Appellant’s claim alleging that the court failed to
provide a factual basis and state specific reasons supporting his upward
departure sentence.3
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3
Appellant also advances the discretionary aspects of sentencing challenge
that the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors in setting sentence.
The record belies this contention. As discussed supra, the court stated on
the record at the time of Appellant’s original sentencing that it considered
Appellant’s mitigation proffer closely before imposing sentence. In any
event, we deem this issue waived for Appellant’s failure to state it in his
concise statement pursuant to Rule 2119(f).
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Finally, Appellant asserts a challenge to legality of his sentence, but
supports it with an inapposite line of decisions, including Apprendi v.
United States, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which prohibits judicial fact-finding to
enhance a sentence beyond that permitted by the verdict. Specifically,
Appellant contends that because his original sentence of 16 to 24 months
represented a standard range sentence on what proved to be an incorrect
grading of his offense, it was incumbent upon the court to impose a standard
range sentence of restorative sanctions on the regraded offense.4 By
imposing an upward departure sentence of six to 12 months, instead, the
court must have engaged in additional fact-finding to find aggravating
factors not reflected in the verdict. We disagree.
Given the downgrading of Appellant’s offense, the court was required
to lower the standard guideline range accordingly; however, it retained the
discretion to consider the evidence adduced at trial and depart from the
guideline range in imposing a new sentence within prescribed statutory
limits. Because the court simply exercised this sentencing discretion, there
is no Apprendi problem. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91
A.3d 1247, 1270 n. 10 (Pa.Super. 2014) (holding neither Alleyne nor
Apprendi implicated when sentencing court retains sentencing discretion to
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4
As we noted in our disposition of Appellant’s previous direct appeal, this
Court affirmed the grading of his offense as a third-degree misdemeanor.
Mclaine, supra at 39 n. 16.
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depart from guideline range elevated post-verdict under sentencing
enhancement statute).
Any objection Appellant has to the court’s exercise of discretion in
deviating from the standard guideline range in imposing Appellant’s new
sentence, therefore, implicates not the legality but, instead, the
discretionary aspects of his sentence.5 We, therefore, reject his legality of
sentence challenge.
Judgment of sentence is AFFIRMED.
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5
Were we to construe Appellant’s claim as a properly preserved aspect of
his discretionary aspects of sentencing challenge, we would find it meritless.
As noted above, the court downgraded Appellant’s offense from a
third-degree felony to a third-degree misdemeanor after granting his
Apprendi-based motion for reconsideration because the verdict slip did not
require the jury to determine the value of the property that gave rise to his
theft conviction. Advised by a new, corrected sentencing guideline sheet
setting a range of RS plus-or-minus three months, and operating under a
reduced statutory maximum sentence of 12 months’ incarceration applicable
to a third-degree misdemeanor, the court deviated upward from the
guideline ranges by three months in imposing its six to 12 month sentence.
Appellant contends the court’s imposition of a standard range sentence
on his third-degree felony conviction obligated it to sentence him in the
standard range on his revised, misdemeanor conviction. It was within the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, however, to consider trial evidence
and victim impact statements at sentencing and conclude that the
circumstances and consequences of the crime, while typical for a third-
degree felony, were atypically egregious and damaging for a third-degree
misdemeanor. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s
decision to depart from a guideline range sentence on Appellant’s third-
degree misdemeanor.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/7/2016
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