State v. Xiomara Gonzales(075911) , 227 N.J. 77 ( 2016 )

SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)
State v. Xiomara Gonzales (A-5-15) (075911)
Argued September 12, 2016 -- Decided November 15, 2016
Albin, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers the proper scope of the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement
under Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution and whether inadvertent discovery of contraband or
evidence of a crime should remain a predicate for a plain-view seizure.
The constitutional question in this case arises out of defendant Xiomara Gonzales’s appeal from the denial
of her motion to suppress evidence seized by police from the vehicle she was driving on February 7, 2009. Pursuant
to their ongoing investigation of a drug-distribution scheme, the police learned that Gonzales and a codefendant
were going to retrieve a package that day that the Prosecutor’s Office suspected would contain a large quantity of
heroin. After Gonzales and the codefendant made two stops in separate cars, the codefendant placed two blue
plastic bags on Gonzales’s back seat, and Gonzales headed toward the Garden State Parkway.
Two officers followed Gonzales. They saw her speed, turn left on a red light, and pass through a toll on the
Garden State Parkway without paying. The officers pulled Gonzales over to the shoulder of the Parkway.
As Officer Perez approached Gonzales’s car, he saw that items had spilled from the blue bags onto the rear
floorboard. He “immediately identified” the spilled items as “bricks of heroin.” Gonzales was arrested and the bags
sealed. At a secure site, it was determined that the bags contained 270 bricks of heroin.
Gonzales was charged with first-degree distribution of more than five ounces of heroin, first-degree
possession of heroin with the intent to distribute, third-degree possession of heroin, and second-degree conspiracy to
commit racketeering. Gonzales moved to suppress the evidence.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, determining that the plain-view exception to the warrant
requirement justified the warrantless seizure of the heroin because Officer Perez (1) was lawfully present beside
Gonzales’s car; (2) discovered the heroin “inadvertently” due to the spillage; and (3) had specialized training and
experience in narcotics detection that made the incriminating nature of the packaged heroin “immediately apparent”
to him. The trial court therefore upheld the constitutionality of the search.
The Appellate Division reversed. Adhering to the plain-view test established in State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J.
210, 236–38 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S. Ct. 1295, 79 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1984), the appellate panel
concluded that, because the motor-vehicle stop was a pretext to enable police to seize drugs they knew to be present
in Gonzales’s car, Officer Perez’s discovery of the heroin did not meet the inadvertence prong of the plain-view
exception. In reaching this conclusion, the panel did not address the fact that, since Bruzzese, the United States
Supreme Court has expressly held that the “inadvertent” discovery of incriminating evidence is not a prerequisite for
plain-view seizure. The panel also found that exigent circumstances did not justify the search because the police had
time to obtain a warrant while pursuing Gonzales’s car. The panel thus remanded the case for further proceedings.
The Court granted the State’s petition for certification. 223 N.J. 164 (2015).
HELD: The Court now excises the inadvertence requirement from the plain-view doctrine. Because it is setting forth a
new rule of law, the Court will apply the reformulated plain-view doctrine prospectively. Nevertheless, the Court holds
that the trial court’s finding of inadvertence is supported by credible evidence in the record. The Court therefore
reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstates the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
1
1. The Court notes that both the New Jersey and Federal Constitutions protect against “unreasonable searches and
seizures” and forbid the issuance of a warrant absent “probable cause.” N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7; see U.S. Const.
amend. IV. Warrantless searches are prohibited unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies such as the
plain-view doctrine, which authorizes an officer to seize evidence or contraband that is in plain view. (pp. 15-16)
2. The United States Supreme Court established the factual predicates necessary to satisfy the plain-view exception
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-72, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2037-41, 29 L. Ed. 2d 695, 582-87 (1984). In
that decision, a plurality of the Court established three requirements for the exception: (1) The officer must be
lawfully in the viewing area when making the observation; (2) the evidence must be discovered inadvertently; and
(3) the incriminating nature of the evidence to be seized must be immediately apparent to the officer. The purpose
of the inadvertence requirement was to ensure that police obtain warrants when they have advance knowledge of
incriminating evidence or contraband subject to seizure. The requirement was never adopted by a majority of the
Court. (pp 16-20)
3. In Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990), the United States Supreme
Court interred the inadvertence requirement as a predicate for a plain-view seizure of evidence. The majority of the
Court found that other aspects of search-and-seizure jurisprudence protect against the concerns that the inadvertence
requirement aimed to address. The Court also rejected the inadvertence requirement because it necessitated a
subjective inquiry into the officer’s state of mind. The Court thus explicitly stated that inadvertence was not a
necessary predicate to a plain-view seizure, a position that a majority of states have since adopted. (pp 20-23)
4. Before Horton was decided, this Court adopted the Coolidge plurality’s formulation of plain view in Bruzzese.
Even in espousing the three-prong plain-view standard, however, the Court expressed the view that the standard of
objective reasonableness governs the validity of a search or seizure. This Court continued to apply the three-part
test in the post-Horton era, but without occasion to assess whether a plain-view seizure would pass muster in the
absence of inadvertence. (pp. 23-26)
5. The Court stresses the preference for objective standards over subjective inquiries in both federal and New Jersey
search-and-seizure jurisprudence. (pp. 27-29)
6. The Court now excises the inadvertence requirement from the plain-view doctrine. The Court finds subjective
inquiry into an officer’s motives to be at odds with the standard of objective reasonableness that applies to a police
officer’s conduct under the New Jersey Constitution. The Court notes that the constitutional limiting principle of the
plain-view doctrine is that the officer must lawfully be in the area where he observed and seized the item, and that it
must be immediately apparent that the seized item is evidence of a crime. Because the Court sets forth a new rule of
law, the Court will apply the reformulated plain-view doctrine prospectively. (pp 29-32)
7. Thus, the Court applies the now-defunct three-part plain-view test to the facts of this case. The Court concludes
that all three parts of the test were met. The motor-vehicle violations gave the officers a reasonable and articulable
suspicion to stop Gonzales’s car, and Officer Perez’s training made the nature of the spilled items “immediately
apparent.” Finally, the trial court’s finding that the discovery was inadvertent was supported by sufficient credible
evidence in the record, and the appellate panel should have deferred to that finding. (pp 32-35)
8. The Court observes that the appellate panel also erred in finding that the police lacked exigent circumstances to
act, stressing that the officers were not required to watch helplessly as Gonzales drove away with what the
authorities reasonably believed was a cache of drugs. Here, again, the plain-view observation of the spilled heroin
provided the basis for the seizure of the contraband. (pp 35-36)
9. The Court provides guidance as to the limits of the plain-view exception and the continuing need to obtain a
warrant when there is sufficient time to do so. (pp 36-37)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the trial court’s denial of the motion to
suppress is REINSTATED. The matter is REMANDED to the Appellate Division for consideration of the
remaining sentencing issue.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA,
SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-5 September Term 2015
075911
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
XIOMARA GONZALES,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued September 12, 2016 – Decided November 15, 2016
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for appellant (Christopher
S. Porrino, Attorney General of New Jersey,
attorney).
Elizabeth C. Jarit argued the cause for
respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
Defender, attorney; Matthew Astore, Deputy
Public Defender, on the letter brief).
Rebecca J. Livengood argued the cause for
amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union
of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal
Director, Ms. Livengood, Mr. Barocas,
Alexander R. Shalom, and Jeanne M. LoCicero,
on the brief).
JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, we must determine the proper scope of the
plain-view exception to the warrant requirement under Article I,
Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution.
In State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 236-38 (1983), cert.
1
denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S. Ct. 1295, 79 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1984),
this Court adopted the plain-view exception as articulated in
the plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971). A warrantless
seizure of evidence in plain view is justified when a police
officer is lawfully in the area where he observed the evidence,
it is “immediately apparent” that the item observed is evidence
of a crime or contraband, and the discovery of the evidence is
inadvertent. Bruzzese, supra, 94 N.J. at 236 (citing Coolidge,
supra, 403 U.S. at 465-68, 470, 91 S. Ct. at 2037-40, 29 L. Ed.
2d at 582-85).
Since our decision in Bruzzese, the United States Supreme
Court in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130, 138-39, 110 S.
Ct. 2301, 2304, 2308-09, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112, 118-19, 124 (1990),
rejected the inadvertence prong of the plain-view exception.
The Court in Horton found that the inadvertence requirement
conflicted with the standard of objective reasonableness that
guides police conduct under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Like federal jurisprudence, our recent state constitutional
decisions have hewed to the view that, in determining the
constitutionality of a seizure, our courts must look to whether
“the search was objectively reasonable.” See State v. Edmonds,
211 N.J. 117, 133 (2012) (quoting Bruzzese, supra, 211 N.J. at
219). Thus, “our Article I, Paragraph 7 jurisprudence primarily
2
has eschewed any consideration of the subjective motivations of
a police officer in determining the constitutionality of a
search or seizure.” Ibid.
In this case, the trial court denied a suppression motion,
determining that the police inadvertently discovered drugs in
plain view during a lawful motor-vehicle stop. A panel of the
Appellate Division reversed and suppressed the evidence. The
panel found that the motor-vehicle stop was constitutional and
the police officer was lawfully in a position to view the drugs
inside the vehicle. The panel, however, concluded that because
the officer had advance knowledge that drugs would be in the
vehicle, the discovery was not inadvertent. On that basis, the
panel determined that the warrantless seizure of the drugs did
not conform to the requirements of the plain-view doctrine under
Bruzzese.
We now hold that the inadvertence requirement for a plain-
view seizure is at odds with the objective-reasonableness
standard that governs our state-law constitutional
jurisprudence. Accordingly, like the United States Supreme
Court in Horton, and most other state courts, we now hold that
an inadvertent discovery of contraband or evidence of a crime is
no longer a predicate for a plain-view seizure. Provided that a
police officer is lawfully in the viewing area and the nature of
the evidence is immediately apparent (and other constitutional
3
prerequisites are met), the evidence may be seized. This
holding is a new rule of law and therefore must be applied
prospectively. Nevertheless, we conclude that the discovery of
the drugs in this case was sufficiently inadvertent to satisfy
the then existing plain-view standard. Accordingly, we reverse
the appellate panel’s suppression order.
I.
A.
Defendant Xiomara Gonzales was charged in a Monmouth County
indictment with first-degree distribution of more than five
ounces of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1); first-degree
possession of heroin with the intent to distribute, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-5(b)(1); third-degree possession of heroin, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-10(a)(1); and second-degree conspiracy to commit
racketeering, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(d).1 The
trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.
Afterwards, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty
to third-degree conspiracy to possess heroin. Defendant was
sentenced to time served -- the 1156 days she had served in jail
from the date of her arrest to the entry of her plea. Defendant
was ordered to pay requisite fines and penalties, and all
1 Defendant was one of many named defendants in this multi-count
indictment, alleging crimes committed between December 31, 2008,
and March 24, 2009.
4
remaining charges were dismissed.
The focus of this appeal is defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence seized by police from the vehicle she was driving on
February 7, 2009. Defendant claims that, after a motor-vehicle
stop, the police conducted a warrantless search of her car in
violation of Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey
Constitution. The Honorable Jamie Perri, J.S.C., presided over
a three-day suppression hearing during which she heard testimony
from Detectives George Snowden and Scott Samis of the Monmouth
County Prosecutor’s Office, and Officer Wilfredo Perez and
Sergeant Johnny Whitaker of the Newark Police Department. The
relevant facts are substantially undisputed; the legal
conclusions to be drawn from those facts, however, are hotly
contested.
The testimony at the motion-to-suppress hearing detailed
the events leading to the stop and search of defendant’s motor
vehicle and her arrest.
B.
In December 2008, the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office
began investigating a drug-distribution scheme involving a
number of individuals, including codefendant Allen Height whose
cell phone the Prosecutor’s Office was wiretapping. Around the
same time, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and
the Newark Police Department were investigating codefendant
5
George Thompson, an owner of an East Orange bodega (grocery
store) on the border of Newark, who was suspected of drug
trafficking.2 While monitoring Height’s cell phone on February
7, 2009, Detective Snowden of the Prosecutor’s Office learned
that Height and an unidentified female -- later revealed to be
defendant -- intended to travel that day to Thompson’s bodega to
pick up a package that the Prosecutor’s Office suspected would
be a large quantity of heroin. The Prosecutor’s Office, the
DEA, and the Newark police coordinated their efforts in staking
out Thompson’s bodega while Detective Snowden continued to
intercept Height’s incoming and outgoing calls.
At about 3:20 p.m., Detective Samis and other members of a
surveillance team positioned themselves outside of the bodega.
In the meantime, Detective Samis made arrangements to maintain
the secrecy of the ongoing wiretap investigation in the event
there was cause to arrest Height or others. Officer Perez and
Detective Thomas of the Newark Police Department were directed
to dress in full uniform and operate a marked patrol vehicle so
that any arrest would appear routine and unplanned.
At 3:54 p.m., a black Chevrolet Impala driven by Height and
a red Toyota Camry driven by defendant, whose identity was still
unknown, parked outside of Thompson’s bodega. Height exited the
2 Height and Thompson were also charged with racketeering and
various other crimes in the multi-count indictment.
6
Impala and entered the bodega carrying a plastic bag while
defendant remained inside her vehicle. Afterwards, a van
occupied by two females pulled up to the bodega, and one of the
women entered the bodega. Meanwhile, the wiretap intercepted a
call between Height and another individual in which the two
discussed in code language narcotics or currency.3 Fifteen
minutes after his arrival, Height, accompanied by the woman,
walked out of the bodega without the bag. He entered his
Impala, and she entered her van.
Height’s Impala, defendant’s Camry, and the van drove in a
convoy for five to ten minutes -- followed by the surveillance
team -- to 256 South 7th Street in Newark, the location of one
of Thompson’s suspected stash houses. There, Height and the two
females from the van entered the house while defendant remained
inside the Camry. Ten to fifteen minutes later, Height departed
from the house carrying two blue shopping bags. He walked to
the Camry, opened its right rear passenger door, and placed the
bags inside. Height then went to the driver’s side of the Camry
and had a brief conversation with defendant. Height returned to
his Impala, and the two drove off with defendant following
3 That individual was later determined to be Jonathan Thomas, who
was charged in the same multi-count indictment in which
defendant was named.
7
Height. At this point, Detective Samis believed that the two
blue bags in defendant’s Camry contained narcotics, based on the
wire intercepts and the surveillance. A stop was not initiated
in front of Thompson’s stash house to avoid compromising the
wide-ranging wiretap investigation that involved other targets.
At 4:34 p.m., Height called defendant and indicated that he
had to return to the stash house, but would lead her to the
Garden State Parkway. During the intercepted call, Height
instructed defendant to go “where you’re safest at, where you
are all the time.”
Detective Samis determined that the wiretap investigation
would be protected by effectuating a routine motor-vehicle stop
and that the packages inside the vehicle would be secured either
by a “search warrant, consent, or a plain view” observation.
Around this time, Officer Perez and Detective Thomas, who were
in uniform and operating a marked Newark patrol vehicle, were
directed to follow defendant. They did so from several car
lengths behind, observing defendant travelling at a speed of
between fifty to fifty-five miles per hour in a twenty-five mile
per hour speed zone. At the intersection of South Orange and
Maybaum Avenues, defendant turned left on a red light. The
officers continued following defendant as she headed toward the
Parkway, all the while remaining in contact with other members
of the surveillance team.
8
At 4:38 p.m., Height called defendant. During their
intercepted conversation, defendant told Height she did not have
the exact change for the toll, and he advised her to go straight
through, beeping her horn first. After defendant passed through
the Parkway’s southbound exact-change toll station without
paying, Officer Perez activated the lights to his patrol unit
and pulled the Camry over on a narrow shoulder of the road. The
surveillance team had advised Officer Perez that two blue
shopping bags had been placed inside the Camry.
As Officer Perez approached the driver’s side of the Camry,
he observed through the rear-view window that some of the
contents of the two blue bags had spilled onto the rear
floorboard. He “immediately identified” the spilled items as
“bricks of heroin.” At this point, defendant was arrested.
Detective Thomas handcuffed defendant and placed her in the
patrol vehicle. Officer Perez then opened the Camry’s rear
door, “gathered up the spilled over bricks of heroin,” and
neatly and tightly put them inside the blue bags, knowing that
the vehicle would be taken to a secure site.
Detective Samis and another officer drove the Camry to a
garage operated by the DEA in Newark. Inside the two blue bags
were 13,500 glassine envelopes totaling 270 bricks of heroin.4
4 Each glassine envelope is known as a deck, and 50 decks equal a
brick.
9
C.
Judge Perri denied the suppression motion, determining
“that the heroin in [defendant’s] vehicle was properly seized,
based upon [Officer] Perez’s plain view observation after a
valid motor vehicle stop.” In reaching that conclusion, Judge
Perri made the following findings. First, Officer Perez and
Detective Thomas “conducted a motor vehicle stop . . . based on
the reasonable and articulable suspicion that [defendant] had
committed numerous traffic infractions,” which included
speeding, disregarding a red light, and failing to pay the
Parkway toll. Second, the plain-view exception to the warrant
requirement justified the warrantless seizure of the heroin
inside the vehicle.
In Judge Perri’s view, the plain-view seizure met the
standard set forth in Bruzzese, supra: Officer Perez was
“lawfully positioned alongside [defendant’s] vehicle, following
a valid motor vehicle stop, when [he] observed what he believed
to be bricks of heroin”; Officer Perez “inadvertently” made his
discovery because, despite his knowledge of an earlier drug
transaction, the heroin had spilled from the bags permitting his
observation; and the incriminating nature of the packaged heroin
was “immediately apparent” to Officer Perez based on his
specialized training and experience in narcotics detection.
Judge Perri therefore upheld the constitutionality of the
10
search.
D.
In an unpublished opinion, a panel of the Appellate
Division reversed the trial court’s denial of the suppression
motion, holding that the seizure of the drugs from defendant’s
car could not be justified based on the plain-view exception.5
Although the panel cited the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, in addition to Article I, Paragraph 7 of
the New Jersey Constitution, as a source of authority, the panel
did not address the fact that in Horton, supra, the United
States Supreme Court expressly stated that the “inadvertent”
discovery of incriminating evidence is not a prerequisite for a
plain-view seizure. Rather, the panel adhered to the Bruzzese
plain-view test, including the inadvertence prong.
According to the panel, the record supported the trial
court’s finding that defendant’s traffic violations provided
Officer Perez with reasonable and articulable suspicion for the
motor-vehicle stop. The panel, however, concluded that Officer
Perez’s discovery of the heroin in defendant’s car did not meet
the inadvertence prong of the plain-view exception. It reached
that conclusion because “the presence of the drugs in
5 Because the appellate panel granted the motion to suppress, it
did not reach defendant’s argument that the sentence imposed was
excessive.
11
defendant’s car was clearly known in advance, and the motor
vehicle stop, as planned, was a pretext to enable police to
seize the narcotics.” The panel determined that the seizure of
the heroin under the plain-view exception “violated defendant’s
rights under the federal and New Jersey Constitutions.”
The panel also found that exigent circumstances did not
justify the search because the police had sufficient time to
secure a warrant while police officers trailed defendant through
the streets of Newark after Height had placed the drugs in her
car. The panel remanded the case for further proceedings in
light of its suppression of the evidence.
We granted the State’s petition for certification. State
v. Gonzales, 223 N.J. 164 (2015). We also granted the motion of
the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU-NJ) to
participate as amicus curiae.
II.
A.
The State urges this Court to align our state-law
constitutional jurisprudence with Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, in particular Horton v. California, supra, which
eliminated the requirement that police must discover
incriminating evidence inadvertently to justify a lawful
warrantless plain-view seizure. The State argues that the
inadvertence requirement necessitates that courts probe the
12
motives and unarticulated suspicions of police officers and
therefore is in conflict with the “objective-reasonableness
test,” which governs search-and-seizure law under Article I,
Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. The State contends
that, so long as a police officer is lawfully in the place where
the plain-view observation is made, it is irrelevant whether the
officer harbored the hope -- the ulterior motive -- of making
the observation. The State asks us to reverse the Appellate
Division on either of two grounds: the police did not have to
discover the drugs inadvertently or, alternatively, the
inadvertence prong was satisfied, as the trial court found.
B.
Defendant maintains that this Court should not abandon the
inadvertence prong of the plain-view exception, which has long
been a part of our state-law jurisprudence, beginning with
Bruzzese, supra. Defendant asserts that the State has failed to
show any special justification for a departure from our
precedents. In defendant’s view, the inadvertence requirement
is consonant with “the true touchstone of New Jersey’s search-
and-seizure law -- when the police have probable cause to
believe that contraband will be at a certain place at a certain
time, they must get a warrant.” Accordingly, defendant submits
that warrantless plain-view seizures are not lawful when the
discovery of the evidence is not inadvertent. Defendant reasons
13
that because the discovery of the drugs in this case was not
inadvertent, the Appellate Division must be affirmed.
C.
Amicus curiae ACLU-NJ encourages this Court not to adopt
the Horton plain-view test, but rather to adhere to our state-
law formulation of the plain-view exception in Bruzzese. The
ACLU-NJ asserts that the Bruzzese plain-view standard is based
on state-constitutional grounds and provides greater protection
to New Jersey’s citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
in the wake of Horton. According to the ACLU-NJ, the
inadvertence requirement has continuing vitality because it
deters pretextual searches -- “planned warrantless searches,
where [the police] know in advance the location of certain
evidence and intend to seize it,” quoting State v. Damplias, 282
N.J. Super. 471, 478-79 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 154
N.J. 607 (1998). The ACLU-NJ posits that abandoning the
inadvertence requirement would offend the doctrine of stare
decisis, noting that this Court employed all three prongs of the
plain-view exception in State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564, 592
(2013). The ACLU-NJ insists that the State has failed to show
that the inadvertence prong is unworkable or is at odds with the
standard of objective reasonableness.
III.
In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision to
14
eliminate the inadvertence requirement as part of the plain-view
exception under the Fourth Amendment, Horton, supra, 496 U.S. at
141-42, 110 S. Ct. at 2310, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 126, we now address
whether the inadvertence prong of the plain-view doctrine has
continuing vitality under our State Constitution. We begin with
a discussion of the constitutional underpinnings of the plain-
view doctrine.
A.
Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, like
its federal counterpart, protects against “unreasonable searches
and seizures” and forbids the issuance of a warrant in the
absence of “probable cause.” N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7; see U.S.
Const. amend. IV. Under our constitutional scheme, the clear
preference is that police officers secure a judicial warrant
before executing a search. Edmonds, supra, 211 N.J. at 129.
For that reason, “a warrantless search is presumptively
invalid.” Id. at 130. To justify a warrantless search, the
State must establish that the search falls into “one of the ‘few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the
warrant requirement.’” Ibid. (quoting State v. Frankel, 179
N.J. 586, 598, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 876, 125 S. Ct. 108, 160
L. Ed. 2d 128 (2004)). One such exception to the warrant
requirement authorizes a police officer to seize evidence or
contraband that is in plain view. Bruzzese, supra, 94 N.J. at
15
235-36. It is the contours of the plain-view exception that are
at issue in this case.
The plain-view exception has long been part of our search-
and-seizure jurisprudence, Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at 465, 91
S. Ct. at 2037, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 582, but not until 1971 did the
United States Supreme Court in Coolidge define in a plurality
opinion, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the factual predicates
necessary to satisfy that exception, see id. at 465-72, 91 S.
Ct. at 2037-41, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 582-87. To understand how the
plurality arrived at the plain-view test in Coolidge, we must
first look to the facts of that case.
The case involved a murder investigation that targeted
Coolidge as the prime suspect. Id. at 445-46, 91 S. Ct. at
2027, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 570-71. Law enforcement authorities
secured from New Hampshire’s Attorney General a warrant to
search Coolidge’s Pontiac automobile, which was believed to have
played a role in the victim’s disappearance. Id. at 447, 91 S.
Ct. at 2028, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 571-72. The Pontiac was parked in
Coolidge’s driveway and “[was] plainly visible both from the
street and from inside the house where Coolidge was actually
arrested.” Id. at 447-48, 91 S. Ct. at 2028, 29 L. Ed. 2d at
572. Two-and-a-half hours after Coolidge’s arrest, the Pontiac
was impounded. Id. at 447, 91 S. Ct. at 2028, 29 L. Ed. 2d at
572. A search of the car uncovered evidence linking Coolidge to
16
the crime. Id. at 448, 91 S. Ct. at 2028, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 572.
The United States Supreme Court first determined that the
warrant did not issue from a neutral and detached magistrate and
therefore was constitutionally invalid. Id. at 449-53, 91 S.
Ct. at 2029-31, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 572-75. Accordingly, the search
of the car could pass muster under the Fourth Amendment only if
the search fit within an exception to the warrant requirement.
Id. at 453, 91 S. Ct. at 2031, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 575. New
Hampshire invoked the plain-view exception as a basis for the
warrantless seizure of the car, claiming that the car was an
instrumentality of the crime. Id. at 464, 91 S. Ct. at 2037, 29
L. Ed. 2d at 581-82.
In an opinion authored by Justice Stewart, a plurality of
the Court articulated three requirements for the plain-view
exception: (1) the officer must be lawfully in the viewing area
when making the observation, see id. at 468, 91 S. Ct. at 2039,
29 L. Ed. 2d at 584; (2) “the discovery of the evidence . . .
must be inadvertent,” id. at 469, 91 S. Ct. at 2040, 29 L. Ed.
2d at 585; and (3) the incriminating nature of the evidence to
be seized must be “immediately apparent to the police,” id. at
466, 91 S. Ct. at 2038, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 583.
The purpose of the inadvertence requirement, in part, was
to acknowledge that “where the discovery is anticipated, where
the police know in advance the location of the evidence and
17
intend to seize it,” the police should secure a valid warrant.
Id. at 470, 91 S. Ct. at 2040, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 585. In other
words, in the absence of exigent circumstances, a warrant was
required to seize the Pontiac. See id. at 471, 91 S. Ct. at
2040-41, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 586. The plain-view seizure of the car
in Coolidge violated the inadvertence prong, and therefore the
Fourth Amendment, because the “police had ample opportunity to
obtain a valid warrant; they knew the automobile’s exact
description and location well in advance; they intended to seize
it when they came upon Coolidge’s property.” Id. at 472, 91 S.
Ct. at 2041, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 586-87.6
In a dissenting opinion, Justice White advanced the
position that “the inadvertence rule is unnecessary to further
any Fourth Amendment ends.” Id. at 517, 91 S. Ct. at 2063, 29
L. Ed. 2d at 613 (White, J., dissenting). In Justice White’s
view, so long as police officers are lawfully in a place --
whether by authority of a warrant or an exception to the warrant
requirement, or the place’s designation as a public area --
“seizure of evidence without a warrant is not itself an invasion
either of personal privacy or of property rights beyond that
already authorized by law.” Id. at 513-15, 91 S. Ct. at 2061-
6 Justice Stewart, however, suggested that a plain-view discovery
of contraband -- even if the discovery were not inadvertent --
might lead to a different outcome. See Coolidge, supra, 403
U.S. at 471-72, 91 S. Ct. at 2041, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 586.
18
63, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 610-12. Justice White reasoned that the
Fourth Amendment does not require officers to “guard [or] ignore
the evidence while a warrant is sought” because “having a
magistrate confirm that what the officer saw with his own eyes
is in fact contraband or evidence of crime are not substantial
constitutional considerations.” Id. at 516, 91 S. Ct. at 2063,
29 L. Ed. 2d at 612. Thus, a police officer authorized by a
warrant to search a home just for a rifle would not have to
secure an additional warrant to seize other evidence of a crime
observed in plain view, even if the observation was not
inadvertent. Ibid.
A majority of the United States Supreme Court never
endorsed the inadvertence prong of the plain-view exception,
even though it was applied in other plurality opinions. In
Texas v. Brown, the Court upheld the seizure of heroin from an
automobile based on the plain-view doctrine as articulated in
Coolidge. 460 U.S. 730, 743-44, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543-44, 75 L.
Ed. 2d 502, 514-15 (1983). Brown involved an automobile stop
during which a police officer, experienced in drug detection,
observed between the driver’s fingers a party balloon that the
officer reasonably believed contained narcotics. Id. at 733-34,
103 S. Ct. at 1539, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 508. The Court clarified
that evidence of a crime is “immediately apparent” under the
plain-view doctrine when the officer possesses “probable cause
19
to associate the property with criminal activity.” Id. at 741-
42, 103 S. Ct. at 1543, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 513 (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587, 100 S. Ct. 1371,
1380, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 651 (1980)). A plurality of the Court
also determined that, “[w]hatever may be the final disposition
of the ‘inadvertence’ element of ‘plain view,’” the discovery of
the heroin was sufficiently inadvertent to justify the seizure
of the heroin. Id. at 743, 103 S. Ct. at 1544, 75 L. Ed. 2d at
514-15 (emphasis added).
In a concurring opinion, Justice White maintained his
disapproval of Coolidge’s requirement “that plain-view seizures
are valid only if the viewing is ‘inadvertent.’” Brown, supra,
460 U.S. at 744, 103 S. Ct. at 1544, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 515 (White,
J., concurring). The plurality’s reference to the uncertain
status of the inadvertence prong set the stage for a future
challenge to the plain-view doctrine.
That challenge came in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,
110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990), where the United
States Supreme Court interred the inadvertence requirement as a
predicate for a plain-view seizure of evidence. In Horton, two
men, one armed with a machine gun and the other with a stun gun,
robbed the victim in his home, stealing cash and jewelry. Id.
at 130, 110 S. Ct. at 2304, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 119. A police
sergeant applied for a search warrant of the defendant’s
20
residence by filing an affidavit, providing probable cause for
the search and describing the weapons and proceeds to be seized.
Id. at 130-31, 110 S. Ct. at 2304, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 119. The
search warrant issued by a magistrate, however, authorized only
a search for the stolen property and not a search for weapons.
Id. at 131, 110 S. Ct. at 2304, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 119. During
the search, the sergeant did not find the proceeds of the
robbery, but he did seize a machine gun, two stun guns, and a
revolver that he observed in plain view -- weapons (other than
the revolver) mentioned in the sergeant’s affidavit. Id. at
131, 110 S. Ct. at 2304-05, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 119. The weapons
were not discovered inadvertently because the sergeant,
according to his testimony, “was interested in finding other
evidence connecting [the defendant] to the robbery.” Id. at
131, 110 S. Ct. at 2305, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 119.
The Court held that inadvertence was not a necessary
component of the plain-view exception. Id. at 141-42, 110 S.
Ct. at 2310, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 126. Writing for the majority,
Justice Stevens explained that protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures did not depend on the inadvertence prong,
which he deemed superfluous to the requirement that a warrant
particularly describe the place to be searched and things to be
seized and the requirement that “a warrantless search be
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.”
21
Id. at 139-40, 110 S. Ct. at 2309, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 124-25.
Horton held that “[s]crupulous adherence to these requirements
serves the interests in limiting the area and duration of the
search” and that once “the officer has a lawful right of access,
. . . no additional Fourth Amendment interest is furthered by
requiring that the discovery of evidence be inadvertent.” Id.
at 140, 110 S. Ct. at 2309-10, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 125.
The Court also took issue with the subjective inquiry that
the inadvertence requirement mandated, explaining that
“evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application
of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that
depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.” Id.
at 138, 110 S. Ct. at 2308-09, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 124. The Court
reasoned that merely because “an officer is interested in an
item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a
search should not invalidate its seizure if the search is
confined in area and duration by the terms of a warrant or a
valid exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 138, 110 S.
Ct. at 2309, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 124. The Horton Court recognized
that although “inadvertence is a characteristic of most
legitimate ‘plain[-]view’ seizures, it is not a necessary
condition” for such seizures. Id. at 130, 110 S. Ct. at 2304,
110 L. Ed. 2d at 118-19.
Since Horton, a majority of states have followed suit and
22
removed the inadvertence requirement from the plain-view
analysis. See, e.g., People v. Kluhsman, 980 P.2d 529, 534 n.6
(Colo. 1999); State v. Ainsworth, 801 P.2d 749, 753 n.9 (Or.
1990); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 662 A.2d 1043, 1049 & n.6 (Pa.
1995); State v. Wright, 706 S.E.2d 324, 327 (S.C. 2011)
(adopting the Horton rule and noting that in doing so it
“join[ed] . . . the majority of states”). But see State v.
Meyer, 893 P.2d 159, 165 n.6 (Haw. 1995); Commonwealth v.
Balicki, 762 N.E.2d 290, 298 (Mass. 2002).
B.
Following Coolidge and Brown, but before the United States
Supreme Court finally set the contours of the plain-view
doctrine in Horton, this Court addressed the plain-view
exception in State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 235-39 (1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S. Ct. 1295, 79 L. Ed. 2d 695
(1984). Recognizing the unsettled state of federal
jurisprudence on the plain-view doctrine at the time, this Court
adopted the Coolidge plurality’s formulation of plain view under
Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. Id. at
237-38.
In Bruzzese, the defendant became a suspect in the burglary
of a commercial establishment, where he had previously worked.
Id. at 213-14. The police uncovered the “distinctive sole
imprint” of a boot on a door that had been kicked in during the
23
burglary. Id. at 213. A criminal records check of the
defendant revealed an outstanding arrest warrant for contempt of
court. Id. at 214. Detective Hicks went to the defendant’s
home for two purposes: to arrest him and question him about the
burglary. Ibid. The defendant was arrested at his home, but
because he was not fully dressed, Detective Hicks and another
officer accompanied him to his bedroom, where the defendant
intended to put on some additional clothes. Id. at 215. Inside
the bedroom, Detective Hicks noticed a pair of boots and
examined the soles, which corresponded to the distinctive print
left at the burglary scene. Ibid. The trial court suppressed
the boots, and the Appellate Division affirmed, stating that
“the observation and seizure of the boots . . . were in fact
pretextual and arbitrary,” in violation of our Federal and State
Constitutions. Id. at 219.
This Court reversed and held that Detective Hicks’s seizure
of the boots met the plain-view exception articulated in Brown
and Coolidge. Id. at 235-39. We adopted the Coolidge/Brown
formulation as the governing standard under Article I, Paragraph
7 of our State Constitution. Id. at 236-38.
We stated “that the proper inquiry for determining the
constitutionality of a search-and-seizure is whether the conduct
of the law enforcement officer who undertook the search was
objectively reasonable, without regard to [the officer’s]
24
underlying motives or intent.” Id. at 219. We declined “to
engage in a costly and time-consuming expedition into the state
of mind of the searching officer.” Id. at 221. We expressed
confidence that, in the long run, “the objective standard will
protect the privacy of our citizens and prevent the police from
exercising merely pretextual searches.” Id. at 225.
The Court determined that the three-prong plain-view
standard was satisfied.7 Id. at 235-39. Specifically, the Court
found that “[Detective] Hicks discovered the boots
inadvertently.” Id. at 238. In making that finding, however,
the tension between the earlier espoused objective standard and
the seemingly subjective nature of the inadvertence requirement
was revealed. In rejecting the challenge to the inadvertence
prong, the Court stated that “[t]he ‘hope’ nestled in the back
of Detective Hicks’s mind that he might learn something about
the burglary in the course of defendant’s arrest does not defeat
the notion that his discovery of the boots was an inadvertent
fortuity.” Id. at 238. Clearly, if an objective standard
governed, and Detective Hicks’s subjective motives were
irrelevant to the inquiry, then no concern would have been
expressed about the particular thoughts Detective Hicks may have
7 The Court also concluded that Detective Hicks had a lawful
basis for accompanying the arrested defendant to his bedroom.
Bruzzese, supra, 94 N.J. at 230-35.
25
harbored.
In the post-Horton era, we continued to apply the three-
prong plain-view test. See Earls, supra, 214 N.J. at 592; State
v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 340-41 (2010). But, importantly, in each
case we concluded that the inadvertence prong was met, and
therefore we had no occasion to address whether a plain-view
seizure would pass muster in the absence of inadvertence.
Earls, supra, 214 N.J. at 592; Mann, supra, 203 N.J. at 340-41.
However, in State v. Johnson, we commented “that whatever
remains of the ‘inadvertence’ requirement of plain view since
Horton was satisfied in this case because the police officers
did not know in advance that evidence would be found.” 171 N.J.
192, 213 (2002) (emphasis added).
In the case before us, the issue is clearly joined. The
Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s denial of the
suppression motion precisely because the State failed to
establish that the plain-view seizure of the drugs occurred
inadvertently. We granted certification to decide whether the
inadvertence requirement has continuing viability under our
state-constitutional jurisprudence.
We next discuss one of the central principles undergirding
both Article I, Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment -- the notion that the reasonableness of a
search or seizure is governed by an objective standard.
26
IV.
The United States Supreme Court has long held that the
reasonableness of a police action under the Fourth Amendment is
viewed objectively, based on the circumstances of the particular
search or seizure, “regardless of the individual officer’s state
of mind.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404, 126 S. Ct.
1943, 1948, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650, 658 (2006); Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L. Ed. 2d
168, 178 (1978) (“[T]he fact that the officer does not have the
state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide
the legal justification for the officer’s action does not
invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify that action.”). The Supreme Court has made
clear that an officer’s motives are not to be taken into account
in analyzing the reasonableness of a search or seizure,
asserting that “[a]n officer’s evil intentions will not make a
Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use
of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an
objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.” Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L. Ed.
2d 443, 456 (1989).
This Court in Bruzzese, supra, expressly adopted the United
States Supreme Court’s “objective approach” to analyzing the
reasonableness of searches and seizures, 94 N.J. at 220-21, and
27
specifically rejected the “pretext approach” advocated by the
Bruzzese dissent, see id. at 244-53 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
We have primarily “eschewed any consideration of the subjective
motivations of a police officer in determining the
constitutionality of a search or seizure” under Article I,
Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution. Edmonds, supra, 211 N.J.
at 133; see also State v. O’Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 614 (2007)
(finding that search of defendant, whether immediately before or
after arrest, was “objectively reasonable” because officers had
probable cause to arrest).
Just four years ago in Edmonds, supra, we refined our
analysis of the emergency aid exception to the warrant
requirement, which in Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 600, allowed
for an analysis of a police officer’s motives in determining the
validity of the search. 211 N.J. at 133. In Edmonds, we
eliminated the factor that permitted an inquiry into the
subjective motives of the officer rendering emergency-aid
because, under our state-constitutional jurisprudence, delving
into “the subjective motivation of the officer [is not] a
legitimate consideration in our search-and-seizure analysis.”
Ibid. (citing O’Neal, supra, 190 N.J. at 613-14). We recognized
that “the elusive attempt to plumb the subjective motivations of
an officer will [not] meaningfully advance either the privacy
interests of an individual or the ultimate determination of
28
whether a particular search or seizure was unreasonable under
state law.” Ibid.
Whether a police officer made an inadvertent discovery
under the plain-view doctrine is a subjective inquiry. See
Horton, supra, 496 U.S. at 138, 110 S. Ct. at 2308-09, 110 L.
Ed. 2d at 124 (finding Coolidge plain-view test flawed because
it “depend[s] upon the subjective state of mind of the
officer”); Damplias, supra, 282 N.J. Super. at 478-79 (“[T]he
purpose of the requirement is to prevent warrantless pretextual
searches and seizures.”). Indeed, the appellate panel in this
case found that the inadvertence prong was not met because of
the subjective motivations of the police: “[T]he presence of
the drugs in [the] defendant’s car was clearly known in advance,
and the motor vehicle stop, as planned, was a pretext to enable
police to seize the narcotics.”
V.
Our federal- and state-constitutional jurisprudence are
squarely aligned in applying the standard of objective
reasonableness in analyzing whether a search or seizure violates
constitutional norms. We now reject the inadvertence prong of
the plain-view doctrine because it requires an inquiry into a
police officer’s motives and therefore is at odds with the
standard of objective reasonableness that governs our analysis
of a police officer’s conduct under Article I, Paragraph 7 of
29
our State Constitution.
We agree with the reasoning of Justice Stevens in Horton,
supra, that faithful adherence to the dictates of the warrant
requirement and to the limiting principles in the well-
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement will better
advance the twin goals of evenhanded law enforcement and
protecting the individual against unreasonable searches and
seizures. See 496 U.S. at 138-40, 110 S. Ct. at 2308-10, 110 L.
Ed. 2d at 124-25.
The requirement that a warrant particularly describe the
place to be searched and the items to be seized -- not the
inadvertence rule -- circumscribes the places where a police
officer may look for evidence. See id. at 139-40, 110 S. Ct. at
2309-10, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 125. Likewise, the exigencies that
give rise to exceptions to the warrant requirement -- not the
inadvertence rule -- limit the scope of a search. See id. at
139-40, 110 S. Ct. at 2309, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 125. For example,
under the emergency-aid doctrine, “[a] police officer entering a
home looking for a person injured or in danger may not expand
the scope of the search by peering into drawers, cupboards, or
wastepaper baskets.” Edmonds, supra, 211 N.J. at 134
(alteration in original) (quoting Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at
599).
It makes little sense that, in a murder investigation, a
30
police officer armed with a warrant to search a home for a knife
should ignore a rifle lawfully observed in plain view that is
clearly linked to the murder. The whole notion of the plain-
view doctrine is that, under such circumstances, the officer
does not have to secure a separate warrant from a judge to
confirm what he has seen with his own eyes.8 The same reasoning
applies to warrantless searches that are permissible under our
federal and state constitutions. A police officer lawfully
entering a home under the emergency-aid doctrine in response to
an ongoing domestic-violence incident is not obliged to ignore
bales of marijuana in plain sight even if he knew the homeowner
was a drug dealer.
Under the plain-view doctrine, the constitutional limiting
principle is that the officer must lawfully be in the area where
he observed and seized the incriminating item or contraband, and
it must be immediately apparent that the seized item is evidence
of a crime.
We acknowledge that, in rejecting the inadvertence prong as
a component of the plain-view exception as articulated in
Bruzzese, we are setting forth a new rule of law. We therefore
8 As Justice Stevens noted in Horton, supra, an officer with
probable cause that an incriminating item is likely to be found
during a search will have no reason purposely to withhold that
information in a warrant application. See 496 U.S. at 138, 110
S. Ct. at 2309, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 124.
31
apply the reformulated plain-view doctrine prospectively. State
v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 449-50 (2015) (prospectively applying
excision of “exigency” requirement from automobile exception to
warrant requirement “because to do otherwise would be unfair and
potentially offend constitutional principles that bar the
imposition of an ‘ex post facto law’” (citation omitted)).
Accordingly, we must analyze whether the seizure of the heroin
in this case satisfied the inadvertence requirement of the
plain-view doctrine.
VI.
A.
We begin with our standard of review. Appellate review of
a motion judge’s factual findings in a suppression hearing is
highly deferential. State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015).
We are obliged to uphold the motion judge’s factual findings so
long as sufficient credible evidence in the record supports
those findings. State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243-44 (2007).
Those factual findings are entitled to deference because the
motion judge, unlike an appellate court, has the “opportunity to
hear and see the witnesses and to have the ‘feel’ of the case,
which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.” State v. Johnson, 42
N.J. 146, 161 (1964).
Judge Perri presided over a three-day suppression hearing,
during which four witnesses testified. The relevant testimony
32
is largely undisputed. Based on wiretap intercepts of
codefendant Height’s cell phone, law enforcement authorities
staked out codefendant Thompson’s East Orange bodega, where
Height was expected to pick up a large quantity of drugs. The
monitoring of Height’s cell phone also revealed that a woman --
later identified as defendant -- would accompany Height. Height
and defendant arrived in two separate cars at the bodega.
Height entered the bodega alone carrying a bag and left carrying
nothing. He and defendant then drove in separate cars to
Thompson’s Newark stash house, which Height entered alone.
Height exited carrying two bags, which he placed in the rear of
defendant’s car.
At this point, the law enforcement authorities had reason
to believe, based on the wiretap intercepts and the
surveillance, that the two bags carried drugs. An arrest at
that time, however, would have compromised the ongoing
investigation, and therefore the authorities decided to
effectuate a routine motor-vehicle stop. The plan was to secure
the bags by way of a search warrant, consent, or a plain-view
observation.
Defendant drove off separately from Height. Newark police
officers, following defendant, observed her make three motor-
vehicle violations: speeding, turning left on a red light, and
failing to pay the Garden State Parkway toll. The officers then
33
pulled defendant over as she entered the Parkway in a congested
area of the roadway. One of the officers observed in plain view
decks of heroin spilled from the bags in the rear of the car.
The officers seized the drugs, and the vehicle was taken to a
DEA garage. Judge Perri determined that the seizure met the
plain-view doctrine.
Judge Perri found, and the appellate panel agreed, that the
officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify
the stop of defendant’s car on the basis of the motor-vehicle
violations. Judge Perri also found, and the appellate panel
agreed, that the officer, from his lawful position outside the
car, observed the decks of heroin and that, from the officer’s
years of specialized training and experience, the nature of the
drugs was immediately apparent to him. Unlike the appellate
panel, Judge Perri concluded that that the police discovered the
evidence inadvertently. She determined that “[a]lthough [the
officer] had been advised that it was suspected that a drug
transaction had taken place, it was only when he approached the
vehicle that he viewed the suspected heroin, which had spilled
from the bags[.]” In other words, the officer could not have
reasonably predicted that the contents of the bags would be
revealed to his plain sight. Had the decks of heroin not
spilled from the bags, the plan –- according to Detective Samis
–- was to seek consent or a warrant to search the car. The
34
officer was not required to avert his eyes from the sight of the
drugs that unexpectedly had fallen from the bags. Once the
officer observed the spilled heroin in the rear of the car, the
plain-view exception to the warrant requirement permitted the
seizure of the drugs. See Mann, supra, 203 N.J. at 341
(upholding seizure of drugs from backseat of vehicle based on
plain-view exception to warrant requirement). Judge Perri’s
finding of inadvertence is supported by sufficient credible
evidence in the record.
The appellate panel failed to afford proper deference to
that finding. Although the panel resolved that the officers
lawfully stopped defendant’s car based on the motor-vehicle
violations, the panel also characterized the stop as pretextual
in concluding that the discovery of the drugs was not
inadvertent. These conflicting findings illustrate the dilemma
of having a standard of objective reasonableness side-by-side
with a test that pries into an officer’s motives. The panel
also clearly erred in concluding that the plain-view standard
violated federal law because Horton, supra, does not require an
inadvertent discovery.
Last, we do not agree with the panel’s finding that police
lacked exigent circumstances to act because time allowed for the
securing of a search warrant. We realize that this issue is not
germane to the outcome of this case because, as Judge Perri
35
found, the valid motor-vehicle stop gave the officers the lawful
opportunity to make the plain-view observation. Nevertheless,
we note that less than one-half hour passed from the moment the
police observed the suspected drug-filled bags placed into
defendant’s car until the motor-vehicle stop -- hardly enough
time to obtain a warrant while police officers trailed
defendant’s vehicle through the streets of Newark. Even had
defendant not violated our motor-vehicle laws, the officers were
not required to watch helplessly as defendant drove away with
what the authorities reasonably believed was a cache of drugs.
Nevertheless, the officers’ reasonable and articulable
basis in stopping the car did not authorize a search of the
vehicle absent a warrant or an exception to the warrant
requirement. Here again, the plain-view observation of the
spilled heroin provided the basis for the seizure of the
contraband. See Mann, supra, 203 N.J. at 341.
In summary, a standard of objective reasonableness governs
the validity of searches and seizures under both our Federal and
State Constitutions. An objectively reasonable search or
seizure is constitutional despite an officer’s questionable
motives, and an objectively unreasonable search or seizure
cannot be saved despite an officer’s unimpeachable motives.
B.
We conclude with two final points. Plain view, in most
36
instances, will not be the sole justification for a seizure of
evidence because police must always have a lawful reason to be
in the area where the evidence is found. Thus, when necessary,
the police will also be required to comply with the warrant
requirement or one of the well-delineated exceptions to that
requirement.
Moreover, the warrantless seizure of the parked car from
the driveway in Coolidge would not be permissible under our
state-law jurisprudence because the police had sufficient time -
- days -- to secure a valid warrant. In Witt, supra, we
specifically noted that, in the case of a car suspected of
containing drugs parked in a driveway, “if the circumstances
giving rise to probable cause were foreseeable and not
spontaneous, the warrant requirement applies.” 223 N.J. at 448.
In short, when the police have sufficient time to secure a
warrant, they must do so.
VII.
For the reasons expressed, we reverse the judgment of the
Appellate Division suppressing the evidence. The motion court’s
denial of the motion to suppress is reinstated. We remand to
the Appellate Division for consideration of the remaining
sentencing issue.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON,
FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s
opinion.
37