People v. Macabeo , 1 Cal. 5th 1206 ( 2016 )


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  • Filed 12/5/16
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
    THE PEOPLE,                          )
    )
    Plaintiff and Respondent, )
    )                            S221852
    v.                        )
    )                      Ct.App. 2/5 B248316
    PAUL MACABEO,                        )
    )                      Los Angeles County
    Defendant and Appellant.  )                    Super. Ct. No. YA084963
    ____________________________________)
    In People v. Diaz (2011) 
    51 Cal. 4th 84
    (Diaz), we held that, incident to a
    custodial arrest, police may search through data on a defendant‟s cellular phone
    without obtaining a warrant. The United States Supreme Court subsequently held
    to the contrary in Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. __ [
    134 S. Ct. 2473
    ] (Riley).
    We conclude the warrantless search of defendant Paul Macabeo‟s phone would
    not have been proper even under our decision in Diaz, and a reasonably well-
    trained officer would have so known. Under these circumstances, the search
    violated the Fourth Amendment and the good faith exception to the exclusionary
    rule does not apply. We reverse the Court of Appeal‟s contrary judgment.
    1
    I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE1
    Detective Hayes and Officer Raymond of the Torrance Police Department
    were on routine patrol at 1:40 a.m. in a dark, residential neighborhood. When they
    saw defendant on a bicycle 20 feet ahead of them, there were few, if any, cars on
    the street. Defendant was not riding erratically, nor did he appear to be trying to
    evade them. Following with their headlights off for a distance of 50 to 75 feet,
    they saw him approach an intersection and roll through a stop sign, an infraction
    under Vehicle Code section 22450. The officers activated their overhead lights
    and stopped him.
    Hayes initially spoke to defendant as he stood astride his bicycle. He asked
    defendant‟s name, where he was coming from and where he was going, whether
    he was on probation, for what offense, when he would be discharged, when he had
    last been arrested, and the name of his probation officer. No mention was made of
    the traffic infraction. Defendant answered all the questions without objection. His
    statements about his probationary status were somewhat confused. He initially
    said that he was on probation for possession of a controlled substance. When
    asked when he would be discharged from probation, he replied he was not sure,
    then reported his case had already been dismissed and he had no probation officer.
    The officers did not check to see if he was actually on probation, or whether any
    probation he might have been on included a search condition.
    Hayes told defendant to walk toward the police car, put his hands up, and
    spread his feet. Defendant told the officers he had nothing illegal on his person.
    Hayes then asked if defendant had “any problem with me taking stuff out of your
    1     The facts set out are based on the testimony given in connection with the
    defense motion to suppress and the transcript of a recording made during Mr.
    Macabeo‟s detention.
    2
    pockets,” and defendant said “go ahead.” Hayes removed a number of items,
    including defendant‟s phone. Hayes continued the questioning, asking when
    defendant had last used drugs, how he had ingested them, whether he possessed
    any needles, or had any outstanding warrants or unpaid parking tickets. Hayes
    asked who he lived with, whether he was working, how he supported himself, and
    what else he had ever been arrested for. Defendant was then told to sit down on
    the curb with his ankles crossed. Hayes told him that he was going to check “that
    you‟re being honest with me tonight,” and asked where he had gotten the bike.
    Told the bike belonged to defendant‟s girlfriend, Hayes asked for the girlfriend‟s
    name and address.
    Hayes directed defendant to take his shoes off one at a time and hand each
    over to him. Finally, after what the transcript described as a “long silence,”
    defendant was told to put his hands on his head. Defendant asked twice if he was
    being arrested. Hayes replied, “I‟ll explain everything in a second. Do not stand
    up; you don‟t want to do that,” whereupon the recording ends.
    At the suppression hearing, Hayes characterized the interrogation as “just
    basic questions that I usually ask on a stop.” He said that before asking to empty
    Mr. Macabeo‟s pockets, he had conducted a patdown search because defendant
    was acting “fidgety.” He did not testify that the patdown revealed anything
    suspicious. After taking defendant‟s phone, Hayes gave it to Officer Raymond.
    Defendant was never asked for permission to activate the phone or examine its
    contents. After five to 10 minutes, Raymond told Hayes that he had found no
    suspicious text messages on defendant‟s phone, but that the picture folder
    contained images of underaged girls. Defendant was then arrested. The parties
    stipulated that possession of the photos was a violation of Penal Code section
    311.11, subdivision (a).
    3
    Hayes repeatedly testified that he based his decision to search Mr. Macabeo
    on defendant‟s probationary status and on his belief that defendant‟s consent to
    remove items from his pockets constituted consent to examine the contents of the
    seized phone. Hayes admitted that after defendant was arrested, he checked the
    computer in his patrol car and learned that defendant had not been on probation for
    several months.
    At the preliminary hearing, defendant moved to suppress the evidence
    found on his phone, arguing the search resulted from an unduly prolonged and
    unjustified detention. The trial court denied the motion, accepting the prosecutor‟s
    argument that because defendant could have been arrested for failing to stop at a
    stop sign, he was lawfully searched incident to arrest, justifying the phone search
    under the existing authority of 
    Diaz, supra
    , 
    51 Cal. 4th 84
    .
    The Court of Appeal affirmed. Although it acknowledged that Diaz‟s
    reasoning was subsequently repudiated in 
    Riley, supra
    , 573 U.S. __ [
    134 S. Ct. 2473
    ], the court concluded the good faith exception applied because Diaz was
    controlling law at the time and officers could reasonably rely on it to justify the
    search.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Search Incident to Arrest
    “In California, issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from
    governmental searches and seizures are reviewed under federal constitutional
    standards.” (People v. Troyer (2011) 
    51 Cal. 4th 599
    , 605; see Robey v. Superior
    Court (2013) 
    56 Cal. 4th 1218
    , 1223.) “ „ “We defer to the trial court‟s factual
    findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In
    determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable
    under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.” ‟ ”
    4
    (People v. Suff (2014) 
    58 Cal. 4th 1013
    , 1053; see People v. Tully (2012) 
    54 Cal. 4th 952
    , 979.)
    “The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits unreasonable
    searches and seizures.” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 
    60 Cal. 4th 335
    , 365.) “ „[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
    “reasonableness.” ‟ [Citation.] Our cases have determined that „[w]here a search
    is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal
    wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial
    warrant.‟ ” (
    Riley, supra
    , 573 U.S. at p. __ [134 S.Ct. at p. 2482], quoting
    Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton (1995) 
    515 U.S. 646
    , 653.) “In the absence of
    a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the
    warrant requirement.” (Riley, at p. __ [134 S.Ct. at p. 2482].) The burden is on
    the People to establish an exception applies. (Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971)
    
    403 U.S. 443
    , 455; People v. Schmitz (2012) 
    55 Cal. 4th 909
    , 933.)
    One such exception is a search incident to lawful arrest. In United States v.
    Robinson (1973) 
    414 U.S. 218
    , 224 (Robinson), the high court noted the exception
    is well settled and “no doubt has been expressed as to the unqualified authority of
    the arresting authority to search the person of the arrestee.” (Id. at p. 225.)
    Robinson rejected the argument that a search incident to arrest must be justified on
    a case-by-case basis: “The authority to search the person incident to a lawful
    custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence,
    does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a
    particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon
    the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause
    is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful,
    a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of
    the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the
    5
    case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception
    to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a „reasonable‟
    search under that Amendment.” (Id. at p. 235.) Robinson concluded that,
    “[h]aving in the course of a lawful search come upon the crumpled package of
    cigarettes, [the officer] was entitled to inspect it; and when his inspection revealed
    the heroin capsules, he was entitled to seize them as „fruits, instrumentalities, or
    contraband‟ probative of criminal conduct.” (Id. at p. 236.)
    United States v. Edwards (1974) 
    415 U.S. 800
    (Edwards) held police could
    seize the defendant‟s clothing and conduct tests for evidence incident to an arrest
    that had occurred 10 hours earlier. Edwards noted officers were authorized to
    seize the defendant‟s clothing immediately upon arrest, but they delayed because
    “it was late at night; no substitute clothing was then available.” (Id. at p. 805.)
    Edwards reasoned: “This was no more than taking from respondent the effects in
    his immediate possession that constituted evidence of crime. This was and is a
    normal incident of a custodial arrest, and reasonable delay in effectuating it does
    not change the fact that Edwards was no more imposed upon than he could have
    been at the time and place of the arrest or immediately upon arrival at the place of
    detention.” (Ibid.)
    A search incident to arrest “has traditionally been justified by the
    reasonableness of searching for weapons, instruments of escape, and evidence of
    crime when a person is taken into official custody and lawfully detained.”
    
    (Edwards, supra
    , 415 U.S. at pp. 802-803.) It is the fact of the arrest that justifies
    the search. An officer need not have particularized cause to believe an arrestee is
    actually armed or possesses contraband in order to search him. (See Gustafson v.
    Florida (1973) 
    414 U.S. 260
    , 266; 
    Robinson, supra
    , 414 U.S. at p. 236.)
    The exception has its limits, however. In United States v. Chadwick (1977)
    
    433 U.S. 1
    , the court held that, without a warrant, officers could not search a 200-
    6
    pound footlocker the defendants were transporting at the time of their arrest.
    Chadwick reasoned the usual justifications for searches incident to arrest did not
    apply once officers have taken an arrestee‟s property away from him and into their
    exclusive control because “there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might
    gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence.” (Id. at p. 15.)
    Accordingly, a search of that property could not be justified as incident to the
    arrest. Similarly, Chimel v. California (1969) 
    395 U.S. 752
    , 768 concluded that a
    search of an entire house incident to an arrest occurring inside “went far beyond
    the petitioner‟s person and the area from within which he might have obtained
    either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him.”
    In Diaz, we applied the high court‟s precedents to conclude that officers
    could conduct a warrantless search of the defendant‟s phone, which had been
    taken from him when he was arrested 90 minutes earlier. Diaz held that because
    the phone “was immediately associated with defendant‟s person, [the officer] was
    „entitled to inspect‟ its contents without a warrant . . . whether or not an exigency
    existed.” (
    Diaz, supra
    , 51 Cal.4th at p. 93.)
    In Riley, the high court concluded differently: “[W]e generally determine
    whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement „by
    assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual‟s
    privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
    legitimate governmental interests.‟ ” (
    Riley, supra
    , 573 U.S. at p. __ [134 S.Ct. at
    p. 2484].) Applying this balancing test, Riley observed that the ordinary
    justifications for searches incident to arrest are to secure weapons, prevent escape,
    and preserve evidence of crime. These apply with less force in the context of cell
    phone data. With respect to officer safety, “[o]nce an officer has secured a phone
    and eliminated any potential physical threats . . . data on the phone can endanger
    no one.” (Id. at p. __ [134 S.Ct. at p. 2485].) While phone data might reveal that
    7
    “confederates of the arrestee are headed to the scene” (ibid.), such a consideration
    “represent[s] a broadening of Chimel‟s concern that an arrestee himself might grab
    a weapon and use it against an officer „to resist arrest or effect his escape‟ ” (
    id. at p.
    __ [134 S.Ct. at p. 2486]). Regarding preservation of evidence, Riley noted the
    possibility that data might be remotely erased or automatically encrypted turns on
    the actions of third parties or functions of a phone‟s security features. (Ibid.) The
    Riley court concluded there was little reason to believe that either erasure or
    encryption is common and suggested police could prevent both by shutting the
    phone off or placing it “in an enclosure that isolates the phone from radio waves.”
    (Id. at p. __ [134 S.Ct. at p. 2487].)
    Riley contrasted the government‟s interests with the heightened privacy
    interests that people have in their cell phone data. Likening these phones to
    “minicomputers” (
    Riley, supra
    , 573 U.S. at p. __ [134 S.Ct. at p. 2489]), Riley
    noted both the volume of sensitive data they contain and the pervasiveness of cell
    phone usage. Riley also observed that cell phone data was “also qualitatively
    different” (
    id. at p.
    __ [134 S.Ct. at p. 2490]) from physical records. It could
    include information, like location data or Internet browsing history, that would
    “typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a
    house.” (Id. at p. __ [134 S.Ct. at p. 2491].) The court was careful to note that in
    any specific case where officer safety or evidence might be compromised, the
    exigent circumstances exception would still apply. (Id. at p. __ [134 S.Ct. at p.
    2494].) Riley concluded: “Modern cell phones are not just another technological
    convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many
    Americans „the privacies of life,‟ [citation]. The fact that technology now allows
    an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information
    any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer to
    the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident
    8
    to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.” (Id. at p. __ [134 S.Ct. at pp.
    2494-2495].)
    Riley concluded that, in the case of cell phone data, the limitation of
    Chadwick should apply. (
    Riley, supra
    , 573 U.S. at p. __ [134 S.Ct. at p. 2489].)
    Just as the contents of a seized footlocker posed no threat to officers who had
    secured it, and there was no danger its contents could be destroyed, Riley‟s cell
    phone data posed no danger and reasonable steps could be taken to prevent
    evidence destruction. Accordingly, because the factors that support the search-
    incident exception were significantly reduced, in light of the heightened privacy
    interest involved, the general warrant requirement applied.
    The warrantless examination of the contents of defendant‟s cell phone here
    ran afoul of Riley. Even before Riley, however, the search here would not have
    qualified as a proper search incident to arrest under Diaz. The People
    acknowledge that the present case is distinguishable from Diaz where we upheld
    the search as incident to an actual custodial arrest. Diaz was properly taken into
    custody and brought to the sheriff‟s station, where his cell phone was taken and
    eventually searched. (
    Diaz, supra
    , 51 Cal.4th at p. 89.) We applied the reasoning
    of Robinson, Edwards, and Chadwick, all of which involved searches incident to
    an actual arrest. Indeed, Robinson and Edwards emphasized that the authority to
    search derived from taking a defendant into custody. “It is the fact of the lawful
    arrest which establishes the authority to search” (
    Robinson, supra
    , 414 U.S. at p.
    235), and such searches have “traditionally been justified by the reasonableness of
    searching for weapons, instruments of escape, and evidence of crime when a
    person is taken into official custody and lawfully detained” 
    (Edwards, supra
    , 415
    U.S. at pp. 802-803). As a second point of distinction, the Diaz arrest was
    supported by probable cause independent of any information subsequently
    discovered on the defendant‟s phone.
    9
    Unlike Diaz, Mr. Macabeo was not under arrest when officers searched his
    phone. Despite this fact, the People urge that the officers could have arrested
    defendant for failing to stop his bicycle at a stop sign, and then searched his phone
    incident to that arrest in reliance on Diaz. For this proposition, the People rely on
    Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980) 
    448 U.S. 98
    (Rawlings). There, officers entered a
    home to serve an arrest warrant. Although the subject of the warrant was absent,
    there were several occupants in the residence, including Rawlings and his
    companion Vanessa Cox. While inside, the officers smelled marijuana smoke and
    saw some marijuana seeds. They detained the occupants 45 minutes while a
    search warrant was obtained. Based on the warrant, officers asked Cox to empty
    the contents of her purse. She did so, revealing 1,800 LSD tablets and vials of
    other drugs. Cox told Rawlings to “ „take what was his‟ ” and he admitted the
    drugs belonged to him. Officers then searched Rawlings and found $4,500 in cash
    and a knife. He was subsequently arrested. (Id. at pp. 100-101.)
    As relevant here, the court assumed the initial detention of Rawlings and
    the other occupants was improper. Even so, it concluded his admission to owning
    the drugs was not the product of that illegal detention. Instead, because of various
    factors, including that all occupants had been read their Miranda rights before the
    search of Cox‟s purse, his admissions were “acts of free will, unaffected by any
    illegality in the initial detention.” 
    (Rawlings, supra
    , 448 U.S. at p. 110.) The
    court went on to uphold the search of Rawlings‟s person because his statements
    provided probable cause for his arrest. It observed, without further elaboration,
    “Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of
    petitioner‟s person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search
    preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.” (Id. at p. 111.) The court took care to
    note that the “fruits of the search of petitioner‟s person were, of course, not
    necessary to support probable cause to arrest petitioner.” (Id. at p. 111, fn. 6.)
    10
    The People read far too much into the Rawlings comment about the order in
    which discovery of probable cause is made and the effectuation of a formal arrest
    takes place. In Rawlings, the court concluded there was probable cause to arrest
    based on his voluntary statements made before any search of his person.
    
    (Rawlings, supra
    , 448 U.S. at p. 111.) Rawlings merely established that when an
    arrest is supported by probable cause, after-acquired evidence need not be
    suppressed because an otherwise properly supported arrest was subsequently made
    formal.
    Furthermore, Rawlings is not the only high court case to speak in this area.
    Indeed, the People‟s expansive understanding of Rawlings, that probable cause to
    arrest will always justify a search incident so long as an arrest follows, is
    inconsistent with Chimel and Chadwick. It is also in tension with the reasoning in
    Knowles v. Iowa (1998) 
    525 U.S. 113
    (Knowles). There, the defendant was
    stopped for speeding. Iowa law authorized police either to take into custody
    anyone committing a traffic violation or, alternatively, to issue a citation. The
    officer chose to issue Knowles a citation in lieu of arrest. He then searched
    Knowles‟s car, found drugs, and arrested him. (Id. at p. 114.) In upholding the
    search, the Iowa Supreme Court relied upon an Iowa statute providing that “the
    issuance of a citation in lieu of an arrest „does not affect the officer‟s authority to
    conduct an otherwise lawful search,‟ ” interpreting this statute to allow a search
    incident to citation. (Id. at p. 115.)
    The high court reversed, finding the lack of a custodial arrest significant. It
    reasoned the two primary justifications for incident searches, disarming an arrestee
    and preserving evidence, did not justify the search of Knowles. 
    (Knowles, supra
    ,
    525 U.S. at p. 116.) Knowles opined that “[t]he threat to officer safety from
    issuing a traffic citation . . . is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial
    arrest” (
    id. at p.
    117) and “while the concern for officer safety in this context may
    11
    justify the „minimal‟ additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out
    of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion
    attending a full field-type search” (ibid.). Similarly with respect to evidence
    preservation, Knowles reasoned that “[o]nce Knowles was stopped for speeding
    and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been
    obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on
    the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car.” (Id. at p.
    118.)
    Knowles was distinguished in Virginia v. Moore (2008) 
    553 U.S. 164
    (Moore). Officers arrested Moore for driving with a suspended license, searched
    him, and found drugs. However, Virginia only authorized issuance of a citation,
    not an arrest, for driving with a suspended license. (Id. at p. 167.) The Virginia
    Supreme Court held that because state law did not authorize an arrest, the officers
    could not rely on that arrest to justify their search. (Id. at p. 168.)
    The high court reversed. It concluded that, state law notwithstanding, both
    the arrest and search were permissible under federal Fourth Amendment
    jurisprudence. “[W]e have said that when an officer has probable cause to believe
    a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancing of private
    and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally reasonable.”
    
    (Moore, supra
    , 553 U.S. at p. 171.) This constitutional principle applies even
    “when a State chooses to protect privacy beyond the level that the Fourth
    Amendment requires.” (Ibid.; see 
    id. at p.
    174.)
    With respect to the search, Moore distinguished 
    Knowles, supra
    , 
    525 U.S. 113
    : “The interests justifying search are present whenever an officer makes an
    arrest. A search enables officers to safeguard evidence, and, most critically, to
    ensure their safety during „the extended exposure which follows the taking of a
    suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station.‟ [Citation.]
    12
    Officers issuing citations do not face the same danger, and we therefore held in
    Knowles . . . that they do not have the same authority to search. We cannot agree
    with the Virginia Supreme Court that Knowles controls here. The state officers
    arrested Moore, and therefore faced the risks that are „an adequate basis for
    treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search justification.‟ ” 
    (Moore, supra
    , 553 U.S. at p. 177.)
    These cases, taken together, stand for the following principles. When a
    custodial arrest is made, and that arrest is supported by independent probable
    cause, a search incident to that custodial arrest may be permitted, even though the
    formalities of the arrest follow the search. (Rawlings.) There is no exception for a
    search incident to citation. (Knowles.) If an actual arrest takes place, a search
    incident to that arrest is allowed if it is supported by federal Fourth Amendment
    jurisprudence, more restrictive state law notwithstanding. (Moore.) Even the
    search-incident exception may be limited when attendant circumstances show the
    arrestee had no potential to put an officer in jeopardy, to escape, or to destroy
    evidence. (Chimel, Chadwick, Riley.)
    These authorities make clear that Rawlings does not stand for the broad
    proposition that probable cause to arrest will always justify a search incident as
    long as an arrest follows. Otherwise, Knowles would have been decided
    differently. The officer in Knowles had probable cause to arrest for a traffic
    infraction, but elected not to do so. 
    (Knowles, supra
    , 525 U.S. at p. 114.) Once it
    was clear that an arrest was not going to take place, the justification for a search
    incident to arrest was no longer operative.
    This case is analogous to Knowles, and the high court‟s rationales for not
    applying the incident search exception have equal force here. Knowles reasoned
    the threat to officer safety was “a good deal less than in the case of a custodial
    arrest,” and no further evidence of speeding would be uncovered by a search.
    13
    
    (Knowles, supra
    , 525 U.S. at p. 117.) Similarly here, any potential threat to
    officer safety was similar to that in Knowles. Further, these officers were no more
    likely to find additional evidence of his failure to stop at a stop sign by searching
    him than the officers in Knowles were likely to find evidence of speeding. Our
    case is more like Knowles than Moore. Even though, as in Moore, defendant
    could have been arrested under federal law, he was not in fact taken into custody.
    Indeed, the People acknowledged during oral argument that state law precluded
    officers from arresting Mr. Macabeo under these circumstances. He was detained
    for failing to stop at a stop sign, an infraction, and, except under circumstances not
    present here, could only have been cited and released. (See Veh. Code §§ 22450,
    subd. (a), 40000.1, 42001, subd. (a); People v. McKay (2002) 
    27 Cal. 4th 601
    ,
    620.) Nor does it appear that there are objective indicia to suggest, as the People‟s
    argument presumes, that the officers would have arrested defendant in violation of
    state law.2
    So, the posture of our case is this. First, the phone search was conducted
    without a warrant and was improper unless justified by an exception to the warrant
    requirement. Second, defendant was not on probation, so the search could not be
    based on that nonexistent status. Third, the People concede that defendant did not
    consent to the search of his phone. Fourth, the search did not qualify as incident to
    2       Devenpeck v. Alford (2004) 
    543 U.S. 146
    , cited by the People, is
    inapposite. That case involved the validity of an actual arrest, with the high court
    concluding that an arrest will not be rendered unconstitutional if there is probable
    cause to arrest for an offense, simply because an officer at the time of the arrest
    identifies a different offense unsupported by probable cause and not “ „closely
    related‟ ” to the offense for which there was probable cause. (Id. at pp. 152-156.)
    Although Devenpeck makes clear that “an arresting officer‟s state of mind (except
    for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause” (
    id. at p.
    153), nothing in our decision suggests otherwise.
    14
    arrest under the Fourth Amendment. Fifth, under Riley, even if defendant had
    been properly arrested, a warrant was required to search the phone. The only way
    to avoid suppression of the data is if the good faith exception to the exclusionary
    rule applies.
    B. The Good Faith Exception
    Exclusion of evidence due to a Fourth Amendment violation is not
    automatic. As the high court stated: “The Fourth Amendment protects the right to
    be free from „unreasonable searches and seizures,‟ but it is silent about how this
    right is to be enforced. To supplement the bare text, this Court created the
    exclusionary rule, a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing
    evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.” (Davis v. United
    States (2011) 
    564 U.S. 229
    , 231-232 (Davis).) “The rule . . . operates as „a
    judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
    generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of
    the party aggrieved.‟ ” (United States v. Leon (1984) 
    468 U.S. 897
    , 906 (Leon).)
    The high court has recognized that the deterrent purpose of the rule is not
    served by excluding evidence when an officer reasonably acts in objective good
    faith. Leon involved an officer‟s reliance on a signed search warrant later found
    deficient. The court held the exclusionary rule should not apply “when an officer
    acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or
    magistrate and acted within its scope,” even if the warrant was subsequently
    invalidated. 
    (Leon, supra
    , 468 U.S. at p. 920.) Leon balanced the “substantial
    social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth
    Amendment rights” with its potential to deter future police misconduct. (Id. at p.
    907.) Application of the exclusionary rule “almost always requires courts to
    ignore reliable, trustworthy evidence bearing on guilt or innocence.” 
    (Davis, 15 supra
    , 564 U.S. at p. 237.) “ „If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
    unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be
    suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge,
    or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional
    under the Fourth Amendment.‟ ” (Leon, at p. 919, quoting United States v. Peltier
    (1975) 
    422 U.S. 531
    , 542.) Leon reasoned that “[i]n the ordinary case, an officer
    cannot be expected to question the magistrate‟s probable-cause determination or
    his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. „[O]nce the
    warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to
    comply with the law.‟ [Citation.] Penalizing the officer for the magistrate‟s error,
    rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth
    Amendment violations.” (Leon, at p. 921.)
    In Illinois v. Krull (1987) 
    480 U.S. 340
    , the Supreme Court applied the
    good faith exception where officers conducted a search based on a statute
    authorizing warrantless administrative searches. The statute was later declared
    unconstitutional. Krull reasoned that excluding evidence under such
    circumstances “would have as little deterrent effect on the officer‟s actions as
    would the exclusion of evidence when an officer acts in objectively reasonable
    reliance on a warrant. Unless a statute is clearly unconstitutional, an officer
    cannot be expected to question the judgment of the legislature that passed the law.
    If the statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional, excluding evidence
    obtained pursuant to it prior to such a judicial declaration will not deter future
    Fourth Amendment violations by an officer who has simply fulfilled his
    responsibility to enforce the statute as written.” (Id. at pp. 349-350.)
    The high court in Davis applied similar reasoning to conclude: “searches
    conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are
    not subject to the exclusionary rule.” 
    (Davis, supra
    , 564 U.S. at p. 232.) Davis
    16
    was arrested after a routine traffic stop. He and another occupant were handcuffed
    and placed in a patrol vehicle. Police then searched the car and found contraband.
    (Id. at p. 235.) Davis observed that “[n]umerous courts read [New York v. Belton
    (1981) 
    453 U.S. 454
    ] to authorize automobile searches incident to arrests of recent
    occupants, regardless of whether the arrestee in any particular case was within
    reaching distance of the vehicle at the time of the search. [Citation.] Even after
    the arrestee had stepped out of the vehicle and had been subdued by police, the
    prevailing understanding was that Belton still authorized a substantially
    contemporaneous search of the automobile‟s passenger compartment.” (Id. at p.
    233.) That understanding changed after Arizona v. Gant (2009) 
    556 U.S. 332
    ,
    335, which held that “Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a
    recent occupant‟s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the
    interior of the vehicle.”
    The search in Davis came after Belton but before Gant. At the time of the
    search, Belton was understood “to establish a bright-line rule authorizing the
    search of a vehicle‟s passenger compartment incident to a recent occupant‟s
    arrest.” 
    (Davis, supra
    , 564 U.S. at p. 239.) “The search incident to Davis‟ arrest
    in this case followed . . . precedent to the letter.” (Ibid.) Davis held the
    exclusionary rule did not apply. “Police practices trigger the harsh sanction of
    exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield „meaningfu[l]‟ deterrence,
    and culpable enough to be „worth the price paid by the justice system.‟ [Citation.]
    The conduct of the officers here was neither of these things. The officers who
    conducted the search did not violate Davis‟ Fourth Amendment rights deliberately,
    recklessly, or with gross negligence. [Citation.] Nor does this case involve any
    „recurring or systemic negligence‟ on the part of law enforcement. [Citation.]
    The police acted in strict compliance with binding precedent, and their behavior
    17
    was not wrongful. Unless the exclusionary rule is to become a strict-liability
    regime, it can have no application in this case.” (Id. at p. 240.)
    Beginning with Leon, the court made clear that the good faith reliance
    doctrine was derived from the policies underlying the exclusionary rule itself. It
    also explained that the doctrine is objective, fact-based, and limited.
    “Accordingly, our good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable
    question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the
    search was illegal despite the magistrate‟s authorization. In making this
    determination, all of the circumstances—including whether the warrant
    application had previously been rejected by a different magistrate—may be
    considered.” 
    (Leon, supra
    , 468 U.S. at pp. 922-923, fn. 23.) While concluding
    that the officers could reasonably rely on a facially valid warrant that was later
    overturned, Leon noted that will not always be the case: “the officer‟s reliance on
    the magistrate‟s probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of
    the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable, [citation], and it is clear that
    in some circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing
    that the warrant was properly issued.” (Id. at pp. 922-923, fns. omitted.) Leon
    noted that an officer could not reasonably rely on a warrant based on an affidavit
    “ „so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
    entirely unreasonable,‟ ” or if the warrant was “so facially deficient . . . that the
    executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” (Id. at p. 923.)
    The high court has also applied the good faith exception when officers have
    acted in reasonable reliance on information that subsequently is determined to be
    inaccurate. These cases, too, emphasize the deterrence rationale. In Arizona v.
    Evans (1995) 
    514 U.S. 1
    (Evans), an officer arrested and searched the defendant
    based on information in a computer database reflecting an outstanding arrest
    warrant. The information had not been updated to show the warrant had
    18
    previously been quashed. In concluding the exclusionary rule should not apply,
    Evans identified and applied three factors: (1) “the exclusionary rule was
    historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct, not mistakes by
    court employees” (
    id. at p.
    14), (2) there was “no evidence that court employees
    are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among
    these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion” (id. at pp.
    14-15), and (3) exclusion of evidence would not “have a significant effect on court
    employees responsible for informing the police that a warrant has been quashed”
    because they are not “adjuncts to the law enforcement team” and “have no stake in
    the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions” (
    id. at p.
    15). Further, because
    the mistake did not originate with police, Evans observed that “application of the
    exclusionary rule also could not be expected to alter the behavior of the arresting
    officer” under the circumstances. (Ibid.) Evans endorsed the trial court‟s
    assessment that the officer would have been “ „derelict in his duty if he failed to
    arrest,‟ ” observing that the type of clerical error at issue occurred once “ „every
    three or four years.‟ ” (Ibid.) As such, “[t]here is no indication that the arresting
    officer was not acting objectively reasonably when he relied upon the police
    computer record.” (Id. at pp. 15-16.)
    Herring v. United States (2009) 
    555 U.S. 135
    (Herring) applied Evans‟s
    reasoning to a similar computer database error made by police employees in a
    neighboring jurisdiction. Herring initially observed that the officers who arrested
    and searched the defendant “did nothing improper” and “the error was noticed so
    quickly because Coffee County requested a faxed confirmation of the warrant.”
    
    (Herring, supra
    , 555 U.S. at p. 140.) Herring noted Leon‟s principle that the
    deterrence benefit of evidentiary exclusion when a search warrant was reasonably
    relied upon would be marginal. It then concluded “[t]he same is true when
    evidence is obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently recalled
    19
    warrant.” (Herring, at p. 146.) The calculus might differ, Herring reasoned, if
    police “have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to
    have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future arrests.”
    (Ibid.) Further, “where systemic errors were demonstrated, it might be reckless
    for officers to rely on an unreliable warrant system.” (Ibid.) However, under the
    circumstances before them, Herring reasoned there was “no evidence that errors in
    Dale County‟s system are routine or widespread.” (Id. at p. 147.) The officer
    testified “he had never had reason to question information about a Dale County
    warrant,” and the police clerks involved “could remember no similar
    miscommunication ever happening on their watch.” (Ibid.) Thus, Herring applied
    the deterrence rationale of Evans by emphasizing that excluding evidence would
    not deter future mistakes where the searching officer had no reason to question the
    apparent authority granted to him by the information in the computer database.
    The People attempt to fit the present search into this paradigm, arguing that
    the search was authorized by 
    Diaz, supra
    , 
    51 Cal. 4th 84
    . However, as we have
    explained, Diaz involved an actual custodial arrest. Our analysis rested on United
    States Supreme Court authorities that all involved custodial arrests. While the
    People cite 
    Rawlings, supra
    , 
    448 U.S. 98
    , for the proposition that probable cause
    to arrest alone will always justify a search incident to arrest, other high court
    authority demonstrates that a reasonably well-trained officer would know this
    search would not qualify as one incident to arrest.
    Such an officer would know the general rule that a search must be
    authorized by warrant. Such an officer would also know that the search-incident
    exception to the general rule is based on the need to protect officer safety, preserve
    evidence, or prevent escape. These concerns come into play when a suspect is to
    be arrested. But here, a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that
    state law prohibited an arrest in these circumstances, and there is no objective
    20
    indication that the officers were going to arrest defendant in defiance of that state
    law. At the time of this search, officers did not issue a citation, which, without
    more, would have precluded an incident search under 
    Knowles, supra
    , 
    525 U.S. 113
    . Nor did they arrest defendant, which would have authorized an incident
    search under 
    Moore, supra
    , 
    553 U.S. 164
    .
    People v. Gomez (2004) 
    117 Cal. App. 4th 531
    , relied upon by the People,
    does not alter this conclusion. Officers there were watching a house they
    suspected was used for drug trafficking. Police saw Gomez arrive at the house,
    load a vehicle with several large boxes, and leave. Officers pulled Gomez over for
    a failing to wear his seatbelt, and detained him “for well over an hour” before
    requesting a canine unit, which discovered drugs. 
    (Gomez, supra
    , 117
    Cal.App.4th at p. 537.) The Gomez court agreed with the defendant that the record
    did not “show the requisite diligence to justify the prolonged detention.” (Id. at p.
    538.) Instead, holding Gomez for over an hour “amount[ed] to a de facto arrest
    that must be supported by probable cause to be constitutionally valid.” (Ibid.)
    Gomez expressly concluded that the de facto arrest was legally justified by
    sufficient facts, known before the search incident to it. Here, by contrast, the
    People do not assert that a de facto arrest occurred.
    Applying the exclusionary rule here is consistent with the deterrence
    rationale of the high court cases. In adopting an objective good faith standard,
    Leon stated: “ „Grounding the modification in objective reasonableness, however,
    retains the value of the exclusionary rule as an incentive for the law enforcement
    profession as a whole to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth
    Amendment.‟ [Citations.] The objective standard we adopt, moreover, requires
    officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.” 
    (Leon, supra
    ,
    468 U.S. at pp. 919-920, fn. 20.) As Evans observed, “the exclusionary rule was
    historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct.” (Evans, supra,
    21
    514 U.S. at p. 14.) Under Herring, “police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate
    that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such
    deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system,” and “the exclusionary
    rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some
    circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” 
    (Herring, supra
    , 555 U.S. at p.
    144.)
    This case does not involve the type of negligence at issue in Evans and
    Herring, where employees failed to update a computer database before an officer
    relied on the information therein. Indeed, the People‟s argument that suppressing
    the evidence would not serve the deterrence rationale is little more than a
    restatement of their contention that Diaz and Gomez specifically authorized the
    search. We have rejected that claim.
    Further, this case is unlike Davis, which reasoned that “[a]bout all that
    exclusion would deter in this case is conscientious police work. Responsible law-
    enforcement officers will take care to learn „what is required of them‟ under
    Fourth Amendment precedent and will conform their conduct to these rules.”
    
    (Davis, supra
    , 564 U.S. at p. 241.) Because appellate authority specifically
    authorized the search there, Davis concluded the “deterrent effect of exclusion in
    such a case can only be to discourage the officer from „ “do[ing] his duty.” ‟ ”
    (Ibid.) Whatever the outer limit of Davis may be, this case lies outside it. In light
    of our conclusion that a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the
    search here did not qualify as one incident to arrest, exclusion of evidence would
    serve a deterrent purpose by ensuring officers have a “reasonable knowledge of
    what the law prohibits” 
    (Leon, supra
    , 468 U.S. at pp. 919-920, fn. 20), and
    discouraging unjustified conduct.
    The circumstances here are in stark contrast to People v. Robinson (2010)
    
    47 Cal. 4th 1104
    . That case involved “mistakes that led to the unlawful collection
    22
    of defendant‟s blood . . . made because correctional staff was under pressure to
    immediately implement a newly enacted law that was complex and
    confusing . . . .” (Id. at p. 1126.) We observed that employees had
    “conscientiously tried to follow” the requirements of the law, and the lab had
    initiated its own verification process to ensure only properly collected samples
    were included in the database. (Id. at pp. 1128-1129.) Evidence also refuted any
    deliberate policy of collecting samples from nonqualifying prisoners as such
    conduct risked “the draconian sanction . . . [of] expulsion from the national crime-
    solving index and removal of the CODIS software from a noncompliant
    laboratory.” (Id. at p. 1127.) In this context, we observed the correctional
    employees acted negligently, but their conduct was not the result of “ „systemic
    error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements‟ ” and was not so
    culpable that deterrence “is worth the price paid by the justice system.” (Id. at p.
    1129.) We further concluded that no deterrent purpose would be served by
    exclusion because a subsequent statutory amendment expanded and simplified
    what constituted a qualifying offense, thus “eliminat[ing] the likelihood that
    biological specimens will be mistakenly collected or analyzed.” (Id. at p. 1129, fn.
    23.)
    It was the duty of correctional employees in People v. Robinson to
    implement a complex and confusing new statutory scheme with little guidance.
    Though that implementation was not perfect, our application of the good faith
    exception was a recognition that exclusion of evidence would only serve to punish
    their attempt to properly perform their duty. By contrast, the search here was not
    the result of negligence, and the People do not contend otherwise. Nor did it result
    from any pressure to apply a newly enacted statutory scheme that was confusing
    and complex. The officers‟ conduct, including the search, was deliberate.
    Exclusion of evidence will serve to deter future similar behavior.
    23
    III. CONCLUSION
    The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. The case is remanded to
    that court. It is directed to return the matter to the trial court with instructions to
    suppress the data seized from Mr. Macabeo‟s cell phone. Further proceedings
    with regard to the plea entered by Mr. Macabeo should proceed in accordance with
    this judgment.
    CORRIGAN, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
    WERDEGAR, J.
    CHIN, J.
    LIU, J.
    CUÉLLAR, J.
    KRUGER, J.
    24
    See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
    Name of Opinion People v. Macabeo
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished Opinion
    Original Appeal
    Original Proceeding
    Review Granted XXX 
    229 Cal. App. 4th 486
    Rehearing Granted
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Opinion No. S221852
    Date Filed: December 5, 2016
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Court: Superior
    County: Los Angeles
    Judge: Mark S. Arnold
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Counsel:
    Bird & Bird, Karen Hunter Bird; Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic, Catherine Crump
    and Charles D. Weisselberg for Defendant and Appellant.
    Peter Bibring, Catherine Wagner, Michael T. Risher and David Blair-Loy for ACLU Foundation of
    Southern California, ACLU Foundation of Northern California and ACLU Foundation of San Diego and
    Imperial Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Edward C. Dumont, State Solicitor General, Dane R. Gillette and
    Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven
    T. Oetting, Deputy State Solicitor General, Michael R. Johnsen and Victoria B. Wilson, Deputy Attorneys
    General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    California Appellate Law Group, Myron Moskovitz and Ben Feuer as Amici Curiae.
    Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
    Charles D. Weisselberg
    Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic
    University of California, Berkeley School of Law
    Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
    (510) 643-4800
    Victoria B. Wilson
    Deputy Attorney General
    300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702
    Los Angeles, CA 90013
    (213) 897-2357