In re: D.M.O. , 250 N.C. App. 570 ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA16-575
Filed: 6 December 2016
Orange County, No. 15 JT 46
IN THE MATTER OF: D.M.O.
Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 16 March 2016 by Judge
Beverly A. Scarlett in Orange County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
19 October 2016.
H. Wood Vann for petitioner-appellee father.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Joyce L.
Terres, for respondent-mother.
No brief filed for guardian ad litem.
ELMORE, Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her
parental rights to D.M.O. (“David”)1 on the ground of abandonment. We vacate and
remand.
I. Background
Respondent-mother and petitioner-father are the biological parents of David.
The parties resided together with David as a family unit from the date of his birth in
March 2007 until the parties separated in July 2010 due to escalating conflict
1 A pseudonym is used to protect the minor’s identity.
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between the parties that resulted in respondent-mother committing acts of domestic
violence against petitioner-father. After the parties separated, petitioner-father took
physical custody of David and filed a custody action in Durham County.
After a hearing, the trial court entered a permanent custody order on 25
January 2011, which granted petitioner-father legal and physical custody of David
and respondent-mother unsupervised visitation on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and
Saturdays. Respondent-mother and petitioner-father made agreements over the
years to change the times of visitation, based on mutual convenience and changes in
David’s school and extracurricular activity schedules.
For several years, respondent-mother has struggled with drug addiction and
substance abuse and has been incarcerated multiple times at multiple jails and
prisons for issues related to drugs and other crimes. Relevant to this appeal, she was
incarcerated at Wake County jail from 10 December 2014 to 7 January 2015. She
was incarcerated at Durham County jail, participating in a drug treatment program,
from 23 January to 2 March 2015. She returned to Wake County jail on 9 March and
then was transferred in late July to a prison within the North Carolina Department
of Adult Correction, where she remained until the termination hearing.
On 28 May 2015, petitioner-father filed a petition to terminate respondent-
mother’s parental rights to David alleging, inter alia, that she “willfully abandoned
[David] for at least six (6) consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the
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petition,” pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7). From jail, respondent-mother
handwrote a letter to the clerk of court stating that she did not want her parental
rights terminated, that she had been incarcerated for most of the year, and that she
wanted an attorney. Respondent-mother also stated that “she ha[d] contacted
[petitioner-father] many, many times[, and she] had either gotten [n]o response or
[petitioner-father responding] ‘No’ & ‘Busy’ on multiple occasions[.]” On 30 June
2015, respondent-mother filed a formal response denying the allegations that she
willfully abandoned David. At some point in July 2015, respondent-mother was
transferred from Wake County jail to Eastern Correctional Institution in Maury,
North Carolina. On 26 August 2015, a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) was appointed for
David.
On 29 January 2016, the district court held a termination hearing. On 16
March 2016, the trial court entered an order concluding that grounds existed to
terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights based on willful abandonment
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7) and that termination was in David’s best
interests. Respondent-mother appeals.
II. Analysis
Respondent-mother argues the trial court erred by concluding she willfully
abandoned David pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7) because there was
insufficient evidence and findings of her “willfulness.” In addition, respondent-
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mother contends the trial court erred by not requiring David’s GAL to perform his
statutory duties of “offer[ing] evidence and examin[ing] witnesses at adjudication,”
as well as “explor[ing] options with the court at the dispositional hearing.” See N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-601(a) (2015).
A. Standard of Review
“ ‘This Court reviews a trial court’s conclusion that grounds exist to terminate
parental rights to determine whether clear, cogent, and convincing evidence exists to
support the court’s findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the
court’s conclusions of law.’ ” In re C.J.H., __ N.C. App. __, __, 772 S.E.2d 82, 88 (2015)
(quoting In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 291, 536 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000)). “If the trial
court’s findings of fact are supported by ample, competent evidence, they are binding
on appeal, even though there may be evidence to the contrary.” Id. (citation omitted).
We review de novo whether a trial court’s findings support its conclusions. See In re
S.N., 194 N.C. App. 142, 146, 669 S.E.2d 55, 59 (2008) (citation omitted), aff’d per
curiam, 363 N.C. 368, 677 S.E.2d 455 (2009).
However, meaningful appellate review requires that trial courts make “specific
findings of the ultimate facts established by the evidence, admissions and
stipulations which are determinative of the questions involved in the action and
essential to support the conclusions of law reached.” Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446,
452, 290 S.E.2d 653, 658 (1982). “Ultimate facts are the final resulting effect reached
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by processes of logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C.
App. 94, 97, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The
court’s order must include “specific ultimate facts to support the judgment, and the
facts found must be sufficient for the appellate court to determine that the judgment
is adequately supported by competent evidence.” Montgomery v. Montgomery, 32
N.C. App. 154, 156–57, 231 S.E.2d 26, 28 (1977) (citations omitted).
B. Willful Abandonment
Respondent-mother asserts “the trial court erred in concluding that [her]
parental rights should be terminated solely on the basis of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(7) when there were no findings of willfulness.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7) (2015) (emphasis added) establishes grounds
for terminating parental rights when “[t]he parent has willfully abandoned the
juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition or motion.” In the context of abandonment, “[w]illfulness is ‘more than an
intention to do a thing; there must also be purpose and deliberation.’ ” In re S.R.G.,
195 N.C. App. 79, 84, 671 S.E.2d 47, 51 (2009) (quoting In re Searle, 82 N.C. App. 273,
275, 346 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1986)). Because “[w]ilful[l] intent is an integral part of
abandonment and . . . is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence[,]” Pratt
v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1962), a trial court must make
adequate evidentiary findings to support its ultimate finding of willful intent. See In
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re T.M.H., 186 N.C. App. 451, 452, 652 S.E.2d 1, 1 (2007) (remanding for further
findings “[w]here the trial court failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law
concerning the willfulness of respondent’s conduct”). “Abandonment implies conduct
on the part of the parent which manifests a willful determination to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” In re Young, 346 N.C.
244, 251, 485 S.E.2d 612, 617 (1997) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Although “the trial court may consider [a parent’s] conduct outside [the six-
month] window in evaluating [a parent’s] credibility and intentions[,]” C.J.H., __ N.C.
App. at __, 772 S.E.2d at 91 (citations omitted), the “determinative” period for
adjudicating willful abandonment is the six consecutive months preceding the filing
of the petition. Young, 346 N.C. at 251, 485 S.E.2d at 617. Thus, termination based
on abandonment requires findings that “show more than a failure of the parent to
live up to [his or her] obligations as a parent in an appropriate fashion.” In re S.R.G.,
195 N.C. App. at 87, 671 S.E.2d at 53. The findings must “demonstrate that [a parent]
had a ‘purposeful, deliberative and manifest willful determination to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims’ to [the child].” In re S.Z.H., __
N.C. App. __, __, 785 S.E.2d 341, 347 (2016) (quoting S.R.G., 195 N.C. App. at 87, 671
S.E.2d at 53) (reversing a termination order based on abandonment for insufficient
findings).
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Here, respondent-mother’s behavior between 28 November 2014 and 28 May
2015 is determinative. The trial court’s relevant findings as to respondent-mother’s
conduct during this period follow:
A. From 2012 to early 2015, when [respondent-mother] was
not incarcerated, she showed up late for visits and over
time the visits decreased in frequency. [Respondent-
mother] was in custody from December 10, 2014 through
January 7, 2015, and January 23, 2015 through March 2,
2015, and March 9, 2015 through present.
B. [David] participates in baseball and basketball.
[Petitioner-father] notified [respondent-mother] of
[David’s] game schedule. [Respondent-mother] attended a
few of the games. She has not attended any games over the
last year.
C. To the knowledge of [petitioner-father] and his wife,
[respondent-mother] last saw [David] in March or April of
2014. [Respondent-mother] has a history of asking to see
[David] and now [sic] showing up or calling to cancel the
visitation.
....
G. [Respondent-mother] did not visit with [David] or
contact [David] during November 2014 or December 2014.
....
I. On or about January 7, 2015, [respondent-mother] texted
[petitioner-father] telling [petitioner-father] that she loves
and misses [David]. [Respondent-mother] did not ask to
speak to [David] or ask that a message be conveyed to
[David]. [Respondent-mother] did not exercise Court
ordered visits with [David] during January 2015.
J. [Respondent-mother] failed to exercise Court ordered
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visitation during February 2015.
K. [Respondent-mother] failed to exercise Court ordered
visitation during March 2015.
L. [Respondent-mother] failed to exercise Court ordered
visitation during April 2015.
M. [Respondent-mother] failed to exercise Court ordered
visitation during May 2015.
N. [Respondent-mother] has called in the past and
requested to speak to [David]. Her request was honored
(see [petitioner-father’s] Exhibit 2).
O. [Respondent-mother] has requested visits in the past
and those visits were allowed by [petitioner-father]. (see
[petitioner-father’s] Exhibit 2).
P. [Respondent-mother’s] sister has requested visits with
[David] and phone calls. Requests were granted (see
[petitioner-father’s] Exhibit 2).
Q. [Respondent-mother] testified that she had made
attempts to call and sent letters but did not keep track of
when she did so because she did not think she would need
them. Her recollection was that she sent a letter in April
and May of 2015. Furthermore, she also sent a small
number of texts during times she was not in custody.
Respondent-mother argues these findings are inadequate to establish that she
willfully abandoned David. Specifically, she contends that despite findings that she
was incarcerated for all but 33 of the determinative 180 days preceding the filing of
the termination petition, the court found that she failed to exercise visitation and
attempted to make contacts during this period, yet failed to make “findings that any
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of [respondent-mother’s] conduct was willful or manifested a willful intent to abandon
her son.” We agree.
“[I]ncarceration, standing alone, neither precludes nor requires a finding of
willfulness [on the issue of abandonment,]” In re McLemore, 139 N.C. App. 426, 431,
533 S.E.2d 508, 511 (2000) (citation omitted), and “[d]espite incarceration, a parent
failing to have any contact can be found to have willfully abandoned the child[.]” In
re D.J.D., 171 N.C. App. 230, 241, 615 S.E.2d 26, 33–34 (2005) (citation omitted).
However, the circumstances attendant to a parent’s incarceration are relevant when
determining whether a parent willfully abandoned his or her child, and this Court
has repeatedly acknowledged that the opportunities of an incarcerated parent to
show affection for and associate with a child are limited. See, e.g., In re B.S.O., 234
N.C. App. 706, 711, 760 S.E.2d 59, 64 (2014) (“[A] parent’s opportunities to care for
or associate with a child while incarcerated are different than those of a parent who
is not incarcerated. The opportunities of an incarcerated parent are even more
limited than those of a deported parent . . . .”); In re Shermer, 156 N.C. App. 281, 290,
576 S.E.2d 403, 409 (2003) (“Because respondent was incarcerated, there was little
involvement he could have beyond what he did—write letters to [his children] and
inform DSS that he did not want his rights terminated.” (emphasis added)); In re
Adoption of Maynor, 38 N.C. App. 724, 726–27, 248 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1978) (“[T]he
fact that the respondent was unable to locate his son and was unable to make support
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payments as a result of his incarceration, is inconsistent with a willful intent to
abandon his son.” (emphasis added)); see also D.J.D., 171 N.C. App. at 240, 615 S.E.2d
at 33 (affirming termination of parental rights based in part upon abandonment,
“acknowledg[ing] that incarceration limited [the parent’s] ability to show affection”);
In re J.L.K., 165 N.C. App. 311, 318–19, 598 S.E.2d 387, 392 (2004) (upholding a
termination order based upon neglect, stating that “[a]lthough his options for
showing affection [while incarcerated] are greatly limited, the respondent will not be
excused from showing interest in his child’s welfare by whatever means available”).
Additionally, the effects of a parent’s addiction may be relevant when considering
evidence related to willfulness on the issue of abandonment. See, e.g., S.R.G., 195
N.C. App. at 86, 671 S.E.2d at 52 (analyzing findings relating to a parent’s failure to
comply with her case plan and continued substance abuse, explaining that “[t]hese
are failings that do not inherently suggest a willful intent to abandon, as they are
subject to other explanations—uncontrolled addiction, for example” (citations
omitted)); Bost v. Van Nortwick, 117 N.C. App. 1, 18, 449 S.E.2d 911, 921 (1994) (“Our
review of respondent’s inability to pay child support due to his dependency on alcohol
and related financial problems does not support a finding of willful abandonment.”).
Furthermore, our cases have consistently recognized that the finding of willful
intent for abandonment under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7) is something greater
than that of the willful intent for leaving a child in foster care without making
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reasonable progress under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). See, e.g., In re J.L.H., 224
N.C. App. 52, 54, 741 S.E.2d 333, 335 (2012) (“The willful leaving of the juvenile in
foster care is ‘something less than willful abandonment’ and ‘does not require a
showing of fault by the parent.’ (citation omitted)); S.N., 194 N.C. App. at 146, 669
S.E.2d at 59. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2), “[w]illfulness is established
when [a parent] had the ability to show reasonable progress, but was unwilling to
make the effort.” In re D.C., 225 N.C. App. 327, 330, 737 S.E.2d 182, 185 (2013)
(emphasis added) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In determining willfulness
in this context, “[i]t is significant that the tasks assigned . . . were within [a parent’s]
ability to achieve, and did not require financial or social resources beyond [a parent’s]
means.” In re McMillon, 143 N.C. App. 402, 410, 546 S.E.2d 169, 175 (2001); see also
In re Matherly, 149 N.C. App. 452, 455, 562 S.E.2d 15, 18 (2002) (“Evidence showing
a parents’ ability, or capacity to acquire the ability, to overcome factors which resulted
in their children being placed in foster care must be apparent for willfulness to
attach.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
In D.J.D., this Court considered the termination of parental rights under
willful abandonment when the parent was incarcerated during the relevant six-
month period. 171 N.C. App. at 241, 615 S.E.2d at 33–34. In that case, the trial court
found that, inter alia, while the respondent had been in custody, “he . . . had
absolutely no contact with his children”; “[h]e ha[d] made no telephone calls, sent any
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cards, written any letters, nor arranged for any gifts”; “no one acting on his behalf
(family member or friend) had contacted the Department of Social Services [DSS]
requesting a visit with or attempting to communicate with [his] children”; and he had
paid “no child support . . . but . . . was not employed at the time.” Id. at 235, 615
S.E.2d at 30. The trial court also found that although the respondent “did have
contact with his mother, sister, and the children’s mother,” he never requested those
individuals, or any other family member or friend, to contact DSS to check on the
welfare of his children nor to ascertain an address where he could send letters to his
children. Id. Additionally, the court found that “[a]lthough respondent is limited as
to what he can do at this time to provide for his children while he is incarcerated, he
has failed to provide any contact, love, or affection for his children,” id. at 236, 615
S.E.2d at 30, and, therefore, terminated his parental rights under abandonment. On
appeal, we held that these findings were sufficient to terminate the respondent’s
parental rights based on abandonment, since they established that the respondent,
although able to while incarcerated, “ha[d] taken none of the steps to develop or
maintain a relationship with his children.” Id. at 241, 615 S.E.2d at 34.
In B.S.O., this Court considered a parent’s deportation to another country in
the context of termination based on abandonment and analogized deportation with
incarceration, noting that “[t]he opportunities of an incarcerated parent are even
more limited than those of a deported parent, . . . [who] would be free to work, send
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funds to support a child, or communicate with a child by phone, internet, or mail from
his own country.” 234 N.C. App. at 711–12, 760 S.E.2d at 64. The B.S.O. Court noted
several findings made by the trial court, including that the deported parent failed to
“provide[ ] any financial support for the children although [he had] the ability to do
so,” had “no known disabilities,” and had on one occasion contacted his social worker
while in Mexico but otherwise made no effort to keep updated on his children while
they were in custody. Id. at 711, 760 S.E.2d at 63. The B.S.O. Court explained that
“[b]oth the evidence and the court’s findings reflect that respondent-father’s arrest
and subsequent deportation did not prevent him from communicating with his
children and [the agency that retained custody of his children].” Id. at 713, 760 S.E.2d
at 65 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we upheld the termination based upon
abandonment because the findings “show[ed] that, during the relevant six-month
period, respondent-father ‘made no effort’ to remain in contact with his children or
their caretakers and neither provided nor offered anything toward their support”
although able. Id. at 711, 760 S.E.2d at 64.
Here, despite finding that respondent-mother had a history of substance abuse
and was incarcerated for multiple periods spanning across each of the determinative
six months, the court also found that, during those months, respondent-mother failed
to exercise visitation and to attend David’s sports games, and failed to contact David
during three of those months. Yet the court never made findings addressing how
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respondent-mother’s periodic incarceration at multiple jails, addiction issues, or
participation in a drug treatment program while in custody might have affected her
opportunities to request and exercise visitation, to attend games, or to communicate
with David. The trial court made no findings establishing whether respondent-
mother had made any effort, had the capacity, or had the ability to acquire the
capacity, to perform the conduct underlying its conclusion that respondent-mother
abandoned David willfully. Unlike in D.J.D., the trial court here made no findings
indicating that it considered the limitations of respondent-mother’s incarceration, or
that respondent-mother was able but failed to provide contact, love, or affection to
her child while incarcerated. Unlike in B.S.O., the trial court here made no findings
related to respondent-mother’s ability but failure to provide financial support or her
abilities but failures to make efforts to communicate with her child or her child’s
caretakers.
We conclude that the trial court’s findings (subparts B, I-M) are inadequate to
support its conclusion of willful abandonment, as these findings fail to address
respondent-mother’s efforts or ability to request and exercise visitation, to attend
David’s sports games, or to communicate with David, particularly in light of the
incomplete findings relating to her history of substance abuse and periodic
incarcerations at multiple jails spanning each of the determinative six months, as
well as the evidence of her participation in drug rehabilitation program while in
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custody and petitioner-father’s testimony that he was not as receptive to her having
a relationship with David while she was in and out of custody.
The trial court’s remaining findings, identified as subparts A–S, are
inadequate to support a conclusion on the issue of abandonment. Subparts C and Q
are either recitations of testimony without the force of a finding of fact. See In re
M.R.D.C., 166 N.C. App. 693, 699, 603 S.E.2d 890, 894 (2004) (“Recitations of the
testimony of each witness do not constitute findings of fact by the trial judge . . . .”
(citations and quotation marks omitted)). Subparts A, G, H, N, O, and P are
insufficiently specific, in that these findings fail to identify specific conduct within
the determinative period. Subparts (D, E, F, P, R, and S fail to address factual
grounds which could support a conclusion that respondent-mother willfully
abandoned David. Thus, the trial court’s findings do not demonstrate that
respondent-mother had a “purposeful, deliberative and manifest willful
determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to
[David].” S.Z.H., __ N.C. App. at __, 785 S.E.2d at 348 (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
Nonetheless, “when a court fails to make appropriate findings or conclusions,
this Court is not required to remand the matter if the facts are not in dispute and
only one inference can be drawn from them.” In re J.K.C., 218 N.C. App. 22, 39, 721
S.E.2d 264, 276 (2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, however, there
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are material conflicts in the evidence relating to the issue of respondent-mother’s
willfulness that were not resolved by the trial court’s order.
C. Conflicts in Evidence
According to petitioner-father’s testimony, respondent-mother never sent any
letters addressed to him or David during the relevant six-month period; he was
receptive to respondent-mother having a relationship with David, except “[he] wasn’t
as receptive” “when [he] was getting text messages from the jail that [respondent-
mother] was in jail every other week or every other month”; respondent-mother never
called him from Durham County jail between 23 January and March 2015; she never
asked him in January 2015 if David could participate in her birthday; she never called
him on 3 March 2015 for David’s birthday; and she never texted him between 2 and
9 March 2015, when she was temporarily released from jail.
According to respondent-mother’s testimony, however, she called petitioner-
father on 7 January when she was released from jail and texted him about seeing
David, but he “texted [her] back saying that they had plans”; she called petitioner-
father “several times” between 7 and 23 January and he failed to answer; she called
him twice when she was in Durham County jail between 23 January and 2 March,
but he never accepted the calls; she called petitioner-father several times on 3 March
to speak with David on his birthday but petitioner-father never answered; she then
sent text messages asking to see David for his birthday sometime that week “[a]nd
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when [petitioner-father] didn’t response to any of those texts, [she] sent one
[requesting that he] . . . at least tell [David she] love[s] him and happy birthday.”
Respondent-mother testified that she made several phone calls and wrote several
letters “but when [petitioner-father] didn’t call [her] back, . . . there was nothing [she]
could do.” When asked why she did not exercise visitation when she was released
from jail in late November 2014, she replied: “Because [petitioner-father] had cut off
the visits. He was not allowing me to see [David].” Respondent-mother stated that
between 9 March and 28 May, she tried to contact petitioner-father about David by
sending letters to petitioner-father’s address, “sen[ding] one [letter] every month” but
“[she] never got any response.”
We recognize that the power to observe and listen to all the witnesses in a
termination hearing “allows the trial court to ‘detect tenors, tones and flavors that
are lost in the bare printed record read months later by appellate judges.’ ” Adams
v. Tessener, 354 N.C. 57, 63, 550 S.E.2d 499, 503 (2001) (citation omitted). Although
it was certainly within the court’s discretion to discredit respondent-mother’s
testimony regarding her attempts to contact petitioner-father about David and to
attempt to request and exercise visitation, the current findings are inadequate or fail
to resolve conflicts in the evidence material to a conclusion that respondent-mother
abandoned David willfully, particularly: whether and to what extent respondent-
mother called, texted, and mailed letters during the relevant period; whether and to
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what extent respondent-mother was able to participate in exercising parental duties
on account of her periodic incarceration at multiple jails; and whether and to what
extent petitioner-father hindered respondent-mother from communicating with
David or exercising visitation; among other evidentiary findings relevant to
determining the ultimate finding of willfulness in the context of abandonment.
Without further fact-finding, we cannot determine whether the trial court’s
conclusions are supported by its findings. Accordingly, we vacate the termination
order and remand to the trial court for further findings and conclusions relating to
the issue of the willfulness of respondent-mother’s conduct during the relevant six-
month period, in order for the trial court to determine whether petitioner-father
proved the ground of willful abandonment. See, e.g., In re F.G.J., 200 N.C. App. 681,
694, 684 S.E.2d 745, 754 (2009) (vacating a termination order and remanding for
further fact-finding to address when “the trial court’s current findings [were]
insufficient to permit this Court to review its decision under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(2)”). The trial court must resolve material conflicts in the evidence related
to the willfulness of respondent-mother’s conduct and may, in its discretion, receive
additional evidence in order to do so. In re D.R.B., 182 N.C. App. 733, 738–39, 643
S.E.2d 77, 81 (2007) (vacating and remanding termination order for entry of adequate
findings of fact and conclusions of law to demonstrate grounds for termination and
permitting the trial court to receive additional evidence on remand).
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We have considered respondent-mother’s remaining argument that the trial
court erred by failing to require the GAL to perform his statutory duties of “offer[ing]
evidence and examin[ing] witnesses at adjudication,” as well as “explor[ing] options
with the court at the dispositional hearing.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-601(a) (2015).
Although the record and transcript as developed do not permit us to engage in a
meaningful review, the record demonstrates that the GAL presented his best-
interests report, listened to respondent-mother’s testimony during adjudication, and
participated during the dispositional phase of the termination hearing but is unclear
as to when the GAL arrived and left the court room during the proceedings. We
emphasize that adherence to the GAL program by both the GAL and the trial court
is critically important to ensure minors’ best interests are protected and served.
III. Conclusion
The trial court failed to enter adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law
to demonstrate grounds for termination regarding N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7).
In addition, the trial court’s order fails to resolve material conflicts in the evidence
relevant to a conclusion that respondent-mother willfully abandoned David.
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further findings of fact
and conclusions of law regarding N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7). The trial court may
hear and receive additional evidence.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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IN RE D.M.O.
Opinion of the Court
Judges HUNTER, JR. and DILLON concur.
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