Daniel Ray Holloway v. State of Indiana , 2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 23 ( 2017 )

FILED
Jan 19 2017, 8:08 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David A. Smith Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
McIntyre & Smith Attorney General of Indiana
Bedford, Indiana Justin F. Roebel
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Daniel Ray Holloway, January 19, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
59A01-1604-CR-745
v. Appeal from the Orange Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Larry R. Blanton,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
59C01-1402-FA-93
Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Daniel Ray Holloway (“Holloway”) appeals his convictions, received following
a jury trial, for Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine,1 Class D felony
maintaining a common nuisance,2 and Class D felony possession of chemical
reagents or precursors.3 At trial, the trial court admitted, over Holloway’s
objection, evidence of items used in methamphetamine manufacturing that
investigators had discovered during a warrantless search of Holloway’s car. On
appeal, Holloway argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
this evidence because the search that produced it violated his right to privacy
under the United States and Indiana Constitutions. We conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion because the exigent circumstances exception
to the prohibition against warrantless searches under the United States
Constitution applied, and the search was reasonable under the Indiana
Constitution.
[2] We affirm.
1
IND. CODE § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1). The dealing in methamphetamine statute has since been amended, and
Holloway’s conviction would now be considered a Level 5 felony. However, because Holloway committed
his offense in February 2014, we will apply the version of the statute in effect at that time.
2
I.C. § 35-48-4-13(b)(2). The maintaining a common nuisance statute has also been amended, and
Holloway’s offense would now be considered a Class A misdemeanor. However, we will apply the version
of the statute in effect at that time.
3
I.C. § 35-48-4-14.5(e). This offense would now be considered a Level 6 felony. Holloway was also
convicted of resisting law enforcement and criminal recklessness and adjudicated an habitual substance
offender, but he does not challenge those convictions or his adjudication on appeal.
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Issue
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence
obtained as a result of a warrantless search of Holloway’s vehicle.
Facts
[3] In the early morning hours of February 10, 2014, Harrison County Sheriff’s
Department Deputy, Michael Andry (“Deputy Andry”), was on duty in
Palmyra, Indiana. He was patrolling a gas station when he saw a black Honda
vehicle parked in front of the gas station door. He found the parking of the
vehicle “odd” because it was “blocking the door completely,” in spite of the fact
that the parking lot was empty and there were actual parking spots available.
(Tr. 122). As a result, he called dispatch and requested that the dispatcher
check the BMV records for the Honda’s license plate. The dispatcher ran the
license plate and reported to him that the plate’s registration was inactive and
was associated with a different car, a Mitshubishi.
[4] Deputy Andry followed the Honda, which had departed the gas station while
he was checking its records, and activated his lights and siren. The Honda did
not stop or pull over. Instead, it led Deputy Andry on a chase that lasted for
fifty minutes and reached speeds of over 100 miles per hour. Eventually,
Deputy Andry followed the Honda onto a street that he knew was a dead end.
He exited his vehicle, believing that the occupants of the Honda were going to
attempt to escape on foot. However, the Honda made a u-turn and drove back
in his direction. As it attempted to get around his police car, Deputy Andry slid
on some ice on the road, and the Honda ran into him. Deputy Andry fell onto
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the car’s hood and, as a result of the impact, accidentally discharged his
firearm. The driver of the Honda, who was later identified as Holloway,
“revv[ed] the motor up,” and Deputy Andry then intentionally discharged his
firearm three more times in Holloway’s direction to make him stop the vehicle.
(Tr. 132). Holloway suffered injuries to both of his hands as a result of the
gunshots but finally stopped the vehicle.
[5] Conservation Officer Neal Bouwington (“Officer Bouwington”), who had
followed Deputy Andry for part of the pursuit, arrived on the scene after the
shooting. He and Deputy Andry determined that there were three people inside
of the Honda and arrested all three of them. Officer Bouwington also looked
into the vehicle and observed that it was a “mess,” although he did not identify
any specific items or conduct a search. (Tr. 223).
[6] Subsequently, other officers arrived as backup. Those officers learned the
identities of the three people who had been in the Honda and became
concerned, based on their prior knowledge of those individuals, that there might
be a mobile methamphetamine laboratory in the vehicle. Rachel Kirkham
(“Kirkham”), one of the passengers, also admitted that “there may be
something methamphetamine related in the vehicle.” (Tr. 243-44). As a result,
the officers contacted State Police Detective Paul Andry (“Detective Andry”),
who was trained to investigate methamphetamine labs.4
4
Deputy Andry and Detective Andry are second cousins.
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[7] When Detective Andry responded to the scene, he saw a glass
methamphetamine pipe lying in the snow outside of the Honda, which “led
[him] to believe that methamphetamine might be involved.” (Tr. 238). He
performed a preliminary search of the vehicle and removed a zipped bag from
the back of the vehicle. He opened the bag and discovered chemicals
commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine, but he did not discover an
active methamphetamine lab. Because the chemicals were not interacting, he
determined that the Honda was safe to move, and the officers transported it to
the Sheriff’s Department. At that point, the officers obtained a search warrant
and inventoried the remaining items in the car. During the inventory, they
discovered several additional items commonly used in manufacturing
methamphetamine, including, among other items, pseudophedrine, lithium
batteries, muriatic acid, Coleman fuel, sulfuric acid, lye, instant cold packs,
baggies, and a scale. They also found methamphetamine residue on a coffee
filter, four baggies of methamphetamine, and a baggie containing a substance
that appeared to be marijuana.
[8] That same day, February 10, 2014, the State charged Holloway with Class A
felony attempted murder; Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine; Class D
felony maintaining a common nuisance; Class D felony possession of chemical
reagents or precursors with intent to manufacture a controlled substance; Class
D felony resisting law enforcement; and Class A misdemeanor criminal
recklessness. The State also alleged that Holloway was an habitual substance
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offender because he had two or more prior unrelated substance abuse
convictions.
[9] A jury trial was held on February 9, 10, and 11, 2016. At trial, Holloway
objected to the admission of the evidence found in the bag that Detective Andry
had searched without a warrant. He argued that the search had violated his
constitutional right to privacy and that the evidence seized as a result of the
search should be excluded. In response to Holloway’s objection, the trial court
heard testimony from Detective Andry outside of the presence of the jury.
Detective Andry testified that he had known the three individuals in the Honda
from prior investigations. He also testified that he had been working on an
active investigation that included them when he responded to the instant case.
As a result, Detective Andrey knew that they had been involved in procuring
precursors for methamphetamine manufacturing “as recent[ly] as the week
before” the car chase. (Tr. 242). He testified that this knowledge made him
afraid that there might be a mobile methamphetamine lab in the car. He
explained, “When [an officer] told [him] that there had been a pursuit that had
gone on for a lengthy period of time[,] [he] was concerned that these chemicals
could be [] potentially explosive.” (Tr. 243). Because there was a danger that
one of the officers could be injured moving the car if there were an explosion,
he believed that the car should not be moved until he could inspect its interior
to make sure none of the chemicals was “in reaction.” (Tr. 243). He also noted
that there was a risk that evidence would be destroyed if there were an
explosion.
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[10] After hearing Detective Andry’s testimony, the trial court overruled Holloway’s
objection to the admission of the evidence discovered during the search of the
bag. As a basis for its conclusion, the trial court reasoned that public safety
concerns justified the search. Then, at the beginning of the next day of the jury
trial, the trial court again addressed its reasoning for overruling Holloway’s
motion. It clarified that it thought the search was permissible under the exigent
circumstances exception to the prohibition on warrantless searches—due to the
need for officer safety and the potential for destruction of evidence—and under
the custodial arrest exception.
[11] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury acquitted Holloway of attempted murder,
but it found him guilty of the remaining charges. Holloway then pled guilty to
the habitual substance offender allegation. The trial court sentenced him to
fourteen (14) years for dealing methamphetamine; one (1) year for maintaining
a common nuisance; one (1) year for possession of chemical reagents; one (1)
year for resisting law enforcement; and one (1) year for criminal recklessness,
with all of the sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court also
enhanced Holloway’s sentence for dealing methamphetamine by four (4) years
for his habitual substance offender adjudication, resulting in an eighteen (18)-
year aggregate sentence. Holloway now appeals his convictions for dealing in
methamphetamine, maintaining a common nuisance, and possession of
chemical reagents.
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Decision
[12] On appeal, Holloway argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting the evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing chemicals and
supplies that Detective Andry discovered during his warrantless search of the
bag in Holloway’s Honda. He argues that the search violated his right to
privacy under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and, accordingly, the evidence
discovered in the search should have been excluded. Although the Federal and
State constitutional provisions have similar structures, their interpretations and
applications vary. Accordingly, we will address Holloway’s argument under
each provision separately.
[13] Preliminarily, though, we note that the trial court has broad discretion to rule
on the admissibility of evidence. Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind.
2016). We review its rulings “‘for abuse of that discretion and reverse only
when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial rights.’” Id. (quoting
Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014)). We will not reweigh the
evidence and will resolve any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the trial
court’s ruling. Miller v. State, 51 N.E.3d 313, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g
denied. However, the “‘constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of
law, and we review it de novo.’” Bradley, 54 N.E.3d at 999 (quoting Kelly v.
State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind. 2013)).
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1. Fourth Amendment
[14] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects persons
from unreasonable searches and seizures by prohibiting, as a general rule,
searches and seizures conducted without a warrant supported by probable
cause. Moore v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1095, 1101 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied.
As a deterrent mechanism, evidence obtained in violation of this rule is
generally not admissible absent evidence of a recognized exception. Id.“‘Where a search or seizure is conducted without a warrant, the State bears the
burden to prove that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the
time of the search or seizure.’” Mullen v. State, 55 N.E.3d 822, 827 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2016) (quoting Brooks v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1234, 1240 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010), trans. denied). “‘Whether a particular warrantless search violates the
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment depends on the facts and circumstances
of each case.’” Weathers v. State, 61 N.E.3d 279, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)
(quoting Trotter, 933 N.E.2d 572, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)).
[15] Here, the trial court determined that there were exigent circumstances
supporting Detective Andry’s warrantless search. We have previously held that
“‘[t]he warrant requirement becomes inapplicable where the ‘exigencies of the
situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’”
McDermott v. State, 877 N.E.2d 467, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Holder v.
State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 936 (Ind. 2006)), trans. denied. Among the well-known
circumstances that have justified a warrantless search or seizure include entries:
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(1) to prevent bodily harm or death; (2) to aid a person in need of assistance; (3)
to protect private property; and (4) to prevent actual or imminent destruction or
removal of incriminating evidence before a search warrant may be obtained.
Notably, in Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013), our supreme court
found that there were exigent circumstances to justify a search when, as in the
instant case, officers suspected the presence of a mobile methamphetamine lab
in the defendant’s car.
[16] Holloway argues that the exigent circumstances exception did not apply here
because Detective Andry and the other officers did not have probable cause to
believe there was a methamphetamine lab in his car.5 As Holloway argues, we
have previously noted that “‘while exigent circumstances justify dispensing with
a search warrant, they do not eliminate the need for probable cause.’”
Montgomery v. State, 904 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting
Cudworth v. State, 818 N.E.2d 133, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans.
denied. “‘[I]n an emergency, the probable cause element may be satisfied where
the officers reasonably believe a person is in danger.’” Id. (quoting United States
v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied). Holloway
5
Holloway also argues that the trial court abused its discretion for denying his objection to the admission of
the evidence on one ground and then later clarifying that it intended to deny the objection on different
grounds. He asserts that, as a result of the trial court’s inconsistency, we should only address the trial court’s
original justification for denying the objection. However, we find that the trial court was consistent in its
conclusion that there were public safety concerns justifying the search. Moreover, we may affirm a trial
court’s decision regarding the admission of evidence if it is sustainable on any basis in the record. Barker v.
State, 695 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ind. 1998), reh’g denied. Accordingly, the trial court’s basis for admitting the
evidence is not dispositive.
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contends that the officers could not reasonably have believed that there was a
methamphetamine lab in the car because the car did not smell like a meth lab.
[17] We conclude that Holloway’s argument is essentially a request for us to
reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Miller, 51 N.E.3d at 315. Even
if there was not a methamphetamine smell outside of the car, there was
evidence supporting the officers’ belief that there might be a methamphetamine
lab in the car. Detective Andry knew the occupants from prior and
contemporaneous methamphetamine investigations and knew that Holloway
had purchased precursors for making methamphetamine in the prior week.
When Deputy Andry attempted to stop Holloway, Holloway led him on a fifty-
minute chase. Then, Detective Andry found a methamphetamine pipe resting
on the snow outside of the vehicle when he arrived on the scene. In light of
these factors, and Detective Andry’s testimony that chemicals in
methamphetamine manufacturing could be explosive after a fifty-minute-long
car chase, we conclude that Detective Andry and the other officers involved
had probable cause to believe that the Honda might contain a mobile
methamphetamine lab and that bystanders might be in danger. Accordingly,
we conclude that there were exigent circumstances and, thus, the search did not
violate Holloway’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.
2. Article 1, Section 11
[18] Alternatively, Holloway argues that Detective Andry’s search violated his right
to privacy under the Indiana Constitution. Like the Fourth Amendment,
Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution protects against warrantless
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searches. However, the legality of a search under the Indiana Constitution
“turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct under the
totality of the circumstances.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind.
2005). Reasonableness of a search depends on a balance of: (1) the degree of
concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred; (2) the degree of
intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary
activities; and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Id. at 361. It is the
State’s burden to show that its intrusion into “‘those areas of life that Hoosiers
regard as private,’” was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013) (quoting State v. Quirk, 842
N.E.2d 334, 339 (Ind. 2006)).
[19] The State argues that Holloway has waived his claim by failing to present an
independent analysis. Although Holloway cited the Indiana Constitution and
the Litchfield factors in his brief, he did not provide any analysis of the factors
independent from his analysis under the Fourth Amendment. As the State
notes, a defendant cannot invoke analysis of an issue under the Indiana
Constitution without a separate and independent analysis of the claim. Dye v.
State, 717 N.E.2d 5, 24 (Ind. 1999). Accordingly, we agree with the State that
Holloway has waived his state constitutional claim. See Francis v. State, 764
N.E.2d 641, 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that failure to provide a separate
and independent Indiana Constitution analysis results in waiver).
[20] Waiver notwithstanding, it is clear that Detective Andry’s search was
reasonable under Article 1, Section 11. Specifically, he had a high degree of
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suspicion that a violation had occurred because he was in the process of
investigating Holloway in another methamphetamine investigation and knew
he had purchased precursors the week before; Kirkham, the passenger in the
Honda, had admitted that “there may be something methamphetamine related
in the vehicle;” (Tr. 243-44); and he had found a methamphetamine pipe
outside the vehicle.
[21] In addition, the intrusion of his search was slight. Holloway had already been
arrested and transported to the hospital when the search occurred, so it did not
involve a search of Holloway’s person. Harris v. State, 19 N.E.3d 298, 303 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2014) (holding that the intrusion of a search was “slight” when the
defendant was already handcuffed and the search was not an invasive search of
his person), trans. denied. Moreover, Detective Andry ended his preliminary
search when he determined that the chemicals in the bag were not interacting
and, therefore, there was not a safety risk that they would explode. The officers
did not search the remainder of the vehicle until they had obtained a search
warrant.
[22] Finally, law enforcement needs were high. As Detective Andry noted, there
was a chance that the methamphetamine chemicals were explosive after the
fifty-minute car chase and could injure officers if they exploded while the car
was being transported to the station. This created a safety risk for the officers
and also a risk that the evidence in the car would be destroyed.
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[23] In light of the above factors, we conclude that Detective Andry’s search was
reasonable and did not violate Holloway’s right to privacy under the Indiana
Constitution. Because we have also found that the search did not violate the
Fourth Amendment, we, thus, also conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting the evidence discovered as a result of the search.
[24] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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