State v. Dodson , 2017 Ohio 350 ( 2017 )

[Cite as State v. Dodson, 2017-Ohio-350.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 16CA0020-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
JESSICA E. DODSON COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 14CR0342
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: January 31, 2017
SCHAFER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Jessica E. Dodson, appeals the judgment of the Medina
County Court of Common Pleas sentencing her to a prison term of eighteen months. For the
reasons that follow, this Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} The Medina County grand jury issued an indictment charging Dodson with one
count of possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(6)(a), one count of possession
of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(3)(a), and one count of aggravated possession of
drugs (methadone) in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(4)(a). At arraignment, Dodson entered a
plea of not guilty and the matter proceeded through the pretrial process.
{¶3} The trial court ultimately found that Dodson met the criteria for intervention in
lieu of conviction (“IILC”). Consequently, Dodson entered a guilty plea to all three counts in the
indictment and the trial court stayed the criminal proceedings without entering a finding of guilt.
2
The trial court then ordered Dodson to comply with the terms and conditions of the IILC
program. However, after several violations, the trial court found Dodson guilty of violating the
conditions of IILC and accepted Dodson’s earlier pleas of guilty to possession of heroin,
possession of cocaine, and aggravated possession of drugs. After a presentence investigation, the
trial court sentenced Dodson to 180 days of incarceration at the Medina County Jail with a credit
for 68 days already served. The trial court also imposed a number of non-residential community
control sanctions, including three years of probation under intensive supervision. While
incarcerated at the Medina County Jail, the trial court also ordered that Dodson be assessed for
placement at the Lorain/Medina County Community Based Correctional Facility (“CBCF”).
{¶4} Although Dodson was eventually placed at CBCF, she was unsuccessfully
terminated a short time later. At a hearing, the trial court accepted Dodson’s plea of admission
and found her guilty of violating the terms and conditions of her probation. The trial court
sentenced Dodson to a jail sentence of an additional thirty days and continued Dodson on
probation.
{¶5} However, Dodson again violated her probation. At a subsequent hearing, the trial
court accepted Dodson’s plea of admission and again found her guilty of violating the terms and
conditions of her probation. The trial court then imposed a prison sentence on Dodson of six
months incarceration on each of the three counts of possession to run consecutively with a credit
of 206 days for time already served.
{¶6} Dodson now brings this timely appeal and raises one assignment of error for our
review.
3
II.
Assignment of Error
The trial court committed plain error and erred as a matter of law in
sentencing Appellant to consecutive sentences for allied offenses that arose
from the same conduct and were not committed separately or with separate
animus.
{¶7} In her sole assignment of error, Dodson contends that the trial court committed
plain error when it imposed consecutive prison sentences because her convictions were allied
offenses arising from the same conduct and were not committed separately or with separate
animus. We disagree.
{¶8} In this case, Dodson did not seek to merge her charges prior to entering her guilty
pleas to possession of heroin, possession of cocaine, and aggravated possession of drugs and the
trial court’s subsequent acceptance of those guilty pleas. Consequently, Dodson states that her
separate convictions were proper “since the merger process was waived below.” Dodson
contends that regardless of this waiver, her convictions for possession of heroin, possession of
cocaine, and aggravated possession of drugs are allied offenses which arose from the same
conduct and, therefore, the trial court committed plain error when it did not merge her
convictions for sentencing purposes.
{¶9} Crim.R. 52(B) allows an appellate court to take notice of a plain error affecting a
substantial right even though the error was not first brought to the trial court’s attention.
However, a plain error review is only proper for instances of forfeiture rather than for waiver.
State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St. 3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, ¶ 23. Waiver is the intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a right, and the waiver of a right “cannot form the basis of any
claimed error under Crim.R. 52(B).” Id., quoting State v. McKee, 91 Ohio St. 3d 292, 299, fn. 3
(Cook, J., dissenting). However, “[i]n contrast to waiver, forfeiture is the failure to timely assert
4
a right or object to an error.” State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St. 3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 21.
Although Dodson uses the term waiver, in the body of her brief Dodson treats her failure to seek
the merger of her charges in the court below as a forfeiture of the argument and not as a waiver.
We recognize that “[i]t is possible for an accused to expressly waive the protection afforded by
R.C. 2941.25, such as by ‘stipulating in the plea agreement that the offenses were committed
with separate animus.’” Id. at ¶ 20, quoting Underwood at ¶ 29. However, after a thorough
review, we conclude that nothing in the record indicates that by pleading guilty Dodson intended
to relinquish the opportunity to argue that her offenses should have merged for the purposes of
sentencing. Additionally, “an allied offenses claim is consistent with an admission of guilt and
therefore is not waived by pleading guilty to offenses that might be allied offenses of similar
import.” Rogers at ¶ 19. Accordingly, we will analyze Dodson’s failure to raise the issue of the
possible merger of her charges before the trial court as a forfeiture of the argument.
{¶10} As we stated previously, Crim.R. 52(B) allows an appellate court to take notice of
a plain error affecting a substantial right even though the error was not first brought to the trial
court’s attention. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[a]n accused’s failure to raise the
issue of allied offenses of similar import in the trial court forfeits all but plain error, and a
forfeited error is not reversible unless it affected the outcome of the proceedings and reversal is
necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id. at ¶ 3. “Accordingly, an accused has
the burden to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the convictions are for allied offenses of
similar import committed with the same conduct and without separate animus; absent that
showing, the accused cannot demonstrate that the trial court’s failure to inquire whether the
convictions merge for purposes of sentence was plain error.” Id.
5
{¶11} “Whether multiple punishments imposed in the same proceeding are permissible
is a question of legislative intent.” State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St. 3d 427, 2013-Ohio-4982, ¶
10. “Absent a more specific legislative statement, R.C. 2941.25 is the primary indication of the
General Assembly’s intent to prohibit or allow multiple punishments for two or more offenses
resulting from the same conduct.” Id. at ¶ 11. “R.C. 2941.25 codifies the protections of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section
10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits multiple punishments for the same
offenses.” State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St. 3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, ¶ 23. The statute provides as
follows:
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or
more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain
counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar
import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or
similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to each, the
indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the
defendant may be convicted of all of them.
Accordingly, R.C. 2941.25(B) provides “that the same conduct can be separately punished if that
conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar import. (Emphasis sic.) State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St. 3d
114, 2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 20. Offenses are of dissimilar import if they involve separate victims or
if the harm that results from each offense is separate and identifiable. Id. at paragraph 2 of the
syllabus.
{¶12} Dodson contends that her convictions for possession of heroin, possession of
cocaine, and aggravated possession of drugs are allied offenses of similar import because they
were committed on the same day and arose from the same conduct. However, in State v.
6
Helmick, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27179, 2014-Ohio-4187, this Court previously recognized the
following:
Generally, crimes relating to different controlled substances are of dissimilar
import and do not merge. Under R.C. 2628.11(C), drug possession offenses are
classified and penalized based on the type and quantity of the controlled substance
involved. Where each violation of R.C. 2925.11 requires proof of the identity of a
different drug that was possessed * * * the legislature intended the possession of
the different drug groups to constitute different offenses.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 26. Other Ohio courts have also concluded
that the legislature intended the possession of different drugs to constitute different offenses and
thus, crimes relating to different controlled substances are of dissimilar import. See State v.
Huber, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2010-CA-83, 2011-Ohio-6175, ¶ 7 (“[T]he fact each violation of R.C.
2925.11 requires proof of the identity of a different drug that was possessed demonstrates ‘that
the legislature intended the possession of the different drug groups to constitute different
offenses.’”) quoting State v. Delfino, 22 Ohio St. 3d 270, 274 (1986); State v. Heflin, 6th Dist.
Lucas No. L-11-1173, 2012-Ohio-3988, ¶ 14 (holding that convictions for simultaneous
possession of cocaine and heroin were not subject to merger as allied offenses of similar import
since possession of either would never support a conviction for possession of the other); State v.
Santiago, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101601, 2015-Ohio-1300, ¶ 12 (concluding that possession of
heroin and possession of cocaine do not constitute allied offenses of similar import since they are
recognized as separate offenses under R.C. 2925.11); State v. Hughes, 5th Dist. Coshocton No.
15CA0008, 2016-Ohio-880, ¶ 24-25 (concluding that convictions for possession of cocaine,
heroin and other controlled substances did not merge for purposes of sentencing).
{¶13} In this case, Dodson was convicted of possession of heroin in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A)/(C)(6)(a), possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(4)(a), and
aggravated possession of drugs (methadone) in violation of R.C. 2925.11 (A)/(C)(1)(a).
7
Although it is undisputed that Dodson’s possession of heroin, cocaine, and methadone occurred
simultaneously, each is recognized as a separate offense under R.C.2925.11. Therefore, we
conclude that Dodson has failed to meet her burden to show a reasonable probability that her
offenses were allied offenses and subject to merger.
{¶14} Accordingly, Dodson’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶15} Dodson’s sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Medina
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JULIE A. SCHAFER
FOR THE COURT
8
WHITMORE, P. J.
HENSAL, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
PAUL E. MEYER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DEAN HOLMAN, Prosecuting Attorney, and VINCENT V. VIGLUICCI, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.