State v. Brown ( 2017 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Brown, 
    2017-Ohio-1114
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                     JUDGES:
    Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P. J.
    Plaintiff-Appellee                        Hon. John W. Wise, J.
    Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J.
    -vs-
    Case No. 2016 CA 0043
    STANLEY D. BROWN, JR.
    Defendant-Appellant                       OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                      Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common
    Pleas, Case No. 2015 CR 0698
    JUDGMENT:                                     Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        March 28, 2017
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                        For Defendant-Appellant
    BAMBI COUCH PAGE                              BYRON CORLEY
    PROSECUTING ATTORNEY                          22 North Walnut Street
    DANIEL M. ROGERS                              Mansfield, OHio 44902
    ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR
    38 South Park Street
    Mansfield, Ohio 44902
    Richland County, Case No. 2016 CA 0043                                                   2
    Wise, J.
    {¶1}   Appellant Stanley D. Brown, Jr. appeals his conviction on two counts of
    Aiding and Abetting Rape and one count of Kidnapping following a jury trial.
    {¶2}   Appellee is the State of Ohio.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
    {¶3}   On August 11, 2015, a Richland County Grand Jury indicted Appellant
    Stanley D. Brown, Jr. on three (3) counts related to Appellant's participation in the gang-
    rape of an intoxicated fifteen (15) year old girl at the Mansfield Rodeway Inn at 880 Laver
    Road in Mansfield, Ohio on January 3, 2015. Counts 1 and 2 charged Appellant with
    alternative forms of Aiding or Abetting Rape, both first-degree felonies pursuant to R.C.
    §2907.02(A)(1)(C) and (A)(2) and §2923.03(A)(2). Count 3 charged Appellant with
    Kidnapping, a first-degree felony pursuant to R.C. §2905.01(A)(4).
    {¶4}   The relevant facts are as follows:
    {¶5}   On Saturday, January 3, 2015, Amir Evans invited fifteen (15) year old J.J.
    to a party at the Rodeway Inn at 880 Laver Road, Mansfield, Ohio. (T. at 217-219). Evans
    had Trae Coopwood pick J.J. up and take her to the Rodeway Inn. (T. at 219).
    {¶6}   After being dropped off at the Rodeway Inn by Coopwood, J.J. met up with
    Evans, who rented two (2) rooms. (T. at 220, 224). J.J., Evans, Jermaine Hughes
    (hereinafter "Co-Defendant Hughes") and four (4) to five (5) other people went into the
    first room and began partying. (T. at 221-223). During the party in the first room, J.J.
    consumed alcohol, Marijuana, and psychedelic mushrooms. (T. at 221, 222, 267, 268).
    {¶7}   Approximately ninety (90) minutes after the party began, Appellant Stanley
    Brown, Jr., Eyrihk Murphy (hereinafter "Co-Defendant Murphy") and several other people
    Richland County, Case No. 2016 CA 0043                                                          3
    arrived at the Rodeway Inn and began partying with J.J., Evans and Co-Defendant
    Hughes. (T. at 222, 223).
    {¶8}   Approximately two (2) hours after J.J. arrived at Rodeway Inn, Appellant
    Brown, Co-Defendant Hughes, Co-Defendant Murphy, J.J., Evans, and several other
    people moved from the first room into the second room rented by Evans. (T. at 224, 225).
    Evans then left the second room, returning to the first room and leaving J.J. alone with
    Appellant Brown, Co-Defendant Hughes, and Co-Defendant Murphy. While in the second
    room, J.J. participated in a drinking game with Southern Comfort and Patron tequila. (T.
    at 226). As a result of her high level of intoxication, J.J. lost consciousness. (T. at 228).
    {¶9}   Upon regaining consciousness, J.J. discovered Co-Defendant Hughes
    vaginally penetrating her without her consent. (T. at 229). Appellant Brown was
    encouraging Co-Defendant Hughes as he vaginally raped J.J. and told J.J. to relax. (T.
    at 230-233). In addition to encouraging Co-Defendant Hughes, Appellant Brown, who was
    sitting on the bed directly next to J.J.'s head throughout the rape, pushed J.J. down by
    her shoulder when she tried to get up from the bed. (T. at 229-231, 470-472). Appellant
    also shoved his penis in J.J.'s face and attempted to force J.J. to perform oral sex on him.
    (T. at 232, 233, 470-472).
    {¶10} While the rape was occurring, Evans attempted to regain entry into the
    second room two (2) different times. (T. at 595-599). However, the occupants locked the
    door and ignored Evans knocking on the door. Id. Following the rape, J.J. returned to the
    first room, confronted Evans, and told him what Appellant Brown, Co-Defendant Hughes,
    and Co-Defendant Murphy had done to her. (T. at 236, 237, 600, 601). However, neither
    Richland County, Case No. 2016 CA 0043                                                     4
    J.J. nor Evans contacted the police, as they were afraid they would get in trouble due to
    their underage drinking and drug use. (T. at 616, 617).
    {¶11} After returning home from Rodeway Inn on Sunday, January 4, 2015, J.J.
    neither showered nor changed her clothes from the night before. (T. at 239). Instead, she
    ran errands with her mother and hoped that the events of January 3, 2015 would remain
    a secret. Id. However, when J.J. went to school on Monday, January 5, 2015, several of
    her friends made contact with her regarding what happened on January 3, 2015 at the
    Rodeway Inn. (T. at 239, 240).
    {¶12} Late in the evening on January 5, 2015, J.J. had a friend take her to
    OhioHealth Mansfield for a SANE exam, as she was still too embarrassed to tell her
    mother what happened at Rodeway Inn on January 3, 2015. (T. at 240, 241). During the
    SANE exam, J.J. advised SANE nurse Tammy Robertson of the events of January 3,
    2015, and identified Appellant Brown and Co-Defendant Hughes as two (2) of her
    attackers. (T. at 329, 330). Ms. Robertson completed a rape kit and collected anal and
    vaginal swabs, pubic hair, and fingernail clippings from J.J. (T. at 325-329). Ms.
    Robertson also made contact with Richland County Sheriff’s Office and J.J.'s mother in
    order to collect J.J.'s clothes from January 3, 2015. (T. at 331, 332). Richland County
    Sheriff’s Deputy Broom collected J.J.'s rape kit and clothing from January 3, 2015, and
    submitted them to Bureau of Criminal Investigation (hereinafter "BCI"). (T. at 578-583).
    {¶13} On January 8, 2015, Richland County Sheriff’s Deputy Dittrich interviewed
    J.J., who provided a statement regarding the rape at Rodeway Inn on January 3, 2015,
    and identified Appellant Brown, Co-Defendant Hughes and Co-Defendant Murphy as her
    attackers. (T. at 507-511). Deputy Dittrich then made contact with Evans and obtained
    Richland County, Case No. 2016 CA 0043                                                    5
    his statement regarding the events of January 3, 2015. (T. at 509). Following her
    interviews with J.J. and Evans, Deputy Dittrich obtained search warrants for DNA swabs
    from Appellant Brown, Co-Defendant Hughes, Co-Defendant Murphy and several other
    guests who were at the party at Rodeway Inn on January 3, 2015. (T. at 511-513). Deputy
    Dittrich submitted those DNA swabs to BCI for comparison to the swabs taken from J.J.'s
    person and J.J.'s clothing. Id.
    {¶14} Lindsey Pruneski and Jennifer Colecchia, two (2) forensic scientists at BCI,
    analyzed and compared the various DNA swabs. (T. at 410-430; 440-483). Ms. Colecchia
    identified Appellant Brown as the source of both sperm and non-sperm DNA on J.J.'s shirt
    from January 3, 2015, with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. (T. at 470-472).
    Ms. Colecchia also identified Co-Defendant Hughes as the source of sperm DNA
    recovered from J.J.'s vagina with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. (T. at 459).
    {¶15} Approximately one (1) week after the rape, Appellant Brown made contact
    with J.J. via Snapchat and asked J.J. if she had called the police. (T. at 243, 244). J.J.
    never responded to Appellant's message. (T. at 244).
    {¶16} On August 11, 2015, a Richland County Grand Jury indicted Appellant
    Stanley D. Brown, Jr. on one count of Aiding or Abetting Rape, pursuant to R.C.
    §2907.02(A)(1)(C) and (A)(2), one count of Aiding or Abetting Rape, pursuant to R.C.
    §2923.03(A)(2), and one count of Kidnapping, pursuant to R.C. §2905.01(A)(4). All
    charges were first-degree felonies.
    {¶17} Appellant entered pleas of not guilty to the charges.
    {¶18} On April 12, 2016, the State filed a "Request for Hearing" with the trial court
    regarding the admissibility of certain evidence.
    Richland County, Case No. 2016 CA 0043                                                    6
    {¶19} On June 1, 2016, the trial court held an Oral Hearing on Admissibility of
    Evidence. During the hearing, Appellant argued that, pursuant to his right of confrontation,
    he should be allowed to present evidence regarding J.J. having a venereal disease and
    J.J. previously frequenting Rodeway Inn.
    {¶20} Following the Oral Hearing on Admissibility of Evidence, the trial court
    excluded any evidence as to J.J. having a venereal disease or any previous visits to the
    Rodeway Inn pursuant to the "Rape Shield Law" under R.C. §2907.02(D).
    {¶21} On June 2, 2016, Appellant's case proceeded to jury trial. During the jury
    trial, the State presented testimony from eight (8) witnesses, including J.J., and
    introduced thirty-one (31) exhibits, including Lab Reports confirming the presence of
    Appellant's sperm and non-sperm DNA on J.J.'s body.
    {¶22} Appellant did not introduce any exhibits and only presented his own
    testimony.
    {¶23} On June 7, 2016, the jury found Appellant guilty of Aiding or Abetting Rape
    pursuant to R.C. §2907.02(A)(1)(c) and not guilty on the remaining counts of the
    indictment.
    {¶24} Following the verdict, the trial court scheduled a Sentencing Hearing for
    June 13, 2016.
    {¶25} On June 13, 2016, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a seven (7) year
    prison term, imposed five (5) years of mandatory post-release control, and classified
    Appellant as a Tier III sex offender.
    {¶26} On July 8, 2016, while represented by appellate counsel, Appellant filed a
    pro se "Motion for New Trial" with the trial court.
    Richland County, Case No. 2016 CA 0043                                                    7
    {¶27} On July 14, 2016, the State filed its "Response to Defendant's Motion for a
    New Trial" with the trial court.
    {¶28} On July 22, 2016, the trial court overruled Appellant's "Motion for New Trial."
    {¶29} Appellant now appeals.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    {¶30} “I. THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING TO EXCLUDE PROBATIVE EVIDENCE
    PURSUANT TO OHIO’S RAPE SHIELD STATUTE R.C.2907(D) [SIC] VIOLATED
    BROWN’S SIXTH AMEMNDMENT [SIC] GURANTEE [SIC] TO REASNONABLE [SIC]
    CROSS-EXAMINATION.
    {¶31} “II. THE JURY FINDING OF GUILTY OF AIDING AND ABETTING THE
    IMPAIRED CONSENT TYPE OF RAPE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT
    EVIDENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.”
    I.
    {¶32} In his First Assignment of Error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred
    in excluding testimony pursuant to R.C. §2907.02. We disagree.
    {¶33} Ohio’s Rape Shield Law as codified in R.C. §2907.02(D) provides:
    Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual activity, opinion
    evidence of the victim's sexual activity, and reputation evidence of the
    victim's sexual activity shall not be admitted under this section unless it
    involves evidence of the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease, or the
    victim's past sexual activity with the offender, and only to the extent that the
    court finds that the evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and
    Richland County, Case No. 2016 CA 0043                                                         8
    that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative
    value.
    {¶34} The “rape shield” law allows testimony on specific instances of a victim's
    “sexual activity” if the evidence is “material to a fact at issue in this case” and its probative
    value outweighs its inflammatory or prejudicial nature.
    {¶35} Here, Appellant argues that he should have been allowed to present
    evidence that “J.J. has previously partied at this hotel.” (Appellant’s brief at 5).
    {¶36} In determining whether “prior acts” evidence should be admitted, the court
    must balance the interests of the victim, which the statute is designed to protect, and the
    defendant's right to confront and cross-examine the State's witnesses. State v. Williams
    (1986), 
    21 Ohio St.3d 33
    , 35, 
    487 N.E.2d 560
    . If the evidence in question is merely being
    used to impeach the victim's credibility, it is not of probative value as to the alleged rape
    itself and should not be admitted. 
    Id.
    {¶37} Appellant does not argue that J.J. had previously engaged in sexual
    conduct with him or his co-defendants at the Rodeway Inn.
    {¶38} Upon review, we find any evidence as to whether or not J.J. had previously
    attended parties at the Rodeway Inn had no probative value as to whether, on the night
    in question, Appellant aided and abetted in her rape or whether she was substantially
    impaired at the time.
    {¶39} Based on the foregoing, we find Appellant's First Assignment of Error not
    well-taken and hereby overrule same.
    Richland County, Case No. 2016 CA 0043                                                   9
    II.
    {¶40} In his Second Assignment of Error, Appellant argues his conviction for
    aiding and abetting rape was not supported by sufficient evidence. We disagree.
    {¶41} A review of the sufficiency of the evidence and a review of the manifest
    weight of the evidence are separate and legally distinct determinations. State v. Gulley
    (Mar. 15, 2000), 9th Dist. No. 19600, at 3. “While the test for sufficiency requires a
    determination of whether the State has met its burden of production at trial, a manifest
    weight challenge questions whether the State has met its burden of persuasion.” State v.
    Thompkins (1997), 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 390, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    .
    {¶42} In order to determine whether the evidence before the trial court was
    sufficient to sustain a conviction, this Court must review the evidence in a light most
    favorable to the prosecution. State v. Jenks (1991), 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
    , 
    574 N.E.2d 492
    ,
    paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by State constitutional amendment on other
    grounds in State v. Smith (1997), 
    80 Ohio St.3d 89
    , 
    684 N.E.2d 668
    .
    {¶43} Specifically, an appellate court's function, when reviewing the sufficiency of
    the evidence to support a criminal conviction, is to examine the evidence admitted at trial
    to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the
    defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, supra. This test raises a
    question of law and does not allow the court to weigh the evidence. State v. Martin (1983),
    
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    , 175, 
    485 N.E.2d 717
    . The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing
    the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
    have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State
    v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    .
    Richland County, Case No. 2016 CA 0043                                                  10
    {¶44} “Because sufficiency is required to take a case to the jury, a finding that a
    conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence must necessarily include a finding
    of sufficiency.” State v. Roberts (Sept. 17, 1997), 9th Dist. No. 96CA006462. Thus, a
    determination that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence will also be
    dispositive of the issue of sufficiency. Cuyahoga Falls v. Scupholm (Dec. 13, 2000), 9th
    Dist. Nos. 19734 and 19735, unreported.
    {¶45} In the case sub judice, Appellant was convicted of Aiding and Abetting
    Rape, pursuant to R.C. §2923.03(A)(2) and R.C. §2907.02(A)(1)(c), which provide in
    relevant part:
    R.C. §2923.03 Complicity
    (A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the
    commission of an offense, shall do any of the following:
    ***
    (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense;
    R.C. §2907.02 Rape
    (A)(1) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another who is
    not the spouse of the offender or who is the spouse of the offender but is
    living separate and apart from the offender, when any of the following
    applies:
    ***
    (c) The other person's ability to resist or consent is substantially
    impaired because of a mental or physical condition or because of
    advanced age, and the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe
    Richland County, Case No. 2016 CA 0043                                                    11
    that the other person's ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired
    because of a mental or physical condition or because of advanced age.
    {¶46} “Sexual conduct” includes the act of cunnilingus, which has been described
    as “placing one's mouth on the female's genitals.” R.C. §2907.01(A); State v. Lynch, 
    98 Ohio St.3d 514
    , 2003–Ohio–2284, 
    787 N.E.2d 1185
    , ¶ 86. As for the element of
    substantial impairment, this Court has repeatedly held that “sleep constitutes a mental or
    physical condition that substantially impairs a person from resisting or consenting to
    sexual conduct.” State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98151, 2012–Ohio–5737, ¶ 30,
    citing State v. Clark, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90148, 2008–Ohio–3358, ¶ 21.
    {¶47} Because “substantial impairment” is not defined in the Ohio Criminal Code,
    the Supreme Court of Ohio has found that “substantial impairment” can be established
    “by demonstrating a present reduction, diminution or decrease in the victim's ability, either
    to appraise the nature of his conduct or to control his conduct.” State v. Zeh, 
    31 Ohio St.3d 99
    , 103–104 (1987); State v. Brown, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9–09–15, 2009–Ohio–
    5428, ¶ 21. Further, substantial impairment “does not have to be proven by expert medical
    testimony; rather, it can be shown to exist by the testimony of people who have interacted
    with the victim, and by allowing the trier of fact to do its own assessment of the person's
    ability to appraise or control his or her conduct.” State v. Brady, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    87854, 2007–Ohio–1453, ¶ 78; Brown at ¶ 21. Finally, a determination of substantial
    impairment is made “on a case-by-case basis, providing great deference to the fact-
    finder.” Brown at ¶ 22.
    {¶48} “Voluntary intoxication constitutes a ‘mental or physical condition’ that can
    cause substantial impartment under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c).” State v. Lasenby, 3d Dist.
    Richland County, Case No. 2016 CA 0043                                                   12
    Allen No. 1–13–36, 2014–Ohio–1878, ¶ 28, citing State v. Harmath, 3d Dist. Seneca No.
    13–06–20, 2007–Ohio–2993, ¶ 14.
    {¶49} “The consumption of large amounts of alcohol in a short period of time is
    evidence that voluntary intoxication caused substantial impairment.” 
    Id.,
     citing State v.
    Hatten, 
    186 Ohio App.3d 286
    , 2010–Ohio–499, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.). It is also sufficient if the
    victim testifies that she is unable to remember the events of the incident to establish
    substantial impairment. 
    Id.,
     citing Harmath at ¶ 19. “[S]tumbling, falling, slurred speech,
    passing out, [and] vomiting,” are evidence that an intoxicated person is substantially
    impaired. Hatten at ¶ 24.
    {¶50}   At trial, the victim testified that she consumed whiskey and tequila,
    marijuana and psychedelic mushrooms at the Rodeway Inn. She testified that she
    participated in a drinking game with Appellant which involved alternating shots of
    Southern Comfort and Patron tequila. She further testified that she became so intoxicated
    that she lost consciousness. She testified that when she awoke, co-defendant Hughes
    was having vaginal intercourse with her and Appellant was sitting on the bed next to her,
    encouraging Hughes, telling her to relax and pushing her back down onto the bed when
    she tried to get up. (T. at 230-233).
    {¶51} Additionally, the victim testified that Appellant attempted to force the victim
    to perform oral sex on him.
    {¶52} The lab results from BCI identified Appellant as the source of both sperm
    and non-sperm DNA recovered from the victim’s shirt.
    {¶53} Based on the foregoing, we find that State presented sufficient evidence to
    support the aiding and abetting rape conviction.
    Richland County, Case No. 2016 CA 0043                                     13
    {¶54} Appellant’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled.
    {¶55} Accordingly the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland
    County, Ohio, is affirmed.
    By: Wise, John, J.
    Delaney, P. J., and
    Wise, Earle, J., concur.
    JWW/d 0310
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2016 CA 0043

Judges: Wise

Filed Date: 3/28/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/28/2017