People v. Perez , 413 P.3d 266 ( 2017 )

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA52
Court of Appeals No. 15CA1352
Adams County District Court No. 14CV2608
Honorable Walter R. Kiesnowski, Jr., Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jimmy Aruther Perez,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division I
Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM
Taubman and Navarro, JJ., concur
Announced April 20, 2017
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Ellen M. Neel, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Lisa Weisz, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Jimmy Aruther Perez, appeals the district court’s
restitution order. He contends that the court abused its discretion
by ordering him to reimburse the victim $10,080 for expended
vacation and sick days. Because we conclude that used vacation
and sick leave are pecuniary losses compensable to the victim
under the Restitution Act (the Act), sections 18-1.3-601 to -603,
C.R.S. 2016, we affirm in part but remand for reduction of the
restitution award by $840 (representing an additional five working
days ordered by the court but not supported by the record).
I. Background
¶2 Perez pleaded guilty to leaving the scene of an accident
resulting in serious bodily injury, § 42-4-1601(1), (2)(a), C.R.S.
2016, in exchange for the dismissal of additional charges. After the
court sentenced Perez, the prosecution requested restitution in the
amount of $9,240, based on the victim missing fifty-five days of
work after the accident. Perez objected to the prosecution’s
restitution request.
¶3 At the restitution hearing, the prosecution submitted evidence
that the victim made $21 an hour and that he typically worked an
eight-hour day. The victim missed fifty-five days of work due to his
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injuries from the accident, but for a portion of those days he was
compensated by his employer through his use of vacation and sick
leave. Perez argued that the victim did not lose wages for the period
he expended vacation and sick leave, and while the expenditure of
his leave was “a loss of some kind,” that loss was not compensable
under the Act. Perez also argued that he was not the proximate
cause of the victim’s losses because he pleaded guilty to leaving the
scene of an accident resulting in serious bodily injury but not to
any crime establishing he was the proximate cause of the victim’s
injury.
¶4 In a written order, the district court held that Perez was the
proximate cause of the victim’s losses because his “construction of
the restitution statute [was] entirely too narrow and ignore[d] the
broad meaning intended by the [G]eneral [A]ssembly when it tied a
defendant’s restitution obligation to his overall criminal conduct
and not the charges to which he has pled guilty.” The court also
concluded that
the reasonable value of the victim’s economic
damages is based upon his hourly rate of
approximately $21.00 per hour, multiplied by
40 hours per week for 12 weeks. . . . [T]he
reasonable value of the paid time off which the
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victim was required to exhaust because of
[Perez’s] overall criminal conduct is $10,080.
II. Restitution
A. Standard of Review
¶5 “A trial court has broad discretion to determine the terms and
conditions of a restitution order.” People v. Rivera, 250 P.3d 1272,
1274 (Colo. App. 2010). “A court abuses its discretion when it
misconstrues or misapplies the law or when its decision fixing the
amount of restitution is not supported by the record.” People v.
Stotz, 2016 COA 16, ¶ 85 (citations omitted). Restitution is part of
a defendant’s criminal sentence. People v. Vasseur, 2016 COA 107,
¶ 16. We review the legality of a sentence de novo. People v. Oliver,
2016 COA 180M, ¶ 16.
¶6 “Whether the sentencing court interpreted the statutory
sentencing scheme correctly is a question of statutory interpretation
that we review de novo.” People v. Rice, 2015 COA 168, ¶ 10. Our
primary task is to give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. Id.
at ¶ 11. “To discern the General Assembly’s intent, we look to the
plain language of the statute, and where that language is clear and
unambiguous, we engage in no further statutory analysis.” Id.
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¶7 “Whether a particular claim for restitution fits within the
statutory definition is a question of law, which this court reviews de
novo.” In re Welfare of M.R.H., 716 N.W.2d 349, 351 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2006); cf. People v. McLain, 2016 COA 74, ¶ 9 (interpretation of
the restitution statute is subject to de novo review).
B. Defendant Proximately Caused the Victim’s Injuries
¶8 Perez claims that the district court erred in holding that his
actions were the proximate cause of the victim’s injuries because it
did not make an express finding on the issue. We identify no
reversible error.
¶9 “‘Proximate cause’ means a cause that in ‘natural and
probable sequence produced the claimed injury’ and ‘without which
the claimed injury would not have been sustained.’” People v.
Lassek, 122 P.3d 1029, 1035 (Colo. App. 2005) (quoting People v.
Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 116 (Colo. 2002)).
[I]n determining the proper amount of
restitution owed, sentencing courts may
consider both uncharged and acquitted
criminal conduct that has been proved by a
preponderance of the evidence; courts are not
limited to considering only the criminal
conduct which a defendant was found beyond
a reasonable doubt to have committed.
4
Stotz, ¶ 90; see People v. Steinbeck, 186 P.3d 54, 60 (Colo. App.
2007) (the Act “only requires that the conduct underlying the basis
of the defendant’s criminal conviction proximately caused the
victim’s losses”).
¶ 10 The prosecution bears the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, both the amount of restitution owed
and that the victim’s losses were proximately caused by the
defendant. Vasseur, ¶ 15.
¶ 11 The People argue on appeal that Perez either waived or invited
this error. See People v. Gross, 2012 CO 60M, ¶ 8 (invited error
doctrine); People v. Rediger, 2015 COA 26, ¶¶ 54-60 (waiver) (cert.
granted Feb. 16, 2016). Our review of the record discloses that
Perez made this argument to the district court at the restitution
hearing, and, therefore, we conclude the doctrines of waiver and
invited error do not apply.
¶ 12 The district court rejected Perez’s proximate cause contention
but did not expressly state it found Perez to be the proximate cause
of the victim’s injuries. However, the court’s rejection necessarily
implied that it found Perez to be the proximate cause of the victim’s
injuries, and sufficient record evidence supports that finding. The
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conduct underlying the charge of leaving the scene of an accident
resulting in serious bodily injury was Perez hitting the victim with
his car. Although the district attorney elected to charge defendant
with leaving the scene of an accident instead of a crime based on
his having caused the victim’s injuries, the court is not precluded
from ordering restitution because of the charge elected. Steinbeck,
186 P.3d at 60. The crime for which Perez pleaded guilty arose
from acts that injured the victim, and we discern no error in the
court’s rejection of his arguments to the contrary.
C. Expended Vacation and Sick Days are Losses Compensable
Under the Restitution Act
¶ 13 Every judgment of conviction for a felony offense must include
the consideration of an order of restitution to be paid by the
defendant. § 18-1.3-603(1); see Lassek, 122 P.3d at 1034. “We
liberally construe the restitution statute to accomplish its goal of
making victims whole for the harms suffered as the result of a
defendant’s criminal conduct.” Rivera, 250 P.3d at 1274; see
Roberts v. People, 130 P.3d 1005, 1009 (Colo. 2006).
“Restitution” means any pecuniary loss
suffered by a victim and includes but is not
limited to all out-of-pocket expenses, interest,
loss of use of money, anticipated future
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expenses, rewards paid by victims, money
advanced by law enforcement agencies, money
advanced by a governmental agency for a
service animal, adjustment expenses, and
other losses or injuries proximately caused by
an offender’s conduct and that can be
reasonably calculated and recompensed in
money. “Restitution” does not include
damages for physical or mental pain and
suffering, loss of consortium, loss of enjoyment
of life, loss of future earnings, or punitive
damages.
§ 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2016 (emphasis added).
¶ 14 While “pecuniary loss” is not defined in the Act, Black’s Law
Dictionary defines pecuniary loss as “[a] loss of money or of
something having monetary value.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1088
(10th ed. 2014); see Roalstad v. City of Lafayette, 2015 COA 146,
¶ 34 (where a statute does not define a term and the word at issue
is a term of common usage, we may refer to dictionary definitions in
determining the word’s plain and ordinary meaning).
¶ 15 Perez contends that vacation and sick leave are not
compensable under the Act because the loss of leave is not a
pecuniary loss. We disagree.
¶ 16 The Act contemplates compensation for a victim’s lost wages.
See § 18-1.3-602(3)(a); People v. Bryant, 122 P.3d 1026, 1029 (Colo.
7
App. 2005) (“‘[L]ost wages’ are wages not received by the victim from
the date the crime was committed to the date restitution is
imposed . . . .”). We conclude expenditure of vacation and sick
leave is a loss of employee benefits comparable to a victim’s lost
wages. See In re Ryan A., 39 P.3d 543, 550 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002)
(Under Arizona’s restitution statute, the court declined “to construe
the term ‘lost wages’ so narrowly as to preclude restitution for the
loss of indirect employment benefits, such as annual leave or
vacation time . . . . The loss of such benefits is a real economic loss
tied to wages earned.”); In re K.F., 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 784, 793 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2009) (Under California’s restitution statute, the court
found a victim’s loss of sick leave was compensable because “by
depleting his sick leave . . . the credits consumed would not be
available [to the victim] to cover future illnesses or for whatever
other beneficial purpose the employer might allow.”); M.R.H., 716
N.W.2d at 353 (Under Minnesota’s restitution statute, “[a]lthough
accrued leave is not one of the losses specifically listed in the
statute, earned but unused leave is a compensable asset, and its
loss therefore may be recoverable by a victim-employee through
restitution.”); see also State v. Loutsch, 656 N.W.2d 781, 786 (Wis.
8
Ct. App. 2002) (under Wisconsin’s restitution statute, sick leave is
compensable), overruled on other grounds by State v. Fernandez,
764 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Wis. 2009).
¶ 17 Perez seeks to distinguish between vested and unvested leave
when considering the compensability of vacation and sick leave.
Relying on In re Marriage of Cardona, 2014 CO 3, he argues that
any unvested leave is not compensable under the Act.1 In that
divorce proceeding, the supreme court concluded that “where a
spouse has an enforceable right to be paid for accrued vacation or
sick leave, as established by an employment agreement or policy,
such accrued leave earned during the marriage is marital property
for purposes of the [Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA)].”
Id. at ¶ 14. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that vested
interests constitute property under the UDMA, id. at ¶¶ 21-29, but
that “interests that are speculative” (unvested interests) “are ‘mere
expectancies’ that are not property.” Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting In re
1The evidence at the restitution hearing established that the victim
was entitled to payment for his accrued vacation leave at any time,
but that he was only entitled to a payment for sick leave after he
accrued 160 hours.
9
Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 36 (Colo. 2001)). Perez urges us
to adopt a similar distinction in the restitution context.
¶ 18 We perceive no benefit to categorizing vacation and sick leave
as vested or unvested under the Act because irrespective of the
leave’s status, its expenditure by the victim constitutes a loss. As
the supreme court noted in Cardona, “time off is itself
‘compensation’ that has value,” id. at ¶ 29, and “when [an]
employee ‘uses’ vacation days, the employee still receives the earned
compensation, albeit in the form of time off from work,” id. at ¶ 32.
When a victim expends his or her right to time off due to the
conduct of a defendant (and the value of that time off can be
reasonably calculated and recompensed in money), the Act
mandates restitution. See § 18-1.3-602(3)(a); cf. People in Interest of
D.S.L., 134 P.3d 522, 528 (Colo. App. 2006) (awarding the victim
lost wages where he was unable to work preapproved overtime
hours because of the defendant’s criminal conduct).
¶ 19 In addition, we liberally construe the Act to accomplish the
statute’s purposes. Johnson v. People, 2016 CO 59, ¶ 32. Making
the victim whole is one such purpose of the Act. Vasseur, ¶ 13. “A
victim is made whole when he or she is placed ‘in the same financial
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position he [or she] would have been in had the wrong not been
committed.’” People v. Reyes, 166 P.3d 301, 304 (Colo. App. 2007)
(alteration in original) (quoting Alcaraz v. State, 44 P.3d 68, 73
(Wyo. 2002)). Because Perez cannot give the victim his vacation
and sick leave back to make the victim whole, in order to place the
victim in the same financial position he would have been in had
Perez not committed the crime, Perez can be ordered to pay the
value of the expended vacation and sick leave. And, contrary to
Perez’s contention, we do not discern this payment to be a
“windfall” inappropriately benefiting the victim. See id. (“Restitution
is intended to make the victim whole, ‘not to put the victim in a
better position than before the crime occurred.’”) (citation omitted)
(quoting Simmons v. State, 205 S.W.3d 194, 198 (Ark. Ct. App.
2005)). While the victim could not receive cash for his first 160
hours of sick leave, such leave had value both because the victim
was forced to exhaust that leave and because that leave will no
longer be available for the victim to use to cover future illnesses.
¶ 20 In sum, we conclude that expended vacation and sick leave
are compensable as “other losses . . . proximately caused by an
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offender’s conduct and that can be reasonably calculated and
recompensed in money.” § 18-1.3-602(3)(a).
D. The Victim Missed Fifty-Five Days of Work
¶ 21 Lastly, Perez contends the court erred in ordering he pay the
victim for twelve weeks of missed work. While the victim did testify
at the restitution hearing that he missed twelve weeks, the
prosecution sought restitution for fifty-five days of missed work,
and the record supports this calculation. Because awarding an
additional five days of missed work results in an $840 windfall to
the victim, we remand for the district court to reduce the restitution
order by $840. See Reyes, 166 P.3d at 304 (the Act avoids a
windfall for the victim); see also Oliver, ¶ 43 (reviewing a claimed
error in the court’s restitution for plain error).
III. Conclusion
¶ 22 The order is affirmed in part, and the case is remanded for the
district court to reduce the restitution order by $840.
JUDGE TAUBMAN and JUDGE NAVARRO concur.
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