State of Maine v. Joshua T. Williamson ( 2017 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 108 Docket: Ken-16-257
Submitted
On Briefs: April 27, 2017
Decided: June 1, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
JOSHUA T. WILLIAMSON
ALEXANDER, J.
[¶1] This appeal involves a defendant who, while showing signs of
significant impairment, accurately predicted to police officers that he would
test at a “point 22,” nearly three times the .08 limit established by law.
See 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(A)(2) (2016). A jury found him guilty of
operating under the influence at a trial where the State had to prove either
that Williamson’s quantitative breath-alcohol level exceeded that limit or that
his mental or physical faculties were impaired however slightly, or to any
extent, by alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicants that he had consumed. See
State v. Atkins, 2015 ME 162, ¶¶ 1, 21, 129 A.3d 952. On appeal, the
defendant’s primary contention is that the State failed to comply with
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technical requirements for the admission of the Intoxilyzer test result. We
affirm the judgment.
[¶2] Joshua T. Williamson appeals from a judgment of conviction
entered by the trial court (Kennebec County, Marden, J.) after a jury found him
guilty of operating under the influence (Class D), 29-A M.R.S.
§ 2411(1-A)(B)(1) (2016), and criminal mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 806(1)(A) (2016). Williamson argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting the breath test result pursuant to 29-A M.R.S.
§ 2431(2) (2016) and that the State’s late disclosure that one of its witnesses
was recently investigated for accidentally shooting himself violated his due
process rights pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
I. CASE HISTORY
[¶3] “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the
jury could rationally have found the following facts beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Rourke, 2017 ME 10, ¶ 2, 154 A.3d 127.
[¶4] On August 11, 2015, Williamson arrived at his Gardiner home from
work between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. and began smoking marijuana and drinking
shots of vodka. Williamson’s girlfriend arrived home at approximately
5:30 p.m. Her Ford Explorer and Jeep Grand Cherokee were parked in front of
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the apartment building in which they lived. She and Williamson had been
arguing all day, and she observed him drink vodka straight from the bottle.1
[¶5] At some point, Williamson left to visit a neighbor in the adjacent
apartment. The neighbor knocked on Williamson’s door later that evening
and asked Williamson’s girlfriend to retrieve Williamson from the neighbor’s
apartment. Williamson and his girlfriend resumed arguing. He took the keys
to her Jeep Grand Cherokee and drove her Jeep into her Ford Explorer, backed
up, and drove the Jeep into the Ford again. The neighbor, upon hearing the
crash, went outside and observed damage to the vehicles parked outside of
the apartment building. The Jeep had a flat tire, and the Ford had a broken
taillight.
[¶6] Approximately twenty minutes later, at 1:54 a.m., Williamson
called 9-1-1 to report a domestic dispute. The dispatcher determined, after
speaking with Williamson, that his speech was slurred and that he had
difficulty answering “straightforward” questions.
1 Williamson’s girlfriend provided conflicting testimony at trial regarding when she observed
Williamson drink alcohol. On direct examination, she testified that Williamson did not drink
anything after he damaged her vehicles, but, on cross-examination, she testified that he began
drinking after he damaged her vehicles. Williamson’s girlfriend also testified to a version of the
timing of events that was different from the version that she provided in her written statement to
police immediately after the incident, which statement the State used to impeach her testimony.
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[¶7] Officers of the Gardiner Police Department arrived approximately
ten minutes after Williamson called 9-1-1. They observed that Williamson
was unsteady on his feet, stumbling over objects, slurring his speech, and
exhibiting erratic behavior. He admitted that he had been drinking alcohol
since getting home from work hours earlier, but he denied driving. The jury
also heard evidence that months later, at a Bureau of Motor Vehicles hearing
held before his trial, Williamson admitted to driving and to damaging his
girlfriend’s vehicles.
[¶8] The police arrested Williamson and transported him to the police
station, where he performed poorly on standardized field sobriety tests.
Williamson agreed to take a breath test and “guesstimated” that he would test
at a “point 22.” An officer administered the breath test on an Intoxilyzer at
3:38 a.m., and Williamson’s result was indeed 0.22 grams of alcohol per
210 liters of breath.
[¶9] In October 2015, Williamson was charged by complaint with
operating under the influence (Class D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(B)(1), and
criminal mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 806(1)(A). Williamson pleaded not
guilty.
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[¶10] The court held a two-day jury trial in May 2016. The State’s
evidence consisted of testimony of the 9-1-1 dispatcher, Williamson’s
neighbor, Williamson’s girlfriend, the responding officers, and the Intoxilyzer
site coordinator for the Gardiner Police Department, and exhibits including a
recording of the 9-1-1 call, photographs of the damaged vehicles, portions of a
police body camera video, and the certified Intoxilyzer result.
[¶11] On the first day of the trial, the State informed Williamson and
the court that Williamson’s neighbor had recently been investigated for
accidentally shooting himself in the leg, but that the State did not intend to file
any charges. Williamson objected to the neighbor’s testimony. He argued:
I have a very detailed Brady discovery request that, you know, if
there [were] reports that he maybe said things or hasn’t made
credible statements to the police or prosecutors, then I should
have known about that, I mean that’s potential Brady information
. . . If he says something and his credibility is an issue, there is a
Brady violation if they have not disclosed reports to me.
The court concluded that the investigation of the accidental shooting had no
bearing on the neighbor’s credibility and overruled the objection.
[¶12] Williamson also offered to stipulate to being under the influence
when the police arrived and to the Intoxilyzer result, but the stipulation was
conditioned on the State not offering videos showing his impairment. The
State did not agree to the stipulation. After the officer who administered the
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breath test testified that the Intoxilyzer bore the stamp of approval of the
Department of Health and Human Services (the Department), the State offered
the breath test result. Williamson objected. He argued that, although the
State had satisfied paragraph H of 29-A M.R.S. § 2431(2), it had not offered
sufficient evidence to satisfy paragraph I. The court sustained the objection.
[¶13] The State then called the Intoxilyzer site coordinator, who
testified that the Intoxilyzer bore the Department’s stamp of approval and
that he performs a monthly calibration check of the solution that is used in the
operation of the Intoxilyzer, which is provided by a chemist from the
Department’s Health and Environmental Testing Laboratory. When asked if
the solution comes with a statement of the manufacturer certifying its
composition and quality, the officer testified that it does not come with a
“certificate” but that it comes directly from the Department “with [the
chemist’s] initials.”
[¶14] The State offered the result of the Intoxilyzer for a second time,
and the court admitted the Intoxilyzer result over Williamson’s objection. The
court stated that paragraph I was satisfied by testimony that the materials
“com[e] from the Department of Health and Human Services with [the
chemist’s] stamp,” which has been “the standard in the industry” in Maine.
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[¶15] After the State rested, Williamson moved for a judgment of
acquittal on the charge of operating under the influence, arguing that the State
had failed to prove that Williamson was impaired at the time of operation.
The court denied the motion. The State and Williamson offered closing
arguments. Williamson’s closing argument focused almost exclusively on the
issue of whether he was impaired at the time of operation.2 The jury found
Williamson guilty of both counts.3
[¶16] Williamson moved for a judgment of acquittal, M.R.U. Crim.
P. 29(a), which the court denied. The court sentenced Williamson to 364 days’
incarceration with all but twenty days suspended, one year of probation, a
$700 fine, and fees and surcharges.4 Williamson timely filed this appeal. See
15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2016); M.R. App. P. 2.
2 Likewise, in Williamson’s opening statement, he asked the jury “to focus like a laser” on the
“critical piece” of the State’s case which is “[Williamson’s] state at the time of driving . . . [n]ot some
time later in the evening, not some earlier time, but at the time of driving.”
3 During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court with three questions. The questions
concerned what time Williamson’s girlfriend retrieved Williamson from their neighbor’s apartment,
the amount of time between the neighbor hearing the crash and the arrival of the police, and
Williamson’s girlfriend’s written statement to police.
4 Before the start of the trial, Williamson stipulated to a prior conviction for operating under the
influence that occurred on September 18, 2007, which enhanced the minimum mandatory sentence
of incarceration. See 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(B)(1), (5)(B) (2016).
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II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Breath Test Result
[¶17] Williamson argues that that the trial court abused its discretion
and clearly erred by admitting the Intoxilyzer result when the State failed to
prove the requirements of paragraphs H and I of 29-A M.R.S. § 2431(2). “[W]e
review the admission of evidence over an objection for lack of foundation for
an abuse of discretion, but review underlying factual findings for clear error.”
State v. Gurney, 2012 ME 14, ¶ 36, 36 A.3d 893.
[¶18] Title 29-A M.R.S. § 2431 (2016) establishes evidentiary rules
governing admission of breath testing results in operating under the influence
cases. State v. Tozier, 2015 ME 57, ¶ 7, 115 A.3d 1240. A breath test result
from an Intoxilyzer may be admitted as prima facie evidence of a criminal
defendant’s alcohol level. 29-A M.R.S. § 2431(2)(G). To admit the result, the
State must either produce expert testimony or present sufficient evidence to
satisfy paragraphs H and I of the statute. Id. § 2431(2)(K); Tozier,
2015 ME 57, ¶ 14, 115 A.3d 1240. Paragraph H requires evidence that the
testing apparatus was approved by the Department, which may be proved by
demonstrating that the apparatus bore the Department’s stamp of approval.
29-A M.R.S. § 2431(2)(H). Paragraph I requires evidence that the materials
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used in operating or checking the operation of the testing apparatus were of
the composition and quality stated, which may be proved by demonstrating
that the materials “bore a statement of the manufacturer or of the
Department.” Id. § 2431(2)(I). The statute does not define “statement.” See
29-A M.R.S. § 2401 (2016).
[¶19] Here, the State met the requirements of paragraph H with the
testimony of both the Intoxilyzer operator and the site coordinator that the
apparatus bore the Department’s stamp of approval. Williamson agreed at
trial that paragraph H had been satisfied. Thus, any challenge to compliance
with paragraph H was waived.
[¶20] Regarding paragraph I, the site coordinator testified that the
solution used in the operation of the breath test apparatus was provided by
the Department’s Health and Environmental Testing Laboratory and bore the
initials of a chemist employed by the Department. As the statute does not
mandate that the statement of the Department take a particular form, the
court did not err in construing the chemist’s initials as a “statement” of the
Department. Because there is competent evidence in the record to support
the court’s findings that the State satisfied paragraphs H and I, the court did
not abuse its discretion or clearly err in admitting the test result.
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B. Late Disclosure Regarding State’s Witness
[¶21] Williamson argues that the State’s disclosure, during trial, that a
State’s witness was recently investigated for accidentally shooting himself
violated Williamson’s due process rights pursuant to Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83.5 We review the alleged due process violation de novo. State v.
Jones, 2012 ME 126, ¶ 35, 55 A.3d 432.
[¶22] “A defendant’s due process rights are violated when the
prosecution withholds evidence favorable to him.” State v. Jobin,
510 A.2d 527, 529-30 (Me. 1986) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). A Brady
violation has three elements: (1) the evidence must be favorable to the
defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) the State must
have suppressed the evidence either willfully or inadvertently, and
(3) prejudice must have ensued. State v. Twardus, 2013 ME 74, ¶ 32,
72 A.3d 523.
[¶23] We have held on numerous occasions that the State’s late
disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence is not necessarily, on its own, a
violation of due process pursuant to Brady. The context and the facts
5 Williamson also argues that his due process rights were violated based on M.R.U. Crim. P. 16
and “notions of fair play” pursuant to the state and federal constitutions. These arguments were
not raised before the trial court, and, therefore, we review only for obvious error. See M.R.U.
Crim. P. 52(b); State v. Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶ 29, 28 A.3d 1147. We conclude that there was no
obvious error.
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surrounding the late disclosure are critical to the analysis. See State v. Gagne,
2017 ME 63, ¶¶ 29-30, --- A.3d --- (concluding that the State’s production of
medical records a week before trial did not deprive the defendant of a fair
trial); State v. Gould, 2012 ME 60, ¶¶ 7, 25-26, 43 A.3d 952 (concluding that
the State’s delivery of test results to the defendant a half hour before the start
of trial was not an unreasonable delay under the circumstances); State v. Kelly,
2000 ME 107, ¶ 26 n.11, 752 A.2d 188 (concluding that there was no error
when the defendant was aware of the exculpatory evidence before trial).
[¶24] Here, the State did not conceal the evidence, which it provided to
Williamson partway through the first day of a two-day trial, soon after the
prosecutor had first learned of the investigation concerning the witness.
Williamson vaguely argues that the investigative report could contain
impeaching information, but there is nothing in the record before us that
suggests that the evidence at issue is either exculpatory or impeaching. The
investigation of the neighbor was wholly unrelated to the matter before the
trial court, and accidentally shooting oneself, without more, does not
demonstrate bias, motive to fabricate, personal interest, hostility, or any other
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factor affecting credibility.6 Therefore, because the State disclosed the
evidence to Williamson, and the information was not favorable to him
pursuant to Brady, Williamson’s right to due process was not violated.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Jeremy Pratt, Esq. and Ellen Simmons, Esq., Camden, for appellant Joshua
Williamson
Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Alisa Ross, Asst. Dist. Atty.,
Prosecutorial District IV, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2015-1241
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
6 Williamson’s contention that the late disclosure left him with no recourse is unpersuasive
where he did not request a continuance, an in camera review, a mistrial, or any other form of relief.
See State v. Gould, 2012 ME 60, ¶ 27, 43 A.3d 952; State v. Dube, 478 A.2d 1138, 1142 (Me. 1984).