State v. Dasean Harper (077427) (Salem and Statewide) , 229 N.J. 228 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                     SYLLABUS
    (This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
    convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
    interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)
    State v. Dasean Harper (A-74-15) (077427)
    Argued January 30, 2017 -- Decided June 5, 2017
    RABNER, C.J., writing for the Court.
    The Legislature passed an amnesty bill in 2013 that, “for a period of not more than 180 days from the
    effective date of [the] act,” L. 2013, c. 117, enabled people to dispose of guns they possessed illegally. During that
    time, the law allowed individuals to transfer or voluntarily surrender firearms. The Court now considers whether the
    law effectively created a nearly six-month grace period from prosecution for the illegal possession of firearms.
    On November 29, 2013, a police officer saw a box truck parked in the wrong direction on a street. He also
    observed that its tires were partially in the roadway. The officer asked for identification, and each man provided a
    Pennsylvania driver’s license. Defendant Dasean Harper was the driver. The officer checked the identifications
    through dispatch and learned that defendant had two outstanding arrest warrants. The officer then asked defendant
    to step out of the truck, told him that he was being placed under arrest, and directed him to put his hands up.
    The officer called for backup, handcuffed defendant, and retrieved a gun from defendant’s waistband—a
    Smith & Wesson .357 Magnum revolver loaded with four hollow-point bullets and two slug rounds. During a
    search, the officer also recovered a concealed-carry permit that the State of Florida had issued to defendant.
    Defendant said that, because of the permit, he thought he had not done anything wrong.
    On February 20, 2014, a grand jury returned an indictment that charged defendant with second-degree
    unlawful possession of a weapon and fourth-degree possession of hollow-point bullets.
    Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment relying, in part, on the Florida permit to claim an exemption
    from prosecution. Defense counsel represented that defendant lived and worked in Pennsylvania and passed through
    New Jersey to make a delivery for his job. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
    A jury convicted defendant on both counts. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. He also filed a
    motion for bail pending appeal. In support of his request, defendant argued for the first time that his handgun
    conviction was illegal because of the amnesty provision. In a two-page order dated August 5, 2015, the Appellate
    Division remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a bail hearing and consider the amnesty law.
    The trial court granted defendant bail pending appeal and later heard oral argument on the meaning of the
    amnesty provision. Based on the plain language of the law, the trial court concluded that an individual who
    unlawfully possessed a handgun on the effective date of the law could keep the firearm and decide how to proceed
    for the next 179 days.
    The court vacated defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm “because the issue of
    amnesty was never presented to the finder of fact.” The Appellate Division denied the State’s motions for leave to
    appeal and for a stay of the trial court’s order.
    The Court granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal. 
    226 N.J. 205
     (2016).
    HELD: The amnesty law did not afford defendants blanket immunity for the entire amnesty period. Reading the law
    in that way would lead to absurd results that the Legislature did not intend. Instead, the law created a period of no more
    than six months during which people could dispose of weapons they illegally possessed without being prosecuted. The
    provision affords a defense to those who attempted to comply with its terms. As with other affirmative defenses, a
    defendant must raise the defense at trial or it is waived.
    1
    1. The Legislature knows how to grant unconditional immunity and has done so in various ways on other occasions.
    Here, instead, the Legislature stated that defendants “may retain possession” of a handgun “for a period of not more
    than 180 days,” during which time they must transfer or surrender the firearm. L. 2013, c. 117. That is not a
    declaration of blanket immunity. (pp. 10-11)
    2. To the extent one might think the text of the amnesty provision offers immunity for six months, such a reading of
    the law would lead to absurd results that are at odds with the overall legislative scheme. If courts interpret the
    amnesty provision as defendant suggests, the statute would have effectively suspended gun-possession laws for
    nearly six months and allowed weapons on the street for that entire time. (pp. 11-12)
    3. Extrinsic sources offer further insight into the Legislature’s intent. On the same day the amnesty provision was
    enacted, the Governor also signed nine related laws. The package of laws “both strengthen[ed] New Jersey’s
    already tough gun laws and upgrade[d] penalties for those who commit gun crimes and violate gun trafficking
    laws.” Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Chris Christie Builds on Comprehensive Plan to Address
    Gun Violence, Takes Action on Gun Legislation (Aug. 8, 2013). Those bills all went into effect within two months
    and one day of their signing; none were delayed by six months. (pp. 12-13)
    4. In State in Interest of C.L.H.’s Weapons, 
    443 N.J. Super. 48
    , 56 (App. Div. 2015), the panel stated that “any
    voluntary surrender under the amnesty law” had to comply with N.J.S.A. 2C:39-12, which requires a person to
    provide written notice to law enforcement before authorities file any charges or begin any investigation. 
    Ibid.
    Otherwise, the panel reasoned, the surrender and amnesty “would be transformed from devices to encourage the
    surrender of firearms to a ‘free pass’ for those the police have already found or suspect to be in illegal possession.”
    Id. at 57. The Court agrees with that sound analysis. (pp. 13-14)
    5. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) makes it an offense to possess a handgun “without first having obtained a permit to carry.”
    A defendant charged under that statute for possession during the amnesty period may raise the amnesty law as an
    affirmative defense. To do so, a defendant must show two things: (1) that he possessed a handgun in violation of
    N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) or (c) “on the effective date of this act”—in other words, that he unlawfully possessed a
    handgun on August 8, 2013; and (2) that he took steps to transfer the firearm or voluntarily surrender it during the
    180-day period beginning on August 8, 2013, consistent with N.J.S.A. 2C:39-12—that is, before authorities brought
    any charges or began to investigate his unlawful possession. (pp. 14-15)
    6. To invoke the amnesty defense, a defendant must abide by the same settled procedures that apply to other
    defenses. As with other affirmative defenses, a defendant must timely assert the defense or it is waived. Defendants
    must give pretrial notice of an amnesty defense and present it at trial. Ignorance of the defense is not an excuse.
    Because defendant did not claim the affirmative defense at trial, he waived it. (pp. 15-17)
    7. Even if defendant had not waived the defense, it is not clear that the amnesty provision would apply to him. The
    statute is not meant to cover an out-of-state person who travels through New Jersey. In addition, although defendant
    asserts that he owned the firearm on August 8, 2013, nothing in the record establishes that he (1) was in New Jersey
    then, and (2) unlawfully possessed a firearm in violation of New Jersey law that day. Also, nothing in the record
    demonstrates that defendant took steps to transfer or surrender the handgun prior to his arrest. Defendant can file an
    application for post-conviction relief. The Court does not limit any effort by defendant to establish the requisite
    proofs and makes no findings on those issues. (pp. 18-19)
    The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and defendant’s conviction and sentence for
    unlawful possession of a weapon are REINSTATED. The matter is REMANDED to the Appellate Division to
    address any outstanding issues.
    JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and
    TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion.
    2
    SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    A-74 September Term 2015
    077427
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    DASEAN HARPER,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    Argued January 30, 2017 – Decided June 5, 2017
    On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate
    Division.
    Jennifer E. Kmieciak, Deputy Attorney
    General, argued the cause for appellant
    (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General of
    New Jersey, attorney).
    Joshua D. Sanders, Assistant Deputy Public
    Defender, argued the cause for respondent
    (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
    attorney).
    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court.
    The Legislature passed an amnesty bill in 2013 that, “for a
    period of not more than 180 days from the effective date of
    [the] act,” L. 2013, c. 117, enabled people to dispose of guns
    they possessed illegally.   During that time, the law allowed
    individuals to transfer or voluntarily surrender firearms.      We
    now consider whether the law effectively created a nearly six-
    1
    month grace period from prosecution for the illegal possession
    of firearms.
    In this case, a jury convicted defendant Dasean Harper of
    unlawful possession of a weapon -- a .357 Magnum revolver loaded
    with hollow-point bullets.    One year later, defendant argued for
    the first time on appeal that, in light of the amnesty
    provision, his possession of the handgun was lawful.     On remand,
    the trial court vacated the conviction based on the language of
    the amnesty law.    The Appellate Division denied the State’s
    motion for leave to appeal.
    We find that the amnesty law did not afford defendants
    blanket immunity for the entire amnesty period.    Reading the law
    in that way would lead to absurd results that the Legislature
    did not intend.    It would permit violent criminals to carry
    weapons in public with impunity, for almost 180 days, and remain
    free from prosecution so long as they transferred or voluntarily
    surrendered their firearms just before the end of the amnesty
    period.
    Instead, the law created a period of no more than six
    months during which people could dispose of weapons they
    illegally possessed without being prosecuted.   The provision
    affords a defense to those who attempted to comply with its
    terms.    As with other affirmative defenses, a defendant must
    raise the defense at trial or it is waived.
    2
    Here, defendant did not argue at trial that the amnesty law
    provided a defense to the charge.      He did not offer proof that
    he attempted to transfer or surrender his handgun.      In short, he
    waived the affirmative defense.     We therefore reverse and
    reinstate his conviction.
    I.
    We draw the following facts from the trial record.         On
    November 29, 2013, a police officer on patrol in Pennsville saw
    a box truck parked in the wrong direction on a street.      He also
    observed that its tires were over the fog line, partially in the
    roadway.    The officer approached the driver and passenger, who
    explained that they were looking for the right address to make a
    delivery.   The officer asked for identification, and each man
    provided a Pennsylvania driver’s license.      Defendant was the
    driver.
    The officer checked the identifications through dispatch
    and learned that defendant had two outstanding arrest warrants.
    The officer then asked defendant to step out of the truck, told
    him that he was being placed under arrest, and directed him to
    put his hands up.
    Defendant complied and told the officer, “I want to let you
    know, I have a gun on me, a handgun on me.”      The officer called
    for backup, handcuffed defendant, and retrieved a gun from
    defendant’s waistband -- a Smith & Wesson .357 Magnum revolver
    3
    loaded with four hollow-point bullets and two slug rounds.
    During a search, the officer also recovered a concealed-carry
    permit that the State of Florida had issued to defendant.
    Defendant said that, because of the permit, he thought he had
    not done anything wrong.
    On February 20, 2014, a grand jury in Salem County returned
    an indictment that charged defendant with second-degree unlawful
    possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (Count One), and
    fourth-degree possession of hollow-point bullets, N.J.S.A.
    2C:39-3(f) (Count Two).
    Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment before trial.       He
    relied, in part, on the Florida permit to claim an exemption
    from prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6.   At a hearing on the
    motion, defense counsel represented that defendant lived and
    worked in Pennsylvania and passed through New Jersey to make a
    delivery for his job.   The trial court denied the motion to
    dismiss and also held that defendant was properly denied entry
    into the pretrial intervention program (PTI).
    A jury convicted defendant on both counts.    The trial court
    sentenced defendant to five years’ imprisonment, with forty-two
    months of parole ineligibility, on Count One.    The court imposed
    a 364-day concurrent term of imprisonment on Count Two.
    Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.    He also filed
    two motions before the Appellate Division:   one for a limited
    4
    remand to reconsider his application for PTI, which is not
    relevant to this appeal, and another for bail pending appeal.
    In support of his request, defendant argued for the first time
    that his handgun conviction was illegal because of the amnesty
    provision.   In a two-page order dated August 5, 2015, the
    Appellate Division remanded the case to the trial court to
    conduct a bail hearing and consider the amnesty law.
    The following week, the trial court granted defendant bail
    pending appeal.   The court later heard oral argument on the
    meaning of the amnesty provision.    According to defense counsel,
    the law allowed an individual to “retain possession” of a weapon
    during the six-month amnesty period provided he otherwise
    complied with the statute by “Day 180.”    After that, defendant
    argued, the police could return, ask the individual if he had
    disposed of the gun, and seek to prosecute him if he had not.
    Based on the plain language of the law, the trial court
    concluded that an individual who unlawfully possessed a handgun
    on the effective date of the law could keep the firearm and
    decide how to proceed for the next 179 days.    To the extent the
    law might “create[] some interest[ing] fact scenarios” in which
    criminal conduct “becomes not criminal because of the statute,”
    the court concluded that the words of the law reflected the
    Legislature’s intent.
    5
    In an order dated February 8, 2016, the court vacated
    defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm
    “because the issue of amnesty was never presented to the finder
    of fact.”    The Appellate Division denied the State’s motions for
    leave to appeal and for a stay of the trial court’s order.
    We granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal.       
    226 N.J. 205
     (2016).
    II.
    The State, represented by the Attorney General, argues that
    the trial court erred when it vacated defendant’s conviction for
    unlawful possession.    The State submits that the amnesty
    provision did not confer “blanket immunity for six months to all
    illegal firearms possessors, regardless of whether they were
    even attempting to comply with the law.”     Instead, the State
    contends that the Legislature intended to encourage people to
    comply with the law expeditiously.     The State relies on the
    law’s plain language and legislative history for support, and
    claims that its reading of the statute is consistent with the
    law’s purpose to promote public safety.
    According to the State, the law requires “the unlawful
    possessor to take affirmative steps to dispose of the illegal
    weapon.”    In any event, because defendant failed to raise the
    provision as an affirmative defense at trial, the State argues
    that he waived the issue.
    6
    Defendant asserts that the trial court’s ruling should not
    be disturbed.   As he did before the trial judge, defendant
    argues that the amnesty provision is “unambiguous on its face”
    and allows for only one interpretation:   that defendant “still
    had time to comply with the Amnesty Provision at the time he was
    charged.”   Defendant maintains that only “those who . . . failed
    to comply with the Amnesty Provision prior to the sunset date”
    could be prosecuted for unlawfully possessing firearms.     Here,
    defendant contends, “the State’s own actions in charging” him
    prevented him from complying.
    Defendant contends that the Legislature acted to reduce the
    number of illegal firearms in the community and encourage
    individuals to transfer them.   He disputes that the law was
    meant to operate as an affirmative defense.   He argues in the
    alternative that, if the law is not clear, the rule of lenity
    requires that it be construed against the State.
    III.
    A.
    At the heart of this appeal is the meaning of L. 2013, c.
    117, which we refer to as the amnesty provision.   Governor
    Christie signed the law on August 8, 2013 as part of a series of
    ten bills the Legislature passed.
    The amnesty provision created a path for people to transfer
    or surrender firearms that they possessed unlawfully, during a
    7
    fixed period of time, without fear of prosecution.      The law
    provided that
    [a]ny person who has in his possession a
    handgun in violation of [N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)]
    or a rifle or shotgun in violation of
    [N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)] on the effective date of
    this act may retain possession of that
    handgun, rifle, or shotgun for a period of not
    more than 180 days after the effective date of
    this act. During that time period, the
    possessor of that handgun, rifle, or shotgun
    shall:
    (1) transfer that firearm to any person
    lawfully entitled to own or possess it; or
    (2) voluntarily surrender that firearm
    pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A.
    2C:39-12.
    [L. 2013, c. 117, § 1.]
    Section 2 of the law contained a similar provision for
    assault firearms and added a third way to comply:      a person
    could transfer or surrender the assault firearm, or “render [it]
    inoperable.”    L. 2013, c. 117, § 2.     The amnesty provision
    became effective on August 8, 2013, and was set to “expire on
    the 181st day after enactment.”       L. 2013, c. 117, § 3.
    The amnesty provision referenced two other statutes.
    N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 makes it an offense to possess certain types of
    weapons, and N.J.S.A. 2C:39-12 addresses voluntary surrender.
    Under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), it is unlawful for any person to
    “knowingly ha[ve] in his possession any handgun, including any
    antique handgun, without first having obtained a permit to
    8
    carry.”   N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c) makes it unlawful for any person to
    “knowingly ha[ve] in his possession any rifle or shotgun without
    having first obtained a firearms purchaser identification card.”
    The voluntary surrender provision provides in relevant part
    that
    [n]o person shall be convicted of an offense
    under   this   chapter   for  possessing   any
    firearms,    weapons,   destructive   devices,
    silencers or explosives, if after giving
    written notice of his intention to do so,
    including the proposed date and time of
    surrender, he voluntarily surrendered the
    weapon, device, instrument or substance in
    question to the superintendent or to the chief
    of police in the municipality in which he
    resides, provided that the required notice is
    received by the superintendent or chief of
    police before any charges have been made or
    complaints filed against such person for the
    unlawful possession of the weapon, device,
    instrument or substance in question and before
    any investigation has been commenced by any
    law enforcement agency concerning the unlawful
    possession.
    [N.J.S.A. 2C:39-12.]
    B.
    This case raises questions about the scope of the amnesty
    provision.   Our review of the statute is de novo.    State v.
    Gorthy, 
    226 N.J. 516
    , 530 (2016).      To interpret the law, we turn
    to certain basic principles of statutory construction.
    A court’s responsibility “is to give effect to the intent
    of the Legislature.”    State v. Morrison, 
    227 N.J. 295
    , 308
    (2016).   To do so, we start with the plain language of the
    9
    statute.   If it clearly reveals the Legislature’s intent, the
    inquiry is over.     DiProspero v. Penn, 
    183 N.J. 477
    , 492 (2005).
    If a law is ambiguous, we may consider extrinsic sources
    including legislative history.    Parsons ex rel. Parsons v.
    Mullica Twp. Bd. of Educ., 
    226 N.J. 297
    , 308 (2016).     We also
    look to extrinsic aids if a literal reading of the law would
    lead to absurd results.    Burnett v. County of Bergen, 
    198 N.J. 408
    , 425 (2009); see also State v. Provenzano, 
    34 N.J. 318
    , 322
    (1961) (“It is axiomatic that a statute will not be construed to
    lead to absurd results.”).
    In addition, a law that is part of a broader “statutory
    framework should not be read in isolation”; we instead consider
    the text “in relation to other constituent parts so that a
    sensible meaning may be given to the whole of the legislative
    scheme.”   Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 
    209 N.J. 558
    , 572 (2012).
    C.
    Defendant argues that, in light of the law’s plain
    language, he and others cannot be prosecuted for possession of a
    handgun during the 180-day amnesty period.     The law, however,
    does not say that.
    The Legislature knows how to grant unconditional immunity
    and has done so in various ways on other occasions.     See, e.g.,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11 (noting that merchants “shall not be
    10
    criminally or civilly liable in any manner or to any extent
    whatsoever” under certain circumstances (emphasis added));
    N.J.S.A. 2C:33-15(f) (noting underage person who calls 9-1-1
    “shall be immune from prosecution” under certain circumstances
    (emphasis added)); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-32(d) (noting that
    law enforcement officer “is immune from civil or criminal
    liability for his action” under certain circumstances (emphasis
    added)).
    Here, instead, the Legislature stated that defendants “may
    retain possession” of a handgun “for a period of not more than
    180 days,” during which time they must transfer or surrender the
    firearm.    L. 2013, c. 117.   That is not a declaration of blanket
    immunity.
    To the extent one might think the text of the amnesty
    provision offers immunity for six months, such a reading of the
    law would lead to absurd results that are at odds with the
    overall legislative scheme.    See Wilson, 
    supra,
     
    209 N.J. at 572
    .
    Consider the following example.     If a gang member possessed
    a handgun in public without a carry permit before the amnesty
    provision went into effect, he could of course have been
    arrested and charged with a crime under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b).
    But suppose the gang member unlawfully possessed a handgun on
    August 8, 2013, and carried it in public without a permit the
    next day.   Under defendant’s reading of the law, had a police
    11
    officer stopped that person on August 9, the officer could not
    have arrested the individual and would have been required to
    return the gun.
    Imagine the same gang member walking the streets the next
    day with the same handgun.   If the police had stopped the
    individual, they would have had to return the weapon once again.
    According to defendant, the same scenario could be repeated each
    day for nearly six months with the same result -- so long as the
    gang member transferred or voluntarily surrendered the firearm
    in accordance with the amnesty provision on or before Day 180.
    In other words, the law would have given gang members and others
    a free pass to carry weapons in public for almost six full
    months -- and place public safety at risk.
    Defendant argues that the amnesty provision was designed to
    remove unlawful guns from the street.   But if courts interpret
    the amnesty provision as defendant suggests, the statute would
    have effectively suspended gun-possession laws for nearly six
    months and allowed weapons on the street for that entire time.
    Extrinsic sources offer further insight into the
    Legislature’s intent.   Although the legislative history of the
    amnesty provision is sparse, we cannot conclude that the
    Legislature intended the absurd result highlighted above.    Such
    an outcome would be at odds with the State’s overall scheme to
    restrict the unlawful possession of firearms and protect public
    12
    safety, and would be inconsistent with other bills that became
    law on August 8, 2013.
    On the same day the amnesty provision was enacted, the
    Governor also signed nine related laws.    The package of laws
    “both strengthen[ed] New Jersey’s already tough gun laws and
    upgrade[d] penalties for those who commit gun crimes and violate
    gun trafficking laws.”   Press Release, Office of the Governor,
    Governor Chris Christie Builds on Comprehensive Plan to Address
    Gun Violence, Takes Action on Gun Legislation (Aug. 8, 2013).
    One of the laws declared a “public health crisis” in the wake of
    multiple instances of gun violence and mass shootings throughout
    the country.   L. 2013, c. 109.   Other new statutes enhanced
    penalties for certain firearms offenses, L. 2013, c. 108; L.
    2013, c. 111; L. 2013, c. 113, and disqualified people on the
    federal Terrorist Watchlist from obtaining a firearm
    identification card or a permit to purchase a handgun, L. 2013,
    c. 114.   Those bills all went into effect within two months and
    one day of their signing; none were delayed by six months.
    Only one reported decision addresses the amnesty provision.
    In State in Interest of C.L.H.’s Weapons, 
    443 N.J. Super. 48
    , 51
    (App. Div. 2015), the police seized five illegal assault rifles,
    under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, from the home
    C.L.H. shared with his wife.   The seizure took place in April
    2013 -- several months before the amnesty provision became law.
    13
    
    Ibid.
       In December 2013, after the prosecutor filed a petition
    for forfeiture, C.L.H.’s lawyer wrote that C.L.H. intended to
    transfer the illegal weapons under the amnesty provision.     Id.
    at 52-53.   Because the firearms were not in C.L.H.’s possession
    on August 8, 2013, the law’s effective date, the Appellate
    Division found that the amnesty provision did not apply.     Id. at
    56.
    The panel added that “any voluntary surrender under the
    amnesty law” had to comply with N.J.S.A. 2C:39-12, which
    requires a person to provide written notice to law enforcement
    before authorities file any charges or begin any investigation.
    Ibid.   Otherwise, the panel reasoned, the surrender and amnesty
    “would be transformed from devices to encourage the surrender of
    firearms to a ‘free pass’ for those the police have already
    found or suspect to be in illegal possession, a result plainly
    not intended by the Legislature.”     Id. at 57.
    We agree with that sound analysis.
    IV.
    To give full effect to the amnesty provision, we read it in
    harmony with, and in the context of, other laws relating to the
    unlawful possession of firearms.     See State v. Moran, 
    202 N.J. 311
    , 323 (2010).
    N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) makes it an offense to possess a
    handgun “without first having obtained a permit to carry.”      A
    14
    defendant charged under that statute for possession during the
    amnesty period may raise the amnesty law as an affirmative
    defense.   To do so, a defendant must show two things:   (1) that
    he possessed a handgun in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) or
    (c) “on the effective date of this act” -- in other words, that
    he unlawfully possessed a handgun on August 8, 2013; and (2)
    that he took steps to transfer the firearm or voluntarily
    surrender it during the 180-day period beginning on August 8,
    2013, consistent with N.J.S.A. 2C:39-12 -- that is, before
    authorities brought any charges or began to investigate his
    unlawful possession.   L. 2013, c. 117; N.J.S.A. 2C:39-12.1
    To invoke the amnesty defense, a defendant must abide by
    the same settled procedures that apply to other defenses.     He
    must give pretrial notice of his intention to rely on the
    amnesty provision.   See R. 3:12-1 (“No later than seven days
    before the Initial Case Disposition Conference . . . the
    defendant shall serve on the prosecutor a notice of intention to
    claim any of the defenses listed herein.”).   A defendant also
    has the burden to raise the defense at trial.2   Cf. State v.
    1  Our focus in this case is on the first paragraph of the
    amnesty provision. Related principles apply to the second
    paragraph as well.
    2  To protect against self-incrimination concerns, statements a
    defendant makes to establish an amnesty defense -- namely, that
    he unlawfully possessed a weapon on or shortly before August 8,
    2013 -- cannot be used as substantive evidence of guilt in a
    15
    Toscano, 
    74 N.J. 421
    , 442 (1977) (noting “defendant shall have
    the burden of producing sufficient evidence” of duress); State
    v. Abbott, 
    36 N.J. 63
    , 72 (1961) (same for self-defense); see
    also N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13(b)(1) (noting prosecution need not
    disprove “an affirmative defense unless and until there is
    evidence supporting such defense”).
    Once raised, the State must rebut the defense and disprove
    it beyond a reasonable doubt.    See, e.g., State v. Urbina, 
    221 N.J. 509
    , 525 (2015) (self-defense); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13.
    Indeed, a revised model jury charge for assault firearms relates
    to the amnesty provision and makes that very point:   “If the
    defendant alleges that the assault firearm was lawfully
    possessed and/or rendered inoperable during the time frame of
    August 8, 2013 to February 5, 2014, the State must disprove that
    defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”    Model Jury Charges
    (Criminal), “Possession of an Assault Firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
    5(f))” (revised Oct. 6, 2014).
    As with other affirmative defenses, a defendant must timely
    assert the defense or it is waived.    See 24 James W. Moore et
    separate proceeding. Cf. Simmons v. United States, 
    390 U.S. 377
    , 394, 
    88 S. Ct. 967
    , 976, 
    19 L. Ed. 2d 1247
    , 1259 (1968)
    (noting that statements made by defendant to support suppression
    motion cannot be used “against him at trial on the issue of
    guilt”); State v. Whitlow, 
    45 N.J. 3
    , 16 (1965) (noting that use
    of inculpatory statements made during defendant’s psychiatric
    examination “is limited to the sanity issue and may not be used
    as substantive evidence of guilt”).
    16
    al., Moore’s Federal Practice, § 612.05 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.)
    (explaining that “various affirmative defenses” under Federal
    Rules of Criminal Procedure “are generally forfeited by failure
    to raise them before trial”).    Our court rules give judges
    discretion to bar witnesses, grant an adjournment, or grant a
    “delay during trial as the interest of justice demands” when a
    defendant fails to provide pretrial notice of a defense.       R.
    3:12-1.   But the rules do not contemplate a defendant raising an
    affirmative defense for the first time after trial.
    A defendant convicted of murder cannot claim on direct
    appeal that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury did
    not consider self-defense.   A drug dealer cannot raise
    entrapment as a defense after the jury’s verdict.     The same is
    true here.   Defendants must give pretrial notice of an amnesty
    defense and present it at trial.3     Ignorance of the defense is
    not an excuse.   See Moran, 
    supra,
     
    202 N.J. at 320
    ; accord Barlow
    v. United States, 
    32 U.S. 404
    , 411, 
    8 L. Ed. 728
    , 731 (1833).
    V.
    In this case, defendant first raised the amnesty provision
    before the Appellate Division.   Because he did not claim the
    affirmative defense at trial, he waived it.
    3  A defendant, of course, can claim that counsel was ineffective
    for not presenting an affirmative defense at trial in an
    application for post-conviction relief.
    17
    Even if defendant had not waived the defense, it is not
    clear that the amnesty provision would apply to him.    At the
    time of his arrest on November 29, 2013, defendant lived and
    worked in Pennsylvania.   When the police approached defendant
    and his passenger on that day, they explained that they were in
    New Jersey to make a delivery.
    The statute is not meant to cover an out-of-state person
    who travels through New Jersey; it is designed to allow someone
    who possessed a handgun in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 “on the
    effective date of [the] act” to transfer or voluntarily
    surrender the firearm.    L. 2013, c. 117.   To comply with the
    law, an out-of-state resident could have simply returned home;
    he would not have needed to transfer or surrender a firearm in
    New Jersey.
    In addition, although defendant asserts that he owned the
    firearm on August 8, 2013, nothing in the record establishes
    that he (1) was in New Jersey then, and (2) unlawfully possessed
    a firearm in violation of New Jersey law that day.    See 
    ibid.
    Also, nothing in the record demonstrates that defendant took
    steps to transfer or surrender the handgun prior to his arrest.
    Defendant can file an application for post-conviction
    relief and try to demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective
    for not raising the amnesty defense at trial.    See R. 3:22-1 to
    -13; see also Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687, 104
    
    18 S. Ct. 2052
    , 2064, 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
    , 693 (1984); State v. Fritz,
    
    105 N.J. 42
    , 58 (1987).     We do not limit any effort by defendant
    to establish the requisite proofs, and we make no findings on
    those issues.   But for defendant to be entitled to a new trial,
    he must demonstrate not only that counsel’s performance was
    deficient but also that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure
    to raise the amnesty defense at trial.     See Strickland, 
    supra,
    466 U.S. at 687
    , 
    104 S. Ct. at 2064
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d at 693
    ; Fritz,
    
    supra,
     
    105 N.J. at 52
    .
    We do not consider the rule of lenity.      The doctrine
    applies when an alleged ambiguity in a statute is not resolved
    by analyzing the law’s text and any extrinsic aids.       See State
    v. Regis, 
    208 N.J. 439
    , 452 (2011); State v. Fleischman, 
    189 N.J. 539
    , 553 n.4 (2007).    That is not the case here.
    VI.
    For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the order of
    the trial court and reinstate defendant’s conviction and
    sentence for unlawful possession of a weapon.    We remand to the
    Appellate Division to address any outstanding issues.       Defendant
    may seek other relief consistent with the principles outlined in
    this opinion.
    JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA,
    SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion.
    19