State v. Howton , 2017 Ohio 4349 ( 2017 )

[Cite as State v. Howton, 2017-Ohio-4349.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 1-16-35
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
BROOKS D. HOWTON, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR 2015 0300
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: June 19, 2017
APPEARANCES:
Allen Vender for Appellant
Terri L. Kohlrieser for Appellee
Case No. 1-16-35
WILLAMOWKSI, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Brooks D. Howton (“Howton”) appeals the
judgment of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas, alleging (1) that the trial
court erred in finding that the offenses of rape and kidnapping in this case were
not allied offenses subject to merger, (2) that the trial court erred in allowing the
State to call rebuttal witnesses who were not disclosed before trial, and (3) that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. For the reasons set forth below,
the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On August 7, 2015, AD woke up at 7:28 a.m. to the sound of Howton
knocking on her bedroom window. Doc. 144 at 200. Though AD lived with her
mother, Darcie Simpson (“Simpson”), AD was alone in her house on this morning
because Simpson was away at work. Id. At this time, AD and Howton were
dating and had a sexual relationship. Id. at 199. Howton occasionally stayed
overnight at Simpson’s house in AD’s room, but he did not live there. Id. at 203.
From outside the window, Howton asked AD to let him inside the house, and she
promptly unlocked her door and let him in the house. Id.
{¶3} Once he was inside, AD began to walk towards her bedroom because
she wanted to go back to sleep. Id. at 272. She did not invite Howton to come
with her into the bedroom. Id. As she was walking, Howton began questioning
her about why she did not answer her phone when he had called her earlier. Id. at
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273. He then questioned her about whether she was communicating with other
men and wanted to check her phone. Id. at 274. AD did not allow him to go
through her phone, left the room, entered the kitchen, and began doing dishes. Id.
at 278. Howton followed AD into the kitchen and “kept bumping into [her]” from
behind before he “bear hugged [her].” Id. at 279. At this point, AD pushed him
away from her, told him to “leave [her] alone,” and walked back into the living
room. Id. at 283-284, 287. Howton then followed AD into the living room and sat
on AD’s lap. Id. at 287. At this point, Howton grabbed AD by her wrists, pulled
her up from where she was sitting, and began pushing her through the house
towards the bedroom. Id. at 289.
{¶4} Once they reached the bedroom, Howton pushed AD onto the bed,
began to undress her, and took off all of her clothing. Id. at 206. While he was
holding her down on the bed, he grabbed a vibrator that was in the bedroom and
forcibly thrust it into AD’s vaginal cavity, pushing so hard that AD “jumped.” Id.
at 208-209. After this, Howton asked AD to perform fellatio on him. Id. at 209-
210. When AD refused, he accused her of engaging in such activity with other
men. Id. at 210. AD then struck him with her fist in an attempt to get him off of
her. Id. at 211. In response, Howton put his arm around AD’s neck and began to
choke her. Id. AD struggled against Howton until she passed out. Id. at 212.
When she regained consciousness, Howton then picked AD up by her neck, lifted
her up, and choked her again until she lost consciousness a second time. Id. at
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213. When AD regained consciousness this time, she was on the floor beside the
bed; her nose was bleeding; and she was out of breath. Id. She begged Howton to
let her get her inhaler from her purse, but he did not allow her to do so and began
slapping her. Id. at 213-214. AD’s nose continued to bleed, and she reached for a
tee shirt to wipe the blood from her face. Id.
{¶5} At this point, Howton said, “I’m going to leave ‘cause I know you’re
going to call the police on me.” Id. at 302. As he was leaving, however, he
noticed that some blood had gotten on his shoes. Id. at 302-303. Howton then
ordered AD to start the washing machine to remove traces of the blood from the
bedding and his shoes. Id. at 215-216, 306. After the washing machine had been
started, Howton began apologizing to AD and asked her to come into the living
room with him. Id. at 308. Once they were in the living room, AD sat down on
the floor and said, “I don’t want you touching me. * * * I want to be by myself. I
don’t want to do anything with you.” Id. at 310. Howton then spread out a
comforter on the floor of the living room and told AD to lay down with him on the
comforter. Id. at 218, 310. When AD refused, Howton began undressing AD, put
his arm around her, and pulled her to the floor. Id. at 219. During his testimony,
Howton estimated that the time period between their struggle in the bedroom and
this interaction in the living room could have been up to an hour. Doc. 145 at 597.
During this process, AD was crying, and Howton told her to stop sobbing. Doc.
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144 at 218-219. Howton then performed oral sex on her and then engaged in
phallic penetration of her vaginal cavity. Id. at 219-220, 313.
{¶6} About ten minutes later, Howton fell asleep. Id. at 315. AD then sat
up, which awakened Howton. He said, “[N]o, lay back down; lay back down.”
Id. at 315. AD said, in response, “I got to pee.” Id. AD then went into the
restroom, locked the door, and climbed out of the bathroom window. Id. at 316.
She then went to a neighbor’s house and called for help. Id. at 328. When the
police arrived, AD told them that Howton was in her house. Id. at 332. The
police knocked on the front door of AD’s house, which was locked, and requested
entry, but no one answered. Doc. 143 at 151. In between 11:00 and 11:30 that
morning, Simpson, who was at work, was contacted by her sister over the phone
and told what had happened to AD. Id. at 186. Simpson drove home and gave the
police a key to the house. Id. at 189. The police were then able to gain entry into
the house, found Howton in AD’s bedroom, and arrested him without incident. Id.
at 155-156. Doc. 144 at 335.
{¶7} On September 17, 2015, Howton was charged with one count of
aggravated burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1), 2911.11(B); one count of
kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), 2905.01(C)(1); one count of
felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), 2903.11(D)(1)(a); two counts
of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), 2907.02(B); and one count of
tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), 2921.12(B). Doc. 3.
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The sixth count, which charged Howton with tampering with evidence, was later
dismissed on the motion of the prosecution. Doc. 143 at 1.
{¶8} The trial occurred in between April 26, 2016, and May 3, 2016.
During trial, Howton chose to testify as part of the Defense’s case-in-chief. Doc.
145 at 559. In his testimony, Howton claimed that the sexual encounters between
him and AD were consensual. Id. at 576-577. He alleged that, during one of these
encounters in the bedroom, AD indicated to him that she wanted him to stop. Id.
at 583. He claimed that he, in response, stopped and, admitting that he was
“lightweight intoxicated,” began to taunt her mildly. Id. at 583-584. He then
testified that AD hit him in the face but admitted that he choked her as retaliation
before pushing her onto the bed and smacking her several times. Id. at 588.
{¶9} In reference to this altercation, the following exchange took place
between Howton’s defense counsel and Howton at trial.
Q. Okay. Did everything stop as far as any sort of her trying to
come at you or anything? Did that all stop?
A. After her nose started bleeding she sat on the bed. The bed
had a couple of blood drops on it, which is her bed, closer to the
south most part of the house.
Q. Okay.
A. Okay. She sat on the bed. She cried a little bit. I talked to
her to let her know that I was tired of her putting her hands on
me and stuff. She stayed in there for a little bit. Like I said, I
told her I was about to leave because I felt like she made me, she
forced this on herself.
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Q. Okay.
A. I felt like she made me get out of my character and, you
know, put my hands on her after she put her hands on me first.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 593-594. Howton testified on direct examination that he
apologized to AD. He described this conversation at trial, saying,
A. But I was also explaining to her that over and over and over
we had had this type of situation.
Q. Okay.
A. Which ultimately I’m the one always getting hit. I’m always
getting—I’m the one always getting smacked. I’m the one
always getting punched. I mean—so this—it wasn’t—I don’t
think it was avoidable, but I started letting her know, like, you
know, ‘I’m sorry for doing that, but I told you that you needed
to stop.’
Q. Now, why do you think—why do you think it should have
been avoidable? Do you mean on your part?
A. Yea, it should have been avoidable on my part because, like
my family said, man, you know, I complained about this the
whole time. I should have done left.
Q. Should you have had more self-control even though you were
getting hit?
A. Yea, I should have had more self-control because I’m a man
and, you know, I don’t feel like it’s right for a man to hit a
woman. But—
Q. Is that why you were apologizing?
A. Yes, sir.
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(Emphasis added.) Id. at 596-597. Howton then alleged that they had consensual
“make-up sex” in the living room after his apology. Id. at 598. Howton’s defense
counsel then began questioning Howton about the subsequent police investigation.
Q. Okay. Well, when you were talking to Detective Neidemire,
again, you were asking about this rape/burglary thing?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you keep telling him that you didn’t rape anybody?
A. I always told him that I didn’t. I ain’t never been known to be
no person like that.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 610.
{¶10} After these exchanges between Howton and his defense counsel on
direct examination on April 28, 2016, the State stated the following on the record:
[I]n light of the defendant talking about character and things of
that nature, his own character, the State is intending to
introduce some things which pursuant to 404(B) we need to put
Mr. Chamberlain on notice of. But, like I said, there’s a lot of
things in the works. I’ve got people out investigating a couple of
things right now as we speak. The first thing tomorrow
morning, or even tonight, I could possibly e-mail Mr.
Chamberlain to give him more precise information as to what
I’m talking about.
Id. at 617. After conducting further investigation that evening, the prosecutor
emailed defense counsel the names of two witnesses that the State intended to call
for the purpose of rebutting Howton’s statements about these offenses being
inconsistent with his good character. Id. at 620-622, 625.
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{¶11} While the State had the name of one of these witnesses—SS—for
two or three weeks prior to trial, the prosecutor informed the court that she, based
upon her experience, did not anticipate that Howton would, even if he chose to
testify, make statements that would make his character an issue. Id. at 622. SS’s
name had been disclosed to defense counsel orally, but SS’s name was not in the
list of witnesses that the State planned on calling to testify. Id. at 637. The
prosecutor only became aware of the other witness—AH—during the course of
the trial. Id. at 652-653. Doc. 105. On April 29, 2016, the court determined that,
on direct examination, Howton had ‘opened the door’ to character evidence being
presented on rebuttal and found that the prosecutor had not committed a Crim.R.
16 violation in failing to disclose the names of SS and AH prior to trial. Id. at
657-658. Further, the trial court also granted defense counsel’s request for a
continuance, giving Howton’s counsel the weekend to prepare for the rebuttal
testimony of SS and AH. Id. at 647-648. On May 2, 2016, the State called SS and
AH as rebuttal witnesses. Doc. 146 at 704, 713.
{¶12} On May 3, 2016, the jury found Howton guilty of one count of
aggravated burglary, one count of kidnapping, one count of felonious assault, and
one count of rape. Doc. 114. The jurors could not come to an agreement on the
fourth count charged in the indictment, which was the first of the two counts of
rape. Doc. 147 at 881. Thus, the jurors could not come to an agreement as to
whether Howton committed the offense of rape in the bedroom as alleged by the
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State in the fourth count of the indictment but found that Howton was guilty of
committing the offense of rape in the living room as alleged by the State in the
fifth count of the indictment. Doc. 112. Doc. 89. The trial judge declared a
mistrial only as to the fourth count charged in the indictment. Doc. 147 at 882.
On June 13, 2016, the trial judge sentenced Howton and found that none of the
offenses in which Howton was convicted were subject to merger. Doc. 126 at 22-
23. Howton filed notice of appeal on July 8, 2016. Doc. 130. On appeal, he
raises the following three assignments of error.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in sentencing Howton, when it determined
that rape and kidnapping were not allied offenses.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the State
to call rebuttal witnesses that it did not disclose before trial but
it reasonably anticipated, and allowed the state to impermissibly
present evidence of other acts by the defendant through those
rebuttal witnesses.
Third Assignment of Error
Howton received ineffective assistance of counsel when his
attorney failed to request a jury instruction for aggravated
assault.
We will consider these three assignments of error in the order in which they
appear in the appellant’s brief.
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First Assignment of Error
{¶13} Howton argues that the offense of kidnapping was incidental to the
offense of rape in this case because his “conduct restraining [AD was] for the
purpose of engaging in sexual activity * * *.” Appellant’s Brief, 8. He argues that
these two crimes were allied offenses of similar import that should have been
merged at sentencing because the offense of kidnapping was committed with the
same conduct as the rape, resulted in the same type of harm to the victim, and was
undertaken with the same animus. For these reasons, he requests that this court
reverse his convictions and remand this case for resentencing.
Legal Standard
{¶14} R.C. 2941.25 codifies certain protections of the Double Jeopardy
Clauses of the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution by prohibiting
a defendant from being convicted multiple times for the same conduct. State v.
Sergent, 148 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-2696, 69 N.E.3d 627, ¶ 28, citing State v.
Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 27. Under R.C.
2941.25,
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the
indictment or information may contain counts for all such
offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more
offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two
or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed
separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment
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or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the
defendant may be convicted of all of them.
R.C. 2941.25(A), (B).
[I]f a defendant is charged with allied offenses—which are
multiple crimes committed with the same conduct—the ‘trial
court is required to merge [these offenses] at sentencing.’ To
determine ‘whether two offenses are * * * subject to merger
under R.C. 2941.25, the conduct of the accused must be
considered.’
(Citations omitted.) State v. Brentlinger, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-16-23, 2017-Ohio-
2588, ¶ 27.
{¶15} However, multiple convictions are permitted “if we answer
affirmatively to just one of the following three questions: (1) Were the offenses
dissimilar in import or significance? (2) Were they committed separate[ly]? And
(3) Were they committed with a separate animus or motivation.” State v. Potts, 3d
Dist. Hancock No. 5-16-03, 2016-Ohio-5555, ¶ 96, quoting State v. Bailey, 1st
Dist. Hamilton No. C-140129, 2015-Ohio-2997, ¶ 76. The question of whether
offenses are allied offenses of similar import subject to merger is reviewed under a
de novo standard. State v. Brown, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-10-31, 2011-Ohio-1461, ¶
36.
Legal Analysis
{¶16} In this case, the crimes of rape and kidnapping were not allied
offenses of similar import because these crimes were committed separately.
Howton was at AD’s home from 7:28 a.m. until in between 11:00 and 11:30 a.m.
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Doc. 144 at 186, 200. In this time period, AD testified that Howton raped her
twice at two different times and in two different rooms. The first alleged rape
occurred in AD’s bedroom. Howton pushed AD from the living room to the
bedroom, held her down, spread her legs apart forcibly, and choked her until she
passed out. Though the jurors did not find him guilty of committing the crime of
rape in the bedroom—as alleged by the prosecution—the jury did find Howton
guilty of the offense kidnapping for these actions. The kidnapping offense, which
was the third count in the indictment, arose from Howton’s actions in the bedroom
not his actions in the living room. Doc. 89. Specifically, the third count in the
indictment charged him with kidnapping for choking AD. Id.{¶17} The offense of kidnapping for which Howton was convicted was a
violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(A) No person, by force, threat, or deception * * * shall remove
another from the place where the other person is found or
restrain the liberty of the other purpose, for any of the following
purposes:
***
(4) To engage in sexual activity * * * with the victim against the
victim’s will;
R.C. 2905.01(A)(4). For the defendant to be found guilty under this provision, the
jury does not have to find that the kidnapping facilitated a nonconsensual sexual
encounter. Rather, this statute only requires that the jury find that the restraint or
removal was performed with the intention of facilitating a nonconsensual sexual
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encounter. The jury determined that Howton had such an intent and convicted him
of kidnapping accordingly. Thus, the offense of kidnapping was completed in the
bedroom. Howton was not convicted of the rape that was alleged to have occurred
contemporaneously with this kidnapping offense.
{¶18} The conviction for rape that Howton received arose from conduct
that occurred some time after this first alleged rape. After Howton released AD
from his grip and she regained consciousness, he was preparing to leave the house
when he realized his shoes had blood on them. Doc. 144 at 302. He decided to
stay until AD had run his shoes through the washing machine. Id. at 215-216,
302, 306. Doc. 145 at 590. By this time, AD and Howton had moved from the
bedroom and into the living room. Id. at 597. According to Howton’s testimony,
he felt bad, at this point, about his behavior towards AD, talked with AD for a
while, apologized for his actions, and asked for forgiveness. Id. At trial, AD
testified that Howton proceeded to rape her a second time in the living room. Doc.
144 at 219-220. Howton testified that up to an hour had passed by between the
incident in the bedroom and the sexual encounter that occurred in the living room.
Doc. 145 at 597.
{¶19} Based on these facts, it is clear that the offenses of kidnapping and
rape were committed separately. First, Howton admitted that he planned to leave
after he completed the crime of kidnapping in the bedroom, which suggests that he
had not yet formed the intent to rape her in the living room. His actions showed
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that he seemed to believe that his activities at AD’s house had come to a
conclusion. This also suggests that the kidnapping and rape were not part of an
ongoing series of criminal activities but were each two separate episodes of
criminal activity. Second, an interlude of up to an hour occurred in between the
commission of the crime of kidnapping in the bedroom and the commission of the
crime of rape in the living room. During this time, AD and Howton talked; AD
did laundry; and Howton formed a bed with blankets on the floor in the living
room. This interval divides the kidnapping in the bedroom and the rape in the
living room into two separate series of events.
{¶20} Third, these offenses occurred in different places in AD’s house.
The kidnapping primarily occurred in the bedroom. After Howton had completed
this action, he ceased violently restraining AD and released her from his physical
control. She then went into the living room voluntarily. It was in this room where
he later began to restrain her forcibly a second time while he committed the
offense of rape. The facts of this case show that these offenses were committed
with separate conduct at different times and in different locations. These crimes
are not, therefore, allied offenses of similar import that are subject to merger. For
these reasons, Howton’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶21} Under this assignment of error, Howton advances two arguments.
First, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to call rebuttal
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witnesses who had not been disclosed to defense counsel prior to the
commencement of the trial. He asserts that the State was aware that he was going
to testify and, therefore, was aware of the possibility that Howton could comment
on his character, which would ‘open the door’ to the admission of character
evidence on rebuttal. Thus, Howton argues the fact that these witnesses could
have been called for rebuttal was foreseeable and that the prosecutor, therefore,
had a duty under Crim.R. 16 to disclose these witnesses prior to trial. Second,
Howton here argues that the trial court also erred in allowing extrinsic evidence of
other bad acts to be presented at trial through the State’s rebuttal witnesses. On
the basis of these arguments, Howton requests that this court vacate his
convictions and order a new trial. We will address these two arguments in the
order presented in Howton’s brief.
Legal Standard for Undisclosed Witnesses
{¶22} Crim.R. 16(I) reads, in its relevant part, as follows: “Each party shall
provide to opposing counsel a written witness list, including names and addresses
of any witness it intends to call in its case-in-chief, or reasonably anticipates
calling in rebuttal or surrebuttal.” Crim.R. 16(I). Thus, “[t]he criterion for
determining whether the state should have provided the name of a witness called
for rebuttal is whether the state reasonably should have anticipated that it was
likely to call the witness, whether during its case in chief or in rebuttal.” State v.
Mossburg, 3d Dist. Van Wert No. 15-06-10, 2007-Ohio-3343, ¶ 24, quoting State
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v. Lorraine, 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 423, 613 N.E.2d 212 (1993), citing State v.
Howard, 56 Ohio St.2d 328, 332-333, 383 N.E.2d 912 (1978). “A prosecutor does
not have ‘a duty to provide the names of witnesses that he reasonably did not
anticipate would testify until testimony was presented by appellant which was then
properly rebutted.’” State v. Evans, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 07CA009274, 2008-
Ohio-4295, ¶ 7, quoting Lorraine at 423.
{¶23} “The purpose of a rebuttal witness is to ‘explain, refute or disprove
new facts introduced into evidence by the adverse party * * *.’” State v. Dubose,
1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-070397, 2008-Ohio-4983, ¶ 69, quoting State v. McNeill,
83 Ohio St.3d 438, 446, 700 N.E.2d 596 (1998). “The testimony of a rebuttal
witness is only relevant to challenge the evidence introduced by the opponent, and
the scope of this testimony is limited to such evidence.” State v. Adkins, 4th Dist.
Gallia No. 03CA27, 2004-Ohio-3627, ¶ 11, citing McNeill at 446. “The admission
of rebuttal evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and an
appellate court will not disturb a ruling on its admissibility absent an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Weaver, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-01-022, 2009-Ohio-
5923, ¶ 35, citing State v. Finnerty, 45 Ohio St.3d 104, 109, 543 N.E.2d 1233,
1238 (1989). “An abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment; rather, it
implies that the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.”
State v. Thompson, --- N.E.3d ---, 2017-Ohio-792, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.), quoting
Heilman v. Heilman, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-12-08, 2012-Ohio-5133, ¶ 14.
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Legal Analysis
{¶24} After examining the record, we do not find any evidence that the
prosecutor had a duty under Crim.R. 16(I) to disclose the names of the rebuttal
witnesses because the State did not reasonably anticipate that it was likely that SS
and AH would be called to testify on rebuttal. Under Evid.R. 404(A)(1), the
evidence presented through SS and AH could not have been introduced in the
prosecution’s case-in-chief and was admissible on rebuttal only if the defendant
placed his own character into evidence during his testimony. Evid.R. 404(A)(1).
The prosecutor could not have known that SS’s testimony was admissible as
character evidence on rebuttal until after hearing Howton proclaim during the
Defense’s case-in-chief that the crimes of which he had been accused were not
consistent with his character. Finnerty at 108-109. See State v. Hicks, 6th Dist.
Lucas No. L-02-1254, 2003-Ohio-4968, ¶ 18. Crim.R. 16(I) requires the State to
disclose witnesses “it reasonably anticipates it is likely to call * * *.” (Emphasis
added.) Howard at 915. This standard does not require the State to anticipate
every conceivable scenario that may arise out of the Defense’s case-in-chief or to
disclose any witness who could possibly be called on rebuttal as a consequence of
every possible eventuality.
{¶25} The State was also unaware of the allegations that Howton had
sexually assaulted AH until April 28, 2016, which was after the trial had already
commenced. Doc. 105. The prosecutor, therefore, could not have disclosed AH’s
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name and address prior to trial. The duty of disclosure under Crim.R. 16(I) is
continuing, but the record shows that the prosecutor disclosed this witness to
defense counsel on the same day that the State had become aware of AH’s
allegations. The State forwarded AH’s information to defense counsel after the
prosecutor had the opportunity to investigate these allegations further. For these
reasons, we hold that the State did not act in violation of Crim.R. 16(I) when it did
not disclose the names of SS and AH prior to trial.
{¶26} Further, the State notified the Defense of its intention to call SS and
AH as rebuttal witnesses during the first recess after the defendant brought his
character into issue, though the prosecutor was not able to disclose SS and AH’s
names until she conducted further investigation that evening. Doc. 145 at 617.
Doc. 146 at 622. In response, defense counsel requested a continuance from the
trial court. Id. at 635-636. The trial court granted a continuance, giving defense
counsel the entire weekend to prepare for the rebuttal witnesses. See State v.
Greiner, 2d Dist. Greene No. 95-CA-08, 1996 WL 354765, 3 (June 28, 1996).
Under Crim.R. 16(L), the granting of a continuance is a remedy for a prosecutorial
violation of Crim.R. 16. Crim.R. 16(L). Even if the prosecutor had failed to
disclose the names of these witnesses in violation of the discovery rules, the trial
court granted a remedy for such a violation, removing the potential for prejudice
against the defendant by the admission of this evidence. See State v. Heinish, 50
Ohio St.3d 231, 236, 553 N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (1990). Given the facts of this case,
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we do not find any evidence that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
this evidence.
Legal Standard for Extrinsic Evidence of Other Acts
{¶27} Evid.R. 404(A) prohibits the admission of character evidence “for
the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion * *
*.” Evid.R. 404(A). One of several exceptions to this general rule follows in
404(A)(1), which states that
Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused,
or by the prosecution to rebut the same is admissible; however,
in prosecutions for rape, gross sexual imposition, and
prostitution, the exceptions provided by statute enacted by the
General Assembly are applicable.
Evid.R. 404(A)(1).
In other words, Evid.R. 404(A)(1) allows a defendant to “offer
evidence of his good character as proof that he did not commit
the act charged because such conduct is not in accord with his
character[,]” but if he does, “the prosecution [may] offer
evidence of the bad character of the accused.” “By introducing
such evidence, the defendant ‘opens the door’ for the
prosecution, which is then permitted to rebut or impeach the
character evidence on cross-examination.”
(Citations omitted.) State v. Velez, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-10, 2014-Ohio-
1788, ¶ 119.
{¶28} Evid.R. 404(A)(1) expressly subjects itself to statutory provisions in
the Revised Code that further restrict the admissibility of character evidence in
rape cases. R.C. 2907.02(D) demarcates these limitations and reads as follows:
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Evidence of specific instances of the defendant's sexual activity,
opinion evidence of the defendant's sexual activity, and
reputation evidence of the defendant's sexual activity shall not
be admitted under this section unless it involves evidence of the
origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease, the defendant’s past
sexual activity with the victim, or is admissible against the
defendant under section 2945.59 of the Revised Code, and only
to the extent that the court finds that the evidence is material to
a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or
prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value.
R.C. 2907.02(D).
{¶29} However, “[a] defendant waives the statutory limitations regarding
specific instances of sexual activity when the defendant ‘opens the door’ to the
issue of his past sexual conduct.” State v. Depinet, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-12-32,
2013-Ohio-1850, ¶ 18, citing State v. Banks, 71 Ohio App.3d 214, 593 N.E.2d 346(3d Dist.1991). See State v. Seymour, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 14324, 1994 WL
660763 (Nov. 23, 1994); State v. Fannin, 4th Dist. Ross No. 98CA2456, 1999 WL
402231 (June 11, 1999); State v. Chojnacki, 9th Dist. Medina No. 2326-M, 1994
WL 721918 (Dec. 30, 1994); State v. Bozeman, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2008-10-
248, 2009-Ohio-3677, ¶ 49-50. Thus, when a defendant in a rape case ‘opens the
door’ by referencing his or her character or past behavior—regardless of whether
this behavior was sexual activity or other acts—the prosecution “may call as
rebuttal witness individuals who have observed a defendant engage in acts that
were inconsistent with his assertions.” State v. Hardie, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
19954, 2004-Ohio-6783, ¶ 21, citing State v. Agner, 135 Ohio App.3d 286, 293,
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733 N.E.2d 676 (1999); Banks, supra, at 219-220. See Holt v. State, 107 Ohio St.
307, 140 N.E. 349 (1923).
{¶30} “The admission of such [other-acts] evidence lies within the broad
discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court should not disturb evidentiary
decisions in the absence of an abuse of discretion that created material prejudice.”
State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 14,
quoting State v. Diar, 120 Ohio St.3d 460, 2008-Ohio-6266, 900 N.E.2d 565, ¶ 66.
“An abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment; rather, it implies that
the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.” Schroeder v.
Niese, --- N.E.3d ---, 2016-Ohio-8397, ¶ 7, quoting Heilman at ¶ 14. “When
applying the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court may not simply
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” State v. Plott, --- N.E.3d ---,
2017-Ohio-38, ¶ 52 (3d Dist.), citing State v. Slappey, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9–12–
58, 2013-Ohio-1939, ¶ 12.
Legal Analysis
{¶31} On appeal, the prosecution argues that Howton made three
statements during direct examination that put his character at issue and ‘opened
the door’ to the admission of SS and AH’s testimony on rebuttal. First, the
prosecution points to a statement made by Howton to his defense counsel when he
was explaining why he repeatedly hit AD. In this exchange, Howton stated, “I felt
like she made me get out of my character and, you know, put my hands on her
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after she put her hands on me first.” Doc. 145 at 593-594. Second, the State
points to the reason that he gave his defense counsel for apologizing to AD after
he hit her. He said, “Yea, I should have had more self-control because I’m a man
and, you know, I don’t feel like it’s right for a man to hit a woman.” Id. at 596-
597. Third, the prosecution points to a statement in which Howton was relaying
the content of a conversation he had with the police investigator assigned to this
case. When asked by his defense counsel at trial whether he denied the allegations
of rape during the police investigation, Howton said, “I always told him [the
investigator] that I didn’t. I ain’t never been known to be no person like that.” Id.
at 610.
{¶32} With these statements, Howton defended himself by arguing that the
accusations against him were inconsistent with his character. His statements
represent himself as a peaceful person that is not disposed to violent behavior. Id.
at 593-594, 596-597, 610. The first two statements put his character at issue in
regard to the offenses of kidnapping and felonious assault. The third statement put
his allegations of his good character forward as a reason to believe that he did not
commit the crime of rape. Id. In so doing, he made his character an issue in this
trial and ‘opened the door’ for the prosecution to rebut these assertions with
evidence showing that his character did not conform to his representations at trial.
See Velez at ¶ 118-119, citing State v. Jacobs, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 03CA24, 2004-
Ohio-3393, ¶ 20; State v. Grubb, 111 Ohio App.3d 277, 675 N.E.2d 1353 (2d
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Dist.1996). Further, we do not see any other indications in the record that the trial
court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. For these reasons, Howton’s
second assignment of error is overruled.
Third Assignment of Error
{¶33} In his third assignment of error, Howton argues that he was
prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. While Howton was
testifying, defense counsel asked him several questions about whether AD struck
Howton first and argued in closing statements that Howton’s violent actions were
provoked by AD. Doc. 145 at 587, 593-594, 597, 611. See Doc. 147 at 801-802.
On appeal, Howton argues that it was not logical for his trial counsel to make this
argument and then not request a jury instruction for aggravated assault. As a
consequence, the trial court only gave the jury instructions for the more serious
offense of felonious assault. Howton argues that had the jury been given the
instructions for aggravated assault, they may have found from these facts that he
acted in response to provocation, finding him guilty of a lesser offense. He now
requests that this court reverse his conviction for felonious assault and order a new
trial.
Legal Standard
{¶34} Under Ohio law, “a properly licensed attorney is presumed to carry
out his duties in a competent manner.” State v. Gee, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-92-9,
1993 WL 270995 (July 22, 1993). Thus, the petitioner has the burden of proving
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the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. State v. Mayse, --- N.E.3d ---, 2017-
Ohio-1483, ¶ 22 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 289, 714
N.E.2d 905 (1999). Under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, the
petitioner must establish two elements. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984). If the petitioner cannot
prove one of these elements, “it [is] unnecessary for a court to consider the other
prong of the test.” State v. Walker, 2016-Ohio-3499, 66 N.E.3d 349, ¶ 20 (3d
Dist.).
{¶35} First, the petitioner must establish that “counsel’s performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.” Strickland at 687. “In order to show deficient performance, the
defendant must prove that counsel's performance fell below an objective level of
reasonable representation.” State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-
2815, 848 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 95, citing Strickland at 687. “Counsel need not raise
meritless issues or even all arguably meritorious issues.” Mayse at ¶ 24, citing
State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 354, 744 N.E.2d 1163 (2001). “[T]he failure to
make objections is not alone enough to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.” Id. at ¶ 103, citing State v. Holloway, 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 244, 527
N.E.2d 831 (1988); State v. Gumm, 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 428, 653 N.E.2d 253-25-
Case No. 1-16-35
(1995). Further, “counsel’s decision not to request a jury instruction falls within
the ambit of trial strategy.” Conway at ¶ 111.
{¶36} Second, the petitioner needs to establish “that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.” Strickland at 687. “To show prejudice, the defendant must show a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Conway at ¶ 95, citing Strickland at 687; State v.
Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 143, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). “Appellate courts
examine the record to determine “whether the accused, under all the
circumstances, * * * had a fair trial and substantial justice was done.” State v.
Rodriquez, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-16-16, 2017-Ohio-1318, ¶ 9, quoting State v.
Hester, 45 Ohio St.2d 71, 341 N.E.2d 304 (1976), paragraph four of the syllabus.
Legal Analysis
{¶37} On appeal, Howton has failed to establish that “counsel’s
performance was deficient” and that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.” Strickland, supra, at 687. He alleges that his trial counsel should
have requested jury instructions for the offense of aggravated assault in addition to
the instructions that were provided for the offense of felonious assault and seems
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to suggest that, upon trial counsel’s request, the trial court would have been
obligated by law to include the requested instruction.
{¶38} A trial court, however, has the discretion to deny requested jury
instructions unless “the requested instructions contain a correct, pertinent
statement of the law and are appropriate to the facts * * *.” State v. Lessin, 67
Ohio St.3d 487, 494, 620 N.E.2d 72, 77 (1993). The following analysis of this
case will show that the trial court would not have been obligated to give these jury
instructions if they had been requested. Thus, the decision by defense counsel not
to request jury instructions for the offense of aggravated assault was a matter of
trial strategy and not a failure to act that falls below the standard of reasonableness
to which attorneys are held. See State v. Harrison, 2015-Ohio-1419, 31 N.E.3d
220, ¶ 89, citing State v. Morris, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22089, 2005-Ohio-1136,
¶ 100; State v. Fisk, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21196, 2003-Ohio-3149, ¶ 9; State v.
Hill, 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 443, 653 N.E.2d 271 (1995); State v. Oates, 2013-Ohio-
2609, 993 N.E.2d 846, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.).
{¶39} The elements for the crimes of felonious assault and aggravated
assault are identical except that the offense of aggravated assault has “the
additional mitigating element of serious provocation.” State v. Deem, 40 Ohio
St.3d 205, 211, 533 N.E.2d 294, 299-300 (1988). See R.C. 2903.12. Compare
R.C. 2903.11.
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[I]n a trial for felonious assault, where the defendant presents
sufficient evidence of serious provocation (such that a jury could
both reasonably acquit defendant of felonious assault and
convict defendant of aggravated assault), an instruction on
aggravated assault (as a different degree of felonious assault)
must be given.
Id. at 300. Under this rule, “[p]rovocation, to be serious, must be reasonably
sufficient to bring on extreme stress and the provocation must be reasonably
sufficient to incite or to arouse the defendant into using deadly force.” Id., quoting
State v. Mabry, 5 Ohio App.3d 13, 449 N.E.2d 16 (1982), paragraph five of the
syllabus.
{¶40} In this case, the defendant admitted at trial that he had his arm
around AD’s throat, grabbed her neck, pushed her, and slapped her. Doc. 145 at
586, 588, 592-593. In letters he sent to AD while he was incarcerated, Howton
admitted that he “lost it,” was drunk at the time of the incident, “smacked [her] a
couple times too hard,” “beat [her] up,” and choked her. Doc. 146 at 683-685. On
appeal, Howton points to the fact that AD punched him one time as the “serious
provocation” that prompted his violent response. Courts across Ohio, however,
have held that “a victim’s simple pushing or punching does not constitute
sufficient provocation to warrant an aggravated assault instruction.” State v.
Bryan, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 03CA3, 2004-Ohio-2066, ¶ 24, citing State v. Koballa,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82013, 2003-Ohio-3535; State v. Pack, 4th Dist. Pike No.
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93CA525, 1994 WL 274429 (June 20, 1994). State v. Pennington, 5th Dist.
Guernsey No. 16CA14, 2017-Ohio-1423, ¶ 19-20.
{¶41} Thus, AD’s action was not enough “to arouse the passions of an
ordinary person beyond the power of his or her control.” State v. Torres, 3d Dist.
Defiance No. 4-01-06, 2002 WL 418392 (March 18, 2002), quoting State v.
Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 637, 590 N.E.2d 272 (1992). Since this evidence was
not sufficient under Ohio law to require a jury instruction for aggravated assault,
the decision not to request a jury instruction for the offense of aggravated assault
was clearly a matter of trial strategy and not evidence of a deficient performance
on the part of defense counsel. As Howton has not carried the burden of showing
his trial counsel’s performance was deficient, his third assignment of error is
overruled.
Conclusion
{¶42} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued, the judgment of Allen County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN and SHAW, J.J, concur.
/hls
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