State v. Ferris ( 2017 )

[Cite as State v. Ferris, 2017-Ohio-5664.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAWRENCE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
: Case No. 16CA27
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
:
vs. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
CHARLES A. FERRIS, :
:
Defendant-Appellant. : Released: 06/23/17
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Gene Meadows, Portsmouth, Ohio, for Appellant.
Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jeffrey
M. Smith, Lawrence County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Ironton, Ohio,
for Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________
McFarland, J.
{¶1} Charles Ferris appeals the judgment of the Lawrence County
Court of Common Pleas convicting him of two counts of rape in violation of
R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), with specifications, both first degree felonies, and
sentencing him to two terms of twenty-five years to life in prison, to be
served concurrently, along with five years of mandatory post-release control.
On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to properly
advise him of post-release control, which he claims renders his conviction
partially void. Because the record confirms the trial court failed to advise
Lawrence App. No. 16CA27 2
Appellant during the sentencing hearing that he would be subject to a
mandatory five-year period of post-release control, the post-release control
portion of Appellant’s sentence is void. Accordingly, the post-release
control portion of Appellant’s sentence must be set aside and this matter
must be remanded for resentencing as to post-release control.
FACTS
{¶2} The parties agree on the following facts:
“On or about June 10, 2016 a complaint [w]as made that
the Defendant-Appellant had been molesting a 9 year old
female for several years. The Lawrence County Sheriff’s
Office investigated the complaint and detained the Defendant-
Appellant, Charles Ferris.
The Defendant-Appellant was interviewed by deputies
from the Lawrence county Sheriff’s Office. During an initial
interview that was audio recorded the Defendant-Appellant
made admissions by nonverbal communications with the
deputy. The deputies later conducted an interview that [w]as
both video and audio recorded. The Defendant-Appellant
admitted to having ‘play time’ with the alleged victim and that
it had been ongoing since 2008.
Lawrence App. No. 16CA27 3
On or about June 29, 2016 the Defendant was indicted
for fifty-four counts of rape in violation of RC 2907.02, a
felony of the first degree. On or about November 3, 2016, the
Defendant was sentenced on two counts of rape, Count 1 and
Count 2 of the indictment, a violation of RC 2907.02. All other
counts of the indictment were dismissed.
The Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life on each
count to run concurrently. Although the notice of post release
control is stated in the Judgment Entry filed herein on
November 8, 2016, there is no mention of the post release
control [in] the sentencing hearing held on November 3, 2016.
A timely notice of appeal was filed.”
{¶3} Although the State agrees with this recitation of the facts, it
points out that “upon pleading guilty to the amended indictment under this
negotiated plea and sentence, the defendant was notified by the Court that he
would be subject to a mandatory five year post release control.” In his
timely appeal, Appellant sets forth a single assignment of error for our
review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
“I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROPERLY
ADVISE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT OF POST RELEASE
Lawrence App. No. 16CA27 4
CONTROL RENDERING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S
CONVICTION PARTIALLY VOID.”
LEGAL ANALYSIS
{¶4} In his sole assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial
court erred by failing to properly advise him of post-release control, an error
which he claims rendered his convictions partially void.1 Although the State
points out that Appellant was notified of post-release control during his guilty
plea hearing, it concedes that the trial court failed to advise Appellant of post-
release control during the sentencing hearing.
{¶5} “Generally, when reviewing felony sentences, we apply the
standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).” State v. Baker, Athens
No. 13CA18, 2014-Ohio-1967, ¶ 25. See also State v. Brewer, Meigs No.
14CA1, 2014-Ohio-1903, 11 N.E.3d 317, ¶ 33 (“we join the growing number
of appellate districts that have abandoned the Kalish plurality's second-step
abuse-of-discretion standard of review; when the General Assembly reenacted
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), it expressly stated that ‘[t]he appellate court's standard of
review is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion’ ”).
1
Although Appellant’s assignment of error alleges a post-release control error rendered his “convictions”
partially void, the argument portion of his brief consistently argues the error rendered the only the post-
release control portion of his sentence void. As such, we construe his argument to be that only the post-
release control portion of his sentence is void, and not the findings of guilt or other lawful elements of his
convictions and sentences.
Lawrence App. No. 16CA27 5
{¶6} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), we may only modify or vacate a
defendant's sentence if we find, clearly and convincingly, that: (1) the record
does not support the mandatory sentencing findings, or (2) that the sentence
is “otherwise contrary to law.” We recognize that this is an “extremely
deferential standard of review.” State v. Venes, 2013-Ohio-1891, 992 N.E.2d
453, ¶ 21. Although State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912,
896 N.E.2d 124, may not provide the standard of review framework for
reviewing felony sentences, it does provide guidance for determining
whether a sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. See State v.
Lee, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012–09–182, 2013-Ohio-3404, ¶ 10.
According to Kalish, a sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to
law when the trial court considered the purposes and principles set forth in
2929.11, as well as the factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, properly applies post-
release control, and sentences within the permissible statutory range. Id.; See
also State v. Kalish, at ¶ 18.
{¶7} Here, although the judgment entry stated Appellant was to be
subject to a mandatory five-year term of post-release control, the trial court
did not notify Appellant of this fact on the record during the sentencing
hearing. “When sentencing a felony offender to a term of imprisonment, a
trial court is required to notify the offender at the sentencing hearing about
Lawrence App. No. 16CA27 6
post-release control and is further required to incorporate that notice into its
journal entry imposing sentence.” State v. Gannon, 4th Dist. Lawrence No.
15CA16, 2016-Ohio-1007, ¶ 26; quoting State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21,
2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, paragraph one of the syllabus. Under
R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) and (e), a trial court must notify certain felony
offenders at the sentencing hearing that: (1) the offender is subject to
statutorily mandated post-release control; and (2) the parole board may
impose a prison term of up to one-half of the offender's originally-imposed
prison term if the offender violates the post-release control conditions.
{¶8} With respect to the State’s notation that Appellant was informed
that he would be subject to post-release control during his plea hearing, we
cannot conclude that such notice satisfies the statutorily required notice that
must be provided at the sentencing hearing. State v. Biondo, 11th Dist.
Portage No. 2008-P-0028, 2008-Ohio-6560, FN. 2 (“not only must a court
notify a defendant at the sentencing hearing and in its journal entry on
sentence, but also, where applicable, prior to accepting his or her plea.”); see
also State v. Delventhal, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81034, 2003-Ohio-1503, ¶
6 (“Informing a defendant of post-release control at sentencing cannot
validate a guilty plea entered without such knowledge, nor can information
Lawrence App. No. 16CA27 7
at a plea hearing substitute for the actual imposition of sentence required
under R.C. 2929.19(B)(3) [now R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)].”).
{¶9} However, not only is a trial court required to notify the offender
about post-release control at the sentencing hearing, it is also required to
incorporate that notice into its journal entry imposing sentence. The main
focus of the post-release control sentencing statutes is on the notification
itself and not on the sentencing entry. State v. Adkins, 4th Dist. Lawrence
No. 13CA17, 2014-Ohio-3389, ¶ 36 (internal citations omitted). “When a
trial court fails to provide the required notification at either the sentencing
hearing or in the sentencing entry, that part of the sentence is void and must
be set aside.” Id. at ¶ 37; citing State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-
Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶¶ 27-29; see also State v. Adams, 4th Dist.
Lawrence No. 15CA2, 2016-Ohio-7772, ¶ 87. Further, “ ‘[i]n most cases,
the prison sanction is not void and therefore “only the offending portion of
the sentence is subject to review and correction.” ’ ” Id.; quoting State v.
Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014, 1 N.E.3d 382, ¶ 7; in turn
quoting Fischer at ¶ 27.
{¶10} Because the record confirms the trial court failed to advise
Appellant of post-release control during the sentencing hearing, which
constitutes a notification error, that portion of his sentence is void, must be set
Lawrence App. No. 16CA27 8
aside and the matter remanded for a resentencing hearing in accordance with
R.C. 2929.191. State v. Adams, supra, at ¶ 87. Accordingly, Appellant’s sole
assignment is error is sustained, to the extent it argues the post-release control
portion of his sentence, rather than his convictions, has been rendered void as
a result of this error.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN
PART, VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED FOR
RESENTENCING.
Lawrence App. No. 16CA27 9
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
Appellant shall recover any costs from Appellee.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
the Lawrence County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into
execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE
UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL
COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to
exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a
continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio
an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If
a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the
expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a
notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal
period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme
Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date
of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Harsha, J. & Hoover, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: _____________________________
Matthew W. McFarland, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from
the date of filing with the clerk.