Darren Lamear v. Nancy Berryhill , 865 F.3d 1201 ( 2017 )


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  •                FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DARREN LAMEAR,                          No. 15-35088
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    D.C. No.
    v.                     3:13-cv-01319-
    AC
    NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
    Commissioner Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.        OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted July 11, 2017
    Portland, Oregon
    Filed August 1, 2017
    Before: Marsha S. Berzon, Paul J. Watford,
    and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Owens
    2                    LAMEAR V. BERRYHILL
    SUMMARY *
    Social Security
    The panel reversed the district court’s judgment
    affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of a
    claimant’s application for disability insurance benefits under
    Title II of the Social Security Act.
    The vocational expert opined that claimant, who had left
    hand manipulative limitations, could still work as an office
    helper, mail clerk, or parking lot cashier; and the
    administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that claimant was
    not disabled.
    The panel held that the ALJ failed to reconcile an
    apparent conflict between the testimony of the vocational
    expert and the Department of Labor’s Dictionary of
    Occupational Titles (“DOT”). Specifically, the panel held
    that it could not say that, based on common experience, it
    was likely and foreseeable that an office helper, mail clerk,
    or parking lot cashier with limitations on his ability to
    “handle, finger and feel with the left hand” could perform
    his duties. The panel noted that the DOT’s lengthy
    descriptions for the jobs strongly suggested that using both
    hands would be necessary to perform the tasks. Absent
    anything in the record to explain the apparent discrepancy,
    the panel reversed and remanded so that the ALJ could ask
    the vocational expert to reconcile the jobs with claimant’s
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    LAMEAR V. BERRYHILL                     3
    left hand limitations. The panel further held that the ALJ’s
    failure to inquire was not harmless.
    COUNSEL
    Alyson R. Young (argued) and Merrill Schneider, Schneider
    Kerr & Gibney Law Offices, Portland, Oregon, for Plaintiff-
    Appellant.
    Jordan Dylan Goddard (argued), Assistant Regional
    Counsel; David Morado, Regional Chief Counsel, Seattle
    Region X; Office of the General Counsel, Social Security
    Administration, Seattle, Washington; Ronald K. Silver,
    Assistant United States Attorney; United States Attorney's
    Office, Seattle, Washington; for Defendant-Appellee.
    OPINION
    OWENS, Circuit Judge:
    Darren Lamear appeals from the district court’s
    judgment affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s
    denial of his application for disability insurance benefits
    under Title II of the Social Security Act. We agree with
    Lamear that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed to
    reconcile an apparent conflict between the testimony of the
    vocational expert and the Department of Labor’s Dictionary
    of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), so we reverse and remand.
    I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL
    HISTORY
    Lamear applied for disability insurance benefits due to
    back and neck problems, which also impacted his left hand
    4                  LAMEAR V. BERRYHILL
    and arm. At a hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from
    Lamear, who was represented by counsel, and a vocational
    expert (“VE”). The VE opined that an individual with
    Lamear’s limitations, which included being able only
    “occasionally” to handle, finger, and reach overhead with his
    left, non-dominant hand and arm, but with no limitations on
    his right side, could not perform Lamear’s past relevant work
    as a cashier, bartender, or stockbroker. In particular, the VE
    testified that such an individual would have trouble using a
    keyboard with his left hand.
    However, the VE opined that Lamear could still work as
    an office helper, mail clerk, or parking lot cashier, even
    though the DOT states that these jobs require “frequent”
    handling, fingering, and reaching. Specifically, the VE
    testified as follows:
    [ALJ:] All right. Can you identify any other
    occupations you believe such an individual
    [with Lamear’s limitations] would be able to
    perform?
    [VE:] Yes, your honor. Given the first
    hypothetical, work would be performed as an
    office helper, 239.567-010, SVP 2, light. We
    have about 3,700 people working locally in
    this occupation, a little [o]ver 890,000
    nationally. The second example would be
    mail clerk, 209.687-026, SVP 2, light. We
    have a little over 1,900 people working in this
    occupation locally and about . . . 233,000
    people working nationally. And then a third
    example would be park[ing] lot cashier,
    211[].462-010, SVP 2, light. We have about
    900 people working in the local economy in
    LAMEAR V. BERRYHILL                             5
    this occupation         and     around      436,000
    nationally.
    [ALJ:] Okay. . . .
    The VE did not explain how Lamear could do this work
    with his left hand and arm limitations, and the ALJ never
    asked the VE to reconcile any potential inconsistency
    between Lamear’s manipulative limitations and the DOT’s
    job descriptions. 1
    The ALJ denied Lamear’s application for disability
    benefits, applying the usual five-step sequential evaluation
    process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ weighed the
    medical evidence and assessed Lamear’s residual functional
    capacity (“RFC”) as follows:
    [Lamear] has the residual functional capacity
    to lift and carry 10 pounds frequently and
    20 pounds occasionally. He can stand and
    walk up to two hours out of an eight-hour day
    and sit six hours out of an eight-hour day. He
    cannot climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. He
    can only occasionally climb ramps and
    stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl,
    reach overhead with his left upper
    extremity, and handle, finger and feel with
    the left hand. He should avoid even
    1
    The ALJ asked the VE about a different possible inconsistency
    between the VE’s testimony and the DOT, regarding Lamear’s standing
    and walking limitations and the “light” exertion level of the identified
    jobs, which is not at issue in this appeal.
    6                 LAMEAR V. BERRYHILL
    moderate exposure to hazards.       (emphasis
    added)
    At step five—the only step at issue on appeal—the ALJ
    found, in light of the RFC assessment and based on the VE’s
    testimony, that there were jobs that existed in significant
    numbers in the national economy that Lamear could
    perform, such as office helper, mail clerk, or parking lot
    cashier. On that basis, the ALJ found Lamear not disabled
    and denied his claim for disability benefits.
    Lamear requested review from the Appeals Council,
    which denied his request, making the ALJ’s decision the
    final agency decision. Before the Appeals Council, Lamear
    argued that there was an apparent conflict between his
    manipulative limitations and the DOT which the ALJ should
    have reconciled.
    Lamear then appealed to the district court, which
    affirmed. The district court rejected Lamear’s argument that
    there was an apparent conflict between the VE’s testimony
    and the DOT. However, the district court noted that the
    Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled on whether “handling,”
    “fingering,” and “reaching” in the DOT require the ability to
    use both hands or arms, and that district courts are divided
    on this issue. This timely appeal followed.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review de novo a district court’s decision regarding
    the Commissioner’s disability determination. Valentine v.
    Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    574 F.3d 685
    , 690 (9th Cir. 2009).
    We must uphold the Commissioner’s decision if it is
    “supported by substantial evidence and a correct application
    of the law.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
                         LAMEAR V. BERRYHILL                           7
    III. DISCUSSION
    In determining whether an applicant is entitled to
    disability benefits, an ALJ may consult a series of sources,
    including a VE and the DOT. Presumably, the opinion of
    the VE would comport with the DOT’s guidance. But “[i]f
    the expert’s opinion that the applicant is able to work
    conflicts with, or seems to conflict with, the requirements
    listed in the Dictionary, then the ALJ must ask the expert to
    reconcile the conflict before relying on the expert to decide
    if the claimant is disabled.” Gutierrez v. Colvin, 
    844 F.3d 804
    , 807 (9th Cir. 2016). 2
    We have explained that the conflict must be “obvious or
    apparent” to trigger the ALJ’s obligation to inquire further.
    
    Id. at 808.
    For example, in Gutierrez, the applicant could
    not reach above shoulder level with her right arm. 
    Id. at 807.
    The VE opined that she could work as a cashier, and the ALJ
    did not specifically question the VE about how the applicant
    could do this in light of her inability to reach overhead with
    her right arm. 
    Id. The applicant
    in Gutierrez, like Lamear,
    argued that the ALJ should have recognized a conflict
    between the DOT and the VE’s testimony, and questioned
    the VE more closely. 
    Id. We held
    there was no error
    because, based on common experience, it is “unlikely and
    unforeseeable” that a cashier would need to reach overhead,
    and even more rare for one to need to reach overhead with
    both arms. 
    Id. at 808–09
    & 809 n.2.
    Of course, “[t]he requirement for an ALJ to ask follow
    up questions is fact-dependent,” 
    id. at 808,
    and the more
    obscure the job, the less likely common experience will
    2
    The district court here did not have the benefit of our recent
    decision in Gutierrez.
    8                     LAMEAR V. BERRYHILL
    dictate the result. To avoid unnecessary appeals, an ALJ
    should ordinarily ask the VE to explain in some detail why
    there is no conflict between the DOT and the applicant’s
    RFC. 3 Doing so here likely would have eliminated the need
    for this appeal.
    But now that this appeal is before us, we must decide it.
    Contrary to the facts in Gutierrez, we cannot say that, based
    on common experience, it is likely and foreseeable that an
    office helper, mail clerk, or parking lot cashier with
    limitations on his ability to “handle, finger and feel with the
    left hand” could perform his duties. The DOT’s lengthy
    descriptions for these jobs strongly suggest that it is likely
    and foreseeable that using both hands would be necessary to
    perform “essential, integral, or expected” tasks in an
    acceptable and efficient manner. 
    Id. According to
    the DOT,
    the general tasks for these jobs include opening and sorting
    mail, stuffing envelopes, distributing paperwork, and
    counting change. See DOT 239.567-010 (office helper),
    
    1991 WL 672232
    ; DOT 209.687-026 (mail clerk), 
    1991 WL 671813
    ; DOT 211.462-010 (cashier II, which includes
    3
    See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 00-4p, 
    2000 WL 1898704
    , at
    *2 (Dec. 4, 2000) (explaining the ALJ’s duty to “fully develop the
    record” as to whether there is consistency between VE occupational
    evidence and the DOT); Zavalin v. Colvin, 
    778 F.3d 842
    , 846 (9th Cir.
    2015) (“The ALJ’s failure to resolve an apparent inconsistency may
    leave us with a gap in the record that precludes us from determining
    whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.”);
    Massachi v. Astrue, 
    486 F.3d 1149
    , 1153 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The
    procedural requirements of SSR 00-4p ensure that the record is clear as
    to why an ALJ relied on a vocational expert’s testimony, particularly in
    cases where the expert’s testimony conflicts with the Dictionary of
    Occupational Titles.”); see also Moore v. Colvin, 
    769 F.3d 987
    , 990 (8th
    Cir. 2014) (“The ALJ is not absolved of this duty [to reconcile conflicts]
    merely because the VE responds ‘yes’ when asked if her testimony is
    consistent with the DOT.”).
    LAMEAR V. BERRYHILL                            9
    parking lot cashier), 
    1991 WL 671840
    . Moreover, all three
    jobs require workers to “frequently” engage in handling,
    fingering, and reaching, which means that these types of
    activities could be necessary for as much as two-thirds of the
    workday. 
    Id. Absent anything
    in the record to explain this
    apparent discrepancy, we must reverse and remand so the
    ALJ can ask the VE to reconcile these jobs with Lamear’s
    left hand limitations.
    The Commissioner urges us to find the ALJ’s failure to
    reconcile the conflict harmless, see 
    Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1154
    n.19, by presuming that the handling, fingering, and
    reaching requirements are unilateral since the DOT does not
    expressly state that they demand both hands. That argument
    assumes away the question of whether these requirements
    necessitate both hands, an issue that has divided many
    courts. 4 As discussed above, we cannot determine from this
    record, the DOT, or our common experience whether the
    jobs in question require both hands, so we cannot say the
    ALJ’s failure to inquire was harmless. Further, we are
    unpersuaded by the Commissioner’s argument that the
    ALJ’s failure was harmless because the VE considered
    bilateral dexterity when formulating his answers, as shown
    by the VE’s testimony that a person with Lamear’s
    4
    See, e.g., Pearson v. Colvin, 
    810 F.3d 204
    , 211 (4th Cir. 2015);
    Bickford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:12-CV-2557-CMK, 
    2014 WL 1302459
    , at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014); Lee v. Astrue, No. 6:12-cv-
    00084-SI, 
    2013 WL 1296071
    , at *10–11 & *11 n.5 (D. Or. Mar. 28,
    2013); Marquez v. Astrue, No. CV-11-339-TUC-JGZ-DTF, 
    2012 WL 3011778
    , at *2–3 (D. Ariz. May 2, 2012), adopted by 
    2012 WL 3011779
    (D. Ariz. July 23, 2012); Marshall v. Astrue, No. 08-cv-1735-L(WMc),
    
    2010 WL 841252
    , at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2010); Fortes v. Astrue, No.
    08-cv-317-BTM(RBB), 
    2009 WL 734161
    , at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18,
    2009); Feibusch v. Astrue, Civ. No. 07-00244 BMK, 
    2008 WL 583554
    ,
    at *4–5 (D. Haw. Mar. 4, 2008).
    10                     LAMEAR V. BERRYHILL
    limitations could not perform his past work due to trouble
    using a keyboard with his left hand.
    The Commissioner cites Meanel v. Apfel, 
    172 F.3d 1111
    ,
    1115 (9th Cir. 1999), to argue that Lamear’s counsel during
    cross-examination should have asked the VE to reconcile the
    DOT with his conclusion, and that counsel’s failure requires
    us to affirm. In Meanel, the claimant’s counsel did not
    present statistical evidence to the ALJ and Appeals Council,
    and we held that claimants who are represented by counsel
    “must raise all issues and evidence at their administrative
    hearings . . . to preserve them on appeal.” 
    Id. Unlike the
    claimant in Meanel, Lamear raised this issue
    to the Appeals Council. And more importantly, our law is
    clear that a counsel’s failure does not relieve the ALJ of his
    express duty to reconcile apparent conflicts through
    questioning: “When there is an apparent conflict between the
    vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT—for example,
    expert testimony that a claimant can perform an occupation
    involving DOT requirements that appear more than the
    claimant can handle—the ALJ is required to reconcile the
    inconsistency.” 5 
    Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 846
    (emphasis added).
    5
    See also SSR 00-4p, 
    2000 WL 1898704
    , at *2 (“When there is an
    apparent unresolved conflict between VE or [vocational specialist ‘VS’]
    evidence and the DOT, the adjudicator must elicit a reasonable
    explanation for the conflict before relying on the VE or VS evidence to
    support a determination or decision about whether the claimant is
    disabled. At the hearings level, as part of the adjudicator’s duty to fully
    develop the record, the adjudicator will inquire, on the record, as to
    whether or not there is such consistency.” (emphasis added)); 
    id. at *4
    (“When a VE or VS provides evidence about the requirements of a job
    or occupation, the adjudicator has an affirmative responsibility to ask
    about any possible conflict between that VE or VS evidence and
    information provided in the DOT.” (emphasis added)); Prochaska v.
    LAMEAR V. BERRYHILL                             11
    That inquiry did not happen here, and so we must remand
    the case to permit the ALJ to follow up with the VE. 6
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    Barnhart, 
    454 F.3d 731
    , 735 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that the claimant
    “was not required to raise th[e conflict] at the hearing, because [SSR 00-
    4p] places the burden of making the necessary inquiry on the ALJ”).
    6
    We reject Lamear’s separate argument that the ALJ “modified” the
    hypothetical at step five such that the VE’s testimony was ambiguous.