K.S. v. K.B. , 2017 Ohio 7103 ( 2017 )

[Cite as K.S. v. K.B., 2017-Ohio-7103.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
FULTON COUNTY
K.S. Court of Appeals No. F-17-005
Appellant Trial Court No. 2033052
v.
K.B. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellee Decided: August 4, 2017
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Todd B. Guelde, for appellant.
K.B., pro se.
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PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, K.S., appeals the February 6, 2017 judgment of the
Fulton County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which, following the parties’
objections to the administrative decision determined, inter alia, the effective date of the
child support modification. Because we find that the court did not abuse its discretion,
we affirm.
{¶ 2} The parties, appellant K.S., mother, residential parent and obligee, and
appellee K.B., father and obligor, have a child together who was born in 2000. Over the
years, the amount of child support owed fluctuated based on the parties’ incomes.
Relevant to this appeal, on February 8, 2016, pursuant to an administrative review
request, the Fulton County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”) sent its
recommendations to the parties. The CSEA recommended that appellee pay $465.11 per
month if he was providing the child’s health insurance; if not, the amount would be
$518.81 per month plus $112 for cash medical support. Objections to the findings were
filed on February 22, 2016. Following a hearing on March 14, 2016, the hearing officer
affirmed the administrative review findings. Both parties filed objections to the
administrative decision and it was sent to the court for judicial review.
{¶ 3} The hearing was originally set for July 2016, but the matter was continued to
August 15, 2016, for appellee to retain counsel. In August, newly retained counsel
requested and was granted a two-week continuance to gain additional information.
Thereafter, following negotiations, at a hearing on October 19, 2016, the parties informed
the court that they had reached an agreement. The agreement was never signed and the
matter proceeded to a final hearing on January 31, 2017.
{¶ 4} At the hearing, the parties made their respective arguments; appellee, pro se,
as counsel had previously withdrawn. The parties expressed agreement as to the actual
amount of the modification: appellee to pay $561.06, when health insurance is provided
by appellant, and appellee to pay $464.54, when health insurance is provided by appellee;
the court determined that the tax exemption be awarded to appellant. Regarding the issue
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on appeal, appellant argued that the child-support modification should apply retroactive
to March 14, 2016, when the hearing she requested was held; appellee contended that the
proper start date was January 1, 2017, when he stopped covering the child’s medical
insurance. The court determined that the proper effective date was October 19, 2016,
when the parties had reached an agreement, though it was not effectuated. The court
further noted: “[A]s a Judge we tend to try to hit the middle, and I ordered your client the
tax exemption over Mr. [B]’s objection, so I’m going to split the middle on the date and
I’m gonna do an effective date of child support of October 19, 2016.” Following the trial
court’s February 6, 2017 judgment entry, appellant commenced this appeal and raises the
following assignment of error:
The trial court abused its discretion by unreasonably and arbitrarily
deciding that the effective date of modification of appellant’s child support
order should take effect on October 19, 2016, and not on the first day of the
month following the date on which the review of the court child support
order began.
{¶ 5} In her sole assignment of error, appellant disputes the portion of the court’s
judgment entry which ordered that the modification’s effective date be October 19, 2016.
Appellant contends that according to law, the modified order’s effective date should
relate back to March 1, 2016, the month following appellant’s filing of objections to the
administrative review finding. Conversely, appellee asserts that the portion of the order
which included the switch of health insurance for the minor from father to mother, was
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never requested by appellant until August 19, 2016, and the proposed change was first
calculated on October 19, 2016.
{¶ 6} We first note that orders involving child support are reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard. Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St. 3d 142, 144, 541 N.E.2d 1028
(1989). An abuse of discretion occurs where a trial court’s judgment is unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St. 3d 217, 219, 450
N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶ 7} Appellant correctly states that “absent some special circumstance, an order
of a trial court modifying child support should be retroactive to the date such
modification was first requested.” State ex rel. Draiss v. Draiss, 70 Ohio App. 3d 418,
421, 591 N.E.2d 354 (9th Dist.1990). See R.C. 3119.71(B). This is to avoid an
inequitable result caused by the usual time delay between the filing of the motion and the
trial court’s disposition. Id. See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 107 Ohio App. 3d 132, 139-140,
667 N.E.2d 1256 (6th Dist.). A “special circumstance” has been found where the
alternate date has a “‘reasonable basis’ and bear[s] some significance in the underlying
litigation.” Sandel v. Choma, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25995, 2012-Ohio-3781, ¶ 6, quoting
In re P.J.H., 196 Ohio App. 3d 122, 2011-Ohio-5970, 962 N.E.2d 389, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 8} In support of her argument, appellant relies on a Second Appellate District
case which reversed the trial court’s finding that the effective date of the modification of
child support set by the magistrate bore no “significance in relation to the grounds for the
relief the court ordered.” Bell v. Bell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23714, 2010-Ohio-5276,
¶ 24. In Bell, in October 2007, the father obligor filed a motion to reduce his child
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support obligation due to the faultless loss of his job. Id. at ¶ 3. The matter came on for
a hearing in the fall of 2008, and the magistrate filed a decision on December 4, 2008. Id.
at ¶ 4. The magistrate granted the modification and set January 1, 2008, as the effective
date. Id. at ¶ 5-6. Following father’s objections the trial court, concluding that the
magistrate provided no rationale for the January date, set the effective date at August 12,
2008, the date the parties first presented testimony on the motion. Id. at ¶ 7-10. On
appeal, the court found that the trial court abused its discretion because the August 2008
date bore “no significance in relation to the grounds for the relief the court ordered,
which arose from the loss of his teaching position in June of 2007.” Id. at ¶ 24.
{¶ 9} Appellant argues that like Bell, the effective date of the modification chosen
by the trial court bears no significance to her request. She asserts that because she filed
her objections to the Administrative Review finding in February 2016, the first day of the
following month, March 1, 2016, was the proper effective date. Conversely, appellee
contends that it was August 2016, before appellant first requested that she be permitted to
provide medical insurance to the child at a lower cost and, thus, increase appellee’s
monthly obligation to appellant. Appellee asserts that this informal request was first
committed to writing at the October 19, 2016 pretrial which was the effective date
ultimately chosen by the court. The worksheet created reflected the adjusted obligation.
Appellee contends that appellant’s insurance request was a “special circumstance,”
allowing the court, in its discretion, to modify the effective date.
{¶ 10} Upon review, we find that unlike Bell, the effective date chosen by the
court did bear significance to the basis of appellant’s request. The October date was
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when the parties reached an agreement regarding the transfer of the child’s health
insurance coverage. Further, appellant stated at the January 31, 2017 hearing that
appellee’s insurance coverage for the child terminated on October 19, 2016.
Accordingly, we find that appellant’s assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 11} On consideration whereof, we find that substantial justice was done the
party complaining and the judgment of the Fulton County Court of Common Pleas,
Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Pursuant to App.R. 24, appellant is ordered to pay the
costs of this appeal.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Arlene Singer, J
_______________________________
Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
_______________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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