State v. Buchar , 2017 Ohio 7601 ( 2017 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Buchar, 
    2017-Ohio-7601
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                               :   JUDGES:
    :
    :   Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
    Plaintiff-Appellee                   :   Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
    :   Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
    -vs-                                        :
    :   Case No. 2017AP010003
    :
    BRADLEY D. BUCHAR                           :
    :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant                  :   OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                         Appeal from the Tuscarawas
    County Court, Case No. 16 CRB
    0038
    JUDGMENT:                                        AFFIRMED
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                          September 11, 2017
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee:                         For Defendant-Appellant:
    ROBERT R. STEPHENSON II                         DAN GUINN
    206 West High Ave.                              P.O. Box 804
    New Philadelphia, OH 44663                      New Philadelphia, OH 44663
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2017AP010003
    2
    Delaney, P.J.
    {¶1} Appellant Bradley D. Buchar appeals from the judgment entries of
    conviction and sentence entered in the Tuscarawas County Court on July 27, 2016
    and November 15, 2016. Appellee is the state of Ohio.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    {¶2} This case arose on January 21, 2016, around 3:00 p.m., when
    appellant confronted Joshua L. Smith about Smith’s alleged taunts of “revving” an
    engine at him and “giving [him] the finger” as Smith drove past appellant.
    {¶3} Appellant and Smith have a purported history of “bad blood” between
    their families but until this incident no police intervention was required. Smith was
    employed as a laborer by the Newcomerstown Water Department and drove a
    department truck, accompanied by his coworker Allen Davis in the passenger seat.
    The two were en route to an address on Ray Street to shut off a resident’s water.
    {¶4} Appellant, in the meantime, was in the parking lot of the Duke Gas
    Station putting air in his tires. “The Duke” is at the corner of Ray Street and State
    Street. Appellant observed Smith and Davis drive by, and heard the engine of the
    water truck “rev” as it went around the corner. Appellant perceived the “revving”
    to be a threat directed at him. Appellant also said Smith “gave [him] the finger.”
    {¶5} Moments later Smith was at work at the residence on Ray Street with
    a “water key,” a large tool placed in a hole in the ground. Davis was seated inside
    the truck with the passenger door open.        Appellant quickly pulled up in his
    Suburban, onto the resident’s grass, jumped out, and yelled profanities at Smith.
    He threatened to break Smith’s jaw. Appellant raised his elbow at Smith as if to
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2017AP010003
    3
    strike him and Smith moved back. According to Smith and Davis, appellant then
    “chest bumped” Smith, got back into his Suburban, and took off.
    {¶6} At trial, Smith admitted he “revved” the engine as he went around the
    corner by the Duke to provoke appellant, but denied giving him the finger. Smith
    and Davis said appellant “stormed” down the road toward them and pulled onto
    the customer’s grass. When confronted by appellant, Smith said he “just stood
    there” with the water key in his hands. Appellant swung at Smith but didn’t make
    contact because Smith moved back. He described the only actual physical contact
    between the two as a chest bump.
    {¶7} Davis confirmed appellant was “in Smith’s face,” calling him names
    and using profanity, and Smith backed away when appellant swung at him. Davis
    also witnessed the “chest bump.”
    {¶8} Ptl. John Gray reported to the Ray Street address to investigate. He
    took statements from Smith and Davis and learned a possible assault occurred.
    The next day he went to appellant’s house to get his side of the story. When asked
    if he knew why Gray was there, appellant responded, “Because of [Smith]?” Gray
    advised appellant of Smith’s assault complaint and appellant responded he “wasn’t
    going to deny anything.” Appellant admitted he swung his elbow at Smith and
    threatened to break his jaw, although he claimed this was a conditional threat “if
    Smith came to his house.”
    {¶9} Gray went to a business across Ray Street from the residence and
    obtained a video of the incident, entered as appellee’s Exhibit A.      In Gray’s
    estimation, the video confirmed Smith’s story and clearly depicted appellant
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2017AP010003
    4
    swinging at Smith, which Gray determined to be an assault.               Some of the
    interaction on the video is blocked by the water truck and the chest bump is not
    apparent on the video.
    {¶10} At trial, two witnesses testified on appellant’s behalf about the
    “history” between appellant and Smith, and claimed Smith and Davis have
    threatened appellant at times. The witnesses were not present during the incident
    on January 21, and one witness acknowledged threats were made by appellant as
    well.
    {¶11} Appellant testified on his own behalf. He stated he was filling his tire
    when he heard “revving” and looked up to see Smith giving him the “evil eye” and
    a “hand gesture.” Appellant finished filling his tire and then “decided to talk to these
    guys,” acknowledging he went to the house where they were working and pulled
    onto the curb.
    {¶12} Appellant testified as follows in pertinent part:
    * * * *.
    [Appellant]: When I looked up to see what the [revving] was
    [Smith] was staring at me and giving me the evil eye and had his
    hand gestured toward me.         I just shook my head and thought
    seriously, more of this? I finished filling up the air in my tires and as
    I was proceeding to leave I was facing the direction where they were
    sitting so instead of backing out onto State Street I just proceeded
    down there and I thought well, you know what, I’m going to stop and
    talk to these guys.
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2017AP010003
    5
    [Defense counsel:] What did you do?
    [Appellant]: I pulled up on the curb so I wouldn’t impede
    traffic. [Smith] was in front of the truck as he stated, as [Davis] stated,
    with a tool in the ground turning on the water. [Davis] was sitting in
    the truck with the door open which means [Smith] was here in front
    of the truck, [Davis] was sitting in the truck and I was behind the truck.
    I asked him, I said, “Listen, you fat motherfucker. Do you want some
    of me? Don’t fuck around with me on the job. I will bust your fucking
    jaw if you come to my house and pull this shit.” And he says, “You
    better get out of here,” and I did. I did make a motion. I stood in front
    of him.
    [Defense counsel]: Show the Court what you did.
    [Appellant]: And I went like this. I said “I will break your jaw
    for you if you come to my house and pull this shit.” I did not make
    any motion to harm him then or there. I told him if they continue this
    come to my house and I will do something about it.
    * * * *.
    T. 52-53.
    {¶13} Appellant was charged by criminal complaint with one count of
    assault pursuant to R.C. 2903.13(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree, and
    appellant entered a plea of not guilty. A criminal protection order was issued on
    behalf Smith and against appellant pursuant to R.C. 2903.213.
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2017AP010003
    6
    {¶14} The matter proceeded to bench trial before a magistrate on July 13,
    2016, and the magistrate found appellant guilty as charged by judgment entry
    dated July 27, 2016. Appellant objected to the magistrate’s decision on October
    17, 2016 but the trial court adopted the magistrate’s findings and conclusions
    pursuant to a judgment entry dated November 16, 2016. On December 16, 2016,
    the trial court imposed sentence upon appellant as follows: a fine of $250 and court
    costs in addition to 30 days in jail with all 30 suspended on certain conditions.
    {¶15} Appellant now appeals from the judgment entries of his conviction
    and sentence.
    {¶16} Appellant raises one assignment of error:
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    {¶17} “APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR ASSAULT PURSUANT TO
    R.C. 2903.13(A) WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
    ANALYSIS
    {¶18} In his sole assignment of error, appellant asserts his conviction upon
    one count of assault is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
    {¶19} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of
    the evidence, the court of appeals functions as the “thirteenth juror,” and after
    “reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences,
    considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts
    in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
    miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be overturned and a new trial
    ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 387, 1997–Ohio–52, 678 N.E.2d
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2017AP010003
    7
    541. Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence
    and ordering a new trial should be reserved for only the “exceptional case in which
    the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” 
    Id.
     A manifest-weight
    challenge “concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence * *
    * to support one side of the issue rather than the other.’” (Emphasis sic.) State v.
    Montgomery, 
    148 Ohio St.3d 347
    , 
    2016-Ohio-5487
    , 
    71 N.E.3d 180
    , ¶ 75,
    reconsideration granted in part, 
    147 Ohio St.3d 1438
    , 
    2016-Ohio-7677
    , 
    63 N.E.3d 157
    , citing Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    , quoting
    Black's Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990).
    {¶20} R.C. 2903.13(A), assault, states, “No person shall knowingly cause
    or attempt to cause physical harm to another * * *.” Appellant argues his conviction
    is against the manifest weight of the evidence for three reasons: the testimony of
    Smith and Davis was “inconsistent;” appellant did not knowingly attempt to cause
    physical harm; and the distance between appellant and Smith established the “arm
    swing” could not have been an attempt to cause physical harm.
    {¶21} Appellant cites several minor examples of inconsistencies in the
    testimony of Smith and Davis.       As to any perceived inconsistencies in the
    testimony of Smith and Davis, the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
    witnesses are determined by the trier of fact. State v. Yarbrough, 
    95 Ohio St.3d 227
    , 231, 2002–Ohio–2126, 
    767 N.E.2d 216
    , ¶ 79. None of these inconsistencies
    go to the manifest weight of the evidence, however, especially in light of the
    corroboration of the basic facts by Ptl. Gray, the video of the incident, and
    appellant’s own testimony. The factfinder, in this case the magistrate, was free to
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2017AP010003
    8
    accept or reject any and all of the evidence offered by the parties and assess the
    witnesses' credibility. “While the [factfinder] may take note of the inconsistencies
    and resolve or discount them accordingly * * * such inconsistencies do not render
    defendant's conviction against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence.”
    State v. McGregor, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 15–COA–023, 2016–Ohio–3082, ¶ 10,
    citing State v. Craig, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 99AP–739, unreported, 
    2000 WL 297252
     (Mar. 23, 2000). The factfinder need not believe all of a witness' testimony,
    but may accept only portions of it as true. 
    Id.
     Our review of the entire record
    reveals no significant inconsistencies or other conflicts in appellee's evidence that
    would demonstrate a lack of credibility of appellee's witnesses. State v. Sanders,
    5th Dist. Ashland No. 15–COA–33, 2016–Ohio–7204, 
    76 N.E.3d 468
    , ¶ 41.
    {¶22} As the trial court pointed out, the video is not definitive but we find it
    to be compelling: a figure is seen at work near a white truck when a Suburban pulls
    up abruptly, into the yard, and a second figure in a light-colored shirt quickly
    emerges from the truck. The second figure, appellant, is visibly agitated and
    gesticulating; the raised-arm gesture described as a “swing” is apparent. It is true
    the video does not establish how close the assailant was to the victim.
    Nevertheless, the video is an additional piece of credible evidence supporting the
    testimony of Smith and Davis. We also note when Ptl. Gray questioned appellant
    about the assault, appellant acknowledged that he knew why Gray sought him out,
    and appellant admitted swinging at Smith.          Appellant has not shown that “a
    miscarriage of justice” occurred or that the finder of fact “lost its way” in finding him
    guilty of assault due to any inconsistencies in the evidence.
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2017AP010003
    9
    {¶23} Appellant also argues the “swing” was effectively a verbal warning to
    Smith and not a knowing attempt to cause physical harm. Gray determined,
    however, that the swing was an assault because it was an attempt to cause
    physical harm; Smith and Davis testified it did not connect only because Smith
    moved out of the way. R.C. 2903.13(A) does not require that a defendant cause
    physical harm; it also prohibits individuals from attempting to cause physical harm
    to another. State v. Belcher, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 24968, 
    2013-Ohio-1234
    , ¶
    57 [testimony of victim that defendant attempted to hit her and swung at her
    satisfies requirements for assault conviction]. See also, State v. Varner, 11th Dist.
    Ashtabula No. 2002–A–0083, 
    2004-Ohio-2790
    , ¶ 31; State v. Barnes, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 87392, 
    2006-Ohio-5436
    , ¶ 11.
    {¶24} Appellant also contends he did not intend to injure Smith with the
    swing, thus he did not have the requisite culpable mental state to sustain a
    conviction for assault. A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when he is
    aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a
    certain nature. State v. Miller, 
    96 Ohio St.3d 384
    , 
    2002-Ohio-4931
    , at ¶ 31.
    “‘Probably’ is defined as ‘more likely than not’ or a greater than fifty percent
    chance.” Miller v. Paulson, 
    97 Ohio App.3d 217
    , 222, 
    646 N.E.2d 521
    (10th
    Dist.1994). The probable result of appellant swinging at Smith in the manner
    shown on the video was that Smith would sustain physical harm, regardless of
    whether such harm occurred.
    {¶25} Smith and Davis testified appellant “swung” at Smith; appellant
    admitted as much to Gray and at trial; and the video shows the “swing.” We find
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2017AP010003
    10
    the evidence, if believed, sufficient to demonstrate appellant knowingly attempted
    to cause physical harm to Smith. We note the swing was accompanied by a threat
    to “break [his] fucking jaw,” which appellant also admitted. Smith and Davis
    testified the swing did not connect because Smith moved back. Appellant’s actions
    indicate knowledge, or even desire, that injury will occur. State v. Fussell, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 87739, 
    2006-Ohio-6438
    , ¶ 44. The evidence adequately supported
    a reasonable inference that appellant acted knowingly. Id. at ¶ 46.
    {¶26} In reaching this conclusion, we note that appellant’s testimony at
    trial, and his insistence here, that he only threatened Smith conditionally is
    completely belied by the video. Although portions of the incident are shielded from
    view, it is apparent appellant rushed up to the scene of the men working, pulled
    into the grass of someone’s yard, jumped from his vehicle, and swung at Smith.
    His rage and agitation are palpable. The suggestion in his testimony that he
    decided almost as an afterthought to “go talk to these guys” is belied by the manner
    in which he did so, which is more consistent with Smith and Davis’ version of
    events.
    {¶27} We conclude the greater amount of credible evidence supports
    appellee’s version of events. Appellant’s assault conviction is not against the
    manifest weight of the evidence and his sole assignment of error is overruled.
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    11
    CONCLUSION
    {¶28} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled and the judgment
    of the Tuscarawas County Court is affirmed.
    By: Delaney, P.J.,
    Hoffman, J. and
    Baldwin, J., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2017AP010003

Citation Numbers: 2017 Ohio 7601

Judges: Delaney

Filed Date: 9/11/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/13/2017