Landrum v. City of Omaha Planning Bd. , 297 Neb. 165 ( 2017 )


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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    297 Nebraska R eports
    LANDRUM v. CITY OF OMAHA PLANNING BD.
    Cite as 
    297 Neb. 165
    M atthew Landrum et al., appellants and cross-appellees,
    v. City of Omaha Planning Board et al.,
    appellees and cross-appellants, and
    Daryl Leise et al., appellees.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed July 14, 2017.    No. S-16-383.
    1.	 Ordinances: Appeal and Error. Interpretation of a municipal ordi-
    nance is a question of law on which an appellate court reaches an
    independent conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the
    court below.
    2.	 Administrative Law: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a decision based
    on a petition in error, an appellate court determines whether the inferior
    tribunal acted within its jurisdiction and whether the inferior tribunal’s
    decision is supported by sufficient relevant evidence.
    3.	 Standing: Words and Phrases. Standing is the legal or equitable right,
    title, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
    4.	 Jurisdiction: Standing. The requirement of standing is fundamental to
    a court’s exercise of jurisdiction, and either a litigant or a court before
    which a case is pending can raise the question of standing at any time
    during the proceeding.
    5.	 Standing: Zoning. It is generally held that an adjacent landowner has
    standing to object to the rezoning of property if such landowner shows
    some special injury separate from a general injury to the public.
    6.	 Municipal Corporations: Actions: Appeal and Error. An appeal or
    error proceeding does not lie from a purely legislative act by a public
    body to which legislative power has been delegated, and the only rem-
    edy in such cases is by collateral attack, that is, by injunction or other
    suitable action.
    7.	 Municipal Corporations: Ordinances: Zoning. A zoning ordinance
    constitutes the exercise of a governmental and legislative function, and
    a city council adopting a rezoning ordinance which amends a general
    zoning ordinance acts in a legislative capacity.
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    LANDRUM v. CITY OF OMAHA PLANNING BD.
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    8.	 Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. When a trial court lacks the power,
    that is, jurisdiction, to adjudicate the merits of a claim, the Supreme
    Court also lacks power to adjudicate the merits of the claim.
    9.	 Standing: Jurisdiction: Proof. A party invoking a tribunal’s jurisdic-
    tion has the burden to establish the elements of standing.
    10.	 Appeal and Error. An issue not presented to the trial court may not be
    raised on appeal.
    11.	 Administrative Law: Evidence: Appeal and Error. The reviewing
    court is restricted to the record before the administrative agency and
    does not reweigh evidence or make independent findings of fact, and
    the evidence is sufficient to support an administrative agency’s decision
    if the agency could reasonably find the facts as it did based on the testi-
    mony and exhibits contained in the record.
    12.	 Administrative Law: Due Process: Jurisdiction: Notice: Evidence:
    Appeal and Error. A court reviewing an order of an administrative
    agency must determine whether there has been due process of law; and
    this includes an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the agency, whether there
    was reasonable notice and an opportunity for fair hearing, and whether
    the finding was supported by evidence.
    Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: J.
    Michael Coffey, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part vacated
    and dismissed.
    Rex J. Moats and Margaret A. McDevitt, of Moats Law
    Firm, P.C., L.L.O., for appellants.
    Russell S. Daub for appellees Daryl Leise et al.
    Alan M. Thelen, Deputy Omaha City Attorney, for appellees
    City of Omaha Planning Board et al.
    Heavican, C.J., Wright, Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy,
    K elch, and Funke, JJ.
    K elch, J.
    I. INTRODUCTION
    Matthew Landrum, Shandra Landrum, Rex Moats, Diane
    Moats, Edward Malesa, and Valerie Malesa (Homeowners)
    appeal the order of the district court for Douglas County that
    dismissed their amended petition in error. The Homeowners
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    LANDRUM v. CITY OF OMAHA PLANNING BD.
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    297 Neb. 165
    sought to challenge a conditional use permit issued by the
    Omaha Planning Board (Planning Board) and a special use
    permit and rezoning granted by the Omaha City Council (City
    Council). The City of Omaha (City), the Planning Board, and
    the City Council cross-appeal, arguing that the Homeowners’
    petition in error was untimely and that the district court lacked
    subject matter jurisdiction. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
    that portion of the Homeowners’ appeal concerning rezoning
    and a special use permit, and we vacate the corresponding
    portion of the district court’s order. However, because the
    Planning Board acted within its jurisdiction, based its find-
    ings on sufficient evidence, and afforded the Homeowners due
    process, we affirm the district court’s order in regard to the
    conditional use permit.
    II. BACKGROUND
    1. Procedural Background
    This appeal arises from permits and rezoning granted to
    Daryl Leise; Redbird Group, LLC; and Ray Anderson, Inc.
    (collectively the Developers), for a proposed convenience stor-
    age and warehouse facility to be constructed on real estate in
    the Omaha area (subject property). Ray Anderson, Inc., is the
    current owner of the subject property.
    The City carries out its zoning powers through the enact-
    ment and enforcement of its zoning code, Omaha Municipal
    Code, chapter 55.
    The Omaha Municipal Code designates various base zoning
    districts, including a “community commercial” (CC) district,
    which is the designation of the subject property. Omaha Mun.
    Code, ch. 55, art. VIII, § 55-362 (1980). Further, the code
    provides for a special “overlay district” that can be “over-
    laid” upon a property in addition to its base zoning district.
    Omaha Mun. Code, ch. 55, art. XI, § 55-682 (2007). One
    type of overlay district is the “major commercial corridor”
    (MCC) district, for which Leise applied in this case. See 
    id. The zoning
    regulations enumerate various use types. For the
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    LANDRUM v. CITY OF OMAHA PLANNING BD.
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    subject property, Leise sought the use types “[w]arehousing
    and distribution (limited),” see Omaha Mun. Code, ch. 55, art.
    III, § 55-49(h) (1980) (emphasis omitted), and “[c]onvenience
    storage,” see Omaha Mun. Code, ch. 55, art. III, § 55-45(m)
    (2007) (emphasis omitted). The “[w]arehousing and distribu-
    tion (limited)” use type is allowed subject to approval of a
    conditional use permit. Omaha Mun. Code, ch. 55, art. VIII,
    § 55-364(e) (2008). Similarly, a special use permit is required
    for convenience storage in the CC district. Omaha Mun. Code,
    ch. 55, art. VIII, § 55-365(c) (2008).
    As noted above, Leise sought to place the subject property
    into the MCC overlay district while maintaining the base
    CC zoning district. Buildings built within the MCC overlay
    district are subject to certain urban design rules. See Omaha
    Mun. Code, ch. 55, art. XI, §§ 55-682 through 55-687 (2007),
    and Omaha Mun. Code, ch. 55, art. XXII, §§ 55-927 through
    55-936 (2007). These urban design rules provide for enhanced
    regulation of screening, parking, site and building access, land-
    scaping, and general building design guidelines. 
    Id. In sum,
    to proceed with the proposed project, the Omaha
    Municipal Code required three zoning approvals from the
    City: a conditional use permit, which could be issued by
    the Planning Board; a special use permit, which could be
    granted by the City Council after a recommendation by the
    Planning Board; and a rezoning, which could be granted by
    the City Council after a recommendation by the Planning
    Board, to place the subject property within the MCC overlay
    district. See Omaha Mun. Code, ch. 55, art. XX, § 55-883(h)
    and (k) (2008), § 55-884(g)(3) (2008), and § 55-886(f) and
    (g) (1980).
    2. Municipal Proceedings
    The subject property is a 4.75-acre vacant lot at the north-
    east corner of 204th Street (Highway 31) and Farnam Street,
    located near a residential area. Leise’s statement of proposed
    use and plans for the subject property anticipated constructing
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    a three-story storage building, resembling an office building,
    with internal storage spaces. Leise also proposed construct-
    ing five single-story storage buildings with garage-type stalls.
    The storage facilities would contain 700 storage spaces for
    rental to customers, with estimated visits of two or three cars
    per hour.
    Leise submitted a proposed concept design to the City’s
    planning department. The concept design, dated February 17,
    2015, provided preliminary specifications to demonstrate com-
    pliance with site development, landscaping, and buffer require-
    ments for a CC property.
    After reviewing the proposed concept design, the plan-
    ning department issued a responsive letter, dated February 27,
    2015. The planning department summarized the proposed proj-
    ect’s classification and permit requirements under the Omaha
    Municipal Code.
    The planning department scheduled the matter for a May
    6, 2015, hearing before the Planning Board. On March 20,
    the planning department issued the following notice via a
    letter to residents near the proposed project site: “NOTICE
    OF REQUEST FOR: Approval of a Special Use Permit to
    allow Convenience storage and a Conditional Use Permit
    to allow Warehousing and distribution (limited) in a
    CC-Community Commercial District, with approval of an
    MCC-Major Commercial Corridor Overlay District.” The
    notice further invited any interested persons to hear and
    comment on the proposal, which was on file at the planning
    department, and provided details about the approval proce-
    dure and hearing.
    On April 6, 2015, Leise submitted a planning department
    zoning application form. The application form allowed the
    applicant to check boxes to select a special use permit, a con-
    ditional use permit, and “Other.” Leise’s application selected
    a special use permit and “Other,” specifying “Adopt MCC
    Overlay District,” but a conditional use permit was not selected.
    The application form provided basic factual information,
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    including the address and legal description of the subject
    property, its owner, the applicant, a contact person, and infor-
    mation on proposed building, parking, and landscaping. Leise
    incorrectly identified the property owner as “Ray Anderson
    c/o Anderson Food Shops,” rather than “Ray Anderson, Inc.”
    Leise listed himself as the applicant and contact person. There
    were illegible signatures on the lines designated for “Owner’s
    Signature” and “Applicant Signature.” Under the applicant’s
    signature, the form states, “(If not the property owner, the
    applicant certificates [sic] with this signature to be the autho-
    rized agent of the property owner.)”
    On April 29, 2015, the planning department issued a rec-
    ommendation report that analyzed the proposed project in
    light of applicable portions of the Omaha Municipal Code.
    The report noted that the adjacent land use was primarily
    residential. It stated that before the City annexed the subject
    property and converted it to a CC district, it was originally
    zoned “C-3 Highway Commercial” by the City of Elkhorn,
    a designation which allowed warehousing and distribution as
    a permitted use. The report noted that conditionally, Leise’s
    permit request was in substantial conformance with “the zon-
    ing ordinance” and the City’s master plan. The report further
    evaluated the proposed uses pursuant to specific portions of
    Omaha Mun. Code, ch. 55, art. XX, § 55-885 (2008), which
    sets forth criteria for the review and evaluation of applications
    for conditional use permits and special use permits. It deduced
    that the proposed uses would comply with those criteria and
    that the economic impact on surrounding properties would
    be acceptable. The report recommended (1) approval of “the
    MCC-Major Commercial Overlay District,” (2) approval of the
    special use permit to allow convenience storage in “a CC-MCC
    District” subject to plan revisions for compliance with zoning
    regulations, and (3) approval of the conditional use permit to
    allow “Warehousing and distribution (limited) in a CC-MCC
    District,” subject to plan revisions for compliance with zon-
    ing regulations.
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    LANDRUM v. CITY OF OMAHA PLANNING BD.
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    On May 5, 2015, residents near the subject property sub-
    mitted to the Planning Board a “Petition” with 52 signatures,
    expressing opposition to the proposed project. Residents also
    submitted letters and email messages detailing the reasons
    for their opposition, which included safety risks, lack of suf-
    ficient buffer space from adjacent homes, increased risk of
    crime, excessive light from the development, lack of conti-
    nuity with the adjacent homes, and adverse effects on prop-
    erty values.
    The Planning Board held a public hearing on Leise’s
    requests on May 6, 2015. Leise appeared and described the
    proposal. Several neighborhood opponents also spoke, includ-
    ing one of the Homeowners. Opponents generally expressed
    that they were not yet familiar with the plan. They opined that
    the structure would not “fit” with the nearby residential neigh-
    borhoods and may contribute to crime and obstruct views. A
    real estate broker with 14 years’ experience and others stated
    that the structure would be detrimental to the neighboring
    residents’ property values. Other concerns included lighting,
    safety, and compliance with the City’s master plan. Some
    opponents stated that they had not been personally informed
    about the project and that they felt they had been “ambushed.”
    Another complained that some residents near the proposed
    project site did not receive the notice of hearing from the
    Planning Board. The Planning Board laid over the case to
    allow Leise and the neighboring residents to meet and discuss
    the issues.
    Leise submitted revised plans, and the City’s planning
    department issued a revised recommendation report on July
    29, 2015. The revised recommendation report found that the
    revised plans “addressed most of the conditions listed in the
    previous recommendation report.” The report noted that the
    Developers needed to provide a floor plan for the indoor stor-
    age facility. Like the previous report, it provided a written
    analysis of the project in light of § 55-885 and concluded that
    other than a few conditions to address, “the proposed uses
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    will comply with all the applicable base district development
    standards and [are] consistent with the criteria in Section
    55-885.” The planning department added that “[t]he proposed
    uses are consistent with and carry out the goals and objectives
    of the City[’s] Master Plan.”
    On August 5, 2015, the Planning Board conducted another
    hearing. The planning department again issued a notice let-
    ter regarding the proposed conditional use permit, special use
    permit, and rezoning. At the hearing, the Developers’ attorney
    addressed issues including tree buffers, the “upgraded design,”
    topography, compliance with size regulations, views from the
    exterior, security issues, and fencing and buffering. He also
    noted the meetings and contacts between Leise and the resi-
    dential neighbors.
    At the August 5, 2015, hearing, neighbors again expressed
    concerns about views from the exterior, lighting, the City’s
    master plan, compatibility with the neighborhood, and safety.
    One of the Homeowners implied that demographically, owners
    of nearby starter homes valued at about $125,000 would be
    more likely to use the storage facility than homeowners like
    him with large homes valued at $400,000. Following these
    remarks, a board member advised the Homeowner and others
    present to be “very careful about generalizing about people.”
    The Homeowner reiterated:
    The point I’m trying to make here is that it is a dif-
    ferent type of housing in this neighborhood that would
    be next to that type of facility. It is not $125,000 homes,
    it is not whatever they are for trailer homes. These are
    houses that are valued between 300,000 and $400,000.
    Later in the hearing, another board member referred to pre-
    meeting discussions, stating, “[I]t was socioeconomic impact
    discussion that really sort of floored me because it dealt with
    the income levels of people who will be using this type of
    storage facility.” He also alluded to the Homeowner’s com-
    ments and said:
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    [T]hat’s offensive to me, okay? It’s offenses [sic] to have
    that type of discussion about the construction of a stor-
    age facility.
    I’m convinced that if we took the same structure that
    [Leise] wants to build and put something else on the
    inside of it, we wouldn’t get this argument because it
    wouldn’t be a storage facility . . . .
    Immediately following the hearing, the Planning Board
    voted in favor of the conditional use permit, special use per-
    mit, and MCC overlay rezoning. Thus, the conditional use
    permit was approved, subject to conditions, and the special use
    permit and rezoning were forwarded to the City Council for
    final action.
    On September 29, 2015, the City Council held a public
    hearing on the special use permit and rezoning, designated
    as separate agenda items. Prior to the hearing before the City
    Council, nearby residents submitted to the City Council an
    “Opposition Document” detailing their concerns about the pro-
    posed project. Two hundred ninety-two neighboring residents,
    including at least three of the Homeowners, signed “petitions”
    that accompanied the opposition document. The opposition
    document was later filed in the City clerk’s office. At the hear-
    ing, the Developers’ attorney again spoke. In addition, some
    neighbors voiced concerns similar to those discussed at previ-
    ous hearings. The City Council voted to lay over the case for
    3 weeks.
    On October 20, 2015, the City Council held another hear-
    ing. The Developers’ attorney stated that in response to the
    neighbors’ concerns, the Developers had further revised the
    plan, adding seven features which the Developers listed in
    a letter to the City Council. The seven features pertained to
    enhanced landscaping and finishes to improve the appear-
    ance of the proposed development. At the hearing, the
    Developers’ attorney reported that one of the homeowners’
    associations that had formerly objected to the project had now
    approved it.
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    The Homeowners’ representative stated at the hearing that
    they had presented an “alternative design” to the Developers.
    The Developers’ attorney responded that they had evaluated the
    cost of the alternative design relative to the potential income
    and concluded that it would be an “economic disaster.”
    The City Council voted 5 to 2 to approve the MCC rezoning
    and ultimately passed an ordinance to implement it. The City
    Council also approved the special use permit by a vote of 5 to
    2, subject to compliance with various regulations and condi-
    tions, including the seven features listed in the Developers’
    October 19, 2015, letter.
    3. District Court Proceedings
    On October 21, 2015, the Homeowners filed a petition
    in error with the district court, seeking to challenge the
    approvals of the conditional use permit, special use permit,
    and rezoning.
    On October 30, 2015, the Homeowners filed an application
    for a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction in
    district court. They sought to prevent the issuance of any per-
    mits, the implementation of the MCC overlay district, and the
    development of the subject property.
    On November 2, 2015, the Homeowners filed an amended
    petition in error. The Homeowners requested vacation or rever-
    sal of (1) the Planning Board’s approval of the conditional
    use permit, (2) the City Council’s passage of a resolution that
    approved the special use permit, and (3) the City Council’s
    passage of an ordinance implementing the MCC overlay dis-
    trict. The Homeowners claimed that the decisions of the City
    Council and the Planning Board were illegal, not supported by
    the evidence, and thus arbitrary, unreasonable, clearly wrong,
    and a violation of due process. Specifically regarding the spe-
    cial use permit and the MCC overlay district, the Homeowners
    alleged, among other things, that Leise had failed to provide
    accurate information about the ownership of the subject prop-
    erty or his authority to develop it.
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    On November 9, 2015, the Developers filed a motion to
    dismiss the Homeowners’ amended petition in error. However,
    on November 25, they withdrew the motion to dismiss and
    filed a motion to affirm the special use permit, along with
    the MCC overlay district. The Developers alleged that while
    the Homeowners’ amended petition in error was pending, the
    special use permit had been issued and the ordinance approv-
    ing the MCC overlay district had been passed and signed by
    the mayor. The Developers further averred that the City enti-
    ties’ actions appeared to comply with the law and that the
    Homeowners’ claims were not specific enough to meet their
    burden of proving otherwise.
    On December 1, 2015, the City Council, the Planning
    Board, and the City filed an answer essentially denying the
    allegations of the amended petition in error. They affirma-
    tively alleged that the Homeowners lacked standing, that the
    district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over some
    or all of the claims, that the Homeowners made an untimely
    challenge of the conditional use permit, and that the City’s
    rezoning of the subject property was not reviewable by an
    error proceeding.
    On February 17, 2016, the district court held a hearing on
    the amended petition in error and received the administrative
    record, including chapter 55 of the Omaha Municipal Code. On
    that date, the district court also determined that it did not have
    subject matter jurisdiction over the application for a temporary
    restraining order and temporary injunction.
    In an April 11, 2016, order, the district court affirmed the
    determinations of the City Council and the Planning Board
    and dismissed the amended petition in error with preju-
    dice. The district court stated that after reviewing the evi-
    dence, it found that the Planning Board and the City Council
    acted within their jurisdiction and that their determinations
    were supported by sufficient relevant evidence. This appeal
    followed.
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    III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    On direct appeal, the Homeowners assign that the district
    court erred in (l) finding that the Planning Board acted within
    its jurisdiction and had sufficient evidence to approve the
    conditional use permit, (2) finding that the City Council had
    jurisdiction and sufficient evidence to approve the special
    use permit, (3) finding that the City Council acted within its
    jurisdiction and had sufficient evidence to approve the MCC
    rezoning, and (4) affirming the determinations of the Planning
    Board and City Council, because the record showed that the
    Planning Board and City Council did not act with due process
    of law.
    On cross-appeal, the City, the Planning Board, and the City
    Council assign that the district court erred in (1) failing to rule
    that the Homeowners’ petition in error was untimely as to the
    conditional use permit, (2) failing to rule that the Homeowners
    lacked standing as to the rezoning challenge and that the
    district court thereby lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and
    (3) failing to rule that the petition in error was an improper
    remedy as to the rezoning, thereby precluding subject mat-
    ter jurisdiction.
    IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] Interpretation of a municipal ordinance is a question of
    law, on which we reach an independent conclusion irrespec-
    tive of the determination made by the court below. See State
    ex rel. Parks v. Council of City of Omaha, 
    277 Neb. 919
    , 
    766 N.W.2d 134
    (2009).
    [2] In reviewing a decision based on a petition in error,
    an appellate court determines whether the inferior tribunal
    acted within its jurisdiction and whether the inferior tribunal’s
    decision is supported by sufficient relevant evidence. Crown
    Products Co. v. City of Ralston, 
    253 Neb. 1
    , 
    567 N.W.2d 294
    (1997).
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    V. ANALYSIS
    1. Cross-A ppeal
    We begin by addressing the cross-appeal of the City, the
    Planning Board, and the City Council, because its resolution is
    partially dipositive of the Homeowners’ direct appeal.
    (a) Timeliness of Petition in Error
    On cross-appeal, the City, the Planning Board, and the City
    Council contend that the district court lacked subject mat-
    ter jurisdiction because the Homeowners untimely filed their
    petition in error more than 30 days after the Planning Board’s
    decision to approve the conditional use permit.
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1905 and 25-1931 (Reissue 2016)
    govern proceedings in error and require that within 30 days
    after the rendition of the final judgment or order sought to
    be reversed, vacated, or modified, a petitioner in error must
    file a petition and an appropriate transcript containing the
    final judgment or order. See, Abdullah v. Nebraska Dept. of
    Corr. Servs., 
    245 Neb. 545
    , 
    513 N.W.2d 877
    (1994); Glup
    v. City of Omaha, 
    222 Neb. 355
    , 
    383 N.W.2d 773
    (1986).
    Here, the Homeowners filed their petition in error with the
    district court on October 21, 2015, unquestionably more than
    30 days after the Planning Board approved the conditional
    use permit on August 5. However, the Homeowners contend
    that the Planning Board’s approval was not a final order.
    We agree.
    The Homeowners point to the Omaha Municipal Code,
    which provides that “[a]pproval of a conditional use permit
    by the planning board shall be effective five days after action,
    unless associated with an application for rezoning or subdivi-
    sion approval.” § 55-883(j). In this instance, the request for
    the conditional use permit was associated with an application
    for rezoning. Therefore, we apply § 55-883(c) of the Omaha
    Municipal Code, which addresses concurrent applications.
    Section 55-883(c) provides in part, “The official effective
    date of a conditional use permit shall be the effective date
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    of an ordinance approved by the city council implementing
    rezoning of the site.” In this case, the conditional use permit
    went into effect on October 20, 2015, when the City Council
    passed the ordinance approving the amendment of the MCC
    overlay district. On the same date, the conditional use permit
    became a final order, and the Homeowners filed their peti-
    tion in error on October 21, within 30 days of the final order.
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2016) (defining final
    order for purposes of review on petition in error). Therefore,
    the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. See Neb.
    Rev. Stat. § 25-1901 (Reissue 2016) (providing for district
    court’s appellate jurisdiction over any “final order made by
    any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions”)
    and § 25-1931.
    (b) Standing
    Next, the City, the Planning Board, and the City Council
    contend that the Homeowners failed to allege or prove any
    special injury arising from the “imposition of the stricter
    MCC overlay rules onto the subject property” and that there-
    fore, they do not have standing. Brief for appellees on cross-
    appeal at 39. The City, the Planning Board, and the City
    Council point out that the MCC overlay district actually
    is more restrictive to future development than the existing
    commercial base district and provides the Homeowners with
    added protection.
    [3-5] Standing is the legal or equitable right, title, or inter-
    est in the subject matter of the controversy. Smith v. City of
    Papillion, 
    270 Neb. 607
    , 
    705 N.W.2d 584
    , 590 (2005). The
    requirement of standing is fundamental to a court’s exercise
    of jurisdiction, and either a litigant or a court before which a
    case is pending can raise the question of standing at any time
    during the proceeding. 
    Id. It is
    generally held that an adjacent
    landowner has standing to object to the rezoning of property
    if such landowner shows some special injury separate from a
    general injury to the public. See 
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    The Homeowners point out that since they live adjacent to
    or within 300 feet of the proposed project, they have stand-
    ing, like the property owners in Smith v. City of 
    Papillion, supra
    . There, we noted that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 19-905 (Reissue
    1997) required notice to owners of property within 300 feet
    of the proposed project in first-class cities such as Papillion
    and that the property owners’ entitlement to such notice sup-
    ported a finding of special injury. Here, the operative statute
    in ­ metropolitan-class cities like Omaha is Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 14-420 (Cum. Supp. 2016), which also requires notice to
    owners of property within 300 feet of the proposed proj-
    ect. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 14-101 (Reissue 2012) (defining
    ­metropolitan-class cities). Thus, the Homeowners’ entitlement
    to notice in this case tends to show the presence of a special
    injury. Further, in Smith, we noted that the finding of spe-
    cial injury was also supported by expert testimony that the
    proposed project would diminish property values in the area.
    We find similar evidence of a special injury in the instant
    case, where a real estate broker with 14 years of experience
    provided evidence to the Planning Board that the proposed
    changes would cause an adverse impact on the neighboring
    residents’ property values. Although contradictory evidence
    was presented by way of the planning department report, the
    Homeowners met their initial burden to show standing to chal-
    lenge the proposed uses and rezoning.
    (c) Jurisdiction
    [6,7] Lastly, the City, the Planning Board, and the City
    Council contend that the City Council’s decision on the appli-
    cation for rezoning was a legislative function and, therefore,
    not the proper subject of an error proceeding. Previously, we
    have found that “an appeal or error proceeding does not lie
    from a purely legislative act by a public body to which leg-
    islative power has been delegated” and that “the only remedy
    in such cases is by collateral attack, that is, by injunction or
    other suitable action.” In re Application of Frank, 183 Neb.
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    722, 723, 
    164 N.W.2d 215
    , 216 (1969). We have held that a
    zoning ordinance constitutes the exercise of a governmental
    and legislative function and that a city council adopting a
    rezoning ordinance which amends a general zoning ordinance
    acts in a legislative capacity. Giger v. City of Omaha, 
    232 Neb. 676
    , 
    442 N.W.2d 182
    (1989); Copple v. City of Lincoln,
    
    210 Neb. 504
    , 
    315 N.W.2d 628
    (1982); In re Application of
    
    Frank, supra
    .
    But as pointed out by the Homeowners, although the above-
    cited cases preclude a petition in error following a legislative
    act, none of them deals with a simultaneous rezoning and spe-
    cial use permit. See, Giger v. City of Omaha, supra; Copple
    v. City of 
    Lincoln, supra
    ; In re Application of 
    Frank, supra
    .
    Our case law does not address that situation. And the ques-
    tion becomes whether the City Council acted legislatively or
    judicially when faced with simultaneous requests for rezoning
    and a special use permit.
    The Homeowners contend that by conducting simultaneous
    hearings on the special use permit and the rezoning, the City
    Council acted judicially. They argue:
    In deciding to include Leise’s convenience storage
    and warehouse project within the MCC Overlay District,
    the . . . City Council acted judicially and not legisla-
    tively. The hearings on the amendment and the special
    use permit were at the same time and date, had the same
    participants and opponents and evidence, and utilized the
    same hearing procedures.
    Reply brief for appellants at 10.
    To support their argument, the Homeowners cite McNally
    v. City of Omaha, 
    273 Neb. 558
    , 
    731 N.W.2d 573
    (2007), for
    the proposition that when a tribunal is required to conduct a
    hearing and receive evidence, it exercises a judicial function
    in determining questions of fact. And under Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 25-1903 (Reissue 2016), proceedings to obtain a reversal,
    vacation, or modification of a final order made by any tri-
    bunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions shall be
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    by a petition entitled “petition in error.” However, McNally
    involved an administrative hearing before a building review
    board and not a hearing before a city council. Further, we
    noted in McNally that there was an adversarial hearing where
    evidence had been presented by both sides and that the build-
    ing review board exercised “‘judicial 
    functions.’” 273 Neb. at 564
    , 731 N.W.2d at 580.
    Where our case law has not explicitly stated whether a pro-
    ceeding is quasi-judicial or legislative, the nature of the pro-
    ceeding in question is a key factor in making that determina-
    tion. For example, in In re Application of Olmer, 
    275 Neb. 852
    ,
    
    752 N.W.2d 124
    (2008), we found that the county board acted
    quasi-judicially in denying an application for a conditional use
    permit; in so finding, we noted that the record included exhib-
    its offered and received and a stipulated supplemental record
    which included a deposition with attached exhibits.
    Here, the record reflects that the special use permit and
    rezoning applications proceeded at the same hearing pursuant
    to separate agenda items. Further, the record does not show
    that evidence was offered and received or that testimony was
    offered. Rather, the Homeowners’ opposition document was
    simply submitted to the City Council prior to the hearing and
    later filed with the City clerk’s office. Several neighboring
    residents, including some of the Homeowners, also presented
    argument at the two City Council hearings. Although we rec-
    ognize that various boards and councils do not function as
    courts in the strict sense, parties cannot transform an other-
    wise legislative proceeding into a quasi-judicial function or
    establish a quasi-judicial record by simply presenting argu-
    ments and handing documents to the presiding body. In light
    of the nature of the proceedings at issue here, we conclude
    that the City Council acted as a legislative body in granting
    the rezoning request and in granting the special use per-
    mit. Accordingly, a request for a permanent injunction, not
    a petition in error, was the proper means to seek review of
    both determinations.
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    [8] Because the Homeowners filed a petition in error to
    review both the rezoning and special use permit approvals by
    the City Council, the district court did not have jurisdiction
    to proceed on those issues, and as a result, neither does this
    court. When a trial court lacks the power, that is, jurisdiction,
    to adjudicate the merits of a claim, the Supreme Court also
    lacks power to adjudicate the merits of the claim. Nebraska
    State Bar Found. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 
    237 Neb. 1
    , 
    465 N.W.2d 111
    (1991). We therefore dismiss for lack of
    jurisdiction that portion of the Homeowners’ appeal regarding
    the City Council’s approval of the rezoning and the special use
    permit. Consequently, we need not address the Homeowners’
    assignments of error concerning the rezoning and the special
    use permit. Johnson v. Nelson, 
    290 Neb. 703
    , 
    861 N.W.2d 705
    (2015) (appellate court is not obligated to engage in analy-
    sis that is not necessary to adjudicate case and controversy
    before it).
    2. Direct A ppeal
    Our holding regarding the cross-appeal limits our consid-
    eration of the Homeowners’ direct appeal to only the follow-
    ing issues related to the conditional use permit: whether the
    Planning Board acted within its jurisdiction, whether it had
    sufficient evidence to approve the conditional use permit, and
    whether it acted with due process of law.
    (a) Jurisdiction
    [9] The Homeowners claim that the district court erred in
    finding that the Planning Board acted within its jurisdiction. In
    reviewing a decision based upon a petition in error, an appel-
    late court determines, among other things, whether the inferior
    tribunal acted within its jurisdiction. See Crown Products
    Co. v. City of Ralston, 
    253 Neb. 1
    , 
    567 N.W.2d 294
    (1997).
    A party invoking the tribunal’s jurisdiction has the burden to
    establish the elements of standing. Field Club v. Zoning Bd. of
    Appeals of Omaha, 
    283 Neb. 847
    , 
    814 N.W.2d 102
    (2012). The
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    Homeowners argue that Leise failed to show standing because
    the application he submitted did not reflect that he was the
    owner of the subject property or the agent of the owner and did
    not specifically request a conditional use permit.
    [10] Both sides agree that Leise failed to check the box
    requesting a conditional use permit on the original applica-
    tion. On the other hand, the City, the Planning Board, and the
    City Council point out that the Homeowners allege Leise’s
    seeking of a conditional use permit in their amended petition
    in error and that the hearings were all advertised to reflect
    that a conditional use permit was being considered. However,
    the controlling issue here is that the Homeowners failed to
    challenge, in their petition in error, Leise’s failure to check
    the box requesting a conditional use permit on the original
    application. An issue not presented to the trial court may
    not be raised on appeal. V.C. v. Casady, 
    262 Neb. 714
    , 
    634 N.W.2d 798
    (2001). Now, for the first time, the Homeowners
    raise the issue of Leise’s failure to check the box requesting
    a conditional use permit, and we cannot consider that portion
    of their argument.
    Similarly, the Homeowners now assert that Leise lacked
    standing to obtain the conditional use permit because his
    application did not demonstrate that he was the owner of
    the subject property or the agent of the actual owner. They
    argue that Leise failed to establish any agency relationship
    when he incorrectly designated “Ray Anderson c/o Anderson
    Food Shops” as the owner, rather than “Ray Anderson, Inc.”
    However, the Homeowners did not raise this issue before the
    district court in the context of the conditional use permit.
    Instead, their amended petition in error alleged that because
    Leise’s application failed to provide accurate information
    about the ownership of the subject property or the authority
    to develop it, the Planning Board and the City Council lacked
    sufficient evidence to approve the special use permit and the
    rezoning. As it pertains to the conditional use permit, then,
    this issue was neither presented to nor passed upon by the
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    district court, and the Homeowners cannot now raise it on
    appeal. See 
    id. (b) Sufficiency
    of Evidence
    [11] The Homeowners also argued to the district court and
    now on appeal that the Planning Board had insufficient evi-
    dence to approve the conditional use permit. In reviewing a
    decision based on a petition in error, an appellate court deter-
    mines whether the inferior tribunal acted within its jurisdic-
    tion and whether the inferior tribunal’s decision is supported
    by sufficient relevant evidence. Crown Products Co. v. City
    of Ralston, 
    253 Neb. 1
    , 
    567 N.W.2d 294
    (1997). Further, the
    reviewing court is restricted to the record before the adminis-
    trative agency and does not reweigh evidence or make inde-
    pendent findings of fact, and the evidence is sufficient to sup-
    port an administrative agency’s decision if the agency could
    reasonably find the facts as it did based on the testimony and
    exhibits contained in the record. Geringer v. City of Omaha,
    
    237 Neb. 928
    , 
    468 N.W.2d 372
    (1991).
    In summary, the Homeowners argue that “[t]here was not
    sufficient competent evidence for approval of the condi-
    tional use permit for the industrial use of warehousing and
    distribution (limited) given the unrebutted evidence regard-
    ing lack of compatibility, adverse economic effects, and
    safety concerns.” Brief for appellants at 30. Specifically,
    the Homeowners maintain that the City, the Planning Board,
    and the City Council failed to follow the criteria as set forth
    in § 55-885. Section 55-885(a) does set forth the criteria
    for review and evaluation for a conditional use permit. But
    § 55-885(b) further provides that “conditional use permits . . .
    shall be reviewed in accordance with the relevant criteria,”
    which means that the reviewing body need not consider each
    listed standard. The record reflects that although the City, the
    Planning Board, and the City Council did not consider each
    factor within § 55-885, they gave due consideration to the
    factors relevant in this case.
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    Additionally, the Homeowners argue that the affected resi-
    dential areas are composed of single-family dwellings in
    medium- to low-density neighborhoods and are not zoned to
    include convenience storage or warehousing as conditional
    or special uses. The Homeowners contend that the Planning
    Board approved the conditional use permit for limited indus-
    trial warehousing and distribution “without any consideration
    of extensive public opposition to the project and the unrebutted
    concerns regarding compatibility, adverse economic effects,
    and safety concerns.” Brief for appellants at 29. Certainly,
    opposition and concerns were raised.
    On the other hand, the City’s planning department presented
    a report to the Planning Board dated April 29, 2015, which
    analyzed Leise’s application. That report acknowledged the
    surrounding residential properties and that prior to the subject
    property’s annexation by the City, warehousing and distribu-
    tion were permitted uses for the subject property. It noted that
    Leise’s permit request was in substantial conformance with
    the zoning ordinance and the City’s master plan. Further, the
    planning department’s report thoroughly analyzed the proposed
    project in light of the relevant criteria of § 55-885 and con-
    cluded that the economic impact on surrounding properties was
    acceptable. In an updated report dated July 29, 2015, the plan-
    ning department opined that Leise had essentially complied
    with all requested changes to his proposal and recommended
    approval of the conditional use permit, the special use permit,
    and the rezoning, subject to certain conditions.
    Although the Homeowners raised valid concerns, we can-
    not find from the record that the Planning Board did not
    evaluate the application using its own criteria as outlined in
    § 55-885 or that its decision was not supported by sufficient
    relevant evidence.
    (c) Due Process
    Lastly, the Homeowners contend that they were not pro-
    vided due process. They argue:
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    The [Planning] Board did not provide the opportunity to
    question . . . Leise or his counsel. Very little time was
    provided to present opposition evidence and concerns to
    the [Planning] Board. It was clear from the responses by
    the majority of [Planning] Board members to concerned
    citizens’ testimony at the May 6 . . . and August 5, 2015
    public meetings that the [Planning] Board had already
    decided in favor of . . . Leise’s plan.
    Brief for appellants at 33. The Homeowners obviously believe
    that the Planning Board did not sufficiently consider their
    viewpoint.
    However, the two portions of the record that the Homeowners
    cite do not support their position. First, a Homeowner sug-
    gested that the storage facility would be frequented by owners
    of lower-end homes rather than owners of higher-end homes
    such as his. In response, a board member cautioned him and
    others present to be “very careful about generalizing about
    people.” The Homeowners argue that this reflects that the
    Planning Board was not an “impartial adjudicator . . . and in
    effect became witnesses” for Leise. Brief for appellants at 32.
    Certainly, the Homeowner who offered the suggestion had the
    right to protect his property investment, which he believed
    would be adversely affected by the proposed uses. However, a
    Planning Board member’s redirecting the Homeowner’s com-
    ments does not equate with partiality or becoming a witness.
    Second, the Homeowners point to a portion of the record
    wherein a Planning Board member expressed his concerns
    about the Homeowners’ arguing against the project from a
    socioeconomic standpoint. Again, we cannot find that those
    concerns reflected either that the board member was not impar-
    tial or that he had become a witness. Further, neither instance
    shows that the Homeowners were not allowed to offer evi-
    dence, were not allowed to offer their opinion, or attempted to
    question Leise on the record.
    [12] A court reviewing an order of an administrative agency
    must determine whether there has been due process of law;
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    and this includes an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the agency,
    whether there was reasonable notice and an opportunity for
    fair hearing, and whether the finding was supported by evi-
    dence. Ashby v. Civil Serv. Comm., 
    241 Neb. 988
    , 
    492 N.W.2d 849
    (1992). See, also, Crown Products Co. v. City of Ralston,
    
    253 Neb. 1
    , 
    567 N.W.2d 294
    (1997) (in proceedings before
    administrative agency or tribunal, procedural due process
    requires, among other things, opportunity to present evidence
    and hearing before impartial board). As an appellate court
    performing a review of the record for due process, we are
    positioned not to judge the wisdom of the Planning Board’s
    decision, but to ensure that an aggrieved party had the oppor-
    tunity to be heard. The Homeowners had that opportunity.
    Certainly, another board may have allowed more time than
    allotted here, but the amount of time devoted is not as relevant
    as the independence of the inquiry. In particular, for us to find
    error, the record must reflect an actual bias rather than mere
    disagreement. Based on our review of the record, we find that
    the Homeowners were provided due process.
    VI. CONCLUSION
    For the aforementioned reasons, we dismiss for lack of
    jurisdiction the portion of the Homeowners’ appeal address-
    ing the rezoning and special use permit, and we further vacate
    the district court’s order in that regard for lack of jurisdiction.
    However, we affirm the district court’s order in regard to the
    conditional use permit.
    A ffirmed in part, and in part
    vacated and dismissed.