People v. Brooks , 104 N.E.3d 417 ( 2017 )

2017 IL 121413
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 121413)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
MICHAEL BROOKS, Appellee.
Opinion filed November 30, 2017.
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and
Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The defendant, Michael Brooks, was charged with driving under the influence
following a single-vehicle motorcycle accident. He filed a motion to suppress the
results of blood-alcohol testing on the ground that the blood draw performed at the
hospital after his accident was a governmental search conducted in violation of the
fourth amendment.
¶2 The circuit court granted defendant’s motion, and the appellate court affirmed
(2016 IL App (5th) 150095-U). We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal.
Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Mar. 15, 2016). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the
judgments of the lower courts.
¶3 Background
¶4 Defendant was charged in the circuit court of Effingham County with driving
under the influence (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2014)) following a
single-vehicle motorcycle accident on August 14, 2014. On October 30, 2014,
defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of a blood-alcohol analysis that was
performed at St. Anthony’s Memorial Hospital (St. Anthony’s) on the night of the
accident.
¶5 In his motion, defendant briefly alleged that, after the accident, police officers
forcibly “placed him in an ambulance and sent him to the hospital,” even though he
had refused medical treatment. Citing People v. Armer, 2014 IL App (5th) 130342,
the motion asserted that a blood draw subsequently performed at the hospital was a
governmental search conducted without a warrant, without his consent, and in the
absence of exigent circumstances. Thus, according to the motion, the blood draw
violated defendant’s fourth amendment right to be free from an unreasonable
search. Defendant’s motion did not challenge the legality of the police officers’
seizure of defendant when he was forced to go to the hospital. Rather, the motion
contended only that the blood draw performed at the hospital was an unlawful
search.
¶6 On December 9, 2014, while defendant’s motion was pending, the State issued
a subpoena duces tecum to St. Anthony’s directing it to produce “[a]ll lab results
(‘blood work’)” originating from defendant’s admission on or about August 14,
2014. The subpoena requested that the hospital produce the results of defendant’s
blood work in a sealed, clearly marked envelope and send it to the Effingham
County circuit clerk. A docket entry reflects the court received a sealed envelope
from the hospital on December 12, 2014.
¶7 Three days later, an evidentiary hearing was held on defendant’s motion to
suppress. At the start of the hearing, the circuit court noted it was in possession of
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an envelope from St. Anthony’s but that it had not been opened. Defendant’s
counsel told the court he presumed the contents of the envelope were the subject
matter of the motion to suppress. The State responded that it, too, presumed the
envelope contained the results of medical blood work done on defendant when he
went to the hospital. The parties, however, did not stipulate to the contents of the
envelope, and the court did not open it. The hearing then began.
¶8 Defendant called police officer Thomas Webb from the Effingham police
department. Webb testified that, on August 14, 2014, at approximately 11:54 p.m.,
he was dispatched to the scene of a single-vehicle motorcycle accident. When he
arrived, Webb observed a motorcycle on a bush in the front yard of a house. He also
saw an open-top Jeep across the street, approximately 100 feet from the
motorcycle, where three other Effingham police officers were gathered. Webb
walked across the street to the Jeep, which did not belong to defendant, and
observed defendant sitting in the passenger seat with the door closed. Although
none of the officers had seen defendant operating a motor vehicle, two witnesses
who were present informed Webb defendant had been driving the motorcycle.
¶9 Webb spoke to defendant and, while doing so, noticed defendant’s speech was
slurred, his eyes were red, and he had an odor of alcohol emitting from his mouth
when he spoke or yelled at the police. According to Webb, defendant appeared
agitated by the presence of law enforcement. Webb believed defendant’s leg was
broken because his foot was “almost upside down.” Webb admitted he had little
medical training and defendant was not bleeding, but he believed the injury was
serious. When Webb asked defendant if he wanted to go to the hospital, defendant
refused. Webb was concerned about defendant’s safety, as he appeared to not be
thinking rationally because he was screaming and swearing at the police.
¶ 10 Emergency medical services (EMS) personnel who were present at the scene
told Webb defendant needed to go to the hospital and requested Webb’s assistance
in getting him there. Although defendant continued to decline medical services,
Webb ordered defendant out of the Jeep. Defendant refused. Thereafter, Webb and
another officer physically removed defendant from the Jeep, placed him on a
gurney, and assisted EMS personnel in putting the gurney into the ambulance.
¶ 11 Webb reiterated that it was EMS personnel who wanted defendant to get
medical treatment and that he did not direct anyone to treat defendant. When asked
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why defendant was removed from the Jeep and forced to go to the hospital, Webb
testified: “I briefly spoke with EMS and asked them if he was going to be
transported to the hospital by them. Whenever a subject is intoxicated and a serious
injury pursues, a lot of times or all the time in that case, ambulance services request
or order basically that we assist them in removing a subject or putting them on the
cot and transporting them to the hospital to make sure they get the medical attention
that they need.” Webb was not in the ambulance when EMS personnel began
transporting defendant to the hospital.
¶ 12 Webb testified that the ambulance stopped after traveling one or two blocks
because defendant was trying to get out. EMS personnel again asked the police to
help in transporting defendant. Webb stated that he was concerned at this time for
the safety of EMS personnel, defendant, and himself. Webb placed defendant on
the gurney, handcuffed him, and rode in the ambulance the rest of the way to the
hospital. Webb then assisted EMS personnel in taking defendant into the
emergency room.
¶ 13 At the hospital, Webb read the statutory “Warning to Motorists” to defendant
and asked him to consent to blood or breath testing. Defendant refused. At that
point, Webb issued defendant a citation for DUI. Webb stated he did not take a
sample of defendant’s blood nor did he direct anyone at the hospital to do so. While
Webb observed nurses working on defendant, he never spoke to them or any
doctor. Webb stated he had no further contact with the hospital after he left and did
not know whether defendant ever gave consent for a blood draw.
¶ 14 Defendant then testified. Defendant briefly stated that, at the hospital, he never
consented to have his blood drawn. Every time he was asked to have his blood
drawn, he refused. Medical staff set his leg, which was broken. Altogether,
defendant stated he spent approximately 12 hours at the hospital.
¶ 15 Defendant rested, and the State called no witnesses. After hearing arguments,
the circuit court took the matter under advisement and retained the sealed envelope
from St. Anthony’s. Approximately one month later, the circuit court issued an
order granting defendant’s motion to suppress. Citing Armer, 2014 IL App (5th)
130342, the court concluded that a blood draw performed on defendant at
St. Anthony’s was a governmental search that had been conducted without his
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consent and that “the State failed to prove exigent circumstances were present to
obtain a blood draw from Defendant absent a warrant.”
¶ 16 Thereafter, the State filed a motion to reconsider. During a hearing on the
motion, the State maintained that defendant had failed to prove that his blood had,
in fact, been drawn at the hospital, as there was no evidence introduced at the
hearing on the motion to suppress which established that fact. In addition, the State
asserted that, even assuming defendant’s blood was drawn, there was no fourth
amendment violation because any blood draw performed at the hospital was a
private search, not a governmental one, and thus there was no State action.
¶ 17 The circuit court rejected the State’s arguments. The court stated that under the
circumstances, there was “some apparent agency” between the hospital and Webb
and concluded that “the argument that somehow the State wasn’t responsible for
the blood draw appears to me to be a form over substance argument.” Therefore,
the court declined to modify its original order. The State filed a certificate of
impairment and appealed (Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a)(1) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014)). The
appellate court affirmed. 2016 IL App (5th) 150095-U.
¶ 18 The appellate court first rejected the State’s argument that defendant had failed
to prove any blood draw was actually performed. The court explained that
defendant filed a motion to suppress and “both parties proceeded to argue the
merits of the underlying motion, with the understanding a blood draw had been
performed on the defendant.” Id. ¶ 17.
¶ 19 The appellate court then addressed the State’s argument that the blood draw
was a private search and not the result of State action. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. The court
emphasized that, despite defendant’s refusal of medical treatment, Webb
physically removed defendant from the Jeep, forcibly placed him on a gurney and
into the ambulance, handcuffed him, rode to the hospital, and then assisted EMS
personnel in delivering defendant to the emergency room. Id. ¶ 21. According to
the appellate court, this was “ample evidence” that demonstrated “that the State
participated in forcing defendant to receive medical treatment.” Id. The appellate
court also noted that there were no exigent circumstances present. Id. ¶ 24. From
this, the court concluded that “the warrantless blood draw violated defendant’s
fourth amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search.” Id. ¶ 25 This
appeal followed.
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¶ 20 Analysis
¶ 21 At issue before us is the correctness of the circuit court’s order granting
defendant’s motion to suppress. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress evidence, we apply a two-part standard of review. People v. Cosby, 231
Ill. 2d 262, 270-71 (2008). Under this standard, a circuit court’s factual findings are
reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, while the
court’s ultimate legal ruling as to whether suppression is warranted is reviewed
de novo. Id. at 271.
¶ 22 When a defendant files a motion to suppress evidence, he bears the burden of
proof at a hearing on that motion. People v. Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d 298, 306 (2003);
725 ILCS 5/114-12(b) (West 2016) (“The judge shall receive evidence on any issue
of fact necessary to determine the motion and the burden of proving that the search
and seizure were unlawful shall be on the defendant.”). A defendant must make a
prima facie case that the evidence was obtained by an illegal search or seizure.
Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d at 306-07. A prima facie showing means that the defendant has
the primary responsibility for establishing the factual and legal bases for the motion
to suppress. People v. Berg, 67 Ill. 2d 65, 68 (1977). Where the basis for the motion
is an allegedly illegal search, the defendant must establish both that there was a
search and that it was illegal. Id. If a defendant makes a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the State to present evidence to counter the defendant’s prima facie case.
Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d at 307. However, the ultimate burden of proof remains with the
defendant. Id.
¶ 23 The sole allegation raised in defendant’s motion to suppress is that his fourth
amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search was violated by a blood
draw conducted at St. Anthony’s. The State contends on appeal that the circuit
court erred in holding that defendant established a prima facie case that any blood
draw conducted at the hospital was an illegal search. We agree with the State.
¶ 24 To make a prima facie case for suppression, defendant had to establish two
things: first, that a search occurred in the form of a blood draw and, second, that the
draw violated the fourth amendment. Defendant failed to establish either of these
propositions.
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¶ 25 Defendant presented no evidence that his blood was actually drawn at the
hospital. Although this was a matter within his personal knowledge, defendant
never testified that he was subjected to a blood draw. Instead, he stated only that he
refused to consent to having his blood drawn. Officer Webb testified that he went
with defendant to the hospital and observed nurses working on him but stated he
had no knowledge of whether a blood draw took place and no knowledge as to
whether defendant ever consented to have his blood drawn. In addition, defendant
did not call any witnesses from the hospital to testify that a blood draw was
performed. Further, while an envelope was sent to the circuit court from
St. Anthony’s, the parties did not stipulate to its contents, and it was never opened.
Thus, no evidence was presented at the suppression hearing that a blood draw was
actually performed at the hospital.
¶ 26 We cannot agree with the appellate court that, because defendant filed a motion
to suppress evidence and the parties proceeded to argue the motion as if a blood
draw was performed, defendant, in fact, established that a search took place. The
mere filing of a motion is not proof that a search occurred. Defendant bore the
burden at the suppression hearing of showing his blood was drawn but failed to
offer any evidence to establish that fact. Accordingly, we conclude defendant failed
to establish the first element of his prima facie case.
¶ 27 Moreover, even assuming a blood draw took place, defendant failed to establish
any fourth amendment violation. The fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV) protects the “right of the people to be secure
*** against unreasonable searches and seizures.” There is no dispute that a blood
draw is a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141,
148 (2013). A search conducted without a warrant is considered per se
unreasonable under the fourth amendment unless it falls within one of a limited
number of exceptions to the warrant requirement. People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502,
513 (2004). No warrant was issued in this case, and the State does not contend that
any exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.
¶ 28 However, the constitutional prohibition “against unreasonable searches and
seizures does not apply to searches or seizures conducted by private individuals.”
People v. Heflin, 71 Ill. 2d 525, 539 (1978) (citing Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S.
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465 (1921)). Where a person performs a search independently of the police, the
search is considered a private one and, because state action is not present, the fourth
amendment is not implicated. See generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave, LaFave Search
and Seizure § 1.8, at 356-57 (5th ed. 2012).
¶ 29 Defendant’s argument in this case rests on the presumption that any blood draw
conducted at the hospital was a governmental search, not a private one.
“The relevant factors involved in determining whether or not a particular
search should be attributed to the government have been frequently discussed
by the Supreme Court of the United States. [Citation]. Where a search is
conducted by a private individual, the search will be subject to constitutional
guarantees when the individual conducting the search can be regarded as acting
as an agent or instrument of the State ‘in light of all the circumstances of the
case.’ (Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 487 ***).
Participation by the police in and of itself, then, does not automatically invoke
the application of the guarantees against unreasonable government intrusions
safeguarded by the fourth and fourteenth amendments.” Heflin, 71 Ill. 2d at
539-40.
¶ 30 Thus, to establish a fourth amendment violation in this case, defendant had to
demonstrate, “in light of all the circumstances,” that the private individual who
conducted the alleged blood draw acted as an agent or instrumentality of the State
when doing so. Defendant did not meet this standard.
¶ 31 Officer Webb testified he never asked anyone to draw blood. In fact, Webb
stated he never spoke to any nurse or doctor and had no knowledge about the
treatment defendant received. Thus, there was no evidence that Webb, or any other
police officer, sought or encouraged a blood draw or was even aware that one had
been done. Cf. Armer, 2014 IL App (5th) 130342 (state action was present where a
police officer requested that hospital staff draw the defendant’s blood with a DUI
kit). Further, and equally as important, defendant did not call any witnesses from
the hospital to testify. Thus, there was no evidence that any individual who may
have drawn defendant’s blood did so while acting at the behest, or under the
influence, of the police.
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¶ 32 The appellate court below stressed the fact that defendant was physically forced
to go the hospital and reasoned that, because defendant was compelled to go to the
hospital, then any hospital employee who drew defendant’s blood necessarily did
so under the guise of state action. This analysis is misplaced.
¶ 33 There is no question police forcibly seized defendant and helped transport him
to the hospital. But defendant has never challenged the legality of the seizure. His
challenge is only to the legality of a search, i.e., the blood draw that allegedly took
place at St. Anthony’s. And, on this record, there is no evidence that a blood draw
even took place, let alone that a hospital employee was acting as an instrumentality
or agent of police when it was performed.
¶ 34 Defendant also emphasizes that he had a right to refuse medical treatment and
that he never consented to any blood draw. Therefore, defendant reasons, any
hospital personnel who drew his blood acted illegally, and any blood draw was
necessarily unlawful under the fourth amendment. This argument is without merit.
The private search doctrine applies “ ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable
one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or
with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official.’ ” (Emphasis
added.) United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (quoting Walter v.
United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by
Powell, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.)); see also, e.g., United States v. Malbrough, 922
F.2d 458, 462-63 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding a search by a private citizen who
trespassed on another person’s property and viewed marijuana).
¶ 35 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, even assuming blood was drawn
from defendant at St. Anthony’s, it was a private search that did not implicate the
fourth amendment. Accordingly, for this additional reason, the circuit court erred in
granting defendant’s motion to dismiss.
¶ 36 Finally, we note that at the conclusion of the hearing held on the State’s motion
to reconsider the circuit court’s suppression order, the circuit court briefly stated
that it believed the State should not have been able to issue a subpoena duces tecum
to St. Anthony’s. The court evidently concluded that, because any blood draw was
the result of state action, the subpoena was improper. However, as we have
explained, on this record, defendant failed to establish that any blood draw was
conducted under the guise of state action.
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¶ 37 Conclusion
¶ 38 For the foregoing reasons, we hold the circuit court erred in granting
defendant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the
circuit and appellate courts. The cause is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 39 Appellate court judgment reversed.
¶ 40 Circuit court judgment reversed.
¶ 41 Cause remanded.
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