State v. Carzelle , 2018 Ohio 92 ( 2018 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Carzelle, 
    2018-Ohio-92
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 105425
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    DEANDRE T. CARZELLE
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-16-604414-A
    BEFORE:           Laster Mays, J., Kilbane, P.J., and McCormack, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                     January 11, 2018
    -i-
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Richard Agopian
    600 Superior Avenue, Suite 2505
    Cleveland, Ohio 44114
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Michael C. O’Malley
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: Gregory J. Ochocki
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    Justice Center, 9th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant Deandre T. Carzelle (“Carzelle”) appeals his sentence
    and asks this court to remand to the trial court for resentencing.   We affirm.
    {¶2} Carzelle pleaded guilty to three counts of discharging of a firearm on or near
    prohibited premises, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3); felonious
    assault (with a three-year firearm specification), a second-degree felony, in violation of
    R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); and having weapons while under disability, a third-degree felony, in
    violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2).      The trial court sentenced Carzelle to 14 years in
    prison; three years on the firearm specification, eight years on the felonious assault
    charge, and three years on the discharging of a firearm charge.
    I.     Facts
    {¶3} On March 1, 2016, Carzelle, along with his cousin, traveled to the scene of
    the crime to confront some people with whom he had a conflict.        Carzelle brought a gun
    with him and shot twice across a roadway towards Dequantai Cross (“Cross”). Cross
    was in a barbershop at the time of the shooting. One of the bullets hit Cross in the face.
    Carzelle was subsequently arrested and charged with six felony counts.
    {¶4} Carzelle pleaded guilty to three of the six counts.      The remaining charges
    were dismissed. At the time of Carzelle’s sentencing, Cross still had the bullet lodged in
    his face. As a result of the shooting, Cross suffered hearing loss, has weekly therapy
    sessions, and faced additional surgeries.
    {¶5} The trial court sentenced Carzelle to a total of 14 years in prison.    The trial
    court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively.    Defense counsel did not object
    or raise the issue at sentencing regarding the allied offenses.   As a result, Carzelle filed
    this timely appeal arguing one assignment of error:
    I.     The trial court erred by imposing a consecutive sentence for an allied
    offense.
    II.    Law and Analysis
    {¶6} In Carzelle’s sole assignment of error, he contends that the trial court erred by
    failing to merge allied offenses of similiar import and imposing consecutive sentences for
    Count 2, discharging a firearm and Count 3, felonious assault. Carzelle asks this court
    to vacate his sentence and remand to the trial court to merge allied offenses.
    {¶7} An appellate court should apply a de novo standard of review in reviewing
    whether two offenses are allied offenses of similar import. State v. Williams, 
    134 Ohio St.3d 482
    , 
    2012-Ohio-5699
    , 
    983 N.E.2d 1245
    , ¶ 28; State v. Anthony, 
    2015-Ohio-2267
    ,
    
    37 N.E.3d 751
    , ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to
    the United States Constitution, and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10, protect a
    defendant against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second
    prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same
    offense. State v. Martello, 
    97 Ohio St.3d 398
    , 
    2002-Ohio-6661
    , 
    780 N.E.2d 250
    , ¶ 7;
    North Carolina v. Pearce, 
    395 U.S. 711
    , 717, 
    89 S.Ct. 2072
    , 
    23 L.Ed.2d 656
     (1969). Id.
    at ¶ 15. R.C. 2941.25 codifies the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
    Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio
    Constitution, prohibiting multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. McCarty,
    
    2015-Ohio-4695
    , 
    47 N.E.3d 515
    , ¶ 13 (8th Dist.).
    {¶8} While,
    [u]nder R.C. 2941.25, Ohio’s multicount statute, where the defendant’s
    conduct constitutes two or more allied offenses of similar import, the
    defendant may be convicted of only one offense. R.C. 2941.25(A). A
    defendant charged with multiple offenses may be convicted of all the
    offenses, however, if (1) the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses of
    dissimilar import, i.e., each offense caused separate identifiable harm; (2)
    the offenses were committed separately; or (3) the offenses were committed
    with separate animus or motivation. R.C. 2941.25(B); State v. Ruff, 
    143 Ohio St.3d 114
    , 
    2015-Ohio-995
    , 
    34 N.E.3d 892
    , ¶13. Thus, to determine
    whether offenses are allied, courts must consider the defendant’s conduct,
    the animus, and the import. 
    Id.
     at paragraph one of the syllabus.
    State v. Clarke, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105047, 
    2017-Ohio-8226
    , ¶ 26.
    {¶9} We find that Carzelle is incorrect in his presumption that felonious assault
    and discharging a firearm on or near prohibited premises are allied offenses.   In Ruff, the
    Ohio Supreme Court explained that “offenses are not allied offenses of similar import if
    they are not alike in their significance and their resulting harm.” Id. at ¶ 21.   When a
    “defendant’s conduct put more than one individual at risk, that conduct could support
    multiple convictions because the offenses were of dissimilar import.” Id. at ¶ 23; State
    v. Grayson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 105081 and 105082, 
    2017-Ohio-7175
    , ¶ 23.
    {¶10} Carzelle pleaded guilty to felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) that
    states “[n]o person shall knowingly cause serious physical harm to another.” The resulting
    harm of Carzelle’s felonious assault was the gunshot to Cross’s face. Carzelle also
    pleaded guilty to discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises under
    R.C.2923.162(A)(3) that states “[n]o person shall discharge a firearm upon or over a
    public road or highway.”     Carzelle admitted that he “let off two shots.     I didn’t know
    where they went.    I just know they went somewhere, and I drove off.”        (Tr. 45.)   The
    resulting harm was to the public.    “Because the offense of discharging a firearm over a
    public road or highway is a strict liability offense, the public was the victim for that
    offense * * *.” State v. James, 
    2015-Ohio-4987
    , 
    53 N.E.3d 770
    , ¶ 34 (8th Dist.).
    {¶11} “A person can discharge a firearm over or on a public road or highway
    without causing or attempting to cause physical harm to another, and the converse is also
    true.   The elements of these two offenses do not correspond to such a degree that
    commission of one results in the commission of the other.” State v. Baldwin, 1st Dist.
    Hamilton No. C-081237, 
    2009-Ohio-5348
    , ¶ 19.
    [T]he act of discharging a firearm on or near a prohibited premises was
    committed with a separate animus, or state of mind, from the felonious
    assault * * *. See State v. Whipple, 
    2012-Ohio-2938
    , 
    972 N.E.2d 1141
    (1st Dist.) (finding defendant’s conduct in discharging a firearm into a
    habitation and felonious assault involved a separate animus for each
    offense); see also State v. West, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98274,
    
    2013-Ohio-487
     (finding separate animus as to             felonious assault,
    possession of a firearm in a liquor permit premises, and having a weapon
    while under a disability where the defendant possessed a gun, shot the
    victim in a bar, fled from the bar, and continued to fire shots from across
    the street).
    State v. Conner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99557, 
    2014-Ohio-601
    , ¶ 131.
    {¶12} In addition, Carzelle did not raise the issue of allied offenses to the trial
    court and has forfeited all but plain error. See Clarke, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105047,
    
    2017-Ohio-8226
    , at ¶ 27.     “A forfeited error is not reversible error unless it affected the
    outcome of the proceedings and reversal is necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of
    justice.” State v. Amison, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104728, 
    2017-Ohio-2856
    , ¶ 4.
    “Crim.R. 52(B) affords appellate courts discretion to correct ‘[p]lain errors
    or defects affecting substantial rights’ notwithstanding the accused’s failure
    to meet his obligation to bring those errors to the attention of the trial
    court.” State v. Rogers, 
    143 Ohio St.3d 385
    , 
    2015-Ohio-2459
    , 
    38 N.E.3d 860
    , at ¶ 22. The defendant “bears the burden of proof to demonstrate
    plain error on the record.” 
    Id.,
     citing State v. Quarterman, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 464
    , 
    2014-Ohio-4034
    , 
    19 N.E.3d 900
    , at ¶ 16. To demonstrate plain error,
    the defendant must show “an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule” that
    was “an ‘obvious’ defect in the trial proceedings,” and that the error
    “affected a substantial right,” i.e., the defendant must demonstrate a
    “reasonable probability” that the error resulted in prejudice, affecting the
    outcome of the trial. Rogers at ¶ 22; State v. Barnes, 
    94 Ohio St.3d 21
    , 27,
    
    2002-Ohio-68
    , 
    759 N.E.2d 1240
    .
    State v. Hilliard, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102214, 
    2015-Ohio-3142
    , ¶ 17.
    {¶13} We find that the trial court did not err when it did not merge the felonious
    assault and discharging of a firearm counts and correctly sentenced Carzelle to
    consecutive sentences for the two offenses of dissimliar import.    We overrule Carzalle’s
    sole assignment of error.
    {¶14} Judgment is affirmed.
    It is ordered that the appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
    been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    ______________________________________
    ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
    TIM McCORMACK, J., CONCUR