State v. Riggs , 2018 Ohio 347 ( 2018 )

[Cite as State v. Riggs, 2018-Ohio-347.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 17CA0011-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
TAYLOR RIGGS COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 16 CR 0520
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: January 29, 2018
CALLAHAN, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Taylor Riggs, appeals from his conviction for assault in the Medina
County Common Pleas Court. For the reasons set forth below, the appeal is dismissed as moot.
I.
{¶2} Mr. Riggs was indicted for felonious assault involving an incident with his former
girlfriend. The jury found Mr. Riggs not guilty of felonious assault, but guilty of the lesser
included offense of assault, a misdemeanor in the first degree. On February 1, 2017, Mr. Riggs
was sentenced to 180 days in the Medina County Jail, with credit for 2 days served, and costs
were waived.
{¶3} While serving his jail sentence, Mr. Riggs timely appealed his conviction and
raised two assignments of error.
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II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT A JUDGMENT OF
ACQUITTAL, PURSUANT TO CRIM.R. 29(A), ON THE CHARGE, AND
THEREAFTER ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION OF THE
OFFENSE AS THAT CHARGE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE, IN VIOLATION OF [MR. RIGGS’S] RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
OF LAW, AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
[MR. RIGGS’S] CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE.
{¶4} Before this Court can address Mr. Riggs’s assignments of error, it must first
determine whether his appeal is moot. This Court cannot consider the merits of a case when the
sentence on a misdemeanor conviction has been served voluntarily and no showing of disability
has been made. State v. Berndt, 29 Ohio St. 3d 3, 4-5 (1987), as modified by State v. Golston, 71
Ohio St. 3d 224 (1994), syllabus; see Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, 129 Ohio St. 3d 389, 2011-Ohio-
2673, ¶ 18-19. The parties were issued a show cause order to present arguments and evidence as
to the issue of mootness. Both Mr. Riggs and the State filed responses.
{¶5} In response to the show cause order, Mr. Riggs argued that his appeal is not
moot because he served his sentence involuntarily and he could suffer 1 of the 199 different
collateral consequences as a result of his conviction. This Court disagrees.
{¶6} Regarding the issue of mootness of an appeal of a misdemeanor conviction, this
Court has previously stated that
when an appellant completes a misdemeanor sentence without requesting a stay
pending appeal and does not offer evidence from which this Court could infer that
the appellant would suffer collateral disability or loss of civil rights stemming
from the misdemeanor conviction, the appeal is moot.
3
State v. Boone, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26104, 2013-Ohio-2664, ¶ 7; see State v. Wilson, 41 Ohio
St.2d 236 (1975), syllabus, as modified by Golston at syllabus. Mr. Riggs does not dispute that
he completed his misdemeanor sentence, but instead argues he served it involuntarily.
{¶7} In Lewis, the Ohio Supreme Court “considered what it mean[t] to ‘voluntarily’
complete a sentence for purposes of the mootness doctrine,” and whether a misdemeanant must
seek a stay of execution of sentence in both the trial and appellate court. Id., 129 Ohio St. 3d 389,
2011-Ohio-2673, at ¶ 20. In relation to the voluntariness of serving a sentence, Lewis held that
[t]he completion of a sentence is not voluntary and will not make an appeal moot
if the circumstances surrounding it demonstrate that the appellant neither
acquiesced in the judgment nor abandoned the right to appellate review, that the
appellant has a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction, and that there is
subject matter for the appellate court to decide.
Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. This Court recognized the following circumstances
considered by Lewis when analyzing the application of the mootness doctrine to a misdemeanant
who has completed the sentence:
“[A] misdemeanant who contests charges at trial and, after being convicted, seeks
a stay of execution of sentence from the trial court for the purpose of preventing
an intended appeal from being declared moot and thereafter appeals the
conviction objectively demonstrates that the sentence is not being served
voluntarily, because no intent is shown to acquiesce in the judgment or to
intentionally abandon the right of appeal.”
State v. Henry, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25479, 2011-Ohio-3566, ¶ 13, quoting Lewis at ¶ 23.
{¶8} Applying the circumstances considered in Lewis, Mr. Riggs contends his appeal is
not moot and he did not acquiesce to the judgment as evidenced by the following: 1) he
“contested the charges by way of a jury trial,” 2) he served his sentence “‘under protest’”
because he filed a “‘Motion for Halftime Release,’” and 3) he filed a timely appeal. While Mr.
Riggs contested the charge by proceeding to a jury trial and timely filed an appeal, he failed to
seek a stay of execution of his sentence to prevent his appeal from becoming moot. Mr. Riggs’s
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“‘Motion for Halftime Release,’” filed two and one-half months after his appeal, requested an
“early release” from jail so that he could “begin putting [his] life back together” and not a stay of
execution of his sentence for appeal purposes. Accordingly, Mr. Riggs has failed to demonstrate
that he served his sentence involuntarily. See Lewis at ¶ 23.
{¶9} As to the collateral disability, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the
misdemeanant must present evidence that “he has such a substantial stake in the judgment of
conviction which survives the satisfaction of the judgment imposed on him.” Wilson, 41 Ohio
St.2d at 237; see also Berndt, 29 Ohio St. 3d at 4. This burden is satisfied by “offer[ing] evidence
from which an inference can be drawn that [the misdemeanant] will suffer some collateral legal
disability or loss of civil rights.” Berndt at 4. Mr. Riggs did not present any such evidence. See
id.
{¶10} Instead, Mr. Riggs contends “[a]s to collateral consequences, it has been said that
any criminal conviction can subject a defendant up to 199 different types of loss of
benefits/rights.” While collateral consequences stemming from a misdemeanor conviction are
generally recognized, Mr. Riggs did not identify any particular consequence that he will suffer as
a result of his assault conviction. See Lewis at ¶ 28-33 (Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring); see
also State v. Farris, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150567, 2016-Ohio-5527, ¶ 6-7.
{¶11} Because Mr. Riggs voluntarily served his sentence and has not shown that he
actually suffered a collateral consequence from his conviction, this Court cannot consider his
appeal. See Henry, 2011-Ohio-3566, at ¶ 17.
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III.
{¶12} Mr. Riggs’s appeal is moot and dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
LYNNE S. CALLAHAN
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
CARR, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
THOMAS REIN, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and VINCENT V. VIGLUICCI, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.