In RE the Detention of Harold Johnson, Harold Johnson , 2011 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 74 ( 2011 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 09–0500
Filed September 23, 2011
IN RE THE DETENTION OF
HAROLD JOHNSON,
HAROLD JOHNSON,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, William J.
Pattinson, Judge.
Sexually violent predator contends the district court erred in
denying his discharge from civil commitment because the State failed to
conduct his final hearing within the sixty-day timeframe provided in Iowa
Code section 229A.8(5)(e) (2009). DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS
VACATED AND JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Michael H. Adams,
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines and Susan
Krisko, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
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ZAGER, Justice.
On further review we must determine whether Iowa Code section
229A.8(5)(e) (2009) entitles a sexually violent predator (SVP) to be
discharged from civil commitment if the district court does not
commence a final hearing within sixty days of the court’s determination
that a final hearing is required. We find section 229A.8(5)(e) requires the
district court to conduct the final hearing within sixty days, but the
court’s failure to conduct a hearing within sixty days entitles an SVP to
civil remedies, not discharge. We therefore vacate the decision of the
court of appeals and affirm the district court’s order denying discharge.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On July 13, 2001, Harold Johnson was determined to be an SVP
and was civilly committed pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 229A. In
2006, Johnson underwent his annual review to determine whether facts
existed to warrant a final hearing to adjudicate whether Johnson still
possessed a “mental abnormality” that predisposed him to commit
sexually violent offenses. The district court determined Johnson
presented no competent evidence that warranted a final hearing. After
the adverse determination, Johnson filed a petition for writ of certiorari
with this court, which we granted. We determined Johnson presented
evidence which would permit a fact finder to reasonably conclude
Johnson’s mental abnormality had changed and, that if discharged, he
was not likely to engage in sexually violent acts. We therefore ordered
the district court to conduct a final hearing for Johnson. See Johnson v.
Iowa Dist. Ct., 756 N.W.2d 845, 851 (Iowa 2008). Procedendo was issued
on November 3, 2008.
On January 2, 2009, sixty days after procedendo was entered, the
parties participated in a teleconference to schedule Johnson’s final
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hearing. The district court scheduled Johnson’s final hearing for
February 24, 2009. During the teleconference, Johnson noted he would
be bringing a motion for discharge or sanctions on speedy trial grounds.
Johnson filed his motion for discharge or sanctions on January 8, 2009.
The motion asked for Johnson to be discharged or, alternatively, for the
State to be restricted from presenting expert evidence at Johnson’s final
hearing. On February 2, 2009, the district court held a hearing on the
motion. Johnson asserted Iowa Code section 229A.8(5)(e) required his
final hearing to be commenced within sixty days of the determination he
was entitled to a hearing. Additionally, because his final hearing was not
held within the sixty-day time limit, Johnson argued he was entitled to
be discharged from the SVP civil commitment program. The district
court denied Johnson’s motion for discharge or sanctions, finding there
was no statutory consequence for failing to meet the final hearing
scheduling deadline outlined in Iowa Code section 229A.8(5)(e) and,
therefore, any breach did not strip the district court of its jurisdiction.
At Johnson’s final hearing, the jury concluded Johnson still
suffered a mental abnormality that predisposed him to commit sexually
violent offenses. The district court entered judgment denying Johnson’s
discharge. Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal. He appealed the
district court’s order denying his motion for discharge or sanctions. The
appeal was transferred to the court of appeals. The court of appeals
affirmed the district court’s order finding Iowa Code section 229A.8(5)(e)
was directory rather than mandatory. Additionally, the court of appeals
concluded the provision does not require a trial to be conducted within
sixty days, only that the trial be scheduled within sixty days. Johnson
petitioned for further review, which we granted.
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II. Standard of Review.
Johnson asks us to determine the meaning of Iowa Code section
229A.8(5)(e). We review questions of statutory interpretation for
correction of errors at law. In re Det. of Fowler, 784 N.W.2d 184, 187
(Iowa 2010).
III. Issues.
We are confronted with two related, but divergent, issues. First,
we must determine whether the district court violated Iowa Code section
229A.8(5)(e) when it failed to commence Johnson’s final hearing within
sixty days. If we find a violation, then we must determine whether
section 229A.8(5)(e) entitles Johnson to discharge. 1
IV. The Sixty-Day Requirement.
Iowa Code section 229A.8(5)(e) states:
e. The burden is on the committed person to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that there is competent
evidence which would lead a reasonable person to believe a
final hearing should be held to determine either of the
following:
(1) The mental abnormality of the committed person
has so changed that the person is not likely to engage in
predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses if
discharged.
(2) The committed person is suitable for placement in a
transitional release program pursuant to section 229A.8A.
If the committed person shows by a preponderance of
the evidence that a final hearing should be held . . . the court
shall set a final hearing within sixty days of the
determination that a final hearing be held.
1Johnson filed a “Motion for Discharge or Sanctions,” asking for discharge or, in
the alternative, for sanctions against the State to prevent the State from offering expert
evidence against Johnson at the final hearing. On appeal, Johnson has only argued
and asked for discharge; Johnson has not referred to his sanctions request. Therefore,
we will not address whether the district court erred in denying Johnson’s requested
sanctions.
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Iowa Code § 229A.8(5)(e) (emphasis added). The precise issue we seek to
resolve is whether the phrase “shall set a final hearing within sixty days”
requires the district court to commence the final hearing within sixty
days or whether it merely requires the district court to schedule the final
hearing within sixty days.
When interpreting a statute, we attempt to ascertain the
legislature’s intent in enacting the law. Fowler, 784 N.W.2d at 187. “We
do not search for meaning beyond the express terms of a statute when
the statute is plain and its meaning is clear.” Id. (quoting Cubit v.
Mahaska Cnty., 677 N.W.2d 777, 781–82 (Iowa 2004)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The ordinary and common meaning of the statute’s
words is dependent on the context and setting in which they are used.
State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Iowa 2006). If the plain
language is not clear, then we must review “the statute’s ‘subject matter,
the object sought to be accomplished, the purpose to be served,
underlying policies, remedies provided, and the consequences of the
various interpretations.’ ” Cox v. State, 686 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Iowa 2004)
(quoting State v. Albrecht, 657 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Iowa 2003)).
We begin our analysis by considering the meaning of the phrase
“shall set a final hearing within sixty days.” The word “set” has various
meanings depending on its context. For example, when a person states
they will “set a fire” the person is using the word “set” to mean “start” or
“commence,” but a person that states they must “set a wedding date”
may use the word “set” to mean “schedule.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 1138–39 (11th ed. 2004). The legislature instructed the
district court to “set a final hearing within sixty days,” and within the
context of lawyers, courts, and common scheduling practices, “set” is
interchangeably used to mean both “schedule” and “conduct.” Therefore,
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dissecting every possible dictionary or grammatical use of the word “set”
is not necessary.
However, the legislature’s instruction to the district court to “set a
final hearing within sixty days” carries little utility if we construe the
provision to merely require the district court to schedule a hearing within
sixty days. The legislature added this sixty-day requirement as part of a
comprehensive amendment to chapter 229A in 2002 which increased the
procedural protections given to civilly committed SVPs. See 2002 Iowa
Acts ch. 1139, §§ 1–27 (codified as amended in Iowa Code ch. 229
(2003)). If “set” is construed to only require the district court to schedule
a hearing within sixty days, then little protection is provided to the SVP
because the provision would permit the district court to actually conduct
the final hearing within any timeframe. Such a construction makes
section 229A.8(5)(e) constructively surplus language and is inconsistent
with the legislative purpose of the provision.
We conclude section 229A.8(5)(e) requires the district court to
commence a final hearing within sixty days of the determination a final
hearing is required. Johnson was not provided a final hearing within
sixty days in violation of his statutory rights.
V. Remedy.
After determining Johnson’s final hearing should have commenced
within sixty days, we must now determine what remedy Johnson is
entitled to. Johnson’s proper remedy is a matter of statutory
construction. Fowler, 784 N.W.2d at 188–90. In ascertaining the
legislature’s intent, we look to the language of the statute, its nature and
objects, legislative history, statutory context, and the consequences that
would flow from each construction. Id. (discussing the history and
development of Iowa’s SVP act); see also Cox, 686 N.W.2d at 213. We
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note chapter 229A is a civil statute, intended to protect the public
through confinement and treatment of SVPs. Atwood v. Vilsack, 725
N.W.2d 641, 651–52 (Iowa 2006). Because confinement creates a risk of
liberty deprivation, however, the legislature included procedural
protections in the SVP civil commitment act to ensure civil commitment
is guided by definite procedures and standards. Fowler, 784 N.W.2d at
188.
In Fowler, we confronted what remedy a respondent was entitled to
if the State failed to prosecute its SVP civil commitment action within the
ninety-day time limit required under Iowa Code section 229A.7(3)
(2007). 2 Id. at 185. We held a violation of section 229A.7(3) entitled
Fowler to dismissal of his civil commitment action. Id. at 190–91. Our
reasoning emphasized the legislature included procedural protections to
guard against potential liberty deprivations, and we analogized the
ninety-day period to other bright-line prosecutorial deadlines like speedy
trial statutes that ensure fairness to the accused in a criminal context.
Id. at 189–90. We noted chapter 229A’s constitutionality significantly
relies upon the procedural protections accompanying its civil
commitment framework. Id. at 188–90. Implicit in our reasoning was
our concern for the respondent’s liberty interest when the respondent
faces indefinite SVP civil prosecution. Construing section 229A.7(3) to
provide the respondent with a bright-line, speedy trial right mitigated the
harm to a respondent’s liberty and provided the respondent prophylactic
protection against due process violations. Our statutory construction in
Fowler was derived, at its core, from our belief “that the legislature
2IowaCode section 229A.7(3) requires the State to prosecute SVP civil
commitment actions “[w]ithin ninety days after . . . the order waiving the probable cause
hearing or completion of the probable cause hearing.”
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intended to create a bright-line [speedy trial] rule to avoid any due
process problems.” 3 Id. at 189.
We do not find Johnson faces the same risk of liberty deprivation
as Fowler. Therefore, the need to construe section 229A.8(5)(e) to
contain prophylactic due process protections is not apposite. Johnson is
not a respondent facing civil commitment prosecution. He is an
adjudicated SVP. See Iowa Code § 229A.7(5) (2009) (stating a
unanimous jury must find the respondent to be an SVP beyond a
reasonable doubt at the civil commitment trial). He showed, however,
by a preponderance of the evidence that there is competent
evidence which would lead a reasonable person to believe
[his] mental abnormality . . . has so changed that [he] is not
likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually
violent offenses if discharged.
Iowa Code § 229A.8(5)(e)(1). Section 229A.8(5)(e), thus, entitled him to a
final evidentiary hearing within sixty days to readjudicate his SVP status.
Constitutional framers, legislatures, and courts have been
peculiarly sensitive to an accused’s liberty rights. 4 Our society has long
3Fowler analyzes whether section 229A.7(3) imposes a mandatory or directory
duty. Fowler, 784 N.W.2d at 189–90. The parties in this appeal also briefed arguments
as to whether section 229A.8(5)(e) imposed a mandatory or directory duty, and the
effect such a construction would have on the district court’s jurisdiction to conduct a
final hearing. The mandatory/directory analysis concerns whether a governmental
agency’s failure to comply with a statutory duty will invalidate the governmental action
to which the statute applies. See Taylor v. Dep’t of Transp., 260 N.W.2d 521, 522–23
(Iowa 1977) (applying dichotomy to department of transportation revocation hearing).
The dichotomy does not apply to courts in setting trials or hearings as courts are bound
by statutes, rules, and due process in making such determinations. While Fowler
employed this dichotomy, the analysis was not essential to resolving that case, nor is
such an analysis necessary in reviewing section 229A.8(5)(e). We decline to craft the
remedy in this case based on a mandatory/directory dichotomy. We instead will look at
the extent to which due process and liberty principles are jeopardized as well as other
familiar tools of statutory construction such as plain language, legislative history, and
statutory context.
4The initial clause of the Sixth Amendment states, “In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial . . . .” The Supreme Court has
noted the speedy trial right
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valued speedy trial protections because such rules: (1) prevent undue
and oppressive imprisonment before trial, (2) minimize the harm of
public accusation, and (3) reduce risk that delay will harm the accused’s
ability to defend himself. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377–78, 89 S.
Ct. 575, 577, 21 L. Ed. 2d 607, 611 (1969). But a person detained
through a robust procedural and evidentiary proceeding, like the
framework contained in chapter 229A, possesses less liberty sensitivities
than an accused facing initial prosecution. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418, 430 (1995)
(finding inmates only suffer liberty deprivation when subjected to
“atypical and significant hardship[s] . . . in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life”). SVP detention, pursuant to adjudicated civil
commitment, is not oppressive or punitive, but serves legitimate
rehabilitative and public safety purposes. In re Det. of Garren, 620
N.W.2d 275, 280 (Iowa 2000) (noting detention of dangerous mentally
unstable persons “has been cited as a classic example of nonpunitive
detention”). Moreover, section 229A.8(5)(e) applies only to adjudicated
SVPs; the anxiety or harm typically derived from public accusation and
prosecution is not present when the respondent is already fixed to the
SVP classification. Simply, an initial civil commitment prosecution
__________________________
has its roots at the very foundation of our English law heritage. Its first
articulation in modern jurisprudence appears to have been made in
Magna Carta (1215), wherein it was written, “We will sell to no man, we
will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right.”
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S. Ct. 988, 993, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1, 8
(1967) (quoting Magna Carta, translated in Edward Coke, The Second Part of the
Institutes of the Laws of England 45 (Brooke, 5th ed. 1797)). Article I, section 10 of the
Iowa Constitution also provides, “In all criminal prosecutions . . . the accused shall
have a right to a speedy . . . trial.” The United States Congress has passed speedy trial
statutes to provide further protection to the accused, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174, (2006)
and Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33 provides a right to a trial within ninety days
of indictment.
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imposes a greater risk of liberty deprivation than readjudication after an
SVP is civilly committed. 5
Since post-civil commitment readjudication does not create the
same threat to liberty deprivation as an initial civil commitment
prosecution, there is less reason to believe the legislature intended
section 229A.8(5)(e) to provide prophylactic due process protection
through discharge or dismissal. Instead, we find chapter 229A’s strict
guidelines for releasing adjudicated SVPs, and the legislature’s stated
purpose in enacting chapter 229A, confirm the legislature did not intend
for SVPs to be released when the court does not comply with section
229A.8(5)(e)’s sixty-day requirement.
Chapter 229A “narrowly circumscribes release of detainees.”
Atwood, 725 N.W.2d at 645. Section 229A.5B states, “A person who is
detained pursuant to section 229A.5 or is subject to an order of civil
commitment under this chapter shall remain in custody unless released
by court order or discharged under section 229A.8 or 229A.10.” Sections
229A.8 and 229A.10 only authorize discharge after an evidentiary
hearing examining the SVP’s suitability for discharge. Iowa Code
§§ 229A.8, 229A.10. Chapter 229A does not contain any mechanism in
which an SVP can be discharged without a final evidentiary hearing on
the merits of the SVP’s mental abnormality. We therefore think it is
5We are not suggesting adjudicated SVPs do not possess liberty due process
interests. We have repeatedly stated, and we reiterate, the State’s civil commitment of
an SVP infringes upon the SVP’s liberty interest, thereby entitling the SVP to due
process of the law. Swanson v. Civil Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders, 737 N.W.2d
300, 308 (Iowa 2007); In re M.T., 625 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Iowa 2001). For example,
substantial delay of an adjudicated SVP’s right to final hearing may run afoul of due
process. Those facts are not before us, and Johnson has not argued a due process
violation. We are simply observing that civil commitment prosecution raises a greater
risk of impermissible liberty deprivation than does post-civil commitment
readjudication.
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unlikely the legislature intended discharge to be the remedy to
accompany a violation of section 229A.8(5)(e)’s timeframe.
We also find the Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s reasoning as to its
legislature’s intent, in an analogous case, to be persuasive. State ex rel.
Marberry v. Macht, 665 N.W.2d 155, 163 (Wis. 2003). The court held the
state’s failure to conduct a timely, post-commitment initial
reexamination in violation of its sexually-violent-person civil commitment
statute did not entitle the respondent to discharge. Id. The court
reasoned
Chapter 980 provides that a person committed may be
released on supervision or discharged from commitment only
after a court finds that he or she is no longer a sexually
violent person and that it is no longer substantially probable
that he or she will commit acts of sexual violence. Release
absent this substantive determination by a court would
compromise both of Chapter 980’s principal purposes—
treatment and public protection—because, until a circuit
court finds otherwise, the committed person remains in need
of treatment and at high risk to reoffend.
Id. (citations omitted). Similarly, the Iowa legislature explained its
purpose for enacting chapter 229A was to confine and rehabilitate
dangerous predators:
The general assembly finds that sexually violent predators’
likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual
violence is high and that the existing involuntary
commitment procedure under chapter 229 is inadequate to
address the risk these sexually violent predators pose to
society.
Iowa Code § 229A.1. Releasing adjudicated SVPs without any
substantive determination on their propensity to reoffend thwarts the
legislature’s public safety and rehabilitative goals in enacting chapter
229A. Construing a violation of section 229A.8(5)(e)’s timeliness
requirement to entitle Johnson to discharge would run counter to the
chapter’s framework and the legislature’s expressed purpose.
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Section 229A.8(5)(e) does not entitle Johnson to discharge, but
Johnson is not without a remedy. Johnson’s remedy is the trial itself.
Chapter 229A is a civil commitment statute. Garren, 620 N.W.2d at 283–
86. Johnson has at his disposal all the remedies of a civil litigant. For
example, Iowa Code chapter 661 authorizes persons to bring a
mandamus action to compel an “inferior tribunal” to act pursuant to its
legal duty. Iowa Code § 661.1. The Iowa rules of civil procedure provide
additional appropriate remedies. Chapter 229A also infringes upon the
SVP’s liberty interest, thereby entitling the SVP to due process of the law.
Swanson v. Civil Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders, 737 N.W.2d 300,
307–10 (Iowa 2007).
VI. Disposition.
The plain and ordinary meaning of Iowa Code section 229A.8(5)(e)
requires the district court to make findings and to commence Johnson’s
final hearing within sixty days of the determination a final hearing is
necessary. Johnson is not entitled to discharge as this is not a remedy
the legislature provided for in the statute. Johnson was entitled to the
remedies afforded a civil litigant. Johnson’s final hearing was conducted
in February 2009. A jury returned a verdict finding the State proved
beyond a reasonable doubt Johnson still suffered from a mental
abnormality that rendered him likely to reoffend. The district court
entered judgment. We vacate the decision of the court of appeals and
affirm the district court’s judgment.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED AND JUDGMENT
OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Mansfield, J., who takes no part.