Walter Corneilus Lewis v. State of Mississippi , 239 So. 3d 1097 ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2016-KA-01712-COA
WALTER CORNEILUS LEWIS A/K/A WALTER APPELLANT
CORNELIUS LEWIS A/K/A WALTER C. LEWIS
A/K/A WALTER LEWIS
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/08/2016
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CHRISTOPHER LOUIS SCHMIDT
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BILLY L. GORE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JOEL SMITH
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/13/2018
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES AND FAIR, JJ.
BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A Harrison County jury convicted Walter Lewis of one count of possession of
cocaine. The trial court sentenced him as a habitual offender to six years in the custody of
the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Lewis appeals, arguing that the trial
court erred in denying his Batson1 challenge during jury selection. Finding no error, we
affirm.
1
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. On December 16, 2014, detectives with the narcotics division of the Gulfport Police
Department were making a routine patrol in an unmarked police vehicle in a neighborhood
that had numerous drug complaints. The detectives observed Lewis, when he saw the
detective’s vehicle, toss a small green pill container to the ground which contained an “off-
white rock-like object” consistent with crack cocaine. Lewis was taken into custody. Lab
tests later showed the container held approximately one gram of cocaine. Lewis was
charged with possession of cocaine and pleaded not guilty. He claimed the drugs were not
his and he was merely waiting for a ride.
¶3. After a jury trial, Lewis was convicted of the charge and was sentenced to six years
in the custody of the MDOC as both a habitual and subsequent offender.2 Lewis filed a
post-trial motion for a new trial or, alternatively, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV), raising the Batson issue, among others, but the trial court denied his motion. Lewis
appeals.
ANALYSIS
¶4. On appeal, Lewis raises only the Batson issue, claiming the trial court used an
incorrect legal standard in denying his challenge. He argues the jury composition violated
his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
¶5. Early in the jury selection process, the defense raised a Batson challenge after the
State used its first two peremptory strikes against two African-American women. The
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Lewis’s prior felony convictions were also for possession of controlled substances.
2
defense claimed there was a “clear pattern” of discrimination and thus requested race-neutral
reasons for the strikes. The State responded that it had already accepted an African-
American female juror.3 The trial judge ruled that the defense had not made a prima facie
case by showing the State’s first two peremptory strikes were for a discriminatory purpose,
overruling the Batson challenge “at this time.” Jury selection was completed; the defendant
never renewed his Batson objection. Ultimately, the minority composition of the twelve-
person jury consisted of three African-American females and one Hispanic male, with the
defendant being African American.
¶6. “Peremptory strikes may not be used for the purpose of striking jurors based solely
on their race or gender.” Talbert v. State, 125 So. 3d 66, 73 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)
(citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 89). An appellate court reviews the trial court’s Batson ruling
with great deference because “finding [the] striking party engaged in discrimination is
largely a factual finding.” Love v. State, 229 So. 3d 717, 720 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)
(quoting Lynch v. State, 877 So. 2d 1254, 1270 (¶46) (Miss. 2004)).
¶7. There is a three-step analysis to a Batson challenge:
(1) the defendant must make out a prima facie case by showing that the totality
of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose;
(2) once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the State to explain adequately the racial [or sexual] exclusion by offering
permissible, race-neutral justifications for the strikes; and
(3) if a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide
whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial [or sexual]
discrimination.
3
Defense counsel had mistakenly thought this juror was white.
3
Pruitt v. State, 986 So. 2d 940, 942-43 (¶8) (Miss. 2008). In order to satisfy the first step
of making a prima facie case, the defendant must produce “evidence sufficient to permit the
trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred. If the defendant fails to
make out a prima facie case showing a discriminatory purpose, the inquiry ends.” Lomax
v. State, 220 So. 3d 211, 214 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (citation omitted).
¶8. Here, the trial court ruled that Lewis did not satisfy the first step of his Batson
challenge by showing the State’s first two peremptory strikes were for a discriminatory
purpose. On appeal, Lewis argues that the trial judge did not make any finding for his prima
facie case. Moreover, Lewis claims the wrong legal standard was used because the trial
judge focused his analysis on the one potential minority juror that was kept rather than the
two potential jurors stricken by the State, in the following exchange:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, they have struck Ebony Simmons, a black
female [juror number 33]. And then the next
black we reach on the jury venire, Torra Fields
[juror number 35], they use S-2.
....
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That clearly shows a pattern and we would press
race neutral reasons for [striking potential jurors]
33 and 35.
[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, we’ve already accepted Ms.
Dedeaux [juror number 32], who is the first black
female.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I had her down as white.
THE COURT: I did not make an observation whether she was a
minority.
4
[PROSECUTOR]: She appeared to be that way to the State, your
Honor, with her features.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I wrote her down as white.
THE COURT: Ebony Simmons [juror number 33] is a minority?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Black female.
THE COURT: As is [juror number] 35 [Torra Fields]?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. I don’t believe accepting [juror
number] 32 as a minority, and then being
accepted by the State, that the defense has made
a prima facie case to establish that the State is
discriminating against members of a minority. So
the Batson challenge at this time is overruled,
subject to further review, if there [are] other
members of the minority protected class [who]
are stricken for cause by the State.
¶9. Lewis contends “[t]hat the prosecutor accepted other black persons as jurors is no
defense to a Batson claim,” as stated in Chisolm v. State, 529 So. 2d 635, 637 (Miss. 1988).
However, Chisolm, issued two years after Batson, is distinguishable from this case. In
Chisolm, the defense successfully made a prima facie case for discrimination, as nine of the
prosecution’s ten peremptory challenges were used to exclude African Americans from the
jury for an African-American defendant. Id. at 637-38. The trial court’s acceptance of the
race-neutral reasons given by the prosecution for the nine strikes was affirmed. Id. at 639.
¶10. Here, the State had only struck two jurors at the time of the defense’s Batson
challenge, with the court ruling that the first step of Batson had not been established; thus,
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the inquiry ended.4 While the trial judge noted one African American had been accepted at
this point, the trial judge was not basing his entire ruling on this fact, but the “totality of
relevant facts.” The State’s striking of two African-American females did not show a
“pattern” of discrimination, nor did the trial judge’s mention of an African American on the
jury indicate an improper legal standard was applied.
¶11. Lewis also complains that the trial court did not seek to determine the race of juror
number 32 (Ms. Dedeaux) but merely accepted the State’s assertion that she was African
American. We disagree. Lewis did not ask the trial court to do so. Additionally, defense
counsel recognized his trial error by admitting in his post-trial motion that juror number 32
“was a very light skinned minority.” We cannot hold the trial judge in error when he was,
in fact, correct.
¶12. Ultimately, four jurors, or one-third of the jury, were minorities. The trial judge did
not abuse his discretion in finding no inference of purposeful racial discriminatory intent
from the State’s first two peremptory strikes. Finally, the trial judge’s finding of no prima
facie case was a sufficient ruling—no further explanation was necessary.
¶13. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Lewis’s Batson challenge.
¶14. AFFIRMED.
LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., CARLTON, FAIR, WILSON,
GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR.
4
In Scott v. State, 981 So. 2d 964, 969-70 (¶¶18, 22) (Miss. 2008), the Mississippi
Supreme Court found that even when the State used nine peremptory strikes against African
American potential jurors, without more facts provided by the defense, the strikes alone
were insufficient to make a prima facie showing of discrimination.
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