State v. Eisenman , 2018 Ohio 934 ( 2018 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Eisenman, 
    2018-Ohio-934
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    State of Ohio,                                      :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                :
    v.                                                  :                No. 17AP-475
    (C.P.C. No. 16CR-515)
    Travis J. Eisenman,                                 :
    (REGULAR CALENDAR)
    Defendant-Appellant.               :
    D E C I S I O N
    Rendered on March 13, 2018
    On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L.
    Gilbert, for appellee. Argued: Seth L. Gilbert.
    On brief: Todd W. Barstow, for appellant. Argued:
    Todd W. Barstow.
    APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
    TYACK, J.
    {¶ 1} Travis J. Eisenman is appealing from his conviction on a charge of felonious
    assault. He assigns a single error for our review:
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND DEPRIVED APPELLANT
    OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE
    FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
    CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE SECTION TEN OF
    THE OHIO CONSTITUTION BY FINDING HIM GUILTY OF
    FELONIOUS ASSAULT AS THAT VERDICT WAS NOT
    SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND WAS ALSO
    AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
    {¶ 2} Major parts of this case are not in serious dispute. Eisenman punched Scott
    Stevens in the head. Stevens fell to the floor, hitting his head. He was transported to a
    No. 17AP-475                                                                             2
    hospital and underwent extensive medical treatment for brain damage. He can no longer
    smell or taste. He has memory loss. He suffers from vertigo. In short, there is no question
    that Stevens suffered serious physical harm as a result of being struck by Eisenman. The
    only question is if Eisenman knowingly caused serious physical harm to Stevens. See R.C.
    2903.11(A)(1) which reads:
    (A) No person shall knowingly do either of the following:
    (1) Cause serious physical harm to another or to another's
    unborn.
    {¶ 3} "Knowingly" is defined in R.C. 2901.22(B) as follows:
    A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the
    person is aware that the person's conduct will probably cause
    a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A
    person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is
    aware that such circumstances probably exist. When
    knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of
    an offense, such knowledge is established if a person
    subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its
    existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious
    purpose to avoid learning the fact.
    {¶ 4} Simple assault is defined by R.C. 2903.13(A) and (B). A felonious assault
    therefore can actually be simple assault if the person throwing the punch did not know he
    or she was causing serious physical harm but only knew he or she was causing physical
    harm. A felonious assault likewise becomes a simple assault if the person throwing the
    punch caused the serious physical harm recklessly.
    {¶ 5} "Recklessly" is defined by R.C. 2901.22(C) as follows:
    A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to
    the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and
    unjustifiable risk that the person's conduct is likely to cause a
    certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is
    reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless
    indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a
    substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances are
    likely to exist.
    {¶ 6} The trial judge in Eisenman's case submitted misdemeanor assault for the
    jury's consideration on a theory of Eisenman recklessly causing serious physical harm. The
    No. 17AP-475                                                                                     3
    jury found that Eisenman knowingly caused the serious physical harm and convicted
    Eisenman of the greater offense.
    {¶ 7} Sufficiency of the evidence is the legal standard applied to determine whether
    the case should have gone to the jury. State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 386 (1997).
    In other words, sufficiency tests the adequacy of the evidence and asks whether the
    evidence introduced at trial is legally sufficient as a matter of law to support a verdict. 
    Id.
    "The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
    prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
     (1991), paragraph
    two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
     (1979). The verdict will not
    be disturbed unless the appellate court finds that reasonable minds could not reach the
    conclusion reached by the trier of fact. Jenks at 273. If the court determines that the
    evidence is insufficient as a matter of law, a judgment of acquittal must be entered for the
    defendant. See Thompkins at 387.
    {¶ 8} Even though supported by sufficient evidence, a conviction may still be
    reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
    Id. at 387
    . In so doing, the
    court of appeals sits as a " 'thirteenth juror' " and, after " 'reviewing the entire record, weighs
    the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and
    determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and
    created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a
    new trial ordered.' " 
    Id.,
     quoting State v. Martin, 
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    , 175 (1st Dist.1983);
    see also, Columbus v. Henry, 
    105 Ohio App.3d 545
    , 547-48 (10th Dist.1995). Reversing a
    conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence should be reserved for only
    the most " 'exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.' "
    Thompkins at 387, quoting Martin.
    {¶ 9} As this court has previously stated, "[w]hile the jury may take note of the
    inconsistencies and resolve or discount them accordingly, see [State v.] DeHass, [
    10 Ohio St.2d 230
     (1967)], such inconsistencies do not render defendant's conviction against the
    manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence." State v. Nivens, 10th Dist. No. 95APA09-
    1236 (May 28, 1996). It was within the province of the jury to make the credibility decisions
    in this case. See State v. Lakes, 
    120 Ohio App. 213
    , 217 (4th Dist.1964) ("It is the province
    No. 17AP-475                                                                              4
    of the jury to determine where the truth probably lies from conflicting statements, not only
    of different witnesses but by the same witness.")
    {¶ 10} See State v. Harris, 
    73 Ohio App.3d 57
    , 63 (10th Dist.1991) (even though
    there was reason to doubt the credibility of the prosecution's chief witness, he was not so
    unbelievable as to render verdict against the manifest weight).
    {¶ 11} Given the standards we are to apply, we cannot overturn the jury's verdict.
    Eisenman struck Scott Stevens in the head with sufficient force to knock Steven's out
    immediately. R.C. 2901.22 does not require that Eisenman had a purpose to cause serious
    physical harm, only an awareness that his conduct would probably cause serious physical
    harm.
    {¶ 12} Given the force of the blow to the head, the jury could reasonably find that
    Eisenman was aware he had caused serious physical harm.
    {¶ 13} The jury verdict was supported by sufficient evidence and was consistent with
    the weight of the evidence. The sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the
    Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
    Judgment affirmed.
    BRUNNER and HORTON, JJ., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17AP-475

Citation Numbers: 2018 Ohio 934

Judges: Tyack

Filed Date: 3/13/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/13/2018