Kittery Point Partners, LLC v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC , 2018 ME 35 ( 2018 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 35Docket: Yor-16-558
Argued: February 14, 2018
Decided: March 15, 2018
Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
KITTERY POINT PARTNERS, LLC
v.
BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, et al.
GORMAN, J.
[¶1] Kittery Point Partners, LLC (KPP) appeals from a partial summary
judgment entered by the Superior Court (York County, Douglas, J.) in favor of
Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC and M&T Mortgage Corporation. KPP challenges
the court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Bayview and M&T and
alleges that disputed issues of material fact remain. Because we conclude that
the judgment that KPP appeals from is not a final judgment, we dismiss the
appeal as interlocutory and do not reach the merits.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] This case concerns a property located in Kittery Point within the
Town of Kittery. The individuals who previously owned the property (the
2
family) deeded title to it to KPP in 2005. KPP executed a promissory note and
mortgage for the property, and those were assigned to Bayview in June of 2005.
[¶3] In 2008, KPP stopped making loan payments and Bayview instituted
a foreclosure action in the Superior Court (York County). In February of 2009,
one of the family members, acting on behalf of KPP, signed a delinquency
repayment agreement with Bayview. In the delinquency repayment
agreement, KPP released Bayview from “any and all claims” associated with the
note and mortgage. Bayview voluntarily dismissed the foreclosure action
pursuant to the delinquency repayment agreement in April of 2010. M.R. Civ. P.
41(a).
[¶4] In August of 2011, KPP filed a complaint against Bayview, M&T,1 and
a third defendant—a former member of KPP—in the Superior Court (York
County). The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the promissory
note and the mortgage securing it are invalid and also sought the recovery of
sums paid on the note. Although the third defendant initially responded to the
complaint, he has otherwise been nonresponsive to the lawsuit.
[¶5] An extremely lengthy discovery process ensued. In February of
2016, Bayview and M&T filed a motion for summary judgment, which KPP
1 At some point, M&T Mortgage Corporation allegedly serviced KPP’s loan.
3
opposed. After a hearing, the court ordered entry of a partial summary
judgment in favor of Bayview and M&T on November 30, 2016. In its order the
court stated:
This judgment is final as to claims between plaintiff KPP and
defendants/counterclaimants Bayview Loan Servicing and M&T
Mortgage Corporation. There is no just reason for delay in entering
final judgment as to those parties. To the extent that any claims
against [the third defendant] remain unresolved, the adjudication
of those issues are not necessary to the resolution of claims
between KPP and Bayview and M&T and do not prevent the entry
of final judgment.
KPP timely appeals.2 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2017); M.R. App. 2(b)(3) (Tower
2016).3
II. DISCUSSION
[¶6] Absent an exception to the final judgment rule, a trial court’s
decision is not appealable unless it resolves all claims against all parties. See
Safety Ins. Grp. v. Dawson, 2015 ME 64, ¶ 6, 116 A.3d 948; Marquis v. Town of
Kennebunk, 2011 ME 128, ¶ 12, 36 A.3d 861. A trial court can, however, certify
2 This appeal was initially set for argument in July of 2017. We stayed the appeal by order dated
June 30, 2017, because KPP had filed for bankruptcy protection. After an order from the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine, In re Kittery Point Partners, LLC, Case No. 17-20316
(Bankr. D. Me. Nov. 7, 2017), we lifted the stay, permitting this appeal to move forward.
3 The Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure were restyled and are effective for appeals commenced
on or after September 1, 2017. See M.R. App. P. 1 (restyled Rules). Because KPP filed this appeal
before September 1, 2017, the restyled Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply.
4
an order pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)(1) to permit the
appeal of partial final judgments, and “[w]e review partial final judgment
certifications from the trial court for an abuse of discretion.” Guidi v. Town of
Turner, 2004 ME 42, ¶¶ 8, 10, 845 A.2d 1189.
[¶7] The court’s November 30, 2016, order appears to be a certification
of a partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b)(1) because it purports to be
final as to the claims against Bayview and M&T, despite the outstanding claims
against the third defendant. M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1). Rule 54(b)(1) states, in
pertinent part:
[W]hen multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the
entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is
no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction,
any order or other form of decision, however designated, . . . which
adjudicates less than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
less than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of
the claims or parties . . . .
Because of the “strong policy against piecemeal review of litigation,” Fleet Nat’l
Bank v. Gardiner Hillside Estates, Inc., 2002 ME 120, ¶ 10, 802 A.2d 408, “a Rule
54(b)(1) partial final judgment order should be entered only in limited and
special circumstances,” Guidi, 2004 ME 42, ¶ 9, 845 A.2d 1189. To properly
certify a partial final judgment, “the trial court must make specific findings and
5
a reasoned statement explaining the basis for its certification.” Id. “[T]here
must be a good reason for immediate certification, and the court must explain
with particularity why it finds that no just reason for delay exists.” Marquis,
2011 ME 128, ¶ 12, 36 A.3d 861 (quotation marks omitted). The court’s
findings and explanation “must be more than a summary recitation of the
provisions of M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1).” Guidi, 2004 ME 42, ¶ 9, 845 A.2d 1189.
[¶8] Here, the court’s order contains no specific findings about and does
not adequately explain the basis for its certification, and its “statement amounts
to a summary recitation of the provisions of Rule 54(b)(1).” Id. ¶ 10. Neither
party requested that the court provide a more robust explanation of its order,
and in the absence of specific findings or an adequate explanation for its
reasoning, “we are unable to determine whether the facts of this case constitute
such an unusual circumstance that the merits of an interlocutory appeal should
be considered before all pending claims are resolved.”4 Id. We, therefore, must
dismiss the appeal.
4 We note that “even an order with proper findings, supporting a certification of partial final
judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1), will not assure that we will reach the merits of an appeal.”
Guidi v. Town of Turner, 2004 ME 42, ¶ 12, 845 A.2d 1189. “When deciding whether the trial court
correctly certified a partial final judgment, we consider the following factors:
• The relationship of the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims;
• The possibility that the need for review may be mooted by future developments in the trial
court;
6
The entry is:
Appeal dismissed.
Clifford H. Ruprecht, Esq. (orally), Roach, Hewitt, Ruprecht, Sanchez & Bischoff,
P.C., Portland, for appellant Kittery Point Partners, LLC
Andrew W. Sparks, Esq. (orally), and Misha C. Pride, Esq., Drummond &
Drummond, LLP, Portland, for appellee Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC
York County Superior Court docket number CV-2011-177
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
• The chance that the same issues will be presented to us more than once;
• The extent to which an immediate appeal might expedite or delay the trial court’s work;
• The nature of the legal questions presented as close or clear;
• The economic effects of both the appeal and any delays on all of the parties, including the
parties to the appeal and other parties awaiting adjudication of unresolved claims; and
• Miscellaneous factors such as solvency considerations, the res judicata or collateral estoppel
effect of a final judgment and the like.”
McClare v. Rocha, 2014 ME 4, ¶ 8 n.1, 86 A.3d 22.