State v. Hite , 2018 Ohio 998 ( 2018 )

[Cite as State v. Hite, 2018-Ohio-998.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-17-1048
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0201602803
v.
Christina Hite DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: March 16, 2018
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Khaled Elwardany, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Lawrence A. Gold, for appellant.
*****
SINGER, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Christina M. Hite, appeals her sentence from the February 10,
2017 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, in which she was sentenced
to 18 months incarceration for attempted compelling prostitution in violation of R.C.
2907.21(A)(2)(a) and (c), and R.C. 2923.02, a felony of the fourth degree. Finding no
error, we affirm.
Assignment of Error
{¶ 2} Appellant sets forth the following assignment of error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
APPELLANT’S SENTENCE SHOULD BE VACATED
DUE TO THE TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
R.C. 2929.11 AND R.C. 2929.12.
Background
{¶ 3} On September 20, 2016, the Northwest Ohio Violent Crimes Against
Children Task Force (the task force) was made aware that a minor the age of 14 (the
minor) was working as an escort. An undercover operation was set in place by the task
force, who searched a website and found the minor’s provided contact information.
{¶ 4} The task force called and reached appellant’s phone. Appellant answered
and allowed the minor to speak for herself in arranging a meeting with the task force
agent. At the meeting place, appellant arrived with the minor and engaged in
conversation with the agent. Appellant offered herself in addition to the minor. The
agent declined appellant’s offer, but left with the minor. The agent and minor were then
pulled over by a uniformed police officer, and the minor was apprehended.
{¶ 5} Meanwhile, appellant returned to her apartment. On September 29, 2016, an
indictment was filed and a warrant was issued for appellant’s arrest. Appellant was
arrested on October 5, 2016, and was charged with compelling prostitution in violation of
R.C. 2907.21(A)(2)(a) and (c), a felony of the third degree.
2.
{¶ 6} On January 23, 2017, appellant pled guilty to the lesser charge of attempted
compelling prostitution. At the hearing, appellant signed and submitted an agreement
reflecting the plea deal, and the record reflects the trial court proceeded with its colloquy
under Crim.R. 11.
{¶ 7} Appellant admitted to the offense. More specifically, the trial court asked
appellant why she was pleading guilty to the charge, to which she replied: “Because I am
guilty.” The trial court accepted the plea, found appellant guilty, ordered a presentence
investigation, and set the date for sentencing.
{¶ 8} At the February 8, 2017 sentencing hearing, appellant was sentenced to 18
months incarceration, 5 years postrelease control, 25 years of registration as a sex
offender, and imposition of court costs. The court stated in open court and in its entry
that it considered the sentencing criteria and applicable statutes. The entry was
journalized February 10, 2017, and appellant now timely appeals.
Legal Analysis
{¶ 9} In her sole assigned error, appellant argues the trial court erred in imposing
the maximum sentence. Appellee contends the record supports the sentence under the
relevant statutes, and that the sentence is not contrary to law.
{¶ 10} We review felony sentences under a two-prong approach. R.C.
2953.08(G)(2) provides that an appellate court may increase, reduce, modify, or vacate
and remand a disputed sentence if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the
following:
3.
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings
under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of
section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code,
whichever, if any, is relevant; or
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶ 11} See State v. Behrendt, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1135, 2016-Ohio-969, ¶ 6;
see also State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 23.
{¶ 12} A sentence is not contrary to law where the trial court considers the
purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 along with the seriousness and
recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12, and imposes a sentence within the statutory range.
See State v. Craig, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-14-061, 2015-Ohio-1479, ¶ 9.
{¶ 13} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(A)(4), the statutory sentencing range for a fourth-
degree felony is between 6 and 18 months.
{¶ 14} Here, appellant was sentenced to a prison term of 18 months for her
attempted compelling prostitution conviction. This prison term is within the permissible
range. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(4).
{¶ 15} R.C. 2929.11(A) provides, in relevant part: “The overriding purposes of
felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others
and to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines
accomplish those purposes * * *.” In order to comply with R.C. 2929.11, a trial court
must impose a sentence that is “reasonably calculated to achieve the two overriding
purposes of felony sentencing * * * commensurate with and not demeaning to the
4.
seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with
sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.” See R.C.
2929.11(B).
{¶ 16} In carrying out its obligations to impose a sentence consistent with the
purposes and principles of sentencing, the trial court must weigh the factors indicating
that the offender’s conduct is more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense
under R.C. 2929.12(B) against those factors indicating that the offender’s conduct is less
serious than conduct normally constituting the offense under R.C. 2929.12(C). Further,
the court must weigh the factors contained in R.C. 2929.12(D) indicating the likelihood
that the offender will commit future crimes against the factors contained in R.C.
2929.12(E) indicating that the offender is not likely to commit future crimes.
{¶ 17} We further note that a sentencing court is not required to use any specific
language or make specific findings to demonstrate that it considered the applicable
sentencing criteria. See State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000);
State v. Thebeau, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-14-017, 2014-Ohio-5598, ¶ 16.
{¶ 18} Here, the trial court stated in open court that it considered R.C. 2929.11 and
2929.12, as follows:
The court has considered the record, oral statements, victim impact
statement and PSI, as well as the overriding principles and purposes of
sentencing under 2929.11, and the seriousness, recidivism and other factors
under 2929.12.* * *
5.
The court further finds [appellant] is not amenable to community
control and that prison is consistent with the purposes of 2929.11, further
finding that this is in fact a sex offense for which [appellant] has been
classified a Tier II sex offender.
{¶ 19} The February 10, 2017 sentencing entry also states: “[t]his court has
considered the record, oral statements, any victim impact statement and presentence
report prepared, as well as the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11,
and has balanced the seriousness, recidivism and other relevant factors under R.C.
2929.12.”
{¶ 20} In light of the statements at the hearing, as well as the language contained
in the sentencing entry, we conclude that the trial court complied with its obligations
under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.
{¶ 21} Lastly, we find the sentence imposed was supported in the record.
{¶ 22} R.C. 2907.21(A)(2)(a) provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly* *
*[i]nduce, procure, encourage, solicit, request, or otherwise facilitate* * *[a] minor to
engage in sexual activity for hire, whether or not the offender knows the age of the
minor[.]”
{¶ 23} Here, the record reveals appellant admitted through her own or her
counsel’s statements that she often provided not only the phone for the 14-year-old minor
to be contacted, but also that she provided transportation and a location for the minor to
engage in such crimes. She confirmed these acts were due to her ongoing addiction to
prescription pills and cocaine. She also stated that she wanted to take “full
6.
responsibility” for the actions which led to her charge. The trial court responded stating
that in order for appellant to take full responsibility she would be sentenced to the
maximum term. Based on our review, we cannot say the trial court erred in this regard.
{¶ 24} Accordingly, factoring in the above statements, findings, and expressed
considerations, we hold the record supports the imposed sentence and that the imposed
sentence is not contrary to law. The sole assignment of error is not well-taken.
Conclusion
{¶ 25} The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Appellant is ordered to pay costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Arlene Singer, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
_______________________________
Christine E. Mayle, P.J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
_______________________________
JUDGE
7.