Interest of: M.R.F., III, minor, Appeal of: K.L.C , 182 A.3d 1050 ( 2018 )

J-A30010-17
2018 Pa. Super. 76
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.R.F., III, A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: K.L.C. AND J.M.C. :
:
Appellants :
:
: No. 904 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order May 26, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County Civil Division at No(s):
No. 33 of 2014
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 28, 2018
Foster parents, K.L.C. and J.M.C. (collectively Appellants), appeal the
juvenile court order denying their motion to intervene in the ongoing
dependency proceedings involving now four-year-old M.R.F., III (“M.R.F.”).1
We affirm.
The juvenile court succinctly summarized the underlying facts and
procedural history as follows:
____________________________________________
1 Appellants also filed a complaint for custody against the birth mother and
Lawrence County Children and Youth Services (“LCCYS”) at civil action
10488 of 2017. Considering the fact that LCCYS has maintained sole legal
and physical custody of M.R.F. since he was adjudicated dependent, and that
Appellants serve as foster parents at the agency’s pleasure and oversight, it
is unclear how they have standing to pursue custody under 23 Pa.C.S. §
5324. See In re J.S., 980 A.2d 117, 122 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2009) (“Foster
Parents did not stand in loco parentis because their status as foster parents
was subordinate to CYF, who maintained legal custody and was primarily
responsible for the child's care and custody.”). Nevertheless, since there are
no issues relating to physical or legal custody in this appeal, we do not
address that litigation herein.
J-A30010-17
M.R.F. . . . came into the legal and physical custody of
Lawrence County Children and Youth Services ("LCCYS")
following a domestic violence incident involving his biological
parents[, T.S. (“Mother”) and M.F., Jr. (“Father”)]. Charges
were filed against both the Mother and Father as a result of the
incident and both were briefly jailed. A dependency action was
filed because both parents were in jail and unavailable to care
for the child. Mother was released within days and all charges
against her were dismissed. M.R.F. . . . was adjudicated
dependent with a permanency goal of reunification. LCCYS
placed M.R.F. . . . with [Appellants] in a foster home setting
[during May 2014,] when he was approximately three (3)
months old and [he] has remained in that foster placement since
that time. On or around February 3, 2016, LCCYS filed a Motion
for Goal Change and a Petition for Involuntary Termination of
Parental Rights of [Mother] and [Father]. Subsequent to the
filing of the Petition for Involuntary Termination by LCCYS, the
Father executed a Consent to Adoption on March 9, 2016 and by
Order of Court dated May 13, 2016 his Consent was confirmed
and his parental rights were terminated. The Petition for
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of the Mother was
denied by Order of . . . Court dated July 6, 2016. The Motion for
Goal Change was also denied, and the permanency goal for
M.R.F. . . . has never been changed from reunification with
Mother[.]
Trial Court Order and Opinion, 5/25/17, 1-2.
Essentially, the juvenile court found that Mother made substantial
compliance with the permanency plan insofar as she attended visitations
with M.R.F. regularly and progressed through the allotted reunification
services. In addition, the court determined that Mother made significant
progress toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated M.R.F.’s
original placement. Specifically, Mother cooperated with criminal authorities,
terminated her involvement with Father, and demonstrated her dedication to
M.R.F. by maintaining a stable living environment.
-2-
J-A30010-17
On May 2, 2017, the juvenile court confirmed that reunification with
Mother was the appropriate permanency goal. Adoption remained the
concurrent goal. In an effort to facilitate M.R.F.’s reunification with Mother,
the juvenile court awarded Mother one overnight visitation and one four-
hour community visit with her son per week. LCCYS retained legal and
physical custody of the child, and the juvenile court concluded that his
current placement in foster care was appropriate. The agency did not appeal
the orphans’ court’s order denying the petition to terminate Mother’s
parental rights or the juvenile court’s ensuing permanency order that
extended the scope of Mother’s visitations with her son.
On June 6, 2017, Appellants countered the juvenile court’s
permanency review order by filing the motion to intervene that is the
genesis of the instant appeal. In pertinent part, Appellants asserted that
LCCYS deemed them to be a preadoptive placement resource and, during
April 2016, the Statewide Adoption and Permanency Network (“SWAN”)
approved them as adoptive parents. The petition continued that the
designation of prospective adoptive parents made them indispensable
parties in the dependency proceedings and satisfied the requirements of
standing under the Juvenile Act. Appellants requested standing to intervene
in the dependency proceedings, including notice of hearings, copies of orders
and reports, and the ability to formally express their opinions and
preferences concerning how to best achieve M.R.F.’s safety, permanency and
-3-
J-A30010-17
wellbeing. Most importantly, notwithstanding the orphans’ court’s refusal to
terminate Mother’s parental rights and the juvenile court’s subsequent
affirmation of reunification as the permanency goal, Appellants entreated the
trial court to proceed with their adoption of M.R.F.
The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on May 23, 2017.
Appellants testified in support of their petition and presented the testimony
of Kayla Gould, the LCCYS caseworker assigned to the family since 2016.
Significantly, Ms. Gould testified that the agency considered Appellants to be
a preadoptive placement resource and confirmed that they completed SWAN
training in anticipation of adoption following the termination of Mother’s
parental rights. N.T., 5/23/17, at 42-43. On May 25, 2017, the juvenile
court entered a memorandum order and opinion that denied Appellants’
petition to intervene and explained the basis for its decision. This timely
appeal followed.
Appellants assert four issues for our review:
A. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred and abused its discretion
by concluding [Appellants’] status as foster parents has never
changed and that [Appellants] failed to present evidence which
supported their claim that they are pre-adoptive/prospective
adoptive[2] parents of the above-named minor child.
____________________________________________
2 Appellants, Mother, and the juvenile court employ the terms “preadoptive
parent” and “prospective adoptive parent” interchangeably. Neither the
Juvenile Act nor the Adoption Act defines either expression, and no
precedential authority has distinguished the phrases. Thus, for the purposes
of this appeal, the two references describe the identical situation where a
would-be parent has a legitimate, genuine, and reasonable expectation of
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-4-
J-A30010-17
B. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred and abused its discretion
by failing to permit the introduction of testimony necessary for
the [c]ourt to give full and adequate consideration to the best
interests, health and safety of the child, which is the focus of
every case involving the care of children.
C. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred and abused its discretion
by failing to permit the introduction of testimony necessary for
the [c]ourt to give full and adequate consideration of the
substantial, direct and immediate nature of [Appellants’] interest
in the above-named child and dependency matter.
D. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion and erred
as a matter of law by concluding that [Appellants] do not fit
within any classes of individuals who have standing to intervene
in the dependency action and are not entitled to intervene in the
above-captioned dependency matter pursuant to Pa.R.J.C.P.
1133.
Appellants’ brief at 3-4.3 While Appellants frame four issues, the argument
section of their brief combines Issue A, B, and C for discussion. For ease of
disposition, we separately address the two arguments concerning the
juvenile court’s decision to exclude certain evidence, Issues B and C, from
the remaining arguments regarding standing.
The juvenile court order denying Appellants’ motion to intervene raises
a question of law that we review de novo. In re J.S., 980 A.2d 117, 120
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
adoption, even though the authority to finalize the adoption is contingent
upon the child care agency’s ultimate approval. See In re Griffin, 690 A.2d
1192 (Pa.Super. 1997).
3 Mother filed a brief in opposition. Neither LCCYS nor the guardian ad litem
filed a brief.
-5-
J-A30010-17
(Pa.Super. 2009). Upon review of the certified record, we affirm the order
denying the motion to intervene.
The Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure govern motions to
intervene in ongoing dependency proceedings. Specifically, Pa.R.J.C.P. 1133
provides,
Motion to Intervene
A. Contents. The motion to intervene shall include:
(1) the name and address of the person moving to intervene;
(2) the relationship of the intervening person to the child;
(3) the contact between the child and the intervening person;
(4) the grounds on which intervention is sought; and
(5) the request sought.
B. Action by court. Upon the filing of a motion to intervene and
after a hearing, the court shall enter an order granting or
denying the motion.
Pa.R.J.C.P. 1133. As explained in the comments to the rule, the standard of
proof required for intervention mirrors that of demonstrating standing in civil
cases, i.e., “To move for intervention in a dependency case, a person is to
show that the interest is substantial, direct, and immediate.” Rule 1133
cmt. Thus, to the extent that standing and intervention are distinct concepts
under the rules of civil procedure, the terms are used interchangeably in
dependency jurisprudence. More accurately stated, intervention is the
means that a nonparty achieves standing in a dependency proceeding. E.g.,
-6-
J-A30010-17
In re G.D., 61 A.3d 1031, 1042 (“Upon considering Aunt’s [Rule 1133]
motion and the evidence from both of the hearings, the trial court found
insufficient grounds for granting Aunt's motion to intervene, i.e., Aunt failed
to establish that she had either statutory standing or stood in loco parentis
as to Child.”).
Section 6336.1(a) and (b) of the Juvenile Act, relating to notice and
hearing, provides foster parents and preadoptive parents notice of hearings
and the right to be heard regarding the dependent child’s “adjustment,
progress and condition.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6336.1. Generally, foster parents do
not have standing to participate in dependency proceedings. Id. (“nothing
in this section shall give the foster parent, preadoptive parent or relative
providing care for the child legal standing in the matter being heard by the
court.”).
Indeed, the statutory scheme outlining foster-parent rights in the
context of dependency proceedings and the case law confronting this issue
limit standing in dependency proceedings to a narrow class of participants.
“Only a ‘party’ has the right to participate, to be heard on his or her own
behalf, to introduce evidence, and/or to cross-examine witnesses.” In re
L.C., II, 900 A.2d 378, 380–81 (Pa.Super. 2006). We have defined party to
include “(1) the parents of the juvenile whose dependency status is at issue;
(2) the legal custodian of the juvenile whose dependency status is at issue,
-7-
J-A30010-17
or (3) the person whose care and control of the juvenile is in question.” In
re J.S., supra. We explained the underlying rationale as follows:
These categories logically stem from the fact that upon an
adjudication of dependency, the court has the authority to
remove a child from the custody of his or her parents or legal
custodian. Due process requires that the child's legal caregiver,
be it a parent or other custodian, be granted party status in
order to be able to participate and present argument in the
dependency proceedings.
Id. (cleaned up).
Appellants are not a party to the dependency proceeding. They are
neither the parents nor legal custodians of M.R.F, and they are not the
people whose care and control is in question. Thus, they do not have
standing to participate in the dependency proceedings as a party possessing
the rights to counsel, to argue their own interests, to introduce evidence,
and/or to cross-examine witnesses pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6336.1(a),
6337, and 6338. See In re J.F., 27 A.2d 1017 (Pa.Super. 2011) (since
foster parent lacked standing, she did not have rights of a party, i.e., the
right to counsel, call witnesses, and conduct cross-examination).
Nevertheless, our case law has carved a narrow exception to permit
the limited participation of a foster resource who has attained prospective-
adoptive status: prospective adoptive parents have standing to contest the
child welfare agency’s decision to remove a child it placed with them in
anticipation for adoption. See In re Griffin, 690 A.2d 1192 (Pa.Super.
1997); Mitch v. Bucks County Children and Youth Social Service
-8-
J-A30010-17
Agency, 556 A.2d 419, 423 (Pa.Super. 1989) (prospective adoptive parents
have standing in juvenile court to contest agency’s decision to remove foster
child from their physical custody).
In re Griffin addressed whether dissatisfied foster parents had
standing to appeal a juvenile court's decision to remove a dependent child
from their care. In upholding the foster parents’ standing to appeal from the
juvenile court order, this Court reasoned that, as the designated prospective
adoptive parents, they had an expectation of permanent custody that grants
them standing in dependency matters involving the foster child. We offered
the following rationale:
[P]rospective adoptive parents, unlike foster parents, have an
expectation of permanent custody which, though it may be
contingent upon the agency's ultimate approval, is nevertheless
genuine and reasonable. Because of this expectation of
permanency, prospective adoptive parents are encouraged to
form emotional bonds with the child from the first day of the
placement. By removing the child from the care of the
prospective adoptive parents, the agency forecloses the
possibility of adoption. In light of the expectation of
permanent custody that attends an adoptive placement, an
agency's decision to remove a child constitutes a direct
and substantial injury to prospective adoptive parents.
Because prospective adoptive parents, unlike foster parents,
suffer a direct and substantial injury when an agency removes
a child from them, we see no reason in law or policy why we
should limit their standing to sue for custody.
In re Griffin, supra at 1201 (quoting Mitch, supra at 419) (emphases
added). With these principles in mind, we address the merits of Appellants’
complaints.
-9-
J-A30010-17
At the outset, we address the evidentiary claims that Appellants assert
in Issue B and Issue C, and for the following reasons, we reject those claims
of error. We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. Lykes v. Yates, 77 A.3d 27 (Pa.Super. 2013). Instantly,
Appellant complains that the juvenile court erred in failing to admit evidence
regarding M.R.F.’s interactions with the foster family and the bonds that he
formed during the three years that he was in placement. In addition,
Appellants argue that the juvenile court barred evidence of their subjective
expectation of adopting M.R.F.
In rejecting these positions, the trial court concluded that the
proposed testimony was irrelevant to the prevailing question concerning
whether Appellants had standing to participate in the dependency
proceedings pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6336.1 and the prevailing case law.
We agree.
The dispositive questions in this case are whether Appellants fit into
one of the three categories of a party, or fall within the designation of
preadoptive/prospective adoptive parents who challenge an agency’s
decision to remove a preadoptive child from their home. Those are legal
questions that are independent of best-interest considerations and the foster
families’ subjective beliefs. Hence, we agree that Appellants’ proposed
evidence regarding the bonds that M.R.F. formed with his foster family
during his three-year placement and their subjective expectations of
- 10 -
J-A30010-17
adoption are irrelevant. Again, the only relevant evidence in this case
related to Appellants’ potential status as either a party or a prospective
adoptive parent—two objective determinations. Therefore, no relief is due.
Next, we address whether the trial court erred in concluding that
Appellants lacked standing to participate in the dependency proceedings.
This subsumes the arguments Appellants raised in the statement of
questions presented under Issues A and D.
In rejecting Appellants’ petition to intervene, the juvenile court
reasoned, in part, that Appellants did not establish that they had attained
the status of prospective adoptive foster parents. Specifically, the trial court
found that Appellants “failed to present any evidence which supported their
claim that they were pre-adoptive/prospective adoptive parents.” Trial Court
Order and Opinion, 5/25/17, at 2. The juvenile court further explained,
because the record is devoid of any official action altering
[Appellants’] status from foster parents to pre-adoptive adoptive
parents, the Court finds that [Appellants’] status has never
changed from that of foster parents. [Appellants’] belief that
they are pre-adoptive/prospective adoptive parents to M.R.F.
. . . does not confer such a status upon them.
Id.
Appellants counter that they are, in fact, the prospective adoptive
parents of four-year-old M.R.F., whom they have taken care of since he was
three months old. They highlight that LCCYS not only specifically requested
that they become an adoptive resource, but also paid for them to obtain
adoption certification through SWAN.
- 11 -
J-A30010-17
While we agree with the trial court’s determinations that it never
formally recognized a change of status and that Appellants’ subjective beliefs
were immaterial, for the reasons discussed, infra, the certified record belies
the juvenile court’s conclusion that Appellants never attained preadoptive
status. The record sustains an objective determination that Appellants have
a legitimate expectation of adopting M.R.F., even though that outcome
remains contingent upon the termination of Mother’s parental rights and
LCCYS’s approval.
During the evidentiary hearing on Appellants’ petition to intervene in
the dependency proceedings, Ms. Gould, the LCCYS caseworker assigned to
the family, testified that the agency considered Appellants to be a
preadoptive resource, and she verified that the couple completed the
adoption program administered by SWAN. N.T., 5/23/17, at 42, 43. She
explained, “When we file for termination of parental rights, . . . we like to
have a pre-adoptive home identified if we are deciding to move forward.”
Id. at 43. She continued, “if a child has been in a home for an extended
length of time, we . . . ask that family whenever we decide to move towards
termination of parental rights if they wish to be a pre-adoptive [resource].”
Id. Most importantly, Ms. Gould verified that even though the current
permanency goal is reunification with Mother, if the juvenile court sought to
pursue the concurrent goal of adoption, the agency still would look to
Appellants as the preadoptive resource. Id. at 47.
- 12 -
J-A30010-17
Likewise, the testimony of K.L.C. and J.M.C. confirmed that during
April 2016, LCCYS directed them to obtain adoption certification in
anticipation of terminating Mother’s parental rights. Id. at 12, 34-35. By
completing the required program, which the agency paid for, Appellants
became eligible to perfect the adoption. Id. at 13, 15. The couple intended
to adopt M.R.F. before the eligibility expired during April 2019. Id. at 15,
36-37. J.M.C. summarized LCCYS’s positon on the previously anticipated
adoption as follows: “They sent us for classes to become adoptive parents
so when the [termination] hearing was [over] . . ., we were to be the
adoptive parents. Id. at 39. K.L.C. testified that she believed that LCCYS
still supported their intent to adopt M.R.F. Id. at 21, 28.
While the guardian ad litem did not present any evidence or witnesses
during the hearing, it supported Appellants’ petition to intervene and opined
that the agency’s regard of Appellants as a preadoptive resource never
changed. Mindful of that position, and in light of the foregoing testimony
demonstrating LCCYS’s perspective of Appellants as a preadoptive resource
upon the termination of Mother’s parental rights, we conclude that the trial
court erred in concluding that Appellants did not demonstrate that they were
preadoptive foster parents as envisioned in In re Griffin.
Finally, to the extent that the juvenile court reasoned that Appellants
were precluded from having any expectation of adoption because it denied
LCCYS’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights and declared that the
- 13 -
J-A30010-17
child’s permanency goal remained reunification, the court’s reasoning is
flawed. While M.R.F. is not eligible for immediate adoption, that option has
not been foreclosed. Although the trial court denied the petition to
terminate Mother’s parental rights, and gave her an opportunity to prove her
commitment to reunification, that does not negate Appellants’ preadoptive
status. Indeed, adoption remains the concurrent goal, and M.R.F. continues
to be placed with Appellants while Mother attempts to demonstrate her
resolve.4 Although adoption is no longer imminent, it continues to be a
plausible outcome of this case, particularly in light of the fact that M.R.F. has
remained in dependency placement for three years—approximately one-year
more than the eighteen to twenty-four months typically allotted to finding
permanency closure for dependent children. Hence, notwithstanding the
increase in Mother’s visitation schedule, Appellants continue to have the
expectation of adoption. Thus, the trial court’s reliance on the current
posture of the dependency proceedings to bolster its conclusion that
Appellants are not a preadoptive resource is ineffectual.
Notwithstanding Appellants’ designation as preadoptive foster parents,
we affirm the juvenile court order denying intervention because the purpose
____________________________________________
4 Mindful that M.R.F. has remained in foster care for what is approaching
four years, we believe it imperative that the juvenile court develop some
sense of urgency in finding permanency for the child, whether it is through
reunification with Mother, adoption, or another alternative available to the
juvenile court pursuant to § 6351(f.1) (3) and (4) of the Juvenile Act.
- 14 -
J-A30010-17
of Appellants’ intervention, i.e., to protest Mother’s increased visitation and
to request the initiation of further proceedings under the adoption act,
exceeds the limited scope of participation that In re Griffin permits.
Phrased differently, as preadoptive foster parents, Appellants would have
standing to pursue the narrow basis recognized in In re Griffin, supra, but
for the reasons we discuss infra, standing is not found here and hence,
intervention was properly denied.
Instantly, Appellants are not seeking to intervene in the dependency
proceedings in order to protect their interest from LCCYS’s decision to
remove M.R.F., and they are not at risk of suffering a substantial injury due
to the child’s removal. Likewise, this is not a scenario where LCCYS decided
to foreclose the possibility of Appellants’ adoption of M.R.F. Indeed, Ms.
Gould testified that the agency is pleased with Appellants’ care of M.R.F.,
does not intend to move him to a different foster family, and still considers
Appellants to be the primary adoptive resource if Mother’s parental rights
are eventually terminated. N.T., 5/23/17, at 46-47. Since Appellants’
desire to intervene in the dependency proceedings relates to the substance
of the juvenile court’s decisions to provide Mother increased visitation,
rather than the agency’s decision to remove the child from their care,
Appellants’ entreaty does not implicate the significant interests that we have
permitted the preadoptive foster parents to protect in In re Griffin, supra,
and its progeny. Accordingly, it does not fit within the narrow exception to
- 15 -
J-A30010-17
the general rule that limits standing in dependency matters to the three
classes of parties listed in In re L.C., II, supra. Hence, the juvenile court
did not err in denying the petition for intervention.
As our holding in In re Griffin, supra, does not apply to Appellants’
reasons for seeking to intercede in the instant dependency proceeding, we
affirm the juvenile court order denying their petition to intervene.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/28/2018
- 16 -