In re Child of Daniel Q. , 2018 ME 45 ( 2018 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 45Docket: Som-17-415
Submitted
On Briefs: February 26, 2018
Decided: April 3, 2018
Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE CHILD OF DANIEL Q.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Daniel Q. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Skowhegan,
Fowle, J.) terminating his parental rights to his child pursuant to 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i), (iv) (2017).1 After reviewing the
record, we conclude that the evidence supports the court’s finding of parental
unfitness.2 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
[¶2] Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found by clear
and convincing evidence that the father (1) is unwilling or unable to protect the
child from jeopardy within a time reasonably calculated to meet his needs, and
(2) failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with him. See
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (iv). “We review the factual findings
1 The mother consented to a termination of her parental rights and is not a party to this appeal.
2 Although the father does not challenge the court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that
termination is in the child’s best interest, our review of the record leads us to conclude that the
evidence supports that finding as well. See In re Anastasia M., 2017 ME 213, ¶ 2, 172 A.3d 922.
2
supporting the unfitness determination for clear error,” In re Zarianna C.,
2018 ME 11, ¶ 2, --- A.3d ---, and “will reverse a finding only if there is no
competent evidence in the record to support it, if the fact-finder clearly
misapprehends the meaning of the evidence, or if the finding is so contrary to
the credible evidence that it does not represent the truth and right of the case,”
In re Zianna G., 2017 ME 226, ¶ 2, 174 A.3d 889 (quotation marks omitted).
“The weight and credibility of the testimony and other evidence are for the
fact-finder’s determination.” Id. (alteration and quotation marks omitted).
[¶3] The court based its determination on the following findings of fact:
In the case of [the child], his entire life has been in the care of
persons other than his parents. The father has made relatively
little progress in achieving the skills needed to parent [the child].
He has achieved little to no insight as to the root of his problems
with women, and relationships. He appears to blame all of his
difficulties on the women he has been married to. He pleaded
guilty to one domestic violence assault, and was found guilty of
another. He was convicted of violating a protective order, and has
had three protective orders lodged against him. The father is
convinced that none of this is his fault, and that his only
responsibility is to not . . . engage in relationships with women who
will victimize him.
The father has little to no ability to support [the child]. He is not
able to provide [the child] with safe, stable housing, and other than
learning to access social service agency resources, he has made
little progress toward that end. It is hard to avoid the conclusion
by clear and convincing evidence that . . . the father is unwilling or
unable to protect the child from jeopardy, and these circumstances
are unlikely to change within a time which is reasonably calculated
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to meet the child’s needs; and that the father has failed to make a
good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child . . . . The
Department has devoted considerable resources in their effort to
achieve reunification between the father and [the child]. The father
has not reciprocated by making any genuine or sustained effort.
[The child] will be eighteen months old by the end of this month.
He is in one of the most critical developmental stages of his life. . . .
Even if one assumes that the father is prepared to engage in a
serious and sustained effort toward reunification (a dubious
assumption based upon his lack of insight and lack of effort up until
now) . . . [the child] simply does not have that much time to wait,
and our jurisprudence strongly suggests that he should not have to
wait that long.
[¶4] Given these findings, all of which are supported by competent
evidence in the record, the court did not err in its determination of unfitness.
See In re Zarianna C., 2018 ME 11, ¶ 2, --- A.3d ---; In re Zianna G., 2017 ME 226,
¶ 2, 174 A.3d 889.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Harold J. Hainke, Esq., Hainke & Tash, Whitefield, for appellant father
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Skowhegan District Court docket number PC-2016-37
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY