Grilliot-Saddler v. Saddler , 2018 Ohio 1689 ( 2018 )

[Cite as Grilliot-Saddler v. Saddler, 2018-Ohio-1689.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
WARREN COUNTY
MICHELLE R. GRILLIOT-SADDLER, : CASE NO. CA2017-09-134
Plaintiff-Appellee, : OPINION
4/30/2018
:
-vs-
:
ERIC T. SADDLER, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION
Case No. 08-DR-31732
Michelle R. Grilliot-Saddler, 3134 Running Deer Trail, Franklin, Ohio 45005, plaintiff-
appellee, pro se
The Kollin Firm, LLC, Thomas M. Kollin, Suite 270, 3725 Pentagon Boulevard, Suite 270,
Beavercreek, OH 45431, for defendant-appellant
M. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Eric Saddler ("Father"), appeals a decision of the
Warren County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, modifying his child
support obligation, awarding plaintiff-appellee, Michelle Grilliot-Saddler ("Mother"), the right
to claim their daughter as a dependent for income tax purposes, and finding him in contempt
Warren CA2017-09-134
for failing to pay his share of their daughter's healthcare expenses.
{¶ 2} The parties' daughter, Olivia, was born in 2002. Following the parties' divorce
in 2008, Mother was designated as the child's residential parent and legal custodian and
Father was granted parenting time. The divorce decree ordered Father to pay $1,136 a
month in child support, awarded the tax dependency exemption to Mother in odd years and
to Father in even years, and ordered that the costs of uninsured medical, dental,
orthodontic, vision, and mental-health expenses ("healthcare expenses") be paid 37
percent by Mother and 63 percent by Father. The child support obligation was calculated
based upon a combined gross income of $150,000, and not upon the parties' actual
combined gross income of $186,675.
{¶ 3} In 2012, the Warren County Child Support Enforcement Agency ("CSEA")
conducted an administrative adjustment review of Father's child support obligation. CSEA
recommended that Father's monthly child support obligation be reduced to $951 and that
Olivia's healthcare expenses be allocated between the parties as follows: 38 percent to
Mother and 62 percent to Father. On September 27, 2012, the trial court approved the
CSEA's administrative adjustment recommendation and adopted it as an order of the court.
{¶ 4} In 2016, CSEA once again conducted an administrative adjustment review of
Father's child support obligation. CSEA recommended that Father's monthly child
support obligation be further reduced to $732.67. As in the divorce decree and the trial
court's September 2012 entry, the child support obligation was calculated based upon a
combined gross income of $150,000, and not based upon the parties' actual combined
gross income of $247,097.30.
{¶ 5} Consequently, Mother filed a multi-branch motion to award her the tax
dependency exemption every year, to modify the child support obligation, to find Father in
contempt for failure to pay his share of Olivia's healthcare expenses, and for attorney fees.
-2-
Warren CA2017-09-134
In turn, Father moved to reduce his child support obligation. In 2017, Mother moved the
trial court to remove the $150,000 combined gross income cap for child support calculation
purposes and to order Father to contribute to the expenses of Olivia. Two months later,
Mother filed a contempt motion against Father, alleging Father had not paid his share of
Olivia's healthcare expenses for the second, third, and fourth quarters of 2016. The motion
further sought attorney fees.
{¶ 6} A hearing on the parties' motions was held in March 2017. Father and Mother
both testified. While the majority of their testimony focused on Olivia's healthcare expenses
and Father's failure to pay his share of the expenses, the parties also testified, albeit briefly,
about their annual income, Olivia's activities, and what each parent pays on behalf of Olivia.
Mother testified that she pays for Olivia's various school fees, school trips, and "pay to play"
sports and activities, and for most of her clothes, grooming, food, and spending money.
Father admitted he does not pay for Olivia's school lunches or cellphone. Mother testified
that the cost of Olivia's various activities has increased over the years and that it has
impacted their standard of living. Mother explained that lifting the $150,000 combined gross
income cap for child support calculation purposes would result in an increased child support
obligation which, in turn, would help cover the increased cost of Olivia's activities. Mother
noted that while the parties' combined gross income was close to $150,000 at the time of
their divorce in 2008, it was now closer to $250,000. Income wise, Father testified that he
was "do[ing] pretty well" and that the past couple years have been good years. The record
shows that Father is a homeowner and Mother is a tenant.
{¶ 7} On May 11, 2017, the magistrate issued a decision ordering Father to pay
$1,280.63 a month in child support, awarding the tax dependency exemption to Mother
every year, and ordering that the costs of Olivia's healthcare expenses "be paid 40% by
Mother and 60% by Father." Unlike previous calculations, the child support obligation was
-3-
Warren CA2017-09-134
not calculated based upon a combined gross income of $150,000. Citing R.C. 3119.04(B),
the magistrate found that upon considering "the needs and standard of living of Olivia, as
well as Mother and Father[,] removing the $150,000 combined gross income cap on child
support is in the best interest of Olivia." The worksheet attached to the magistrate's decision
shows that the annual gross income of Father and Mother was $145,262 and $101,000,
respectively.
{¶ 8} The magistrate further found Father in contempt for failure to pay his share of
Olivia's healthcare expenses in violation of the divorce decree. The magistrate sentenced
Father to ten days in jail but provided him the opportunity to purge the contempt charge by
"pay[ing] directly to Mother the amount of $1,793.36 representing his portion of Olivia's
unreimbursed medical expenses. If Father sent a check on March 24, 2017 in the amount
of $1,499.81 as he testified in Court, he need only pay Mother the difference of $293.55 on
or before May 15, 2017." The magistrate also ordered Father to pay $1,606.25 for Mother's
attorney fees.
{¶ 9} Father filed objections to the magistrate's decision. On August 9, 2017, the
trial court recalculated Mother's gross income for child support purposes, subsequently
ordered Father to pay $1,278.75 a month in child support, and modified the allocation of
Olivia's healthcare expenses between the parties as follows: "43% by Mother, and 57% by
Father." The trial court overruled Father's other objections and adopted the magistrate's
contempt decision and attorney fees award.
{¶ 10} Father now appeals, raising four assignments of error. The third and fourth
assignments of error will be considered together.
{¶ 11} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 12} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DEVIATING FROM THE
$150,000 COMBINED GROSS INCOME CAP.
-4-
Warren CA2017-09-134
{¶ 13} Father argues the trial court abused its discretion in not using $150,000 as
the parties' combined gross income when it calculated Father's child support obligation.
Father asserts "there [was] scant, if any, credible evidence presented to allow the trial court
to determine the $150,000.00 combined gross income 'cap' should be removed" pursuant
to R.C. 3119.04(B).
{¶ 14} A trial court's decision regarding child support obligations falls within the
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of
discretion. Daniel v. Hester, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2016-02-037, 2016-Ohio-7543, ¶ 18.
{¶ 15} R.C. 3119.04(B) governs child support calculations when the combined gross
income of the parents exceeds $150,000 per year. Specifically, R.C. 3119.04(B) provides
that if the combined gross income of both parents is greater than $150,000 per year, the
trial court "shall determine the amount of the obligor's child support obligation on a case-
by-case basis and shall consider the needs and the standard of living" of the child and the
parents.
{¶ 16} R.C. 3119.04(B) eliminated the former requirement that trial courts
extrapolate to determine the appropriate amount of child support when the combined gross
income of the parents exceeds $150,000. Moore v. Moore, 182 Ohio App. 3d 708, 2009-
Ohio-2434, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.); Cyr v. Cyr, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84255, 2005-Ohio-504
(explaining the extrapolation method). R.C. 3119.04(B) "does not prohibit trial courts from
extrapolating, nor does the $150,000 amount constitute a 'cap' that trial courts may not
exceed." Moore at ¶ 16. Instead, R.C. 3119.04(B) "leaves the determination entirely to the
court's discretion, unless the court awards less than the amount of child support [awarded]
for combined incomes of $150,000," in which case the trial court is required to make specific
findings. Cyr at ¶ 53, 54. In exercising its discretion under R.C. 3119.04(B), the trial court
is required to consider the needs and standard of living of both the parties' child and the
-5-
Warren CA2017-09-134
parties themselves. Wolf v. Wolf, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2008-03-045, 2009-Ohio-1845,
¶ 38.
{¶ 17} The parties' combined gross income is greater than $150,000. The trial court
was therefore required to determine the amount of Father's child support obligation by
considering the needs and standard of living of Olivia and of the parties themselves. R.C.
3119.04(B); Vaughn v. Vaughn, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2007-02-021, 2007-Ohio-6569, ¶
13. In calculating Father's child support obligation pursuant to R.C. 3119.04(B), the
magistrate specifically noted he had "considered the needs and standard of living of Olivia,
as well as Mother and Father in deciding that removing the $150,000 combined gross
income cap on child support is in the best interest of Olivia." In overruling Father's objection
on this issue and in upholding the magistrate's decision to apply R.C. 3119.04(B), the trial
court stated, "The record indicates that child support above the cap is appropriate given the
needs and standard of living of the Child (Olivia)."
{¶ 18} As stated above, the parties presented some evidence regarding the needs
and standard of living of Olivia and of themselves at the March 2107 hearing. While neither
the magistrate nor the trial court made findings in this regard, they were not required to do
so as the amount of child support they awarded was not less than the amount of child
support awarded for a combined gross income of $150,000. The record plainly reflects that
the needs and standard of living of Olivia and the parties were considered in the calculation
of Father's child support obligation in compliance with R.C. 3119.04(B).
{¶ 19} We note that Father further asserts that the trial court erred in deviating from
the $150,000 combined gross income when it ordered him to pay $1,278.75 a month in
child support. However, the trial court "had discretion to award any amount above the
Guidelines amount for a combined income of $150,000. Any amount awarded above this
baseline amount is not considered a deviation. Because there is no Guidelines figure or
-6-
Warren CA2017-09-134
extrapolated figure required, there can be no deviation in the award." Cyr, 2005-Ohio-504
at ¶ 57.
{¶ 20} In light of the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in ordering Father to pay $1,278.75 a month in child support based upon the parties'
combined gross income rather than a combined gross income of $150,000.
{¶ 21} Father's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 22} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 23} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING [SIC]
APPELLEE ALL TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR ALL YEARS.
{¶ 24} Father argues the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the tax
dependency exemption to Mother every year because "there was no credible evidence
presented to award [Mother] all future tax exemptions."
{¶ 25} An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision allocating tax exemptions
for dependents under an abuse of discretion standard. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 12th
Dist. Butler No. CA2014-06-127, 2015-Ohio-1700, ¶ 68. However, this discretion is both
guided and limited by R.C. 3119.82. Id.
{¶ 26} Pursuant to R.C. 3119.82, if the parties agree on which parent should claim
the child as a dependent, the trial court must designate that parent as the one who may
claim the child. However, if the parties do not agree which parent should claim the child as
a dependent, the court may grant the nonresidential parent the tax dependency exemption,
"only if the court determines that this furthers the best interest of the [child] and * * * the
payments for child support are substantially current as ordered by the court for the year in
which the [child] will be claimed as [a] dependent." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 3119.82. In
determining the best interest of the child, the court shall consider a number of factors,
including: any net tax savings, the relative financial circumstances and needs of the parents
-7-
Warren CA2017-09-134
and child, the amount of time the child spends with each parent, the eligibility of either or
both parents for the federal earned income tax credit or other state or federal tax credit, and
any other relevant factor concerning the best interest of the child. Id.
{¶ 27} The Internal Revenue Code creates a presumption in favor of awarding the
tax exemption to the residential parent. Zimmerman, 2015-Ohio-1700 at ¶ 71. If there is a
disagreement as to which parent should claim a child as a dependent, the burden is on the
nonresidential parent to produce competent and credible evidence to show that allocating
the dependency exemption to the nonresidential parent would be in the best interests of the
child. Id.; Meassick v. Meassick, 171 Ohio App. 3d 492, 2006-Ohio-6245, ¶ 15 (7th Dist.).
{¶ 28} Mother was designated as Olivia's residential parent and legal custodian.
Therefore, there was a presumption she receive the tax dependency exemption for the
child. As the nonresidential parent, Father was required to show that granting him the tax
exemption would be in Olivia's best interest. Father failed to do so. Father not only failed
to provide any evidence as to many of the factors listed in R.C. 3119.82, including net tax
savings, his eligibility for the federal earned income tax credit or other state or federal tax
credit, and any other relevant factor concerning Olivia's best interest, he also failed to prove
that it would be in Olivia's best interest that he be allocated the tax exemption. See Burns
v. Burns, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2011-05-050, 2012-Ohio-2850.
{¶ 29} In overruling Father's objection on this issue, the trial court found that "Father
did not present testimony of net taxable savings. Further, Mother makes considerably less
money than Father. Mother also is the primary caretaker and is sole residential parent of
Olivia. It is therefore equitable that Mother be permitted to claim Olivia for income tax
purposes until Olivia is emancipated." The record supports the trial court's finding.
{¶ 30} In light of the foregoing, because Father failed to carry his burden in providing
competent and credible evidence that awarding him the tax dependency exemption would
-8-
Warren CA2017-09-134
be in the best interest of Olivia, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding the tax exemption to Mother every year. Burns, 2012-Ohio-2850; Hendrickson v.
Parrett, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-01-010, 2014-Ohio-3997.
{¶ 31} Father's second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 32} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶ 33} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING APPELLANT
IN CONTEMPT FOR FAILURE TO PAY MEDICAL BILLS.
{¶ 34} Assignment of Error No. 4:
{¶ 35} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO
APPELLEE.
{¶ 36} Father challenges the trial court's decision finding him in contempt for failure
to pay his share of Olivia's healthcare expenses and the court's related award of attorney
fees to Mother. Specifically, in his third assignment of error, Father argues that the trial
court abused its discretion in finding him in contempt because Mother did not provide him
with Olivia's medical bills as required under the divorce decree. In his fourth assignment of
error, Father does not challenge the amount or calculation of the attorney fees or the
reasonableness of Mother's attorney fees affidavit. Rather, Father simply argues that
because he should not have been found in contempt, the trial court erred in ordering him to
pay for Mother's attorney fees related to her contempt motions. Mother asserts that both
the contempt issue and the attorney fees issue are moot.
{¶ 37} As an initial matter, we note that Father was found to be in civil contempt for
failure to pay his share of Olivia's healthcare expenses. Where the sanctions imposed are
primarily for reasons benefiting the complainant and are remedial and coercive in nature,
the contempt is civil in nature. Ganaway v. Ganaway, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2016-05-
039, 2017-Ohio-1009, ¶ 24. "Prison sentences imposed as punishment for civil contempt
-9-
Warren CA2017-09-134
are conditional, and the contemnor is said to carry the keys of his prison in his own pocket
due to the fact that his compliance with the court order secures his freedom." Whittington
v. Whittington, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2011-06-065, 2012-Ohio-1682, ¶ 23. A trial
court's finding of civil contempt will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion. Ganaway at ¶ 24.
{¶ 38} The record reveals that Father complied with the trial court's purge conditions
and purged himself of the contempt charge. On September 13, 2017, the trial court issued
the following entry: "This matter came before the Court on September 13, 2017 for final
sentencing. * * * The Court received evidence that Mr. Saddler has now paid all sums due
as part of his purge requirement. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Saddler has
PURGED his contempt finding." Father does not dispute that he has purged himself of the
contempt charge.
{¶ 39} An appeal from a finding of contempt becomes moot when the offender either
purges himself of the contempt or serves the sentence. Ganaway, 2017-Ohio-1009 at ¶
26; see also Docks Venture, L.L.C. v. Dashing Pacific Group, Ltd., 141 Ohio St. 3d 107,
2014-Ohio-4254; Sypherd v. Sypherd, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25815, 2012-Ohio-2615. Such
a holding stems from the general rule that satisfaction of a judgment strips a party of the
right to appeal. Ganaway at ¶ 26. Because an appellate court must decide only actual
controversies, it may not decide contempt appeals once the contemnor has purged the
contempt. Id.
{¶ 40} Because Father complied with the trial court's purge conditions, thereby
purging himself of the contempt charge, we find that Father's appeal of the trial court's
contempt finding and the related award of attorney fees to Mother are moot. Consequently,
Father's second and third assignments of error are moot and we need not address the
issues on their merits. Pagliaro v. Pagliaro, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA93-02-014, 1993
- 10 -
Warren CA2017-09-134
Ohio App. LEXIS 4074, *6-7 (Aug. 23, 1993).
{¶ 41} Judgment affirmed.
RINGLAND, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.
- 11 -