State v. Daniels ( 2018 )

[Cite as State v. Daniels, 2018-Ohio-1701.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-170145
TRIAL NO. 17CRB-1667
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
O P I N I O N.
RUSSELL DANIELS, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 2, 2018
Paula Boggs Muething, City Solicitor, Natalia Harris, City Prosecutor, and
Christopher Liu, Assistant City Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
William F. Oswall, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
ZAYAS, Judge.
{¶1} Russell Daniels appeals his conviction in the Hamilton County
Municipal Court for domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). The victim of
the offense was Daniels’s wife, Crystal Daniels. For ease of discussion, we will refer
to Crystal Daniels as Mrs. Daniels.
{¶2} Daniels challenges his conviction on the grounds that the trial court
abused its discretion in not dismissing the case at the state’s request, his trial counsel
was ineffective for not requesting a jury trial after the court denied the request to
dismiss and not objecting to prejudicial evidence, and the conviction was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. We find no merit to Daniels’s arguments and affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
Relevant Facts
{¶3} Russell Daniels was charged with one count of domestic violence in
violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree. The complaint
alleged that Daniels had physically harmed his wife by picking her up by her face and
pulling her hair.
{¶4} Daniels pled not guilty and proceeded to a bench trial. Prior to trial,
the prosecutor informed the trial court that Mrs. Daniels did not wish to proceed
because the charge was based on a heated argument with her husband. The
prosecutor requested that the case be dismissed for want of prosecution.
{¶5} The trial court invited the investigating officer to speak. The officer
confirmed that the charge was based on a verbal argument that turned physical. He
further explained that Mrs. Daniels had alleged that Daniels had attempted to break
their dog’s neck and had followed her when she had left the house to file a police
report. After hearing these facts, the trial court denied the state’s request to dismiss
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the charge.
{¶6} Mrs. Daniels and Daniels testified at trial and agreed to the following
facts. The Danielses had been married for 22 years, and had three children together.
They had been separated for three days when Mrs. Daniels invited him to the marital
home to discuss their marriage. The discussion took place in their bedroom, while
Mrs. Daniels was lying in bed. Their discussion became heated after he accused her
of cheating. Both were screaming and yelling at each other.
{¶7} Each testified to a different version of the physical altercation. Mrs.
Daniels testified that her hair was in a ponytail, and that Daniels pulled her hair, but
did not hurt her. Then he grabbed her face and chin and raised her face upwards.
She explained that the facial grab did not leave any marks, but it hurt. While they
were arguing, the dog jumped on the bed and tried to play with Daniels. Daniels
lifted the dog by the scruff of its neck and set the dog on the floor.
{¶8} After Daniels grabbed her, they continued the argument downstairs.
While they were arguing, their 12-year-old daughter came into the room and slapped
Daniels in the face. Daniels moved their daughter, but did not hurt her. Mrs.
Daniels asked him to leave, and she went to her car with her daughter and the dog to
call 911. She saw his car behind hers briefly and initially assumed that he was
following her. When she looked behind her a second time, he was gone. She
proceeded to drive to the police station to file a report.
{¶9} During cross-examination, the following exchange occurred between
counsel for Daniels and Mrs. Daniels:
Q. This incident allegedly took place on January 20th of this
year; is that correct?
A. Yes.
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Q. And actually - - correct me if I’m wrong, but January 19th,
you actually went to District 3 to inquire about how to file for
domestic violence?
A. No, that is [ ] incorrect. * * * I went to District 3 to ask
how to keep him off of my work’s property because some
coworkers felt threatened and my administrator advised me
to find out if there was anything I could do to keep him off
work’s property. They told me no. Unless he comes on the
property, then they can call the police.
Q. So you inquired about a protection order?
A. From my work’s property, not for myself.
{¶10} The state rested, and Daniels made a Crim.R. 29(A) motion for an
acquittal, which the trial court denied.
{¶11} Daniels testified that the argument began when Mrs. Daniels accused
him of cheating. Afterwards, he accused her of cheating, and they were both yelling
at each other. As he was leaving, she jumped out of the bed and startled him. He
threw up his hands and may have hit her face. Then he left to go to his mother’s
house. He confirmed that he moved the dog off of the bed, and that his daughter
slapped him.
{¶12} For its rebuttal case, the state recalled Mrs. Daniels. She testified that
she did not remember jumping off the bed toward her husband.
{¶13} After summarizing the evidence, the trial court found Daniels guilty
because he grabbed his wife’s face, and the grab was not a startled reflex. The court
further found that Daniels pulled her head up and caused her pain. The trial court
concluded that Mrs. Daniels was “honest” while testifying.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶14} The court sentenced him to 180 days in jail, suspended 179 days, and
credited the one day he spent in jail. The court sentenced him to 11 months of
probation, placed him on 180 days of electronic monitoring, ordered him to complete
an anger-management course and imposed court costs. The sentence was stayed
pending the resolution of the appeal.
The Motion to Dismiss
{¶15} In his first assignment of error, Daniels contends that the trial court
erred by denying the state’s motion to dismiss the case.
{¶16} A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a prosecutor’s request to
dismiss a charge is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Mucci, 150 Ohio
App.3d 493, 2002-Ohio-6896, 782 N.E.2d 133, ¶ 30 (7th Dist.). An abuse of
discretion requires trial court action that is unreasonable, unconscionable, or
arbitrary. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).
{¶17} Crim.R. 48(A) provides, “The state may by leave of court and in open
court file an entry of dismissal of an indictment, information, or complaint and the
prosecution shall thereupon terminate.” A trial court should grant the state's motion
for a dismissal if the request meets the good cause and open court requirements
of Crim.R. 48(A). See Newark v. Williams, 5th Dist. Licking No. 00-CA-68, 2001
WL 1783087, *3 (Mar. 6, 2001), citing State v. Sutton, 64 Ohio App.2d 105, 411
N.E.2d 818 (9th Dist.1979). In making this determination, the trial court can review
the information underlying the charges. See Mucci at ¶ 32.
{¶18} “Good cause,” has been defined as “a substantial reason and one that
affords a legal excuse.” State v. Brown, 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 308, 528 N.E.2d 523(1988). The requirement of “good cause” requires “more than a cursory recitation
that good cause exists[.]” Lakewood v. Pfeifer, 83 Ohio App.3d 47, 51, 613 N.E.2d
5OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
1079 (8th Dist.1992).
{¶19} Here, the record reflects that the prosecutor made an oral motion to
dismiss the charge, in open court, and informed the trial court that Mrs. Daniels did
not wish to pursue the charge. The only explanation the prosecutor gave was that
Mrs. Daniels had indicated the charge stemmed from a heated argument with her
husband. After the investigating officer recited the allegations that led to the filing of
the domestic-violence charge against Daniels, the trial court denied the state’s
request.
{¶20} We conclude that the trial court acted within its sound discretion in
denying the motion to dismiss. Based on the allegations, the complaint was
sufficient to charge a domestic-violence offense, and the prosecuting witness was
present to testify regarding the allegations. The prosecutor did not provide good
cause to dismiss. See Brown at 308.
{¶21} Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶22} In his second assignment of error, Daniels alleges that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to request a jury trial after the court denied the state’s motion,
failing to object to inadmissible evidence, and eliciting prejudicial testimony.
{¶23} To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Daniels must
demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and he was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). With regard to deficient
performance, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689.
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Furthermore, “the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id.{¶24} In order to demonstrate prejudice, Daniels must establish that, but for
counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of trial would have
been different. Strickland at 687; State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-142, 538
N.E.2d 373 (1989). The failure to make an adequate showing on either prong is fatal
to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. See Strickland at 697.
1. Failure to request a jury trial
{¶25} Daniels contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for proceeding
with a bench trial after the trial court denied the state’s motion to dismiss. He
further argues that his counsel should have requested a continuance and filed a jury
demand after the court heard the allegations and denied the state’s request to
dismiss the charge. Generally, the decision whether to try a case to a jury or a judge
is a trial-strategy decision. State v. Feltha, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160574, 2017-
Ohio-8640, ¶ 7.
{¶26} Daniels does not explain why the failure to request a jury trial was
deficient or allege that he was prejudiced. Absent any explanation about how
counsel’s performance was deficient, Daniels has not overcome the presumption that
counsel’s decision was sound trial strategy. See Strickland at 689; Feltha at ¶ 7.
2. Failure to object to inadmissible testimony
{¶27} Here, the state introduced testimony that the Danielses’ daughter
slapped Daniels in the face while he was arguing with Mrs. Daniels. Daniels argues
that testimony was irrelevant and inadmissible because the daughter did not witness
the alleged domestic violence, and the slap by the daughter was not relevant to prove
the offense. Daniels further argues that he was prejudiced by the testimony because
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the trial court stated, while rendering the verdict, that “the fact that the daughter
came down and felt the need to slap him, too, that’s not exactly helpful.”
{¶28} Assuming, without deciding, that the testimony was inadmissible,
Daniels has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
trial would have been different absent the evidence.
{¶29} Having considered the evidence provided by the state at trial, we do
not find that the absence of the testimony would have changed the outcome of this
case. The sole issue in this case was the credibility of the witnesses, and the trial
court found that Mrs. Daniels’s testimony was more credible than Daniels’s
testimony. Although the trial court mentioned the testimony about the slap during
the summation of the evidence, the court made it clear that the verdict was based on
its finding that Mrs. Daniels’s testimony was honest.
{¶30} Daniels has failed to demonstrate that, but for counsel’s failure to
object to the testimony, the outcome of the trial would have been different.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; Bradley, 42 Ohio
St.3d at 142, 538 N.E.2d 373.
3. Eliciting prejudicial testimony
{¶31} Daniels asserts that counsel was ineffective for eliciting prejudicial
testimony from Mrs. Daniels during cross-examination. Defense counsel elicited
testimony from Mrs. Daniels that she had gone to the police station at the request of
her coworkers to find out how to prevent Daniels from driving in the parking lot at
her workplace. A review of the testimony reveals that counsel was attempting to
show that Mrs. Daniels had asked the police how to file a domestic-violence charge
the day before the argument occurred. Taken in context, it appears that counsel was
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
attempting to impeach the witness. This was a reasonable trial strategy and did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶32} Daniels has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective.
Accordingly, we overrule his second assignment of error.
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶33} In his third assignment of error, Daniels argues that his conviction
was against the manifest weight of the evidence. When considering a challenge to
the weight of the evidence, the court must review the entire record, weigh the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and
determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost
its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio
St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Reversing a conviction as being against the
manifest weight of the evidence should be reserved for only the most “ ‘exceptional
case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” Id., quoting State
v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983), paragraph three of
the syllabus.
{¶34} Daniels argues that the face grab was the result of a startled reaction
and not a deliberate attempt to harm Mrs. Daniels. He further argues that her bare
assertion that it hurt when Daniels grabbed her face was not credible.
{¶35} R.C. 2919.25(A) provides that “No person shall knowingly cause or
attempt to cause physical harm to a family or household member.” “Physical harm”
is defined as “any injury, illness, or other physiological impairment, regardless of its
gravity or duration.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(3). The slightest injury is sufficient proof of
physical harm. See State v. Hustead, 83 Ohio App.3d 809, 615 N.E.2d 1081 (4th
Dist.1992) (slap to the face, which causes no redness, bruising or head movement, is
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
sufficient proof of physical harm); State v. Neff, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 92 AP 655,
1992 WL 250253, *2 (Sept. 30, 1992) (the act of grabbing and jerking a victim’s arm
and causing pain constitutes physical harm); State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Greene No.
88-CA-83, 1989 WL 43040, *4 (Apr. 27, 1989) (the infliction of pain by grabbing the
male genitalia is physical harm).
{¶36} At trial, the only disputed element was whether Daniels knowingly
caused physical harm to Mrs. Daniels. Mrs. Daniels testified that Daniels grabbed
her face, causing her pain.
{¶37} It is well settled law that the trial court was in the best position to
determine the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Railey, 2012-Ohio-4233, 977
N.E.2d 703, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.). The trial court heard both versions of the physical
altercation and specifically found that Mrs. Daniels’s testimony was “honest.” Based
on our review of the record, we cannot say that the court clearly lost its way and
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that we must reverse Daniels’s
conviction and order a new trial. Accordingly, we overrule his third assignment of
error.
Conclusion
{¶38} Having considered and overruled all of Daniels’s assignments of error,
we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
MOCK, P.J., and CUNNINGHAM, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.
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