State v. Close ( 2018 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Close, 
    2018-Ohio-2244
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    LOGAN COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,
    CASE NO. 8-17-45
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
    v.
    KEITH A. CLOSE,                                            OPINION
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court
    Trial Court No. CR17-03-0094
    Judgment Affirmed
    Date of Decision: June 11, 2018
    APPEARANCES:
    Eric J. Allen for Appellant
    Alice Robinson-Bond for Appellee
    Case No. 8-17-45
    WILLAMOWKSI, P.J.
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant Keith A. Close (“Close”) brings this appeal from
    the Judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Logan County for sentencing him
    to prison for his conviction for trafficking in cocaine.      Close challenges the
    forfeiture specification and the failure to impose the joint sentencing
    recommendation. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is affirmed.
    {¶2} On April 11, 2017, the Logan County Grand Jury indicted Close on four
    counts: 1) Trafficking in Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(4)(g), a
    felony of the first degree; 2) Possession of Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A),
    (C)(4)(f), a felony of the first degree; 3) Trafficking in Marijuana in violation of
    R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(3)(c), a felony of the fourth degree; and 4) Possession of
    Marijuana in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(3)(c), a felony of the fifth degree.
    Doc. 7. Each count included a specification for forfeiture of money and counts one
    and two included a major drug offender specification. 
    Id.
     Close was arraigned on
    April 14 and entered pleas of not guilty to all counts. Doc. 12.
    {¶3} On August 30, 2017, a change of plea hearing was held. Doc. 32. The
    State moved that the indictment be amended making Count One a violation of R.C.
    2925.03(A)(2), (C)(4)(e), a felony of the second degree. 
    Id.
     Pursuant to a plea
    agreement, Close agreed to enter a guilty plea to the amended Count One and a
    specification for forfeiture in money. 
    Id.
     at Ex. A. In return the State agreed to
    dismiss the remaining counts at sentencing and to jointly recommend a sentence of
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    Case No. 8-17-45
    five years. 
    Id.
     After discussing the matter with the defendant, the trial court
    accepted the guilty plea and set a date for sentencing. 
    Id.
     The sentencing hearing
    was held on October 2, 2017. Doc. 34. At the hearing, the trial court sentenced
    Close to six years in prison and ordered him to pay a mandatory fine. 
    Id.
     No
    mention of the forfeiture was made.1 The remaining charges were dismissed upon
    the application of the State. 
    Id.
     Close appealed from this judgment on October 31,
    2017. On appeal, Close raises the following assignments of error.
    First Assignment of Error
    The trial court committed reversible error by not including the
    forfeiture specification in the judgment entry.
    Second Assignment of Error
    The record in this matter does not support more than the joint
    sentencing recommendation presented to the court.
    {¶4} In the first assignment of error, Close claims that the trial court erred by
    not including the forfeiture specification in the sentencing judgment entry. The
    Supreme Court of Ohio has held that judgments of forfeiture need not be included
    in the criminal sentencing judgment entry. State v. Harris, 
    132 Ohio St.3d 318
    ,
    
    2012-Ohio-1908
    , 
    972 N.E.2d 509
    .                      A judgment of conviction complies with
    Criminal Rule 32(C) when it sets forth four essential elements: 1) the fact of
    conviction; 2) the sentence; 3) the signature of the judge; and 4) entry on the journal
    1
    The order of forfeiture was in the judgment entry accepting the change of plea. Doc. 32.
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    by the clerk of courts. 
    Id.
     The Court determined that an order of forfeiture does not
    need to be included in the entry to satisfy Criminal Rule 32(C). Id. at ¶ 24. This
    determination was based on the finding that an order of forfeiture is not a conviction.
    Id. at ¶ 25. The Court also stated that an order of forfeiture is not a sentence as it is
    not a penalty imposed as a punishment for the offense. Id. at ¶ 28. Thus, the trial
    court determined that since forfeiture requires judicial action and consideration
    extending beyond a criminal case, it is not a part of the sentence. Id. at ¶ 32-33.
    Since the order of forfeiture was not part of the sentence, the trial court did not err
    by not including it in the sentencing order. The first assignment of error is
    overruled.
    {¶5} In the second assignment of error, Close claims that the trial court’s
    sentence was against the manifest weight of the evidence. This court has previously
    held that trial courts have full discretion to impose any prison sentence within the
    statutory range as long as they consider the purposes and principles of felony
    sentencing and the seriousness and recidivism factors. State v. Alselami, 3d Dist.
    Hancock No. 5-11-31, 
    2012-Ohio-987
    , ¶ 21. The trial court is not required to make
    any specific findings to demonstrate the consideration of those statutory sentencing
    factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. 
    Id.
    R.C. 2929.11 provides that sentences for a felony shall be guided
    by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing: “to protect the
    public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish
    the offender.” R.C. 2929.11(A). In order to comply with those
    purposes and principles, R.C. 2929.12 instructs a trial court to
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    Case No. 8-17-45
    consider various factors set forth in the statute relating to the
    seriousness of the conduct and to the likelihood of the offender’s
    recidivism. R.C. 2929.12(A) through (D). In addition, a trial
    court may consider any other factors that are relevant to
    achieving the purposes and principles of sentencing. R.C.
    2929.12(E).
    Id. at ¶ 22.
    {¶6} In this case, Close entered a guilty plea to trafficking in cocaine, a
    felony of the second degree. “For a felony of the second degree, the prison term
    shall be two, three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years.” R.C. 2929.14(A)(2). The
    trial court imposed a prison term of six years. Thus, it was within the statutory
    range. The trial court stated at the hearing that it had reviewed the presentence
    investigation report and had considered the purposes of sentencing. Oct. 2 Tr. 16-
    17. The trial court indicated that it had considered the consistency of the sentence
    and whether it was proportional to the harm caused. Id. at 17. The trial court also
    discussed the seriousness of the offense and the likelihood of recidivism. Id. at 18-
    19. Based upon its consideration of the statutory factors, the trial court imposed a
    six-year prison term.
    {¶7} Close argues that the evidence does not support imposing more than the
    agreed sentence. However, although there was a jointly recommended sentence of
    five years in prison, Close was informed prior to entering his plea that the trial court
    was not bound by that recommendation. At the change of plea hearing, the
    following dialogue between the trial court and Close occurred.
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    Case No. 8-17-45
    The Court: As part of the discussion, there is a joint
    recommendation of five years ODRC, a forfeiture of the money,
    and that you would testify honestly against Dustin Dye. I want
    you to understand that while there’s been that recommendation
    for sentencing, the Court is not bound to accept that
    recommendation. Do you understand that?
    The Defendant: Yes.
    The Court: The – knowing that the Court is not obligated to
    follow that plea recommendation or sentencing recommendation,
    do you still wish to proceed?
    The Defendant: Yes.
    Aug. 30 Tr. 7-8. The trial court specified what the range of prison terms could be.
    Id. at 11. A review of the presentence investigation report showed that none of the
    more or less serious factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12 were applicable, but that some
    of the recidivism factors did apply. The trial court indicated that it was imposing
    the sentence it chose to deter future criminal activity and to adequately punish the
    offender. These considerations are permitted pursuant to R.C. 2929.11. Since the
    trial court imposed a sentence within the statutory range and considered all of the
    statutory guidelines, the sentence is not contrary to law and is not against the
    manifest weight of the evidence. The second assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶8} Having found no error in the particulars assigned and argued, the
    judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Logan County is affirmed.
    Judgment Affirmed
    SHAW and PRESTON, J.J., concur.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 8-17-45

Judges: Willamowski

Filed Date: 6/11/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/11/2018