Samara v. Matar , 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 446 ( 2018 )


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  • Filed 6/25/18
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
    RANA SAMARA,                        )
    )
    Plaintiff and Appellant,       )
    )                              S240918
    v.                             )
    )                       Ct.App. 2/7 B265752
    HAITHAM MATAR,                      )
    )                       Los Angeles County
    Defendant and Respondent.      )                     Super. Ct. No. EC056720
    ____________________________________)
    When a trial court judgment rests on more than one ground, it may be
    impossible for a losing party to obtain appellate review of all of the court’s
    determinations. In a breach of contract action, for example, a trial court might
    grant a defense motion for summary judgment because no contract was formed,
    and because in any event there was no breach. On direct review, an appellate
    court could affirm if either of those conclusions was correct, without resolving or
    even considering the other one. Thus, a plaintiff who argues on appeal that there
    was a contract (and that the contract was breached) might lose based on a lack of
    breach without appellate review of whether a contract existed in the first place.
    This case concerns the claim- and issue-preclusive significance, in future
    litigation, of a conclusion relied on by the trial court and challenged on appeal, but
    not addressed by the appellate court. We hold that the preclusive effect of the
    judgment should be evaluated as though the trial court had not relied on the
    1
    unreviewed ground. Our contrary decision in People v. Skidmore (1865) 
    27 Cal. 287
    (Skidmore) is overruled.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. Claim and Issue Preclusion
    The law of preclusion helps to ensure that a dispute resolved in one case is
    not relitigated in a later case. Although the doctrine has ancient roots (see Note,
    Developments in the Law: Res Judicata (1952) 65 Harv. L.Rev. 818, 820-822), its
    contours and associated terminology have evolved over time. We now refer to
    “claim preclusion” rather than “res judicata” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co.
    (2002) 
    28 Cal. 4th 888
    , 896-897 (Mycogen)), and use “issue preclusion” in place of
    “direct or collateral estoppel” (Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.
    (1984) 
    465 U.S. 75
    , 77, fn. 1; see Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 
    21 Cal. 4th 815
    , 824 (Vandenberg)).1
    Claim and issue preclusion have different requirements and effects. Claim
    preclusion prevents relitigation of entire causes of action. (
    Mycogen, supra
    ¸
    28 Cal.4th at p. 896; see also 
    id., at p.
    904 [discussing “primary right theory,”
    which defines the scope of a cause of action].) Claim preclusion applies only
    when “a second suit involves (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same
    parties [or their privies] (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit.”
    1       We also avoid using “ ‘res judicata’ as an umbrella term” capable of
    referring to claim preclusion, issue preclusion, or both. (DKN Holdings v. Faerber
    (2015) 
    61 Cal. 4th 813
    , 823 (DKN Holdings); see Lucido v. Superior Court (1990)
    
    51 Cal. 3d 335
    , 341, fn. 3 (Lucido).) Even the more modern terminology of
    “claim” and “issue” preclusion can be further refined. (See, e.g., Standefer v.
    United States (1980) 
    447 U.S. 10
    , 21 [describing “nonmutual” issue preclusion];
    Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore (1979) 
    439 U.S. 322
    , 329 [distinguishing
    “offensive” and “defensive” issue preclusion].) But for present purposes, “claim”
    and “issue” preclusion will suffice.
    2
    (DKN 
    Holdings, supra
    , 61 Cal.4th at p. 824.) Issue preclusion, by contrast,
    prevents “relitigation of previously decided issues,” rather than causes of action as
    a whole. (Ibid.) It applies only “(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical
    issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted
    against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.”
    (Id., at p. 825.) Courts have understood the “ ‘necessarily decided’ ” prong to
    “require[] only that the issue not have been ‘entirely unnecessary’ to the judgment
    in the initial proceeding” 
    (Lucido, supra
    , 51 Cal.3d at p. 342) — leaving room for
    a decision based on two grounds to be preclusive as to both.
    B. Facts and Procedural History
    Plaintiff Rana Samara was missing a tooth. Dr. Haitham Matar
    recommended that she receive a dental implant, and Dr. Stephen Nahigian
    performed the implantation surgery. Samara later sued them both for professional
    negligence. Our focus is Samara’s contention that defendant Matar is vicariously
    liable for former defendant Nahigian’s alleged tort.
    1. First judgment, in favor of Nahigian
    Nahigian moved for summary judgment. He argued, in pertinent part, that
    the suit against him was untimely and that he did not cause Samara’s alleged
    injuries. The trial court agreed that the suit was untimely with respect to Nahigian
    (unlike Matar) and further agreed that no material factual dispute prevented
    judgment in Nahigian’s favor on the issue of causation. The court entered
    judgment on both grounds.
    Samara appealed. She conceded that the judgment against her could be
    affirmed based on the statute of limitations. Concerned about the potential
    preclusive effect of the trial court’s determination regarding a lack of causation,
    however, she urged the Court of Appeal to reverse that portion of the trial court’s
    3
    decision. The Court of Appeal declined to do so in an unpublished opinion,
    stating, “We need not, and do not, reach the court’s alternative ground for granting
    summary judgment.” It added, “Because the question is not before us, we also do
    not address whether collateral estoppel may be used with regard to an alternative
    ground for judgment not reviewed by the appellate court.”
    2. Second judgment, in favor of Matar
    Around the time Samara noticed an appeal from the first judgment, Matar
    moved for summary judgment in the trial court. As relevant here, Matar argued
    that the court’s earlier no-causation determination precluded holding him liable for
    Nahigian’s conduct. After the remittitur issued in the first appeal, the trial court
    agreed, granting Matar’s motion for summary judgment. Although the particulars
    of the trial court’s reasoning are not entirely clear, the core of its rationale was that
    because Nahigian was not liable to Samara for his conduct, Matar could not be
    liable for that conduct vicariously.
    The Court of Appeal, in an opinion issued by the same panel that decided
    the first appeal, reversed and remanded the matter. It concluded that preclusion
    provided no basis for the trial court’s decision. The court’s analysis of claim
    preclusion focused on whether there had been “a final judgment on the merits in
    the first suit.” (DKN 
    Holdings, supra
    , 61 Cal.4th at p. 824.) The court observed
    that the prior judgment was affirmed solely because of the statute of limitations,
    which the court believed to be a “purely procedural ground” rather than a decision
    on the merits. Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that under our decision in
    
    Skidmore, supra
    , 
    27 Cal. 287
    , a judgment on the merits affirmed on purely
    procedural grounds might qualify as a judgment on the merits in the relevant
    sense. Noting that “the Supreme Court [of California] might want to address” the
    continuing vitality of the “Civil War-era” Skidmore decision, the Court of Appeal
    4
    instead ruled that claim preclusion was unavailable because Samara sued Nahigian
    and Matar in a single lawsuit, rather than two successive suits. The court further
    held that Skidmore was inapplicable to issue preclusion, concluding that “an
    affirmance on an alternative ground operates as collateral estoppel/issue
    preclusion only on the ground reached by the appellate court.”
    We granted Matar’s petition for review. He contends that the Court of
    Appeal’s claim- and issue-preclusion analysis is inconsistent with Skidmore and
    asks us to “address the viability of” that 1865 decision. Because we conclude that
    Skidmore must be overruled, we agree with the Court of Appeal that Matar is not
    entitled to summary judgment on preclusion grounds.
    II. SKIDMORE’S VIABILITY
    A. The Skidmore Decision
    To contextualize Skidmore’s analysis of the preclusive effect of a particular
    judgment, we begin by describing the litigation resulting in that judgment.
    Walter Skidmore was charged with murder. (
    Skidmore, supra
    , 27 Cal. at
    p. 289.) To secure his appearance to answer the charge, Skidmore and his sureties
    entered into a recognizance, something roughly akin to a bail bond. (See ibid.)
    Skidmore also created a trust for his sureties’ financial protection, pledging
    property toward the payment and extinguishment of the recognizance should he
    fail to appear. (People v. Skidmore (1861) 
    17 Cal. 260
    , 261; unless otherwise
    noted, all short-form Skidmore citations concern the 1865 appellate decision.)
    After he failed to appear, the People sued. (Ibid.) The suit sought equitable relief
    against the trustee, urging that the property held in trust “be applied to the debt due
    by the recognizance.” (Ibid.; see also 
    Skidmore, supra
    , 27 Cal. at p. 289.) The
    trial court entered judgment against the People, and the People appealed.
    5
    We affirmed. (People v. 
    Skidmore, supra
    , 17 Cal. at p. 262 [initial
    appeal].) Our opinion addressed a demurrer based on “a misjoinder of causes of
    action, among other [objections].” (Id., at p. 261.) Declining to reach those other
    objections, we agreed that there had been a misjoinder: “It may be that the
    sureties will not be held liable at all; or it may be, if they are, that they are ready
    and willing to pay whenever their liability is declared; and in that case, there
    would be no necessity of coming upon this fund. If, after judgment, the
    defendants are insolvent, another question might arise, or the question might arise
    of a right to sell or subject this property as the property of Skidmore. But it is not
    necessary to pass upon this matter in advance of the proper stage of the inquiry.”
    (Id., at p. 262.) “The effect of the judgment and of this affirmance,” we added,
    “will not be to preclude the plaintiff from suing again when the cause of action can
    be more formally set out.” (Ibid.)
    A second suit followed. (See 
    Skidmore, supra
    , 27 Cal. at p. 289.) In the
    decision at the core of this case, we held that the People’s claim was barred. In
    determining whether the decision in the first case barred the second suit, we
    treated as dictum our earlier statement that the first suit would not preclude a
    second one (
    id., at p.
    293) and deemed the dispositive issue whether the judgment
    in the first suit was “based upon the merits” (
    id., at p.
    289). We concluded that it
    was. (Id., at p. 294.) The judgment entered by the trial court, we reasoned, was
    “based upon the merits of the claim, and not upon the dilatory matters raised by
    the demurrer nor any other mere technical defect.” (Ibid.) And although our
    affirmance had been limited to the misjoinder problem — a non-merits issue —
    we noted that we had not reversed or modified the trial court’s judgment. (Id., at
    pp. 292-293.) As we explained, “in examining the judgment in connection with
    the errors assigned, [we] found that there was at least one ground upon which the
    judgment could be justified, and therefore very properly refrained from
    6
    considering it in connection with the other errors. But the affirmance, still, was an
    affirmance to the whole extent of the legal effect of the judgment at the time when
    it was entered in the court below. [We] found no error in the record, and therefore
    not only allowed it to stand, but affirmed it as an entirety, and by direct
    expression.” (Ibid.) Treating “the judgment rendered in the first action . . . now as
    it was in the beginning,” we held that the People’s claim was barred. (Id., at
    p. 293.) In doing so, we allowed a trial court’s ruling to determine the preclusive
    effect of the judgment, without regard for whether that ruling was addressed on
    appeal.
    Courts considering Skidmore have disagreed about whether its precedential
    force extends to issue preclusion. (Compare, e.g., Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008)
    
    159 Cal. App. 4th 76
    , 86 (Zevnik) [no] with, e.g., Diruzza v. County of Tehama (9th
    Cir. 2003) 
    323 F.3d 1147
    , 1153 (Diruzza) [yes].) It might be argued that Skidmore
    addressed only claim preclusion and that requirements unique to issue preclusion
    make Skidmore inapplicable in that context. (See, e.g., Zevnik, at p. 86 [“Skidmore
    involved res judicata rather than collateral estoppel and therefore is not on
    point”].) Skidmore, however, cannot be so easily limited. It is not enough to
    observe, for example, that issue preclusion applies only to issues “actually
    litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit” (DKN 
    Holdings, supra
    , 61
    Cal.4th at p. 825; see Zevnik, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 88), because it matters which
    court’s decision is the focus of the inquiry. If, as in Skidmore, the focus of the
    preclusion inquiry is the trial court’s decision, then an issue might have been
    “actually litigated and necessarily decided” (DKN Holdings, at p. 825) whether or
    not an appellate court agreed with the trial court’s disposition of the issue.
    We need not decide exactly what Skidmore means for the law of issue
    preclusion. (Cf. Moss v. Superior Court (1998) 
    17 Cal. 4th 396
    , 401 [disapproving
    a prior decision “insofar as it might be read to apply” to certain orders]; People v.
    7
    Carbajal (1995) 
    10 Cal. 4th 1114
    , 1126 [disapproving a prior decision “insofar as
    [it] may be read” in a particular way].) For present purposes, it is enough to say
    that Skidmore’s focus on the trial court’s decision, without regard for the basis of
    the appellate court’s affirmance, could reasonably be understood to bear on the
    issue preclusion inquiry. (See 
    Diruzza, supra
    , 323 F.3d at p. 1153; see also
    People ex rel. Brown v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC (2009) 
    171 Cal. App. 4th 1549
    ,
    1574-1575 [suggesting that Skidmore was relevant to issue preclusion, but
    refusing to follow it]; Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. v. Founding Members of
    Newport Beach Country Club (2006) 
    140 Cal. App. 4th 1120
    , 1130-1132 [same].)
    B. Skidmore’s Aftermath
    Although Skidmore has not been widely cited, there was once broad support
    for the view that the preclusive effect of an affirmed judgment should be
    determined without regard for the basis of the affirmance. (See, e.g., Bank of
    America v. McLaughlin etc. Co. (1940) 
    40 Cal. App. 2d 620
    , 628-629; State ex rel.
    Squire v. City of Cleveland (Ohio 1937) 
    22 N.E.2d 223
    , 225-226; Kinsley Bank v.
    Woods (Mo.Ct.App. 1934) 
    78 S.W.2d 148
    , 149; Russell v. Russell (3d Cir. 1905)
    
    134 F. 840
    , 840-841; Town of Fulton v. Pomeroy (Wis. 1901) 831, 832-834; Finch
    v. Hollinger (1877) 
    46 Iowa 216
    , 217-218; but see, e.g., Moran Towing &
    Transportation Co. v. Navigazione Libera Triestina, S.A. (2d Cir. 1937) 
    92 F.2d 37
    , 40-41.)
    However, courts’ understanding of preclusion has evolved in the more than
    150 years since Skidmore was decided. Although no precise turning point can or
    must be identified, one influential development occurred in 1942, when the
    Restatement First of Judgments diverged from Skidmore’s reasoning. The
    Restatement, concerning claim preclusion, conveyed that “[w]here the trial court
    bases the judgment for the defendant upon two alternative grounds, one on the
    8
    merits and the other not on the merits, and an appellate court affirms the judgment
    solely on the ground which is not on the merits, the judgment does not bar a
    subsequent action by the plaintiff based upon the same cause of action.” (Rest.,
    Judgments (1942) § 49, com. c., p. 196; see also 
    Mycogen, supra
    , 28 Cal.4th at
    pp. 896-897 [dividing claim preclusion into “merge[r]” and “bar”].) The
    Restatement similarly opined, in passages addressing issue preclusion, that a
    judgment affirmed on one of two alternative grounds “is not conclusive in a
    subsequent action in which the other ground is in issue” (Rest., 
    Judgments, supra
    ,
    § 68, com. n, p. 308), and that “[i]f the appellate court determines that one of these
    grounds is sufficient and refuses to consider whether or not the other ground is
    sufficient, and accordingly affirms the judgment, the judgment is conclusive only
    as to the first ground” (id., § 69, com. b, p. 316). In short, the Restatement would
    evaluate the claim- and issue-preclusive effect of the judgment without regard for
    a determination relied upon by the trial court but not embraced on appeal.
    The Restatement Second of Judgments, published in 1982, echoes the
    position of the Restatement First of Judgments with respect to issue preclusion.
    (See Rest.2d Judgments (1982) § 27, com. o, p. 263.) The second Restatement
    does not appear to take an explicit position on the claim preclusive effect of a
    judgment affirmed on a non-merits ground, perhaps reflecting aversion to the
    terminology “ ‘on the merits[,]’ ” which has “possibly misleading connotations.”
    (Id., § 19, com. a, p. 161.) Regardless, the second Restatement conveys that in the
    absence of an appeal, a trial court “dismissal . . . based on two or more
    determinations, at least one of which, standing alone, would not render the
    judgment a bar to another action on the same claim . . . should not operate as a
    bar.” (Id., § 20, com. e, p. 172.) Nothing in the second Restatement suggests that
    if such a judgment is affirmed solely on grounds that would not trigger claim
    preclusion, the judgment should be imbued with claim preclusive effect.
    9
    The weight of more recent authority is in accord with these Restatements,
    at least with respect to cases in which an appeal has been taken. (See 18 Wright et
    al., Fed. Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction & Related Matters (3d ed. 2016)
    § 4421, p. 619 [“The federal decisions agree with the Restatement view that once
    an appellate court has affirmed on one ground and passed over another, preclusion
    does not attach to the ground omitted from its decision”]; 18A Wright et al., supra,
    § 4432, p. 60 [“the nature of the ultimate final judgment in a case ordinarily is
    controlled by the actual appellate disposition”]; see also, e.g., Omimex Canada,
    Ltd. v. State, Dept. of Revenue (Mont. 2015) 
    346 P.3d 1125
    , 1129-1130; Tydings
    v. Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP (N.Y. 2008) 
    897 N.E.2d 1044
    , 1046-1047;
    Beaver v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, L.P. (Ark. 2003) 
    138 S.W.3d 664
    , 666-670;
    Stanton v. Schultz (Colo. 2010) 
    222 P.3d 303
    , 309; Connecticut Nat. Bank v.
    Rytman (Conn. 1997) 
    694 A.2d 1246
    , 1254; Humana, Inc. v. Davis (Ga. 1991) 
    407 S.E.2d 725
    , 726-727; but see, e.g., Markoff v. New York Life Ins. Co (9th Cir.
    1976) 
    530 F.2d 841
    , 842 [attempting to discern Nevada law].) Although most of
    these authorities concern issue rather than claim preclusion, their refusal to afford
    preclusive significance to a trial court determination that evades appellate review
    is informative.
    C. Skidmore’s Continuing Vitality
    1. Skidmore reflects a flawed view of preclusion
    We agree with the weight of modern authority that Skidmore’s approach to
    preclusion is flawed.
    Rules of claim and issue preclusion are, or at least should be, inextricably
    intertwined with rules of procedure. (See Rest.2d 
    Judgments, supra
    , Introduction,
    pp. 5-13.) The law of preclusion reflects a view “that at some point arguable
    questions of right and wrong for practical purposes simply cannot be argued any
    10
    more. It compels repose. In substituting compulsion for persuasion, the law of
    [preclusion] trenches upon freedom to petition about grievances and autonomy of
    action, very serious concerns in an open society.” (Id., at p. 11.) This finality “has
    to be accepted if the idea of law is to be accepted, certainly if there is to be
    practical meaning to the idea that legal disputes can be resolved by judicial
    process.” (Ibid.) But that does not mean finality should be embraced reflexively,
    nor attached to every decision rendered. “The ‘chance’ to litigate is not simply
    some unspecified opportunity for disputation over legal rights; it is the opportunity
    to submit a dispute over legal rights to a tribunal legally empowered to decide it
    according to definite procedural rules.” (Id., at pp. 6-7.) The less robust the
    process involved in resolving litigation the first time, the stronger the argument for
    permitting litigation once more. (Compare, e.g., Sanderson v. Niemann (1941)
    
    17 Cal. 2d 563
    [deeming small claims court too informal to support issue
    preclusion] with, e.g., Perez v. City of San Bruno (1980) 
    27 Cal. 3d 875
    , 884-885
    [more formal trial on appeal from small claims court judgment can support issue
    preclusion].)
    The availability of a direct appeal reflects a sensible determination that the
    process culminating in a trial court’s disputed decision is not sufficient to resolve
    litigation conclusively. Of course, a litigant’s ability to secure appellate review
    may be waived or forfeited, as when a litigant fails to file a timely notice of appeal
    or fails to make an objection in the trial court. But when a litigant properly seeks
    appellate review of a ground underlying a trial court’s determination, the fortuity
    that the judgment may be sustained on some other ground should not imbue the
    challenged ground with final and conclusive effect. The challenged ground is no
    more reliable — no more deserving of finality — merely because it need not be
    evaluated to resolve the appeal. (See 
    Zevnik, supra
    , 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 85.)
    11
    Recall, for example, the hypothetical breach of contract action in which the
    trial court concludes that no contract existed, and that even if a contract existed,
    the contract was not breached. (See ante, at p. 1.) If an appellate court agrees that
    any existing contract was not breached — but does not consider whether any
    contract existed in the first place — it would be harsh indeed to bind the plaintiff
    to the trial court’s “no contract” determination, preventing the plaintiff from suing
    the defendant on the contract even for subsequent conduct that clearly would
    constitute a material breach. Perhaps there was a contract, perhaps not. But the
    trial court’s answer to that question should not be final merely because the
    judgment could be affirmed on another ground. Skidmore’s focus on the trial
    court’s reasoning, however, is in tension with this conclusion.
    Skidmore also is in tension with some of our other preclusion case law. We
    have repeatedly underscored the important role that the availability of appellate
    review plays in ensuring that a determination is sufficiently reliable to be
    conclusive in future litigation. We have, for example:
    • Refused to give preclusive effect to a trial court’s legal ruling on child
    custody issues presented by writ of habeas corpus, acknowledging that, “[s]ince
    an order denying an application for writ of habeas corpus is not appealable,”
    finding preclusion would “wrongfully deprive[]” “the unsuccessful petitioner” “of
    custody until such time as he could allege a change in circumstances” (In re
    Richard M. (1975) 
    14 Cal. 3d 783
    , 790);
    • Held that a finding made in connection with a cause of action should not
    have preclusive effect when the finding was adverse to the party that prevailed on
    that cause of action, in part because the party could not appeal (see Albertson v.
    Raboff (1956) 
    46 Cal. 2d 375
    , 384-385);
    • Embraced a rule that an entity cannot be bound by a judgment as a
    privy, based on alleged control over the underlying litigation, if the entity lacks
    12
    control over whether to take an appeal (see Minton v. Cavaney (1961) 
    56 Cal. 2d 576
    , 581-582);
    • Held that at least a certain type of issue preclusion might not attach to
    the decision of a private arbitrator, in part because “the arbitrator’s errors must be
    accepted without opportunity for review” 
    (Vandenberg, supra
    , 21 Cal.4th at
    p. 832); and
    • Explained that, when evaluating the preclusive effect of an
    administrative determination, “ ‘[t]he opportunity for judicial review of adverse
    rulings’ is an important procedural protection against a potentially erroneous
    determination and is a factor to consider in determining whether collateral
    estoppel [(that is, issue preclusion)] applies. ([Citation]; see also Rest.2d
    Judgments, § 28(1), p. 273 [issue preclusion will not apply if the party to be
    precluded could not, as a matter of law, obtain review].)” (Murray v. Alaska
    Airlines, Inc. (2010) 
    50 Cal. 4th 860
    , 875-876.)2
    The fundamental problem with Skidmore, then, is that it improperly gave
    effect to a trial court determination that evaded appellate review. Our opinion in
    the appeal preceding Skidmore considered only whether there had been a
    misjoinder of causes of action. We nevertheless held in Skidmore that the
    judgment at issue in the first case was “upon the merits,” because of a trial court
    determination that we did not embrace on appeal. (
    Skidmore, supra
    , 27 Cal. at
    p. 293.) More than a century later, and consistent with the modern approach to
    preclusion described above, we now conclude that a ground reached by the trial
    court and properly challenged on appeal, but not embraced by the appellate court’s
    2      Our law’s emphasis on the importance of some form of judicial review is
    not limited to the preclusion context. (See generally Powers v. City of Richmond
    (1995) 
    10 Cal. 4th 85
    [discussing state constitutional right of review].)
    13
    decision, should not affect the judgment’s preclusive effect. This approach aligns
    far better with the recognition that although trial court decisions are often
    thorough, thoughtful, and correct, litigants should be afforded more procedural
    fairness before being bound by all aspects of a trial court’s challenged
    determination.
    Matar contends, however, that Skidmore properly reflects the principle that
    a trial court’s judgment is presumptively correct. (See, e.g., Denham v. Superior
    Court (1970) 
    2 Cal. 3d 557
    , 564.) This argument confuses two concepts. It is true
    that a trial court’s judgment is presumed correct, and so ordinarily will not be set
    aside on appeal absent an affirmative showing of reversible error. (See id.; but
    see, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8) [stipulated reversals].) But that
    principle governs how appellate courts should review trial court determinations; it
    does not speak to the preclusive effect, in future litigation, of a challenged trial
    court determination that evaded appellate review. The distinction is particularly
    clear under California law: Although the presumption of correctness applies while
    direct review is ongoing (see Denham, at p. 564), under California law, an
    unsatisfied trial court judgment has no preclusive effect until the appellate process
    is complete (see, e.g., Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 
    25 Cal. 3d 932
    , 954; Brown v.
    Campbell (1893) 
    100 Cal. 635
    , 646-647).
    Matar also argues that affording preclusive effect to a trial court’s
    alternative (but ultimately unnecessary) determination would reduce litigation,
    thereby promoting judicial economy. We are not so sure. “While the rules of
    preclusion are supported in part by considerations of efficiency, affording the
    possibility of reconsideration is also a matter of efficiency, for it relaxes the
    requirements of procedural meticulousness in the first instance.” (Rest.2d
    
    Judgments, supra
    , Introduction, p. 12.) To hold that an unreviewed alternative
    ground has preclusive effect “would put pressure on appellate courts to review
    14
    alternative grounds as a matter of course . . . .” (
    Zevnik, supra
    , 159 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 85 [discussing issue preclusion].) Thus, “[a]ny benefit that might result from
    precluding” relitigation in future cases — cases “which may or may not arise” —
    “would come at the cost of increasing the burden on the appellate court in the
    initial action.” (Ibid.)
    Nor is it clear that affording preclusive effect to such an alternative ground
    would protect parties from the burdens of litigation, as Matar also argues. If all
    unreversed trial court determinations must be given preclusive effect, then
    nonparties, armed with the issue preclusive effect of the trial court’s unreviewed
    determination, may be encouraged to engage in litigation with the party bound by
    the effectively unappealable determination. (Cf. 
    Vandenberg, supra
    , 21 Cal.4th at
    pp. 831-834.)
    In any event, our judicial system does not exist simply to resolve cases
    quickly, nor to prevent litigation from ever taking place. It is a serious matter
    whether a decision is correct in law and results from a fair process for all sides.
    Affording preclusive effect to a trial court determination that evades appellate
    review might speed up the resolution of controversies, but it would do so at the
    expense of fairness, accuracy, and the integrity of the judicial system. We decline
    to endorse that tradeoff. (Cf. Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 
    24 Cal. 4th 61
    ,
    77 (Johnson) [refusing to give preclusive effect to a judgment based on laches,
    notwithstanding “the public policies of giving certainty to legal proceedings,
    preventing parties from being unfairly subjected to repetitive litigation, and
    preserving judicial resources”].)
    We further observe that Matar’s concerns about repetitive litigation are
    overstated. For one thing, if Matar had sought summary judgment on causation
    grounds when Nahigian did, Matar, too, would have had the benefit of the trial
    court’s decision. Had Samara appealed, the judgment would not have been
    15
    affirmed with respect to Matar simply because Samara’s suit against Nahigian
    was untimely; the Court of Appeal would likely have confronted the merits of the
    trial court’s no-causation ruling. In other words, Matar could have promoted
    judicial economy and protected himself from the burdens of further litigation
    simply by timely filing such a motion. (Cf. Love v. Waltz (1857) 
    7 Cal. 250
    , 252
    [“If defendants had any doubt in regard to the right of plaintiff to sue, and wished
    to be protected from any further liability to Mrs. Love, they should have made her
    a party to the first suit, and then the judgment would have been conclusive upon
    all parties that could have any interest”].)
    More generally, courts are not powerless to prevent a waste of judicial
    resources. Appellate courts can affirm on multiple grounds where appropriate.
    Trial courts can decline to reach issues that are unnecessary for judgment. And
    although, on remand, the trial court in this case should resolve Matar’s motion for
    summary judgment without relying on the supposedly preclusive effect of the
    judgment in favor of Nahigian, the court need not forget or ignore the work it has
    already completed in this litigation. Declining to find preclusion does not require
    that a new judge be assigned and the case start afresh; it means only that a prior
    determination by itself does not necessarily, as a matter of law, bind the future one
    — and that the correctness of that future determination, if appealed, can be
    reviewed on its merits.
    2. Stare decisis does not compel continued adherence to Skidmore
    “[T]he doctrine of stare decisis” is “a fundamental jurisprudential policy
    that prior applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if
    considered anew, might be decided differently by the current justices.” (Moradi-
    Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 
    46 Cal. 3d 287
    , 296.) But the
    policy is just that — a policy — and it admits of exceptions in rare and appropriate
    16
    cases. Factors that have contributed to our reconsideration of precedent include:
    “a . . . tide of critical or contrary authority from other jurisdictions” (Freeman &
    Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co. (1995) 
    11 Cal. 4th 85
    , 100); our precedent’s
    “divergence from the path followed by the Restatements” (Riverisland Cold
    Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Assn. (2013) 
    55 Cal. 4th 1169
    ,
    1179); and our concern that no “satisfactory rationalization has been advanced”
    for the decision at issue (Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 
    19 Cal. 2d 807
    , 812
    [overruling mutuality requirement for issue preclusion]). As discussed, these rare
    factors are present here, as is tension between Skidmore and our other preclusion
    case law.
    Moreover, several of the concerns that can give stare decisis particular
    force are not applicable in this case. When the party urging us to overrule a
    decision could have easily avoided the decision’s effect, for example, we are less
    inclined to disturb our precedent. (See, e.g., Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware,
    Inc. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260, 272 [declining to overrule principle that nonparty class
    member cannot appeal, where other options meant that member would not be
    “discourage[d] . . . from filing a meritorious appeal”]; cf. Kimble v. Marvel
    Entertainment, LLC (2015) __ U.S. __, __ [
    135 S. Ct. 2401
    , 2408] [declining to
    overrule case that contracting “parties can often find ways around”].) Under
    Skidmore, however, a party that has lost in the trial court and has appealed the trial
    court’s rulings can do little to ensure reversal of an adverse but ultimately
    unnecessary trial court determination.
    Nor does Skidmore implicate the reliance concerns that have encouraged
    adherence to precedent in other contexts. We are particularly reluctant to overrule
    precedent when, unlike here, “[d]oubtless many people” have entered into
    transactions in reliance upon that precedent. (Sacramento Bank v. Alcorn (1898)
    
    121 Cal. 379
    , 382.) Although Skidmore might theoretically have induced some
    17
    number of settlements following unsuccessful appeals, it is not the sort of “rule of
    property” that encourages strict adherence to precedent. (Security Pacific
    National Bank v. Wozab (1990) 
    51 Cal. 3d 991
    , 1000.) Perhaps for this reason, no
    party has urged us to depart from “the general rule that a decision of a court of
    supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation,”
    rather than purely prospective. (County of Los Angeles v. Faus (1957) 
    48 Cal. 2d 672
    , 680-681.)
    Under all these circumstances, we conclude that People v. 
    Skidmore, supra
    ,
    
    27 Cal. 287
    should be — and is now — overruled. We caution, however, that we
    take no position on the significance of an independently sufficient alternative
    ground reached by the trial court and not challenged on appeal.
    III. NEITHER CLAIM NOR ISSUE PRECLUSION SUPPORTS
    THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MATAR
    Whether the trial court erred by granting Matar’s motion for summary judgment
    is a question of law we review de novo. (See, e.g., 
    Johnson, supra
    , 24 Cal.4th at
    pp. 67-68.) We hold that it did. The critical point here is that the preclusive effect of
    the judgment in favor of Nahigian should be evaluated as though the trial court had not
    reached the causation issue. (See ante, Part II.C.) That premise implies that the
    causation issue was not “necessarily decided in the first suit,” or even “decided” at all,
    rendering issue preclusion unavailable. (DKN 
    Holdings, supra
    , 61 Cal.4th at p. 825.)
    Moreover, the Court of Appeal concluded, and Matar’s briefing does not dispute, that a
    decision on timeliness grounds is not a decision “on the merits” in the relevant sense.
    Accepting that premise as undisputed (and without deciding its correctness), it follows
    that the ruling in favor of Nahigian was not a “final judgment on the merits,” and that
    claim preclusion is likewise unavailable. (DKN 
    Holdings, supra
    , 61 Cal.4th at p. 824.)
    Thus, neither claim nor issue preclusion can support the summary judgment entered in
    favor of Matar, and the trial court’s ruling to the contrary was erroneous.
    18
    IV. DISPOSITION
    We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal; overrule 
    Skidmore, supra
    ,
    
    27 Cal. 287
    ; and disapprove Bank of America v. McLaughlin etc. 
    Co., supra
    ,
    
    40 Cal. App. 2d 620
    , to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion.3
    CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
    WE CONCUR:
    CHIN, J.
    CORRIGAN, J.
    LIU, J.
    CUÉLLAR, J.
    KRUGER, J.
    HOCH, J.*
    3     We decline to address any other issues raised by the parties. (See Cal.
    Rules of Court, rule 8.516(b)(3).)
    *      Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned
    by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    19
    See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
    Name of Opinion Samara v. Matar
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished Opinion
    Original Appeal
    Original Proceeding
    Review Granted XXX 8 Cal.App.5th 796
    Rehearing Granted
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Opinion No. S240918
    Date Filed: June 25, 2018
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Court: Superior
    County: Los Angeles
    Judge: William D. Stewart
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Counsel:
    Curd, Galindo & Smith, Alexis Galindo and Tracy Labrusciano for Plaintiff and Appellant.
    Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar, Katherine M. Harwood; Tardiff Law Offices and Neil S. Tardiff for
    Defendant and Respondent.
    McGarrigle Kenney & Zampiello, Patrick C. McGarrigle and Michael J. Kenney for Kenneth Barton as
    Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
    Law Offices of Mary A. Lehman and Mary A. Lehman for Stephen H. Bennett, Richard T. Letwak and
    Letwak & Bennett as Amici Curiae.
    Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
    Tracy Labrusciano
    Curd, Galindo & Smith
    301 East Ocean Boulevard, #1700
    Long Beach, CA 90802
    (562) 624-1177
    Neil S. Tardiff
    Tardiff Law Offices
    P.O. Box 1446
    San Luis Obispo, CA 93406
    (805) 544-8100
    Patrick C. McGarrigle
    McGarrigle Kenney & Zampiello
    9600 Topanga Canyon Boulevard, Suite 200
    Chatsworth, CA 91311
    (818) 998-3300
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S240918

Citation Numbers: 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 446, 419 P.3d 924, 5 Cal. 5th 322

Judges: Cantil-Sakauye

Filed Date: 6/25/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/18/2024

Authorities (21)

Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC , 135 S. Ct. 2401 ( 2015 )

Moran Towing & Transportation Co. v. Navigazione Libera ... , 92 F.2d 37 ( 1937 )

Johnson v. City of Loma Linda , 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 316 ( 2000 )

Denham v. Superior Court , 2 Cal. 3d 557 ( 1970 )

Sherol Diruzza, AKA Sherl Janc v. County of Tehama Robert ... , 323 F.3d 1147 ( 2003 )

Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. , 50 Cal. 4th 860 ( 2010 )

Lucido v. Superior Court , 51 Cal. 3d 335 ( 1990 )

Albertson v. Raboff , 46 Cal. 2d 375 ( 1956 )

Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. , 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 432 ( 2002 )

Vandenberg v. Superior Court , 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366 ( 1999 )

Vasil M. Markoff v. New York Life Insurance Company , 530 F.2d 841 ( 1976 )

People v. Carbajal , 10 Cal. 4th 1114 ( 1995 )

Moss v. Superior Court , 17 Cal. 4th 396 ( 1998 )

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore , 99 S. Ct. 645 ( 1979 )

Minton v. Cavaney , 56 Cal. 2d 576 ( 1961 )

County of Los Angeles v. Faus , 48 Cal. 2d 672 ( 1957 )

In Re Richard M. , 14 Cal. 3d 783 ( 1975 )

Security Pacific National Bank v. Wozab , 51 Cal. 3d 991 ( 1990 )

Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Saving ... , 19 Cal. 2d 807 ( 1942 )

Sanderson v. Niemann , 17 Cal. 2d 563 ( 1941 )

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