Sexton v. Beaudreaux , 201 L. Ed. 2d 986 ( 2018 )


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  •                  Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)            1
    Per Curiam
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    MICHAEL SEXTON, WARDEN v.
    NICHOLAS BEAUDREAUX
    ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
    STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    No. 17–1106. Decided June 28, 2018
    PER CURIAM.
    In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
    Ninth Circuit reversed a denial of federal habeas relief, 
    28 U. S. C. §2254
    , on the ground that the state court had
    unreasonably rejected respondent’s claim of ineffective
    assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals’ decision
    ignored well-established principles. It did not consider
    reasonable grounds that could have supported the state
    court’s summary decision, and it analyzed respondent’s
    arguments without any meaningful deference to the state
    court. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted,
    and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
    I
    Respondent Nicholas Beaudreaux shot and killed
    Wayne Drummond during a late-night argument in 2006.
    Dayo Esho and Brandon Crowder were both witnesses to
    the shooting. The next day, Crowder told the police that
    he knew the shooter from middle school, but did not know
    the shooter’s name. Esho described the shooter, but also
    did not know his name. Seventeen months later, Crowder
    was arrested for an unrelated crime. While Crowder was
    in custody, police showed him a middle-school yearbook
    with Beaudreaux’s picture, as well as a photo lineup in-
    cluding Beaudreaux. Crowder identified Beaudreaux as
    the shooter in the Drummond murder.
    Officers interviewed Esho the next day. They first
    spoke with him during his lunch break. They showed him
    2                 SEXTON v. BEAUDREAUX
    Per Curiam
    a display that included a recent picture of Beaudreaux and
    pictures of five other men. Esho tentatively identified
    Beaudreaux as the shooter, saying his picture “was ‘clos-
    est’ to the gunman.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. Later that
    day, one of the officers found another photograph of
    Beaudreaux that was taken “closer to the date” of the
    shooting. Record ER 263. Beaudreaux looked different in
    the two photographs. In the first, “ ‘his face [was] a little
    wider and his head [was] a little higher.’ ” 
    Id.,
     at ER 262.
    Between four and six hours after the first interview, the
    officers returned to show Esho a second six-man photo
    lineup, which contained the older picture of Beaudreaux.
    Beaudreaux’s photo was in a different position in the
    lineup than it had been in the first one. Esho again identi-
    fied Beaudreaux as the shooter, telling the officers that
    the second picture was “ ‘very close.’ ” 
    Id.,
     at ER 263–ER
    264. But he again declined to positively state that
    Beaudreaux was the shooter. Esho was hesitant because
    there were “a few things” he remembered about the shooter
    that would require seeing him in person. 
    Id.,
     at ER
    283–ER 284. At a preliminary hearing, Esho identified
    Beaudreaux as the shooter. At trial, Esho explained that
    it “clicked” when he saw Beaudreaux in person based on
    “the way that he walked.” 
    Id.,
     at ER 285. After seeing
    him in person, Esho was “sure” that Beaudreaux was the
    shooter. 
    Ibid.
     At no time did any investigator or prosecu-
    tor suggest to Esho that Beaudreaux was the one who shot
    Drummond. 
    Ibid.
    Beaudreaux was tried in 2009 for first-degree murder
    and attempted second-degree robbery. Esho and Crowder
    both testified against Beaudreaux and both identified him
    as Drummond’s shooter. The jury found Beaudreaux
    guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of 50
    years to life. Beaudreaux’s conviction was affirmed on
    direct appeal, and his first state habeas petition was
    denied.
    Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)           3
    Per Curiam
    In 2013, Beaudreaux filed a second state habeas peti-
    tion. He claimed, among other things, that his trial attor-
    ney was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress
    Esho’s identification testimony. The California Court of
    Appeal summarily denied the petition, and the California
    Supreme Court denied review. Petitioner then filed a
    federal habeas petition, which the District Court denied.
    A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. The
    panel majority spent most of its opinion conducting a
    de novo analysis of the merits of the would-be suppression
    motion—relying in part on arguments and theories that
    Beaudreaux had not presented to the state court in his
    second state habeas petition. See App. to Pet. for Cert.
    1a–7a; Record ER 153–ER 154. It first determined that
    counsel’s failure to file the suppression motion constituted
    deficient performance. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a. The
    circumstances surrounding Esho’s pretrial identification
    were “unduly suggestive,” according to the Ninth Circuit,
    because only Beaudreaux’s picture was in both photo
    lineups. 
    Id.,
     at 4a. And, relying on Ninth Circuit prece-
    dent, the panel majority found that the preliminary hear-
    ing was unduly suggestive as well. 
    Ibid.
     (quoting Johnson
    v. Sublett, 
    63 F. 3d 926
    , 929 (CA9 1995)). The panel ma-
    jority next concluded that, under the totality of the cir-
    cumstances, Esho’s identification was not reliable enough
    to overcome the suggestiveness of the procedures. App. to
    Pet. for Cert. 5a. The panel majority then determined that
    counsel’s failure to file the suppression motion prejudiced
    Beaudreaux, given the weakness of the State’s case. 
    Id.,
    at 5a–6a. After conducting this de novo analysis of
    Beaudreaux’s ineffectiveness claim, the panel majority
    asserted that the state court’s denial of this claim was not
    just wrong, but objectively unreasonable under §2254(d).
    See id., at 6a–7a. Judge Gould dissented. He argued that
    the state court could have reasonably concluded that
    Beaudreaux had failed to prove prejudice. Id., at 8a.
    4                   SEXTON v. BEAUDREAUX
    Per Curiam
    The State of California petitioned for certiorari.
    II
    Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
    Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal court cannot grant habeas
    relief “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on
    the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudica-
    tion of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was con-
    trary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
    established Federal law, as determined by” this Court,
    or “a decision that was based on an unreasonable determi-
    nation of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
    State court proceeding.” §2254(d). When, as here, there is
    no reasoned state-court decision on the merits, the federal
    court “must determine what arguments or theories . . .
    could have supported the state court’s decision; and then it
    must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could
    disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent
    with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.” Har-
    rington v. Richter, 
    562 U. S. 86
    , 102 (2011). If such dis-
    agreement is possible, then the petitioner’s claim must be
    denied. 
    Ibid.
     We have often emphasized that “this stand-
    ard is difficult to meet” “because it was meant to be.”
    Ibid.; e.g., Burt v. Titlow, 
    571 U. S. 12
    , 20 (2013). The
    Ninth Circuit failed to properly apply this standard.
    A
    To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner
    must demonstrate both deficient performance and preju-
    dice. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U. S. 668
    , 687 (1984).
    The state court’s denial of relief in this case was not an
    unreasonable application of Strickland. A fairminded
    jurist could conclude that counsel’s performance was not
    deficient because counsel reasonably could have deter-
    mined that the motion to suppress would have failed. See
    Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)                    5
    Per Curiam
    Premo v. Moore, 
    562 U. S. 115
    , 124 (2011).1
    This Court has previously described “the approach
    appropriately used to determine whether the Due Process
    Clause requires suppression of an eyewitness identifica-
    tion tainted by police arrangement.” Perry v. New Hamp-
    shire, 
    565 U. S. 228
    , 238 (2012). In particular, the Court
    has said that “due process concerns arise only when law
    enforcement officers use[d] an identification procedure
    that is both suggestive and unnecessary.” 
    Id.,
     at 238–239
    (citing Manson v. Braithwaite, 
    432 U. S. 98
    , 107, 109
    (1977), and Neil v. Biggers, 
    409 U. S. 188
    , 198 (1972);
    emphasis added). To be “ ‘impermissibly suggestive,’ ” the
    procedure must “ ‘give rise to a very substantial likelihood
    of irreparable misidentification.’ ” 
    Id., at 197
     (quoting
    Simmons v. United States, 
    390 U. S. 377
    , 384 (1968)). It is
    not enough that the procedure “may have in some respects
    fallen short of the ideal.” 
    Id.,
     at 385–386. Even when an
    unnecessarily suggestive procedure was used, “suppres-
    sion of the resulting identification is not the inevitable
    consequence.” Perry, 
    565 U. S., at 239
    . Instead, “the Due
    Process Clause requires courts to assess, on a case-by-case
    basis, whether improper police conduct created a ‘substan-
    tial likelihood of misidentification.’ ” 
    Ibid.
     (quoting Big-
    gers, 
    supra, at 201
    ). “[R]eliability [of the eyewitness iden-
    tification] is the linchpin’ of that evaluation.” Perry,
    
    supra, at 239
     (quoting Manson, 
    432 U. S., at 114
    ; altera-
    tions in original). The factors affecting reliability include
    “the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the
    time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the
    accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level
    of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the
    ——————
    1 Judge Gould found that the state court could have reasonably con-
    cluded that Beaudreaux failed to prove prejudice because the weight of
    the evidence against him—even without Esho’s identification—would
    have been sufficient to ensure his conviction. See App. to Pet. for Cert.
    8a. We need not reach that issue.
    6                     SEXTON v. BEAUDREAUX
    Per Curiam
    time between the crime and the confrontation.” 
    Id., at 114
    . This Court has held that pretrial identification pro-
    cedures violated the Due Process Clause only once, in
    Foster v. California, 
    394 U. S. 440
     (1969). There, the
    police used two highly suggestive lineups and “a one-to-
    one confrontation,” which “made it all but inevitable that
    [the witness] would identify [the defendant].” 
    Id., at 443
    .2
    In this case, there is at least one theory that could have
    led a fairminded jurist to conclude that the suppression
    motion would have failed. See Richter, 
    supra, at 102
    .3
    The state court could have reasonably concluded that
    Beaudreaux failed to prove that, “under the ‘totality of the
    circumstances,’ ” the identification was not “reliable.”
    Biggers, 
    supra, at 199
    . Beaudreaux’s claim was facially
    deficient because his state habeas petition failed to even
    address this requirement. See Record ER 153–ER 154.
    And the state court could have reasonably concluded that
    the totality of the circumstances tipped against
    Beaudreaux. True, Esho gave a vague initial description
    of the shooter, see Manson, 
    supra, at 115
     (noting the
    detailed physical description the witness gave “minutes
    after”), and there was a 17-month delay between the
    shooting and the identification, see Biggers, 
    supra, at 201
    (determining that “a lapse of seven months . . . would be a
    seriously negative factor in most cases”). But, as the
    ——————
    2 In the first lineup, the suspect was nearly six inches taller than the
    other two men in the lineup, and was the only one wearing a leather
    jacket like the one the witness described the robber as wearing. Foster,
    
    394 U. S., at 441, 443
    . Police then arranged a “one-to-one confronta-
    tion” in which the witness sat in the same room as the suspect and
    spoke to him. 
    Id., at 441
    . And in the second lineup, the suspect was
    the only one in the five man lineup who had been in the original lineup.
    
    Id.,
     at 441–442.
    3 Because our decision merely applies 
    28 U. S. C. §2254
    (d)(1), it takes
    no position on the underlying merits and does not decide any other
    issue. See Kernan v. Cuero, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (per curiam) (slip
    op., at 7); Marshall v. Rodgers, 
    569 U. S. 58
    , 64 (2013) (per curiam).
    Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)            7
    Per Curiam
    District Court found, Esho had a good opportunity to view
    the shooter, having talked to Beaudreaux immediately
    after the shooting. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 66a. He also
    was paying attention during the crime and even remem-
    bered Beaudreaux’s distinctive walk. See 
    id.,
     at 64a, 66a.
    Esho demonstrated a high overall level of certainty in his
    identification. He chose Beaudreaux’s picture in both
    photo lineups, and he was “sure” about his identification
    once he saw Beaudreaux in person. Record ER 285; App.
    to Pet. for Cert. 63a–64a, 66a. There also was “little pres-
    sure” on Esho to make a particular identification. Man-
    son, supra, at 116. It would not have been “ ‘ “objectively
    unreasonable” ’ ” to weigh the totality of these circum-
    stances against Beaudreaux. White v. Woodall, 
    572 U. S. 415
    , 419 (2014).
    B
    The Ninth Circuit’s opinion was not just wrong. It also
    committed fundamental errors that this Court has repeat-
    edly admonished courts to avoid.
    First, the Ninth Circuit effectively inverted the rule
    established in Richter. Instead of considering the “argu-
    ments or theories [that] could have supported” the state
    court’s summary decision, 562 U. S., at 102, the Ninth
    Circuit considered arguments against the state court’s
    decision that Beaudreaux never even made in his state
    habeas petition.
    Additionally, the Ninth Circuit failed to assess
    Beaudreaux’s ineffectiveness claim with the appropriate
    amount of deference. The Ninth Circuit essentially evalu-
    ated the merits de novo, only tacking on a perfunctory
    statement at the end of its analysis asserting that the
    state court’s decision was unreasonable. But deference to
    the state court should have been near its apex in this case,
    which involves a Strickland claim based on a motion that
    turns on general, fact-driven standards such as sugges-
    8                 SEXTON v. BEAUDREAUX
    Per Curiam
    tiveness and reliability. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis did
    not follow this Court’s repeated holding that, “ ‘[t]he more
    general the rule . . . the more leeway [state] courts have.’ ”
    Renico v. Lett, 
    559 U. S. 766
    , 776 (2010) (brackets in origi-
    nal). Nor did it follow this Court’s precedents stating that,
    “because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a
    state court has even more latitude to reasonably deter-
    mine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.”
    Knowles v. Mirzayance, 
    556 U. S. 111
    , 123 (2009). The
    Ninth Circuit’s essentially de novo analysis disregarded
    this deferential standard.
    *     *    *
    The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent’s
    motion to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The
    judgment of the United States Courts of Appeals for the
    Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    It is so ordered.
    JUSTICE BREYER dissents.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-1106

Citation Numbers: 138 S. Ct. 2555, 201 L. Ed. 2d 986, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 4038

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 6/28/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/7/2020

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