Betty L. Green Living Trust v. Morrill Cty. Bd. of Equal. , 299 Neb. 933 ( 2018 )


Menu:
  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    07/27/2018 09:10 AM CDT
    - 933 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    299 Nebraska R eports
    BETTY L. GREEN LIVING TRUST v. MORRILL CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 933
    Betty L. Green Living Trust and R ichard R. Green
    Living Trust, appellants, v. Morrill County
    Board of Equalization, appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed May 11, 2018.     No. S-17-873.
    1.	 Taxation: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Appellate courts review
    decisions rendered by the Tax Equalization and Review Commission for
    errors appearing on the record.
    2.	 Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors
    appearing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the deci-
    sion conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is
    neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
    3.	 Taxation: Appeal and Error. Questions of law arising during appellate
    review of the Tax Equalization and Review Commission’s decisions are
    reviewed de novo on the record.
    4.	 Administrative Law: Judgments. Whether an agency decision con-
    forms to the law is by definition a question of law.
    5.	 Administrative Law: Judgments: Words and Phrases. Agency action
    is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable if it is taken in disregard of the
    facts or circumstances of the case, without some basis which would lead
    a reasonable and honest person to the same conclusion.
    6.	 Taxation: Valuation: Presumptions: Evidence. A presumption exists
    that a board of equalization has faithfully performed its official duties in
    making an assessment and has acted upon sufficient competent evidence
    to justify its action. That presumption remains until there is competent
    evidence to the contrary presented, and the presumption disappears
    when there is competent evidence adduced on appeal to the contrary.
    From that point forward, the reasonableness of the valuation fixed by
    the board of equalization becomes one of fact based upon all the evi-
    dence presented.
    7.	 Taxation: Valuation: Proof: Appeal and Error. The burden of show-
    ing a valuation to be unreasonable rests upon the taxpayer on appeal
    from the action of the board of equalization.
    - 934 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    299 Nebraska R eports
    BETTY L. GREEN LIVING TRUST v. MORRILL CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 933
    8.	 Taxation: Valuation: Proof. The burden of persuasion imposed on
    a complaining taxpayer is not met by showing a mere difference of
    opinion unless it is established by clear and convincing evidence that
    the valuation placed upon the property when compared with valuations
    placed on other similar property is grossly excessive and is the result of
    a systematic exercise of intentional will or failure of plain duty, and not
    mere errors of judgment.
    9.	 Taxation: Valuation: Witnesses. A resident owner who is familiar with
    his or her property and knows its worth is permitted to testify as to its
    value without further foundation. This principle rests upon the owner’s
    familiarity with the property’s characteristics, its actual and potential
    uses, and the owner’s experience in dealing with it.
    Appeal from the Tax Equalization and Review Commission.
    Affirmed.
    Timothy L. Moll and Anthony M. Aerts, of Rembolt Ludtke,
    L.L.P., for appellants.
    Travis R. Rodak, Morrill County Attorney, for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, and Funke,
    JJ., and Colborn and Samson, District Judges.
    Miller-Lerman, J.
    NATURE OF CASE
    This appeal involves the valuations of certain grassland
    properties owned by the Betty L. Green Living Trust and the
    Richard R. Green Living Trust (the Trusts). The Trusts appeal
    from the July 18, 2017, order of the Tax Equalization and
    Review Commission (TERC) which affirmed the valuations
    which had been established by the Morrill County assessor and
    were approved by the Morrill County Board of Equalization
    (the Board). We affirm TERC’s order.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    Between them, the Trusts own five grassland parcels of
    agricultural and horticultural land located in Morrill County,
    Nebraska, the assessed valuations of which for tax year 2016
    were the subject of protests. In its order, TERC dismissed
    - 935 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    299 Nebraska R eports
    BETTY L. GREEN LIVING TRUST v. MORRILL CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 933
    the case involving a sixth property for lack of jurisdiction.
    The Trusts do not challenge that part of the decision, and
    therefore, we discuss only the five parcels that are at issue in
    this appeal.
    For tax year 2016, the assessor determined the assessed
    valuations of the five properties to be $144,025, $106,260,
    $166,080, $157,410, and $186,470, for a total of $760,245. The
    Trusts protested the assessments to the Board and requested
    assessed valuations of $100,249, $41,824, $132,076, $91,627,
    and $78,966, respectively, for a total of $444,742. The Board
    accepted the assessor’s valuations and denied the protests. The
    Trusts appealed to TERC.
    As they argued to the Board and to TERC, the Trusts assert
    in this appeal that the assessor used a method of valuation that
    was flawed when applied to grassland properties such as the
    properties at issue in this case. TERC noted in its order that
    valuation of agricultural and horticultural land is governed
    by, inter alia, chapter 77, article 13, of the Nebraska Revised
    Statutes and the regulations adopted thereunder by the Property
    Tax Administrator and the Nebraska Department of Revenue’s
    property assessment division (PAD). TERC found Neb. Rev.
    Stat. § 77-1363 (Cum. Supp. 2016) to be relevant to this case.
    Section 77-1363 provides as follows:
    Agricultural land and horticultural land shall be divided
    into classes and subclasses of real property under sec-
    tion 77-103.01, including, but not limited to, irrigated
    cropland, dryland cropland, grassland, wasteland, nurser-
    ies, feedlots, and orchards, so that the categories reflect
    uses appropriate for the valuation of such land accord-
    ing to law. Classes shall be inventoried by subclasses
    of real property based on soil classification standards
    developed by the Natural Resources Conservation Service
    of the United States Department of Agriculture as con-
    verted into land capability groups by the Property Tax
    Administrator. County assessors shall utilize soil surveys
    from the Natural Resources Conservation Service of the
    - 936 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    299 Nebraska R eports
    BETTY L. GREEN LIVING TRUST v. MORRILL CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 933
    United States Department of Agriculture as directed by
    the Property Tax Administrator. Nothing in this section
    shall be construed to limit the classes and subclasses
    of real property that may be used by county assessors
    or [TERC] to achieve more uniform and proportion-
    ate valuations.
    TERC described the law and regulations relevant to valua-
    tion in this case as follows:
    In Nebraska agricultural land and horticultural land
    classes shall be inventoried by subclasses of real property
    based on soil classification standards developed by the
    Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) of the
    United States Department of Agriculture as converted
    into land capability groups (LCG) by the Property Tax
    Administrator. County assessors are required to utilize
    these LCGs as directed by the Property Tax Administrator.
    The Property Tax Administrator and the Nebraska
    Department of Revenue’s [PAD] has adopted and prom­
    ulgated Rules and Regulations to carry out their duties
    pertaining to the classification of agricultural and horti-
    cultural land by LCGs. These rules and regulations state
    that the conversion legend for all LCGs is prepared by the
    PAD according to the dryland capability classification of
    each soil that shows, in a general way, the suitability of
    each soil for most kinds of field crops. This conversion
    legend shows the LCGs for each soil in a county whether
    in grassland, dryland or irrigated cropland.
    PAD’s regulations require county assessors to inven-
    tory and categorize each parcel of agricultural land using
    the following classes: (1) irrigated cropland; (2) dryland
    cropland; (3) grassland; and (4) wasteland. The county
    assessor is then required to use a soil conversion legend
    created by PAD to assign agricultural land to an appropri-
    ate LCG.
    For grassland the LGCs 1G1, 1G, 2G1, 2G, 3G1, 3G,
    4G1, and 4G should generally progress from very high
    - 937 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    299 Nebraska R eports
    BETTY L. GREEN LIVING TRUST v. MORRILL CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 933
    yields of forage to very low yields of forage. In addition
    to the soil conversion legend, the regulations provide
    LCG definitions and guidelines for use by county asses-
    sors for purposes of assessing agricultural and horticul-
    tural land. The regulations also permit county assessors to
    develop additional LCG sub-classifications if needed to
    achieve uniform and proportionate valuation.
    Much of the case that the Trusts presented to TERC was
    based on testimony and exhibits provided by Gerald W. Green,
    who is the trustee of the Trusts. Green testified regarding
    his experience and study in the area of agricultural land
    valuation. Through Green, the Trusts presented evidence to
    TERC which purported to show that the land capability groups
    (LCG) assignments determined by the PAD for grassland soil
    types present in Morrill County, when compared to Natural
    Resources Conservation Service range production ratings, did
    not progress from very high yields of forage to very low yields
    of forage. In other words, the Trusts argued that grassland
    soil types assigned to the 1G1 classification should have the
    highest yields of forage while those assigned to the 4G classi-
    fication should have the lowest yields of forage. The evidence
    presented through Green purported to show that this expecta-
    tion was not the case and that instead, a full range of yields
    of forage was present in each LCG classification and some
    soils classified as 4G had higher yields of forage than some
    soils classified as 1G. Green opined that the LCG assign-
    ments were random, arbitrary, and virtually meaningless and
    that therefore, the LCG’s established by the PAD for grassland
    classifications did not meet the requirements of the applicable
    regulations and did not result in assessments that were uniform
    and proportionate.
    Green proposed an alternate valuation methodology that
    did not use the LCG’s determined by the Property Tax
    Administrator and instead categorized grassland properties by
    the Natural Resources Conservation Service range production
    rating. Valuations would be determined by using comparable
    - 938 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    299 Nebraska R eports
    BETTY L. GREEN LIVING TRUST v. MORRILL CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 933
    sales in Morrill County and nearby counties and making “a
    determination of what buyers are paying for livestock carry-
    ing capacity or in other words, $/AUM (Animal Unit Month).”
    Such “$/AUM” could then be “applied to all grassland parcels
    to come up with a valuation that is based on the current market
    conditions and the individual parcel’s productivity.” The Trusts
    calculated their requested valuations for the subject properties
    by determining a dollar value per animal unit month (AUM)
    based on sales of other grassland properties in Morrill County
    and then applying that dollar value per AUM to AUM’s for
    the subject properties. This process resulted in the requested
    assessed valuations noted above.
    In its order of July 18, 2017, TERC acknowledged the
    Trusts’ evidence and stated that “[t]he LCG assignments for
    each grassland soil type according to the Rules and Regulations
    of the Department of Revenue for grassland in Morrill County
    appear to be flawed when looking at the [Natural Resources
    Conservation Service] production ratings for each soil type
    compared to its assigned LCG.” In its order, TERC neverthe-
    less found that while the Trusts showed potential flaws in the
    LCG assignments for grasslands, they “failed to demonstrate
    that this flaw has resulted in assessed value determinations
    in Morrill County that are incorrect or grossly excessive and
    the result of systematic will or failure of a plain legal duty.”
    In reaching this determination, TERC noted the assessor had
    testified that she valued the Trusts’ properties “in the same
    way that she valued all agricultural and horticultural prop-
    erty in Morrill County, and that this valuation followed the
    requirements of law imposed upon her.” The assessor “looked
    at all sales, not just sales containing only grassland, to deter-
    mine the assessed values for agricultural and horticultural land
    values in all classes, irrigated, dryland and grassland.” With
    respect to the specific properties at issue in this case, the court
    described the assessor’s procedure, relating that “there were
    no sales of properties with the same soil types as those on the
    [Trusts’ properties] so she utilized her training and experience
    - 939 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    299 Nebraska R eports
    BETTY L. GREEN LIVING TRUST v. MORRILL CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 933
    along with the sales information pertaining to similar rough
    rocky ridge areas to determine the assessed values for” the
    Trusts’ properties. The assessor, the court wrote, had noted in
    this regard that sales of such “rough rocky ridge areas in and
    around Morrill County were influenced by factors other than
    productivity alone.”
    As compared to the assessor’s approach, TERC emphasized
    that the valuation methodology urged by the Trusts “focused
    on a single factor, production of forage, as the basis for [the]
    entire analysis, alleging that no other factors apply to grass-
    land values in Morrill County.” TERC noted that the asses-
    sor “testified that she had no market information to indicate
    that a reclassification of grassland soil types from the flawed
    LCG’s . . . was warranted when determining assessed values
    for Morrill County.” TERC noted that although the asses-
    sor acknowledged that production capability was one factor
    to be considered when valuing grassland, the assessor also
    “testified that the sales she utilized indicated that there were
    other factors at work in the market beyond production of
    forage alone,” and that she “determined the assessed values
    for grassland in Morrill County based on all of the evidence
    before her,” which included both the concerns presented by
    the Trusts as well as the legal requirements imposed on her in
    making assessments.
    Taking all this into consideration, TERC found that
    while the [Trusts have] demonstrated that there are flaws
    in the LCGs classified as grassland determined by the
    PAD, the [Trusts have] failed to demonstrate that this
    flaw has resulted in assessed value determinations in
    Morrill County that are incorrect or grossly excessive
    and the result of systematic will or failure of a plain
    legal duty.
    TERC further found that the Trusts did not establish by clear
    and convincing evidence that the valuations placed on their
    properties, when compared to valuations placed on similar
    property, were grossly excessive and the result of ­systematic
    - 940 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    299 Nebraska R eports
    BETTY L. GREEN LIVING TRUST v. MORRILL CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 933
    will or failure of a plain legal duty and not mere error
    of judgment.
    TERC concluded that there was “not competent evidence to
    rebut the presumption that the . . . Board faithfully performed
    its duties and had sufficient competent evidence to make its
    determination.” TERC further concluded that there was “not
    clear and convincing evidence that the . . . Board’s decision
    was arbitrary or unreasonable.” TERC therefore denied the
    Trusts’ appeals and affirmed the valuations determined by
    the Board.
    The Trusts appeal TERC’s order.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    The Trusts claim, restated and renumbered, that TERC
    erred when it (1) improperly applied the standard of review,
    (2) concluded that they failed to rebut the presumption of
    correctness as to the Board’s determinations, and (3) found
    that the Board’s valuations were not arbitrary, capricious, and
    unreasonable.
    STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    [1,2] Appellate courts review decisions rendered by TERC
    for errors appearing on the record. Platte River Crane Trust
    v. Hall Cty. Bd. of Equal., 
    298 Neb. 970
    , 
    906 N.W.2d 646
    (2018). When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on
    the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the decision
    conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and
    is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. 
    Id. [3,4] Questions
    of law arising during appellate review of
    TERC’s decisions are reviewed de novo on the record. County
    of Webster v. Nebraska Tax Equal. & Rev. Comm., 
    296 Neb. 751
    , 
    896 N.W.2d 887
    (2017). Whether an agency decision con-
    forms to the law is by definition a question of law. 
    Id. [5] Agency
    action is arbitrary, capricious, and unreason-
    able if it is taken in disregard of the facts or circumstances of
    the case, without some basis which would lead a reasonable
    and honest person to the same conclusion. County of Douglas
    - 941 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    299 Nebraska R eports
    BETTY L. GREEN LIVING TRUST v. MORRILL CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 933
    v. Nebraska Tax Equal. & Rev. Comm., 
    296 Neb. 501
    , 
    894 N.W.2d 308
    (2017).
    ANALYSIS
    The Trusts generally claim that TERC erred when it affirmed
    the Board’s decision accepting the assessor’s valuations of their
    properties for the 2016 tax year. The Trusts specifically argue
    that TERC misapplied the standard of review, that TERC erred
    when it found that the Trusts did not rebut the presumption of
    correctness of the Board’s decision, and that TERC erred when
    it failed to find the Board’s decision to be arbitrary, capricious,
    and unreasonable. We reject these assignments of error and
    affirm TERC’s order.
    Standards of Review.
    With regard to the standard of review that TERC is to use
    when reviewing decisions of county boards of equalization,
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-5016(9) (Cum. Supp. 2016) provides
    as follows:
    In all appeals, excepting those arising under section
    77-1606, if the appellant presents no evidence to show
    that the order, decision, determination, or action appealed
    from is incorrect, [TERC] shall deny the appeal. If the
    appellant presents any evidence to show that the order,
    decision, determination, or action appealed from is incor-
    rect, such order, decision, determination, or action shall
    be affirmed unless evidence is adduced establishing that
    the order, decision, determination, or action was unrea-
    sonable or arbitrary.
    [6-8] We have held that the language of § 77-5016(9) cre-
    ates a presumption that a board of equalization has faithfully
    performed its official duties in making an assessment and has
    acted upon sufficient competent evidence to justify its action.
    JQH La Vista Conf. Ctr. v. Sarpy Cty. Bd. of Equal., 
    285 Neb. 120
    , 
    825 N.W.2d 447
    (2013). That presumption remains until
    there is competent evidence to the contrary presented, and
    the presumption disappears when there is competent evidence
    - 942 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    299 Nebraska R eports
    BETTY L. GREEN LIVING TRUST v. MORRILL CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 933
    adduced on appeal to the contrary. 
    Id. From that
    point for-
    ward, the reasonableness of the valuation fixed by the board
    of equalization becomes one of fact based upon all the evi-
    dence presented. 
    Id. The burden
    of showing such valuation to
    be unreasonable rests upon the taxpayer on appeal from the
    action of the board. 
    Id. We have
    further stated that the burden
    of persuasion imposed on a complaining taxpayer is not met by
    showing a mere difference of opinion unless it is established
    by clear and convincing evidence that the valuation placed
    upon the property when compared with valuations placed on
    other similar property is grossly excessive and is the result of a
    systematic exercise of intentional will or failure of plain duty,
    and not mere errors of judgment. 
    Id. The burden
    of persuasion
    always remains with the taxpayer. See 
    id. The Trusts
    assert that TERC misapplied the foregoing stan-
    dards in this case. They argue that TERC erred when it found
    the Trusts failed to rebut the presumption of validity afforded
    by § 77-5016(9) to the Board and that it compounded the
    error by applying a presumption in favor of the Board when
    it found that the Board’s valuation of their property was not
    arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
    We believe that although TERC’s order as written lends itself
    to confusion, TERC did not err in its application of the correct
    standards of review. The confusion appears to result from the
    fact that TERC both concluded that there was “not competent
    evidence to rebut the presumption that the . . . Board faithfully
    performed its duties and had sufficient competent evidence to
    make its determination” and also stated that there was “not
    clear and convincing evidence that the . . . Board’s decision
    was arbitrary or unreasonable.” From these and other state-
    ments in the order, the Trusts contend that TERC improperly
    applied a presumption of reasonableness to the Board’s valu-
    ations. We reject the Trusts’ assignment of error claiming that
    TERC applied an incorrect standard of review.
    It is well settled that TERC’s threshold determination should
    be whether the taxpayer presented competent evidence to rebut
    - 943 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    299 Nebraska R eports
    BETTY L. GREEN LIVING TRUST v. MORRILL CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 933
    the presumption in favor of the Board. Brenner v. Banner Cty.
    Bd. of Equal., 
    276 Neb. 275
    , 
    753 N.W.2d 802
    (2008); US
    Ecology v. Boyd Cty. Bd. of Equal., 
    256 Neb. 7
    , 
    588 N.W.2d 575
    (1999). TERC’s determination of that question may often
    be informed by considering whether the taxpayer has presented
    evidence that would call into question whether the valuation
    adopted by the Board is reasonable. That is, evidence tending
    to show that the valuation is questionable can serve toward
    rebutting the presumption that the Board faithfully performed
    its duties. And where a taxpayer overcomes the presumption
    of validity for the county’s valuation, the reasonableness of
    the valuation fixed by the board of equalization becomes a
    question of fact based on all of the evidence presented. JQH
    La Vista Conf. 
    Ctr., supra
    .
    The Evidence.
    With the foregoing explanation in mind, and as we discuss
    below, we read TERC’s order in this case as having concluded
    that the Trusts did not present competent evidence to rebut
    the presumption. See § 77-5016(9). Having concluded that the
    Trusts did not rebut the presumption, TERC did not need to,
    nor did it, make a fact finding regarding the reasonableness
    of the Board’s valuations. A fortiori, TERC did not apply an
    improper presumption relative to a hypothetical reasonable-
    ness determination.
    Reading the order in this manner, we review TERC’s deci-
    sion for errors appearing on the record. Our inquiry is whether
    TERC’s decision conforms to the law, is supported by compe-
    tent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreason-
    able. See Platte River Crane Trust v. Hall Cty. Bd. of Equal.,
    
    298 Neb. 970
    , 
    906 N.W.2d 646
    (2018). As discussed below, we
    conclude under this standard of review that TERC’s decision
    conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and
    is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
    The Trusts rely on JQH La Vista Conf. Ctr. v. Sarpy Cty. Bd.
    of Equal., 
    285 Neb. 120
    , 
    825 N.W.2d 447
    (2013), in support
    - 944 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    299 Nebraska R eports
    BETTY L. GREEN LIVING TRUST v. MORRILL CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 933
    of their argument that TERC erred when it concluded that they
    had failed to rebut the presumptions regarding the Board’s
    determinations. In JQH La Vista Conf. Ctr., we reviewed
    TERC’s decision which had affirmed a board of equalization’s
    valuations. We first determined that “TERC was incorrect
    when it concluded that the presumption of correctness was
    not overcome by competent evidence.” 
    Id. at 126,
    825 N.W.2d
    at 452. Because we determined that the taxpayer in that case
    had rebutted the presumption, we then examined whether the
    taxpayer had shown by clear and convincing evidence that the
    board’s valuation was unreasonable. Because we determined
    that the taxpayer “failed to meet its burden of showing that
    the county’s valuation was unreasonable and arbitrary,” we
    ultimately affirmed TERC’s decision. 
    Id. at 129,
    825 N.W.2d
    at 454.
    In reaching the initial conclusion in JQH La Vista Conf.
    Ctr. that the taxpayer had overcome the presumption of valid-
    ity, we reasoned that the taxpayer had done so by presenting
    the appraisals of a certified appraiser who testified that the
    appraisals were prepared in conformity with uniform standards
    of appraisal practice. We noted that “[t]he appraisals provided
    three alternative valuations of the [subject property], using
    each of the three methods provided for by” Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 77-112 (Reissue 2009). JQH La Vista Conf. 
    Ctr., 285 Neb. at 126
    , 825 N.W.2d at 453.
    We note at this point that under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-201(1)
    (Cum. Supp. 2016), all real property, unless expressly exempt,
    is subject to taxation and is to be valued at its actual value.
    Agricultural and horticultural land is valued for taxation
    purposes at 75 percent of its value, but the starting point
    for determining taxable value is still actual value. Under
    § 77-112, which we cited in JQH La Vista Conf. Ctr., “[a]ctual
    value . . . means the market value of real property in the
    ordinary course of trade.” Section 77-112 provides, “Actual
    value may be determined using professionally accepted mass
    appraisal methods, including, but not limited to, the (1) sales
    - 945 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    299 Nebraska R eports
    BETTY L. GREEN LIVING TRUST v. MORRILL CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 933
    comparison approach using the guidelines in section 77-1371,
    (2) income approach, and (3) cost approach.” Ultimately in
    JQH La Vista Conf. Ctr., we concluded that the taxpayer had
    rebutted the presumption of correctness of the board’s deci-
    sion by presenting appraisals for the subject property, which
    appraisals were performed by a certified appraiser using
    approved methods.
    In contrast to the evidence presented by taxpayers in JQH
    La Vista Conf. Ctr., the Trusts in this case attempted to rebut
    the presumption of validity by presenting valuations of their
    properties that were determined using a method that was
    not shown to be a “professionally accepted mass appraisal
    method[].” See § 77-112. The Trusts did not present evidence
    of alternate valuations calculated using methods of valuation
    that were authorized under the relevant statutes and regula-
    tions, and as we discuss below, the method urged by the Trusts
    was not appropriate. That is, we believe the Trusts’ evidence
    and methodology did not tend to show that the Board and the
    assessor failed to faithfully perform their duties or that they did
    not have sufficient competent evidence to make their determi-
    nation of valuations in accordance with the law and regulations
    that govern the assessment process. The evidence in this case
    indicates instead that the Board and the assessor followed the
    relevant statutes and regulations to arrive at valuations for the
    Trusts’ properties.
    TERC acknowledged that the Trusts’ evidence may have
    indicated a possible flaw in the methodology developed by the
    PAD to classify grassland properties, which methodology the
    assessor was required to employ. The assessor generally testi-
    fied that she used the classifications required by the PAD and
    then valued the properties using a sales comparison approach
    based on such classifications. TERC determined that the evi-
    dence showed that the assessor and the Board followed the
    law imposed on them and valued the properties using a profes-
    sionally accepted mass appraisal method. That is, TERC deter-
    mined that the evidence did not indicate that the Board in this
    - 946 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    299 Nebraska R eports
    BETTY L. GREEN LIVING TRUST v. MORRILL CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 933
    case neither failed to faithfully perform its duties nor made its
    determinations based on incompetent evidence.
    The Trusts’ arguments were directed to flaws in the clas-
    sifications promulgated by the PAD rather than to failures on
    the part of the assessor or the Board in applying the methods
    imposed on them by law. The Trusts argued in part that the
    assessor should have made additional subclassifications based
    on productivity of the soil for grassland purposes. However,
    the assessor generally testified that in applying a sales com-
    parison approach, she compared the subject properties to sales
    of what she determined to be comparable properties based on
    various factors, including but not limited to productivity as
    grassland. In particular, she noted that the subject properties
    were characterized by areas of “rocky, rough ground” and
    that she compared the subject properties to other properties
    with similar rough, rocky features. TERC determined that the
    Trusts did not rebut the presumption of correctness, and in
    comparison, it noted that the Trusts’ alternate methodology
    had focused on a single factor—productivity—rather than
    the multiple factors that the assessor considered in making
    sales comparisons.
    The Trusts generally used sales comparisons to calculate
    a valuation per AUM, which they asserted to be the best
    measure of productivity for grassland purposes. The Trusts
    calculated a valuation per AUM for the comparison proper-
    ties based on AUM for those properties and then calculated
    an alternate valuation for their properties by multiplying that
    “$/AUM” by AUM for their properties. The Trusts did not
    demonstrate or present evidence to show that this method was
    a recognized professionally accepted mass appraisal method in
    addition to those identified in § 77-112. The method appeared
    to be a modified sales comparison approach in which sales
    of other grasslands were considered but were adjusted based
    entirely on the single feature of productivity. As noted above,
    TERC rejected this approach because it focused on a single
    feature, as compared to the assessor’s testimony that she
    - 947 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    299 Nebraska R eports
    BETTY L. GREEN LIVING TRUST v. MORRILL CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 933
    considered various features of the properties to determine
    comparable sales.
    We recognize that the Trusts’ reliance on AUM as a meas­
    ure of productivity for grasslands finds some support in the
    law governing property valuation. Under § 77-112, an income
    approach is specifically noted as an appropriate professionally
    accepted mass appraisal method, and the regulations set forth
    an income approach for valuing grasslands based on AUM
    in appropriate circumstances. See 350 Neb. Admin. Code,
    ch. 11, § 005.03 (rev. 2009). This income approach generally
    requires capitalizing net cash rents, and specifically “in the
    case of grassland use,” net cash rents are to be determined as
    “cash rent per [AUM].” § 005.03A(3). However, in this case,
    the Trusts did not present evidence of cash rent per AUM and
    did not capitalize net cash rent in accordance with the income
    approach as set forth in this regulation. Instead, the Trusts
    used the modified sales comparison approach described above
    in which they adjusted valuations based on the sole factor of
    AUM. Given the law in this area, the valuations that resulted
    from the Trusts’ approach were not competent evidence to
    rebut the presumption that the Board faithfully performed
    its duties and had sufficient competent evidence to make
    its determination.
    [9] In connection with competent evidence, we note that the
    Trusts argue that TERC erred by rejecting Green’s testimony
    which they assert was “competent evidence” to rebut the pre-
    sumption of correctness. Brief for appellants at 17. They rely
    on cases in which we have said that a resident owner who
    is familiar with his or her property and knows its worth is
    permitted to testify as to its value without further foundation
    and that this principle rests upon the owner’s familiarity with
    the property’s characteristics, its actual and potential uses,
    and the owner’s experience in dealing with it. See Brenner
    v. Banner Cty. Bd. of Equal., 
    276 Neb. 275
    , 
    753 N.W.2d 802
    (2008). The Trusts argue that because an owner may so tes-
    tify, Green’s testimony in this case was competent evidence to
    - 948 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    299 Nebraska R eports
    BETTY L. GREEN LIVING TRUST v. MORRILL CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 933
    rebut the presumption in favor of the Board. However, these
    principles relate to admissibility and foundation requirements
    for a resident owner’s testimony regarding the value of his or
    her property. And although this sort of testimony is admissible
    evidence, it does not automatically lead to the conclusion that
    such evidence constitutes competent evidence contrary to the
    presumption. That determination involves considering not only
    whether the taxpayer presented admissible evidence but spe-
    cifically whether the substance of the evidence presented by
    the taxpayer was competent to rebut the presumption that the
    Board faithfully performed its duties and had sufficient compe-
    tent evidence to make its determinations.
    In this case, TERC did not dismiss Green’s testimony out
    of hand. Instead, TERC allowed Green to testify regarding
    the value of the property, but after considering his testimony,
    TERC concluded that it did not serve to rebut the presumption.
    As discussed above, we conclude that TERC did not err when
    it determined that Green’s testimony and other evidence pre-
    sented by the Trusts did not rebut the presumption of validity
    regarding the Board’s determinations.
    CONCLUSION
    We conclude that TERC’s decision—in which it concluded
    that the Trusts did not present competent evidence to rebut the
    presumption that the Board faithfully performed its duties and
    had sufficient competent evidence to make its determinations—
    conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and
    is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. We therefore
    affirm TERC’s order.
    A ffirmed.
    Wright, J., not participating.