Murray Ex Rel. Purnell v. City of Phila. , 901 F.3d 169 ( 2018 )


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  •                                        PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 16-3145
    _____________
    TRACY MURRAY,
    on behalf of The Est. of Albert Purnell, II (Deceased)
    v.
    CITY OF PHILADELPHIA;
    PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT;
    DAVID ERBELE, Police Officer;
    NICHOLAS HALBHERR, Police Officer
    Tracy Murray,
    Appellant
    On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 2-11-cv-06900)
    Hon. C. Darnell Jones, II
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    June 15, 2018
    Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, CHAGARES, FUENTES,
    Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: August 21, 2018)
    Tracy Murray, appellant pro se
    1530 East Maryland Street
    Philadelphia, PA 19138
    Daniel J. Auerbach
    City of Philadelphia Law Department
    1515 Arch Street, 17th Floor
    Philadelphia, PA 19102
    Counsel for Appellees
    Will W. Sachse, Esq.
    Ellen L. Mossman, Esq.
    Dechert LLP
    Cira Centre
    2929 Arch Street
    Philadelphia, PA 19104
    Chase McReynolds
    University of Pennsylvania Law School
    3400 Chestnut Street
    Philadelphia, PA 19104
    (Admitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 46.3)
    Amicus Curiae
    ____________
    OPINION
    ____________
    CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
    2
    Tracy Murray was named the administrator of her son’s
    estate, of which her son’s daughter was the sole beneficiary.
    Murray instituted a civil rights lawsuit on behalf of the estate
    and now appeals an adverse judgment entered after a jury trial
    in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
    Pennsylvania. Although Murray was represented by counsel
    in the District Court, she filed this appeal pro se. We hold that
    a non-attorney who is not a beneficiary of the estate may not
    conduct a case pro se on behalf of the estate. As a result, we
    will dismiss Murray’s appeal.
    I.
    David Erbele and Nicholas Halbherr, Philadelphia
    police officers, shot and killed Albert Purnell, II. Purnell died
    intestate. Purnell’s minor daughter is the sole beneficiary of
    the estate. See 
    20 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2103
    . Murray, Purnell’s
    mother, hired an attorney and obtained letters of administration
    to act on behalf of her son’s estate. Murray filed a lawsuit in
    the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia on behalf of the
    estate alleging excessive force against the City of Philadelphia,
    Erbele, and Halbherr under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     and state law.
    The City removed the case to the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and Murray withdrew
    her state-law claims. The District Court granted summary
    judgment to the City on Murray’s § 1983 claim, but allowed
    her remaining § 1983 claim against Erbele and Halbherr to
    proceed to a jury trial. The officers’ chief defense at trial was
    that they had used deadly force in self-defense. The jury
    returned verdicts in favor of Erbele and Halbherr.
    Murray subsequently filed a pro se notice of appeal.
    This Court ordered the pro bono appointment of amicus curiae
    3
    to address whether Murray may proceed pro se on behalf of
    Purnell’s estate. 1
    II.
    We must decide whether Murray, a non-attorney, may
    litigate an appeal pro se as the non-beneficiary administrator of
    her son’s estate. Under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1654
    , “the parties may
    plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel” in
    the federal courts. Section 1654 thus ensures that a person may
    conduct his or her own case pro se or retain counsel to do so.
    See Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 
    937 F.2d 876
    , 882 (3d
    Cir. 1991) (“The statutory right to proceed pro se reflects a
    respect for the choice of an individual citizen to plead his or
    her own cause.” (quoting Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found.
    of Buffalo, Inc., 
    906 F.2d 59
    , 61 (2d Cir. 1990))).
    Although an individual may represent herself or himself
    pro se, a non-attorney may not represent other parties in federal
    court. See Collingsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 
    161 F.3d 225
    ,
    232 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The rule that a non-lawyer may not
    represent another person in court is a venerable common law
    rule.”), abrogated on other grounds by Winkelman ex rel.
    Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 
    550 U.S. 516
     (2007).
    This principle has been applied by the Supreme Court, this
    1
    We express our gratitude to amicus curiae counsel Ellen
    L. Mossman and Will W. Sachse of Dechert LLP, and Chase
    McReynolds of the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
    and commend them for their high-quality assistance. The
    amicus curiae counsel also addressed whether an estate may be
    granted in forma pauperis status. Because of our holding, we
    need not consider this issue.
    4
    Court, and other courts in various contexts. See, e.g., Rowland
    v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 
    506 U.S. 194
    , 202 (1993) (recognizing
    that corporations must be represented by counsel and that “save
    in a few aberrant cases, the lower courts have uniformly held
    that 
    28 U.S.C. § 1654
     . . . does not allow corporations,
    partnerships or associations to appear in federal court
    otherwise through a licensed attorney” (footnote omitted));
    Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 
    546 F.3d 661
    , 667 (9th Cir. 2008)
    (holding that a non-lawyer could not litigate pro se on behalf
    of an ERISA plan); Osei-Afriyie, 
    937 F.2d at 882
     (“We hold
    that Osei-Afriyie, a non-lawyer appearing pro se, was not
    entitled to play the role of attorney for his children in federal
    court.”); Phillips v. Tobin, 
    548 F.2d 408
    , 411–12 (2d Cir.
    1976) (holding that a non-attorney could not appear pro se to
    conduct a shareholder’s derivative suit).
    We turn to whether a non-attorney, non-beneficiary
    administrator like Murray conducts her “own case” when
    representing an estate in federal court. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1654
    . The
    answer is no. If an estate has one or more beneficiaries besides
    the administrator, then the case is not the administrator’s own
    because the interests of other parties are directly at stake. The
    interests of other parties, such as beneficiaries, 2 may not be
    represented by a non-attorney administrator of an estate.
    Accordingly, we hold that this case is not Murray’s own and
    2
    Other courts have indicated that an estate’s creditors
    may also have interests in that estate. See, e.g., Rodgers v.
    Lancaster Police & Fire Dep’t, 
    819 F.3d 205
    , 211 (5th Cir.
    2016); Jones ex rel. Jones v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 
    401 F.3d 950
    , 952 (8th Cir. 2005); Pridgen v. Andresen, 
    113 F.3d 391
    ,
    393 (2d Cir. 1997).
    5
    that she may not conduct it pro se on behalf of her
    granddaughter, the estate’s sole beneficiary.
    Our holding accords with those of our sister Courts of
    Appeals to consider the question we decide today. 3 Further,
    practical considerations support our holding. Attorneys’
    training, experience, and their “ethical responsibilities and
    obligations” help ensure that a represented party’s interests are
    not squandered. Collinsgru, 
    161 F.3d at 231
    ; see Osei-Afriyie,
    
    937 F.2d at 882
     (holding that a pro se father’s “lack of legal
    experience has nearly cost his children the chance ever to have
    any of their claims heard.”). Only attorneys may be sued for
    legal malpractice; a represented party could not seek recourse
    against a non-attorney for even the most egregious conduct.
    3
    See, e.g., Rodgers, 819 F.3d at 211 (holding that a
    person may represent an estate pro se “if that person is the only
    beneficiary and the estate has no creditors”); Malone v.
    Nielson, 
    474 F.3d 934
    , 937 (7th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“[I]f
    the administrator is not the sole beneficiary of the estate, then
    he or she may not represent the estate in court.”); Jones, 
    401 F.3d at 952
     (“[The administrator] is not the only
    beneficiary/creditor of [the] . . . estate. Thus, as a non-
    attorney, [he] may not engage in the practice of law on behalf
    of others.”); Shepherd v. Wellman, 
    313 F.3d 963
    , 970–71 (6th
    Cir. 2002); Pridgen, 
    113 F.3d at 393
     (“[A]n administratrix . . .
    of an estate may not proceed pro se when the estate has
    beneficiaries or creditors other than the litigant.”); see also
    Reshard v. Britt, 
    839 F.2d 1499
     (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
    (plurality opinion) (per curiam) (affirming by operation of law
    as a result of an equally divided en banc court the district
    court’s ruling that estate representatives could not proceed pro
    se when the estate had other beneficiaries).
    6
    See Collinsgru, 
    161 F.3d at 231
    . Accordingly, our holding
    limiting pro se representation pursuant to § 1654 “serve[s] the
    interests of the represented party as well as the interests of
    adversaries and the court.” Pridgen, 
    113 F.3d at 393
    .
    Our decision is not based on Murray’s particular
    abilities or motivations. Murray is Purnell’s mother and the
    grandmother of the estate’s beneficiary. With that in mind, we
    have no reason to doubt her sincere desire to zealously advance
    the claims she has brought. Nevertheless, the law governing
    representation in federal courts requires us to conclude that as
    a non-attorney and non-beneficiary of the estate, she may not
    represent the estate pro se because this case is not Murray’s
    own within the meaning of § 1654. This Court advised Murray
    on October 27, 2016 and March 29, 2017 that a non-attorney
    could not represent an estate and granted her time to obtain
    counsel on the estate’s behalf. Because it is clear that Murray
    is unable or unwilling to obtain counsel for the estate, dismissal
    is appropriate at this time.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss Murray’s
    appeal on behalf of the estate. Murray’s motions for the
    appointment of counsel and motion for transcript copies at the
    government’s expense are dismissed as moot.
    7