In re Brigitte L. Adams ( 2018 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 16-BG-370
IN RE BRIGITTE L. ADAMS, RESPONDENT.
A Member of the Bar
of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
(Bar Registration No. 426034)
On Report and Recommendation
of the Board on Professional Responsibility
(Board Docket No. 14-BD-031)
(DDN-505-10, et al.)
(Argued February 15, 2017 Decided August 30, 2018)
Brigitte L. Adams, pro se.
Elizabeth A. Herman, Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, with whom Wallace E.
Shipp, Jr., Disciplinary Counsel at the time the brief was filed, and Jennifer P.
Lyman, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, were on the brief, for the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel.
Before GLICKMAN and FISHER, Associate Judges, and WASHINGTON, Senior
Judge. *
PER CURIAM: In 2015, a Hearing Committee (“Committee”) of the Board on
*
Judge Washington was Chief Judge at the time of argument. His status
changed to Senior Judge on March 20, 2017.
2
Professional Responsibility (“Board”) determined that Brigitte L. Adams
(“Respondent”) violated multiple Rules of Professional Conduct when she
neglected the cases of five Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”) clients. The Committee
recommended respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months
and that her reinstatement be conditioned on proof of her fitness to practice law.
The Board agreed with a substantial majority of the Committee’s findings
and conclusions; however, the Board disagreed with the Committee’s
recommended fitness requirement and the findings underlying that
recommendation. The Board, instead, recommended a six-month suspension with
all but ninety days stayed, no fitness requirement, and a probation period with
supervision and therapy. Disciplinary Counsel disagreed with the Board’s
recommendation and noted its objection with this court. Respondent requests that
we adopt the recommendations of the Board.
For the reasons stated below, we agree with the Board that a fitness
requirement is not appropriate in this matter. However, we are not convinced that
the Board’s sanction recommendations are sufficient to protect the integrity of the
Bar. Therefore, we impose a lengthier probation period, with practice monitoring
should respondent resume her practice during the probationary period, and a few
3
additional conditions recommended by the Board and discussed below.
I. Procedural Background
Brigitte L. Adams has been a member of the District of Columbia Bar since
1990. Respondent was brought to the attention of Disciplinary Counsel after she
abandoned the cases of five indigent criminal defendants, whom she was assigned
to represent on appeal under the Criminal Justice Act from 2008 until 2010. In
regard to the five client matters, Disciplinary Counsel filed a Specification of
Charges, which alleged respondent violated numerous rules of conduct: Rules 1.1
(a) and (b) (failing to represent clients competently, and with skill and care); Rules
1.3 (a), (b)(1), and (c) (failing to diligently and zealously represent clients,
intentionally failing to seek clients’ lawful objectives, and failing to act with
reasonable promptness); Rule 1.4 (a) (failing to keep clients reasonably informed
and failing to comply with reasonable requests for information); Rule 1.4 (b)
(failing to explain a matter to permit clients to make informed decisions); Rule
1.16 (d) (failing to protect clients’ interests, in connection with termination of
representation); Rule 3.4 (c) (disobeying the rules of a tribunal); Rule 8.4 (d)
(engaging in conduct that seriously interferes with the administration of justice);
and D.C. Bar R. XI, §§ 2 (b)(3) and 2 (b)(4) (failing to comply with orders of the
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Court and the Board and failing to respond to an inquiry from the Court or the
Board in connection with a disciplinary proceeding). Respondent was also alleged
to have violated Rule 5.5 (a) for practicing law in a jurisdiction where doing so
violates the regulation of the legal profession.
The intricacies of respondent’s alleged misconduct are not at issue.
Respondent, in fact, admitted nearly all of the fifty-two factual allegations in
Disciplinary Counsel’s Specification of Charges and only disputed the alleged
violations of Rules 3.4 (c) and 5.5 (a). Notwithstanding, a summation of her
alleged misconduct is appropriate. 1 Beginning in 2001, respondent was placed on
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ CJA panel of attorneys willing to
accept appointments to represent indigent criminal defendants in appellate matters.
From 2008 to 2010, respondent was appointed to represent five separate criminal
defendants. Respondent, however, in almost every respect failed to communicate
with these five clients, pursue her clients’ interests, file briefs on their behalf, or
respond to Court orders. Instead, respondent filed numerous motions for
extensions of time in which to file briefs but, ultimately, ignored twenty-six
separate Court orders to file briefs. We were forced to vacate her appointment in
the five cases in late 2010 and ordered respondent to turn over her files to
1
Respondent stipulated to the following facts.
5
successor counsel.
At this point, Disciplinary Counsel had become aware of respondent’s
misconduct. It sent various inquiries and orders to respond, all of which went
unanswered. When respondent failed to comply with a court order enforcing
Disciplinary Counsel’s subpoena for her files, the Superior Court held a hearing on
our referral of respondent’s contempt. Respondent failed to appear and a bench
warrant was issued for her arrest. Numerous unsuccessful attempts were made to
serve respondent the warrant. Finally on May 30, 2012, we ordered respondent’s
license temporarily suspended based upon her failure to respond to the Board’s
order.
On August 7, 2012, respondent appeared before a Superior Court judge as
counsel for Eutelsat America Corporation. The court refused to let her proceed in
light of our order of suspension. Shortly thereafter, respondent’s counsel sent
Disciplinary Counsel a letter responding to the allegations of unethical conduct.
From this point on, respondent fully cooperated with Disciplinary Counsel and
stipulated to all the relevant facts. The Superior Court quashed the bench warrant,
and we vacated the order of temporary suspension.
6
On August 27, 2014, the Hearing Committee held an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether respondent violated Rules 3.4 (c) and 5.5 (a) — she had already
stipulated to the remaining violations — and to hear evidence to mitigate her
misconduct. Respondent presented three witnesses and her own testimony of her
emotional and mental condition underlying these events. Specifically, respondent
claimed that she began having difficulties working on her criminal appeals after
she handled a murder appeal, in which her client was convicted of a particularly
egregious murder and expressed no remorse. Working on this case upset
respondent and caused her “to shut down.” She testified that those negative
feelings resurfaced when she began receiving phone calls from one of her CJA
clients, who was also convicted of committing a murder. Respondent “would sit
down with the transcripts and [she] would sit there and not be able to open it.” The
Hearing Committee accepted as credible respondent’s testimony regarding her
murder cases that were difficult for her emotionally and caused her to shut down.
Nevertheless, the Committee recognized that these difficulties did not render
respondent incapable of conducting her civil practice, keeping up with deadlines in
her CJA cases, or filing motions for extension of time to file briefs.2
2
During this entire period, respondent maintained a civil practice until she
became a full-time employee for Eutelsat Americorp.
7
Respondent presented the testimony of Nickie Irish, a senior counselor at the
D.C. Bar Lawyer Assistance Program, who testified regarding respondent’s
rehabilitation efforts. Ms. Irish evaluated respondent over the course of four
meetings and observed that respondent reported anxiety and avoidance behaviors
with her CJA criminal cases. Ms. Irish recommended that respondent seek
psychological treatment for her condition and referred respondent to Dr. Ronald
Kimball. Stefan Lopatkiewicz, respondent’s former supervisor and mentor, also
testified regarding her shut down and failure to open any of her communications
from the court or Disciplinary Counsel. Finally, Dr. Ronald Kimball testified
regarding his psychological evaluation of respondent, her emotional difficulties
associated with her criminal cases, and her ability to successfully practice law in
the future. Dr. Kimball acknowledged that respondent’s judgment was intact, she
was quite capable of working as an attorney, and that her “borderline dependent
personality features” did not rise to the level requiring a clinical diagnosis. Dr.
Kimball concluded that there was no reason why respondent should not continue to
operate as a licensed attorney.
The Hearing Committee concluded that Disciplinary Counsel had met its
burden of proving each of respondent’s alleged violations with the exception of the
D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 2 (b)(4) violation for failing to respond to an inquiry from the
8
Board. The Hearing Committee recommended respondent be suspended for six
months from the practice of law and be subjected to a fitness requirement before
she could be readmitted to the bar. The Committee relied on three of its findings
as support for the imposition of a fitness requirement: (1) respondent’s testimony
that she did not open her mail, receive calls, or review her answering machine
between 2009-12 was incredible and inconsistent with the record; (2) respondent
filed motions to extend the time for filing a brief with no intention of actually filing
the briefs; and (3) respondent acted with “callousness” in destroying client files
rather than transmitting those files to successor counsel.
The Board, however, took exception to the Hearing Committee’s findings
undergirding its recommended fitness requirement concluding that the findings
were unsupported by substantial evidence in the record and were inconsistent with
other evidence. Therefore, the Board rejected the Committee’s recommendation
that a fitness requirement be imposed and instead recommended that ninety days of
respondent’s six-month suspension be stayed during a one-year period of
supervised probation with conditions to ensure that she continue to receive
appropriate psychological treatment. The Board further recommended that
respondent be removed from all panel lists for court-appointed counsel, without
prejudice to her ability to reapply following her suspension and probation.
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Disciplinary Counsel disagrees with the Board’s recommendation and noted its
objection with this court.
II. Disputed Factual Findings
In its Report and Recommendation, the Board determined that the three
findings relied upon by the Committee to impose a fitness requirement amounted
to a general attack on respondent’s credibility. The Board, in reviewing the report
and recommendation of the Committee, determined that the Committee’s findings,
in this regard were too conclusory and were undermined by other evidence in the
record. After a thorough review of the record, and after giving the required
deference to the Board’s ultimate findings, we agree that, under the circumstances
here, a fitness requirement is unwarranted.
First, we “accept the findings of fact made by the Board unless they are
unsupported by substantial evidence of record.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9 (h)(1); see
also In re Temple, 629 A.2d 1203, 1208 (D.C. 1993) (“[T]he Board has the power
to make its own factual findings and forward them to the court [of appeals] with a
recommendation”). The Board, in overruling the findings of the Committee, fully
supported its findings with evidence in the record. First, when contrasted with the
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conclusory findings of the Committee, and despite the Disciplinary Counsel’s
subsequent efforts to reinforce the Committee’s findings, we are persuaded that the
Board’s findings should be accorded the appropriate level of deference. Second,
the contested findings relate to respondent’s “intent” and “state of mind” in filing
requests for extensions of time to file briefs and in destroying client files. While
those findings are probative as to the appropriate level of discipline for
respondent’s prior misconduct, we find them less probative on the question of
whether a fitness requirement is necessary to protect members of the public from
future misconduct.
III. Disciplinary Action
We must impose the discipline recommended by the Board “unless to do so
would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct
or would otherwise be unwarranted.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9 (h)(1). The Board’s
recommended sanction thus “comes to the court with a strong presumption in favor
of its imposition.” In re Hallmark, 831 A.2d 366, 371 (D.C. 2003). “Generally
speaking, if the Board’s recommended sanction falls within a wide range of
acceptable outcomes, it will be adopted and imposed.” Id. (quoting In re Lopes,
770 A.2d 561, 567 (D.C. 2001)). “Although we must give considerable deference
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to the Board’s recommendations in these matters, the responsibility for imposing
sanctions rests with this court in the first instance.” In re Temple, 629 A.2d at
1207. “The discipline we impose should serve not only to maintain the integrity of
the profession and to protect the public and the courts, but also to deter other
attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct.” In re Martin, 67 A.3d 1032, 1053
(D.C. 2013) (quoting In re Scanio, 919 A.2d 1137, 1144 (D.C. 2007)).
A. Length of Suspension
We first address the appropriate length of suspension. Both the Hearing
Committee and the Board recommend a period of suspension of six months. The
distinction is that in lieu of the fitness requirement recommended by the Hearing
Committee, the Board recommended that ninety days of the six-month suspension
be stayed and that respondent be placed on probation subject to supervision and
continued therapy. Therefore, both the Hearing Committee and the Board are
recommending a six-month suspension for respondent’s conduct in this case.
Because the Committee and the Board agree on the length of the suspension, we
give heightened deference to that recommendation. See In re Boykins, 999 A.2d
166, 173 (D.C. 2010); see also D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9 (h)(1).
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After reviewing our prior decisions in similar disciplinary cases, it appears
that the recommended suspension is not outside the permissible range of previous
suspensions for comparable conduct. Therefore, we are satisfied that a suspension
from the practice of law for six months, to begin from the date of the issuance of
this decision, is appropriate.3 See In re Murdter, 131 A.3d 355, 357-58 (D.C.
2016) (imposing a six-month suspension with sixty days stayed in favor of a
probation for one year, where Murdter accepted and then ignored appointment in
five CJA appeals, failed to open his mail, and was convicted of two counts of
criminal contempt); In re Askew, 96 A.3d 52, 59-62 (D.C. 2014) (imposing a six-
month suspension with all but sixty days stayed in favor of probation for one year,
where Askew consciously disregarded one CJA appeal and failed to transfer case
files promptly to successor counsel).
B. Fitness Requirement
That brings us to the central issue we must decide in this appeal: whether to
impose a fitness requirement or instead order other assurances that respondent’s
conditions are met as part of the discipline in this case necessary to protect the
3
As discussed below, a portion of this sentence will be suspended pursuant
to a probationary period with conditions.
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public. In order to justify the imposition of a fitness requirement as a condition of
reinstatement, “the record in the disciplinary proceeding must contain clear and
convincing evidence that casts a serious doubt upon the attorney’s continuing
fitness to practice law.” In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1, 24 (D.C. 2005). Serious doubt is
a real skepticism, not just a lack of certainty. Id. Proof of serious doubt involves
“more than no confidence that a Respondent will not engage in similar conduct in
the future.” In re Guberman, 978 A.2d 200, 213 (D.C. 2009) (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]hile the decision to suspend an attorney for
misconduct turns largely on the determination of historical facts, the decision to
impose a fitness requirement turns on a partly subjective, predictive evaluation of
the attorney’s character and ability.” In re Cater, 887 A.2d at 22.
Here, the Committee found that respondent’s case warranted the imposition
of a fitness requirement because of her callous and egregious disregard for the
cases of five indigent clients. Although she explained her misconduct by stating
that she “shut down” psychologically because of the stress caused by her criminal
law practice, respondent conceded before the Committee that her “shut down” was
not a complete shutdown. She acknowledged being able to carry on a civil practice
throughout the same period and, therefore, the Committee found that she had the
capacity, but failed, to represent her clients faithfully, respond to court orders, and
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take appropriate steps recommended to withdraw from her assigned CJA cases.
The Board rejected the Committee’s recommended sanction because it read
the Hearing Committee’s report as inviting it to impose a fitness requirement based
solely on the egregious nature of the respondent’s conduct, and her callous
disregard of her clients’ interests. The Board rejected this justification because in
cases with equally egregious misconduct, where there is nothing in the record to
give reason to think that misconduct will be repeated, no fitness requirement has
been imposed, even if we cannot say with certainty that the respondent will not
engage in similar misconduct upon a return to practice. See In re Guberman, 978
A.2d at 213; see generally In re Murdter, 131 A.3d 355; In re Askew, 96 A.3d 52.
In rejecting the Committee’s analysis that the respondent’s conduct alone
supports the imposition of a fitness requirement, the Board also relied on
respondent’s extensive efforts to remedy and prevent a recurrence of her mental
“shut down” and consequent misconduct. Specifically, the Board cited to the
evaluation performed by Ms. Irish of the D.C. Bar’s Lawyer Assistance Program
and Dr. Kimball, a psychologist to whom she had been referred and with whom
respondent participated in at least twenty therapy sessions. Dr. Kimball testified
that respondent had made substantial progress in recognizing and addressing the
15
cause for her mental shut down, and that he believed respondent’s “judgment ha[d]
improved and she’s very unlikely to get herself into a situation like this again.”
Based largely on this evidence, the Board concluded that “Disciplinary Counsel
failed by a wide margin to meet its burden of proof to show, by clear and
convincing evidence, that there is a ‘serious doubt’ as to Respondent’s current and
future fitness to practice law.”
Nonetheless, Disciplinary Counsel stands by its arguments that a fitness
requirement is necessary to protect the public and the integrity of the court.
Disciplinary Counsel argues that respondent has not “own[ed] up” to the full scope
of her misconduct, and that a fitness requirement is therefore necessary. As
support for its recommendation, Disciplinary Counsel relies on this court’s
opinions in In re Delate, 579 A.2d 1177 (D.C. 1990), and In re Bradley, 70 A.3d
1189 (D.C. 2013). However, these cases are easily distinguishable from the
present case. In re Delate involved an attorney who failed to present any evidence
or argument to the Hearing Committee or the Board in meaningful explanation of
her misconduct. 579 A.2d at 1180. Likewise, In re Bradley involved an attorney
who disputed the allegations of misconduct against her and, by her own admission,
gave false testimony before a hearing committee. 70 A.3d at 1192-93. While,
Disciplinary Counsel may find respondent’s mitigating evidence less than
16
satisfying, here, unlike in Delate and Bradley, the respondent affirmatively
acknowledged her misconduct and offered an explanation for her failures to meet
our standards of professional conduct. Therefore, its reliance on those prior
decisions of our court to justify a fitness requirement in this case is misplaced.
However, Disciplinary Counsel also posits that the seriousness of
respondent’s misconduct has a predictive value and that the Board failed to
consider all of the aggravating factors present in this case, and weigh them
appropriately against respondent’s rehabilitation evidence. While we agree that the
severity of a lawyer’s misconduct can support the imposition of a fitness
requirement, it is only where the record contains clear and convincing evidence
that casts a serious doubt upon the attorney’s continuing fitness to practice law that
it is appropriate. See In re Cater, 887 A.2d at 24. Here, we are satisfied that
respondent accepted her responsibility for the misconduct, stipulated to almost all
of the charges, and took appropriate steps to ensure, to the degree possible, that
such misconduct would not occur again. We agree with the Board that her
acknowledgement of her wrongdoings, and the remedial measures she embraced to
prevent a re-occurrence of this conduct in the future recommends against assigning
any predictive value to her past misconduct.
17
We acknowledge that there is no bright line test for determining whether and
when an attorney is fit to practice law. In prior cases, we have tried to distinguish
between those circumstances where a fitness requirement is appropriate and where
it is not. See In re Guberman, 978 A.2d at 211. The detailed examination by the
Guberman court need not be repeated here; however, the court in that case
observed that this court historically has imposed a fitness requirement when an
attorney shows a lack of remorse; failed to cooperate or engaged in questionable
conduct during the disciplinary process; engaged in repeated neglect of client
matters; engaged in repeated misconduct of the type for which the attorney was
previously disciplined; or failed to resolve misconduct attributed to her personal
problems and pressures. Conversely, the court observed that we generally do not
impose a fitness requirement when the misconduct involves a response to the
pressure of the moment or unique situations that are unlikely to be repeated. Id.
Here, while respondent’s misconduct was serious, since learning of her
suspension respondent has fully cooperated with the disciplinary process. Remorse
for her misconduct was evident during the disciplinary proceeding and during oral
arguments before this court. She has also taken numerous steps to resolve the
personal problems and pressures that contributed to her misconduct. Finally,
respondent’s decision to transition into a purely civil practice to eliminate the
18
trigger that led to her shut down, reduces the likelihood that a situation like this
will be repeated. For these reasons, this case is distinguishable from others where
we have imposed a fitness requirement.
C. Future Monitoring
Despite our belief that a fitness requirement is not warranted here, we do
agree with Disciplinary Counsel that some sort of monitoring and support should
be required of and given to respondent. Respondent neglected the cases of five
indigent criminal appellants, filed unnecessary requests for extensions of time to
file briefs, failed to file briefs, avoided official correspondence from Disciplinary
Counsel and this court, and destroyed client files. Although respondent has since
sought mental health treatment for her “shut down,” fully cooperated with
Disciplinary Counsel, and accepted responsibility for her actions, we feel that some
manner of assurance must be instituted to ensure that respondent continues to take
steps to address the issues that led to her misconduct.
In the past, we have encouraged the use of a practice monitor in lieu of
imposing a fitness requirement where a fitness requirement was not “the most
practical and effective method of protecting the public and advancing the goals of
19
attorney discipline” and “to help respondents remedy specific practice deficiencies
that were at the root of their disciplinary violations.”4 In re Edwards, 870 A.2d 90,
98-99 (D.C. 2005); see also In re Cater, 887 A.2d at 23 n.27. Compare In re
Vohra, 762 A.2d 544 (D.C. 2000) (ordering practice monitor to supervise
attorney’s professional conduct and other conditions relating to the attorney’s
mental health issues), and In re Pullings, 724 A.2d 600, 603 (D.C. 1999) (ordering
one-year probation with supervision by a practice monitor for failure to properly
represent a client), with In re Boykins, 999 A.2d at 174 (recognizing an attorney’s
misconduct of negligent misappropriation and misleading of Disciplinary Counsel
during its investigation directly weighed against the use of a practice monitor).
Further, the “[f]ailure to cooperate with practice monitoring then exposes the
attorney to revocation of probation and the imposition of any other permissible
disciplinary sanction to the extent stated in the order imposing probation.” In re
Edwards, 870 A.2d at 98 (citing as example In re Larsen, 633 A.2d 797 (D.C.
1993)).
While not appropriate in every case, respondent’s unique mental avoidance
4
“We also may require a respondent to cooperate with a practice monitor
while on suspension as a condition of reinstatement.” In re Edwards, 870 A.2d at
98 (citing D.C. Bar R. XI, § 3 (b) (“authorizing the imposition of ‘any other
reasonable condition’”)).
20
issues, which only manifested in her criminal practice, make a practice monitor
appropriate in lieu of a fitness requirement. By overseeing her current practice, the
monitor can “help assure that respondent not only understands but also fulfills her
ethical obligations.” In re Edwards, 870 A.2d at 99. The monitor shall work with
respondent to ensure that she has systems in place to file court documents in a
timely manner and help avoid unnecessary delays and procrastination. Further, the
practice monitor will be in a position to observe respondent’s emotional response
to the pressures of her legal practice. If respondent fails to follow proper
procedures or otherwise engages in unprofessional conduct, the monitor can sound
an early alarm. This requirement will be in addition to the conditions
recommended by the Board. 5
While we agree with the Board that a probationary period in lieu of a fitness
requirement is appropriate in this case, we believe the gravity of respondent’s
actions as well as the need to protect the public require a longer period of probation
than the Board recommended. Accordingly, all but ninety days of respondent’s
suspension will be stayed in favor of an eighteen-month probation period. See In
5
The Board recommended that respondent (1) continue to engage and
comply with the D.C. Bar Lawyer Assistance Program for monitoring and
treatment, and (2) be removed from all panel lists for court-appointed counsel,
without prejudice to her ability to reapply.
21
re Peek, 565 A.2d 627, 634 (D.C. 1989) (“[W]e cannot conclude that a respondent
attorney will be aggrieved by a long probationary term that affords an obvious
advantage: the continuation or early resumption of a law practice that otherwise
would be suspended”); see also In re Elgin, 918 A.2d 362, 376 (D.C. 2007)
(“[O]ur purpose in conducting disciplinary proceedings and imposing sanctions is
not to punish the attorney; rather, it is to offer the desired protection by assuring
the continued or restored fitness of an attorney to practice law”) (quoting In re
Bettis, 855 A.2d 282, 287 (D.C. 2004)). If respondent decides to resume the
practice of law during her probationary period, a practice monitor will be provided
to her by the Board. The practice monitor shall ensure that respondent has
processes in place to prevent a reoccurrence of the violations that led to this
disciplinary proceeding. Failure to cooperate shall constitute a violation of her
probation that will subject respondent to revocation of probation and the
imposition of a period of suspension of ninety days, with the additional
requirement that she furnish proof of fitness to practice as a condition of her
reinstatement thereafter.
IV. Conclusion
The integrity of the bar is of the utmost importance to this court.
22
Respondent’s actions fell far below the standard set for attorneys, severely
hindered five indigent criminal appeals, and undermined the reputation of our CJA
panel system. That said, we are satisfied that respondent has acknowledged the
severity of her misconduct and that she has taken appropriate steps to prevent its
future occurrence to the degree necessary to discourage the imposition of a fitness
requirement. However, a period of probation is appropriate so that we can monitor
respondent’s efforts to fully remedy the causes of her past transgressions.
Therefore, it is hereby ordered that respondent is suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six months, all but ninety days of which is stayed in
favor of an eighteen-month probation period, with the same probation conditions
recommended by the Board, including that respondent continue to engage and
comply with the D.C. Bar Lawyer Assistance Program for monitoring and
treatment. Further, Respondent is removed from all panel lists for court-appointed
counsel in Superior Court and the Court of Appeals. Respondent’s attention is
drawn to the reinstatement provisions under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16 (c), including the
filing of the affidavit required under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14 (g).
So ordered.