State v. Clemens , 300 Neb. 601 ( 2018 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
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    STATE v. CLEMENS
    Cite as 
    300 Neb. 601
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
    Nathan W. Clemens, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed July 27, 2018.    No. S-17-872.
    1.	 Pleas: Appeal and Error. A trial court is given discretion as to whether
    to accept a guilty plea, and an appellate court will overturn that decision
    only where there is an abuse of discretion.
    2.	 Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists when
    the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly
    depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in mat-
    ters submitted for disposition.
    3.	 Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question
    of law, which an appellate court reviews independently.
    4.	 Pleas. To support a plea of guilty or no contest, the record must establish
    that (1) there is a factual basis for the plea and (2) the defendant knew
    the range of penalties for the crime with which he or she is charged.
    5.	 Pleas: Effectiveness of Counsel. When a court accepts a defendant’s
    plea of guilty or no contest, the defendant is limited to challenging
    whether the plea was understandingly and voluntarily made and whether
    it was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.
    6.	 Pleas. A sufficient factual basis is a requirement for finding that a plea
    was entered into understandingly and voluntarily.
    7.	 Statutes. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary
    meaning.
    8.	 Statutes: Legislature: Intent: Appeal and Error. An appellate court
    will not look beyond a statute to determine the legislative intent when
    the words are plain, direct, or unambiguous.
    9.	 Statutes: Intent: Appeal and Error. When interpreting a statute,
    effect must be given, if possible, to all the several parts of a statute; no
    sentence, clause, or word should be rejected as meaningless or super-
    fluous if it can be avoided. An appellate court must look to the stat-
    ute’s purpose and give to the statute a reasonable construction which
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    STATE v. CLEMENS
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    best achieves that purpose, rather than a construction which would
    defeat it.
    10.	 Convicted Sex Offender: Jurisdiction: States. Under Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) (Reissue 2016), whether one is “required to regis-
    ter as a sex offender” in another jurisdiction is determined under the
    laws of the other jurisdiction rather than under Nebraska law. Section
    29-4003(1)(a)(iv) adds no additional requirement that registration in the
    other jurisdiction must be based on a “conviction” or an offense that
    would have required the person to register in Nebraska if the offense had
    been committed in Nebraska.
    11.	____: ____: ____. A sex offender registrant’s actual registration
    under another jurisdiction’s law is conclusive evidence that the reg-
    istrant was required to register within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) (Reissue 2016).
    Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: John
    A. Colborn, Judge. Affirmed.
    Joseph D. Nigro, Lancaster County Public Defender, Todd
    Molvar, and Sarah L. Burghaus, Senior Certified Law Student,
    for appellant.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Melissa R.
    Vincent for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, and
    Papik, JJ., and H all, District Judge.
    Miller-Lerman, J.
    NATURE OF CASE
    Nathan W. Clemens appeals his plea-based conviction and
    sentence in the district court for Lancaster County for attempted
    violation of Nebraska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA).
    He claims that the district court committed plain error when it
    accepted the factual basis for the plea and sentenced him. We
    affirm Clemens’ conviction and sentence.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    In August 2016, Clemens was taken into custody by a
    Lancaster County sheriff’s deputy following a disturbance
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    in a bar. As a result of conducting a background check on
    Clemens, the deputy determined that Clemens was registered
    as a sex offender in Colorado; that he was still required to
    be registered in Colorado; and that he had last registered in
    Colorado on January 14, 2016, with an Aurora, Colorado,
    address. Further investigation indicated that Clemens had been
    living and working in Nebraska since June 2016, but that he
    had never registered as a sex offender in Nebraska. The State
    charged Clemens with a violation of SORA under Neb. Rev.
    Stat. § 29-4011(1) (Reissue 2016) based on his failure to regis-
    ter within 3 working days after entering Nebraska, as required
    by Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) and 29-4004(1)
    (Reissue 2016).
    As part of a plea agreement, the State amended the charge
    to attempted violation of SORA, and on June 5, 2017, Clemens
    pled guilty to the amended charge. At the plea hearing, the
    State set forth a factual basis which included, inter alia, the
    following: that Clemens “was a registered sex offender in
    Colorado”; that “on February 18th of 1999, [he] was found
    to have committed the offense of sexual assault of a child”
    in Colorado; that “[a]s a result of his conviction, [he] was
    required to register as a sex offender” in Colorado; that a
    law enforcement officer in Colorado confirmed that Clemens
    “was still required to registered as a sex offender, and his last
    registration in Colorado was on January 14th, 2016, when he
    listed his address at that time as being in Aurora, Colorado”;
    that Clemens had posted on social media in June 2016 that he
    was leaving Colorado and “was going to Nebraska for a new
    start”; that his employer provided timecards showing that he
    “had been working in Nebraska since June 20th of 2016”; that
    Clemens had “acknowledge[d] that he knew he was required to
    register as a sex offender, but said he did not know the rules
    in Nebraska”; and that a “review of the Nebraska State Patrol
    Registry and the records of the Lancaster County Sheriff’s
    Office show that . . . Clemens had never registered as a sex
    offender in Nebraska or in Lancaster County.” After the State
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    finished giving its factual basis, the court asked Clemens, “Sir,
    did you commit this offense?” and Clemens replied, “Yes, sir.”
    After further colloquy, the court accepted Clemens’ plea and
    found him guilty of attempted violation of SORA.
    On July 28, 2017, the court sentenced Clemens to imprison-
    ment for 270 days and to postrelease supervision for 9 months.
    On August 15, Clemens filed a notice of appeal. At an appeal
    bond hearing held on August 16, the district court received into
    evidence two exhibits offered by Clemens: an August 4, 2017,
    letter from the Nebraska State Patrol stating that Clemens did
    not need to register under SORA and a copy of the decision of
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in A.W. by and
    through Doe v. State, 
    865 F.3d 1014
    (8th Cir. 2017). Clemens
    stated that he was offering the exhibits “just for the purpose of
    setting the appeal bond.”
    In the August 4, 2017, letter, legal counsel for the Nebraska
    State Patrol advised Clemens that his “registration is being
    terminated due to a decision of the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals
    relating to out-of-state juvenile adjudications.” The Eighth
    Circuit opinion to which the letter referred was A.W. by and
    through 
    Doe, supra
    , filed on July 31, 2017. In that opin-
    ion, the Eighth Circuit interpreted SORA and, in particular
    § 29-4003(1)(a), which provides: “[SORA] applies to any per-
    son who on or after January 1, 1997: . . . (iv) [e]nters the state
    and is required to register as a sex offender under the laws of
    another village, town, city, state, territory, commonwealth, or
    other jurisdiction of the United States.” In its opinion in A.W.
    by and through Doe, based on its interpretation of the term “sex
    offender,” the Eighth Circuit concluded that § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv)
    of SORA did not apply to persons who move to Nebraska from
    another state and were required to register in that other state
    if the registration required in the other state was a result of a
    juvenile adjudication rather than a criminal conviction.
    At the appeal bond hearing, Clemens stated that the letter
    from the Nebraska State Patrol and the Eighth Circuit deci-
    sion were “why [he] filed the appeal” and that they indicated
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    “a mitigating circumstance [such that he should be] released
    on an appeal bond.” Clemens did not ask to withdraw his
    plea, nor did he request any relief other than the setting of an
    appeal bond.
    The State responded that it did not have any objection to the
    court’s setting a bond in this case, but it stated that it had sent
    an email to the court and to Clemens’ counsel “with a deter-
    mination by the Patrol, subsequent to the letter that [Clemens
    had] offered [to the court] that says, oh, wait a minute, we
    didn’t know some other things.” The State continued by say-
    ing that the “issue is not cut and dry, as it would appear from
    just those two exhibits.” The State concluded that it “just
    want[ed] the Court to be aware of that” and repeated that it
    did not object to setting a bond. The court then set a bond
    for Clemens.
    Clemens appeals his conviction and sentence.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    Clemens claims that the district court “committed plain error
    by accepting the factual basis at the plea, and by sentencing
    [him].” Clemens argues that there was no factual basis for
    the district court to accept his plea, because under the Eighth
    Circuit’s interpretation of SORA, he was not required to regis-
    ter in Nebraska and therefore he could not have violated SORA
    by failing to register in Nebraska.
    We note that while Clemens claimed that the court com-
    mitted plain error “by sentencing” him, he does not make a
    separate argument regarding sentencing per se. Instead, his
    argument appears to be that because the court should not have
    accepted his plea, the court should not have sentenced him at
    all. Therefore, our resolution of the sentencing claim is based
    entirely on our resolution of the claim relating to acceptance
    of the plea.
    STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    [1,2] A trial court is given discretion as to whether to accept
    a guilty plea, and an appellate court will overturn that decision
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    only where there is an abuse of discretion. State v. Russell, 
    291 Neb. 33
    , 
    863 N.W.2d 813
    (2015). A judicial abuse of discretion
    exists when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly
    untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right
    and denying just results in matters submitted for disposition.
    State v. Jones, 
    297 Neb. 557
    , 
    900 N.W.2d 757
    (2017).
    [3] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which
    an appellate court reviews independently. See State v. Kennedy,
    
    299 Neb. 362
    , 
    908 N.W.2d 69
    (2018).
    ANALYSIS
    This Court Treats Clemens’ Claim of Plain Error
    as Challenge to Court’s Finding That His Plea
    Was Entered Understandingly and Voluntarily.
    We first address the procedural posture of this case and the
    manner in which Clemens claims error on appeal. Clemens
    asserts on appeal that the district court committed plain error
    when it accepted the factual basis of his plea and sentenced
    him. In particular, he contends that he was not required to reg-
    ister as a sex offender in Nebraska and that therefore, he could
    not have been found guilty of a violation or attempted violation
    of SORA based on a failure to register.
    Clemens phrases his assignment of error as an assertion
    that the court committed “plain error.” He apparently raises
    the issue as plain error because he did not object to the factual
    basis at the plea hearing and he did not move to withdraw his
    plea after he received the letter from the Nebraska State Patrol.
    Thus, Clemens could not assign error based on the court’s
    “overruling” an objection he did not raise or a motion he did
    not make.
    Instead of seeking a ruling directly challenging the neces-
    sity to register, the only point at which Clemens brought to the
    district court’s attention the issue of whether he was required
    to register was in the context of the appeal bond hearing. At
    that hearing, he stated that he was offering evidence regard-
    ing the issue of whether he was required to register “just for
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    the purpose of setting the appeal bond” and, as noted above,
    that the evidence he presented indicated “a mitigating circum-
    stance [such that he should be] released on an appeal bond.”
    Although the State took issue with the import of the evidence
    offered by Clemens, it stated that it did not object to the
    court’s setting a bond for Clemens. The court then set a bond
    for Clemens, and thus, Clemens could not assign error to the
    denial of a bond.
    Regarding the substance of the assertion of plain error in
    this appeal, we note that in State v. Wilkinson, 
    293 Neb. 876
    ,
    
    881 N.W.2d 850
    (2016), we concluded that a defendant did
    not waive a challenge to the factual basis for a plea when he
    entered a plea. We stated that a sufficient factual basis is a
    requirement for finding that a plea is entered into understand-
    ingly and voluntarily. Therefore, on appeal, one of the limited
    challenges a defendant may raise to a plea that was accepted
    by the trial court is the claim that the plea was not understand-
    ingly and voluntarily made. In view of the foregoing, we read
    Clemens’ assertion of plain error in this appeal as a challenge
    to the court’s acceptance of his plea on the limited basis that
    the plea was not understandingly and voluntarily made because
    there was not a sufficient factual basis for the plea.
    Based on Plain Reading of SORA Registration
    Requirements, Clemens Was Required to Register
    Under SORA: The Factual Basis for
    Clemens’ Plea Was Sufficient.
    We note at this point that the parties indicate on appeal, and
    it is reflected in the presentence report prepared after the plea
    was accepted, that Clemens was a juvenile at the time of the
    events leading to his adjudication in Colorado. We accept that
    understanding for the purpose of our analysis.
    Relying on the Nebraska State Patrol’s letter and the Eighth
    Circuit’s interpretation of § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) in A.W. by and
    through Doe v. State, 
    865 F.3d 1014
    (8th Cir. 2017), Clemens
    contends that the factual basis in this case was not sufficient
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    because, inter alia, his Colorado registration from a juvenile
    adjudication and the factual basis recited by the State did
    not include an allegation that he was required to register in
    Colorado based on an actual “conviction.” Brief for appel-
    lant at 5. He contends there was not a sufficient factual basis
    because he was not in fact required to register in Nebraska and
    therefore could not have violated or attempted to violate SORA
    by failing to register. Clemens basically argues that he could
    not have understandingly and voluntarily pled guilty to an
    offense he did not commit. We conclude that there was a suf-
    ficient factual basis to support Clemens’ plea to an attempted
    violation of SORA and that the court did not err when it
    accepted the plea.
    [4-6] To support a plea of guilty or no contest, the record
    must establish that (1) there is a factual basis for the plea and
    (2) the defendant knew the range of penalties for the crime
    with which he or she is charged. State v. 
    Wilkinson, supra
    .
    “When a court accepts a defendant’s plea of guilty or no con-
    test, the defendant is limited to challenging whether the plea
    was understandingly and voluntarily made and whether it was
    the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.” 
    Id. at 881,
    881
    N.W.2d at 855. A sufficient factual basis is a requirement for
    finding that a plea was entered into understandingly and vol-
    untarily. 
    Id. Clemens pled
    guilty to an attempted violation of
    § 29-4011(1), which provides that “[a]ny person required
    to register under [SORA] who violates the act is guilty of a
    Class IIIA felony.” The offense as charged by the State was
    that Clemens violated SORA when he failed to timely register
    as required by §§ 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) and 29-4004(1). Section
    29-4003(1)(a) provides that SORA “applies to any person who
    on or after January 1, 1997,” meets one of the listed criteria,
    including the criterion listed in subsection (1)(a)(iv), referring
    to a person who “[e]nters the state and is required to register
    as a sex offender under the laws of another village, town,
    city, state, territory, commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of
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    the United States.” Section 29-4004(1) provides that “[a]ny
    person subject to [SORA] shall register within three working
    days after becoming subject to the act at a location desig-
    nated by the Nebraska State Patrol for purposes of accepting
    such registration.”
    As noted above, the factual basis provided by the State at
    the plea hearing held on June 5, 2017, included allegations
    to the effect that prior to June 2016, Clemens had lived in
    Colorado; that he moved to Nebraska in June 2016; that at
    the time he moved to Nebraska, he was required to register
    as a sex offender in Colorado; and that he had never regis-
    tered as a sex offender in Nebraska or in Lancaster County.
    The foregoing factual basis would appear to support a con-
    viction under § 29-4011(1) based on the plain language of
    §§ 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) and 29-4004(1).
    Notwithstanding the facts recited by the State, Clemens
    argues that the factual basis was not sufficient, because the
    language in § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) that one is “required to register
    as a sex offender” should be made by reference to Nebraska
    law concerning who is required to register in Nebraska—
    not Colorado law concerning who is required to register in
    Colorado. In this regard, Clemens points out that juveniles
    adjudicated delinquent in Nebraska do not have to register
    under SORA, whereas in Colorado, they are required to do so.
    As a consequence of his interpretation of subsection (1)(a)(iv),
    Clemens maintains that the plea did not satisfy his reading of
    § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv).
    Clemens’ interpretation is based on the Eighth Circuit’s
    decision in A.W. by and through Doe v. State, 
    865 F.3d 1014
    (8th Cir. 2017). As we noted above, that case held that the
    term “sex offender” as used in § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) refers
    only to a person who has been criminally convicted of a sex
    offense, but does not include one who is required to register in
    another state based on a juvenile adjudication which is gener-
    ally not considered a criminal “conviction” under Nebraska
    law. Clemens argues that because he was required to register
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    in Colorado based on a juvenile adjudication but not a criminal
    conviction, he was not a “sex offender” within the meaning of
    § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv).
    In A.W. by and through 
    Doe, supra
    , the Eighth Circuit
    rejected the State’s argument that under § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv),
    the determination of whether one is required to register as
    a sex offender in another jurisdiction is to be determined
    based on that other jurisdiction’s definition of the term “sex
    offender.” The Eighth Circuit reasoned instead that whether one
    is required to register as a sex offender in the other jurisdiction
    depends on whether the registration requirement in that other
    jurisdiction is based on the person’s being a “sex offender” as
    that term is defined by Nebraska law. Because SORA does not
    include a definition of the term “sex offender,” and given its
    approach to subsection (1)(a)(iv), the Eighth Circuit looked to
    ascertain who would be required to register as a “sex offender”
    under Nebraska law. The Eighth Circuit then determined a
    criminal “conviction” is necessary to being considered a “sex
    offender” under Nebraska law, and it reasoned that because a
    juvenile adjudication is not considered a “conviction” under
    Nebraska law, one who is required to register in another state
    because of a juvenile adjudication is not a “sex offender” under
    Nebraska law and therefore not “required to register as a sex
    offender under the laws of another” jurisdiction for purposes of
    § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv).
    [7-9] Resolution of the issue of whether Clemens was
    required to register under SORA requires us to interpret
    § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv), and we therefore review standards relevant
    to statutory interpretation. Statutory language is to be given its
    plain and ordinary meaning. State v. Jasa, 
    297 Neb. 822
    , 
    901 N.W.2d 315
    (2017). An appellate court will not look beyond a
    statute to determine the legislative intent when the words are
    plain, direct, or unambiguous. 
    Id. When interpreting
    a stat-
    ute, effect must be given, if possible, to all the several parts
    of a statute; no sentence, clause, or word should be rejected
    as meaningless or superfluous if it can be avoided. State v.
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    Kennedy, 
    299 Neb. 362
    , 
    908 N.W.2d 69
    (2018). An appellate
    court must look to the statute’s purpose and give to the statute
    a reasonable construction which best achieves that purpose,
    rather than a construction which would defeat it. 
    Id. [10] We
    respectfully disagree with the Eighth Circuit’s inter-
    pretation of § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) and reject Clemens’ argument
    based thereon. We think that the Eighth Circuit’s decision to
    focus on the meaning of “sex offender” under Nebraska law
    and the posited requirement of a “conviction” deviates from a
    plain reading of § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv). To repeat, § 29-4003(1)(a)
    provides that SORA “applies to any person who on or after
    January 1, 1997: . . . (iv) [e]nters the state and is required to
    register as a sex offender under the laws of another village,
    town, city, state, territory, commonwealth, or other jurisdiction
    of the United States.” Our plain reading of the statute leads us
    to conclude that “required to register as a sex offender” is mod-
    ified by “under the laws of another . . . jurisdiction.” Reading
    the section as a whole, whether one is “required to register
    as a sex offender” in another jurisdiction is determined under
    the laws of the other jurisdiction rather than under Nebraska
    law. Section 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) adds no additional requirement
    that registration in the other jurisdiction must be based on a
    “conviction” or an offense that would have required the per-
    son to register in Nebraska if the offense had been committed
    in Nebraska.
    In this regard and in contrast to SORA’s § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv),
    we are aware of other states’ sex offender statutes and note
    that elsewhere there is deliberate language, such as requiring
    registration if the individual was “convicted” in the other state;
    such statutes would be compatible with the Eighth Circuit’s
    approach to § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv). E.g., State v. Frederick, 
    292 Kan. 169
    , 174, 
    251 P.3d 48
    , 51 (2011) (determining person
    required to register in other state based on juvenile adjudica-
    tion not required to register in Kansas, because Kansas statute
    refers to person convicted in other state and under Kansas law,
    “convictions” do not include “adjudications”).
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    Our reading of § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) is bolstered by read-
    ing other provisions of § 29-4003(1)(a) as well as the stat-
    ute as a whole. Section 29-4003(1)(a) describes persons to
    whom SORA applies. Section 29-4003(1)(a)(i)(A) through (N)
    lists the sexual predatory conduct to which SORA applies.
    Subsection 29-4003(1)(a)(ii) in particular requires persons to
    register in Nebraska who have “ever pled guilty to, pled nolo
    contendere to, or been found guilty of any offense that is sub-
    stantially equivalent to a registrable offense under subdivision
    (1)(a)(i) of this section by” another jurisdiction.
    Section 29-4003(1)(a)(ii) uses the language of criminal law
    and essentially requires a person with a “conviction” for a
    sex offense in another jurisdiction to register in Nebraska. By
    imposing a “conviction” requirement onto § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv),
    in A.W. by and through Doe v. State, 
    865 F.3d 1014
    (8th Cir.
    2017), the Eighth Circuit’s reading of subsection (1)(a)(iv)
    tends to make it superfluous to subsection (1)(a)(ii). We rec-
    ognize there is some overlap between subsections (1)(a)(ii)
    and (1)(a)(iv), for example, where one was convicted of an
    offense and required to register in another jurisdiction and
    also would have been required to register in Nebraska if the
    offense had been committed in Nebraska. However, as we read
    § 29-4003(1)(a), each subsection covers some circumstances
    that the other does not. Subsection (1)(a)(ii) covers persons
    convicted of an offense in another state that would have
    required registration in Nebraska, whether or not that person
    is required to register under the laws of the other jurisdiction,
    whereas subsection (1)(a)(iv) covers persons who are required
    to register as a sex offender in another jurisdiction whether
    or not they would otherwise have been required to register in
    Nebraska. Thus, in contrast to the Eighth Circuit’s approach
    to § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv), our reading tends to make subsections
    (1)(a)(ii) and (1)(a)(iv) harmonious.
    We have reviewed the jurisprudence relative to registrable
    offenses and believe our reading of § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) is con-
    sistent with the approaches taken by other states addressing
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    when to require registration of a person coming into the
    state from another state. The literature recognizes differing
    approaches in imposing registration requirements for one
    who moves from another state to the forum state. Wayne A.
    Logan, Horizontal Federalism in an Age of Criminal Justice
    Interconnectedness, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 257 (2005). Alternative
    approaches have been described as being either “internal” or
    “external.” 
    Id. at 261.
    Under an internal approach, the forum
    state “requires that out-of-state convictions, and any punish-
    ment resulting from those convictions, satisfy the eligibility
    requirements of the forum state’s registration . . . law.” 
    Id. Under an
    external approach, the forum state “allows such
    decisions to be based on the legal determinations of the forum
    state’s fellow sovereigns.” 
    Id. Some state
    courts have noted
    that their statutes take both approaches. See Crabtree v. State,
    
    389 S.W.3d 820
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (Alcala, J., dissenting;
    Johnson and Cochran, JJ., join).
    Nebraska’s statute uses both approaches. Section
    29-4003(1)(a)(ii) uses the internal approach. And, although
    the Eighth Circuit applied an internal approach analysis to
    § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv), we believe § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) is an exter-
    nal approach statute. See Com. v. Bell, 83 Mass. App. 82, 
    981 N.E.2d 220
    (2013) (Grainger, J., dissenting in part) (identifying
    § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) as being among statutes from other states
    that require registration in forum state based on registration
    requirement in another state whether or not offense would have
    required registration if committed in forum state).
    We note that in Murphy v. Commonwealth, 
    500 S.W.3d 827
    (Ky. 2016), the Supreme Court of Kentucky considered
    a statute that used an external approach similar to that used
    in § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv). Referring to the Kentucky statute, the
    court in Murphy stated that the law at issue required registra-
    tion in Kentucky for “‘a person . . . required to register under
    . . . the laws of another state . . . 
    .’” 500 S.W.3d at 829
    . The
    court in Murphy concluded that the “plain language of the
    statute” required the defendant, who was required to register
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    in another state based on that other state’s law, to register
    in 
    Kentucky. 500 S.W.3d at 831
    . In so concluding, the court
    rejected an argument—similar to that urged by Clemens—that
    a defendant is not required to register in Kentucky, because his
    registration in the other state arose from a juvenile adjudication
    and Kentucky did not require registration for persons found
    to have committed a sex offense in a juvenile adjudication
    in Kentucky.
    When it rejected the defendant’s argument, the court in
    Murphy reasoned that public policy regarding whether and
    which juveniles should register was to be determined by the
    Kentucky General Assembly rather than the court and that
    “if the General Assembly has required registration of some
    juveniles from other states, then that is the 
    law.” 500 S.W.3d at 832
    . For completeness, we note that after the decision in
    Murphy, the Kentucky General Assembly amended the statute
    to exclude registration based on juvenile adjudications in other
    states. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17.510(6)(b) (LexisNexis
    Cum. Supp. 2017) (providing in part that “[n]o person shall be
    required to register under this subsection for a juvenile adjudi-
    cation if such an adjudication in this Commonwealth would not
    create a duty to register”).
    As we discussed above, the external approach of the plain
    language of § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) requires registration in this
    state when the person was required to register as a sex offender
    in the other jurisdiction. This statute’s registration requirement
    does not explicitly require a “conviction” in the other state, nor
    does it explicitly exclude from registration a juvenile adjudica-
    tion in the other state. If the policy of Nebraska is to exclude
    registration when a person moves to Nebraska with a registra-
    tion requirement in another state based on a juvenile adjudica-
    tion, then our Legislature would need to make that decision
    and amend our statutes. As our statute now reads, we conclude
    § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) requires registration based on a registration
    requirement from another state even if the requirement in the
    other state is based on a juvenile adjudication.
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    [11] In Skaggs v. Nebraska State Patrol, 
    282 Neb. 154
    , 
    804 N.W.2d 611
    (2011), we held that a sex offender registrant’s
    actual registration under another jurisdiction’s law is con-
    clusive evidence that the registrant was required to register
    within the meaning of § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv). Given Skaggs and
    our current holding, there was a sufficient factual basis in
    the instant case to accept the plea, because the basis set forth
    at the plea hearing showed that at the time Clemens entered
    Nebraska, he was required to register and actually was regis-
    tered as a sex offender in Colorado. Under § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv),
    that registration requirement under Colorado law was all that
    was needed to establish that he was required to register in
    Nebraska under SORA. When the facts showed that Clemens
    failed to register in Nebraska within 3 working days as
    required by § 29-4004(1), a factual basis was established to
    find him guilty under § 29-4011(1) of an attempted violation
    of SORA.
    For completeness, we note that there are issues we need not
    and do not address in this opinion. We are aware that there is
    some argument by Clemens that it would violate certain con-
    stitutional rights to require registration in Nebraska based on
    his Colorado juvenile adjudication. In this case, Clemens did
    not raise a constitutional challenge to § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) in
    the district court and therefore did not preserve any such chal-
    lenge for our review on appeal. In this regard, we also note that
    certain constitutional issues were raised in A.W. by and through
    Doe v. State, 
    865 F.3d 1014
    (8th Cir. 2017), but not resolved,
    because of the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of SORA as not
    requiring registration in that case.
    We also are aware that issues were raised in A.W. by and
    through 
    Doe, supra
    , regarding whether it would be appropriate
    for Nebraska to make registration information public when the
    person is required to register in Nebraska based on a juvenile
    adjudication in another state and the person would not have
    been subject to public disclosure in the other state. For pur-
    poses of the present case, our decision is limited to whether
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    there was a factual basis to support Clemens’ plea to attempted
    violation of SORA. We determined that Clemens was required
    to register under SORA; however, whether the State may
    make certain information public after a person has registered
    is a separate issue from whether the person is required to
    register, and the public disclosure question is not at issue in
    this case. Similarly, issues regarding the length of time one
    may be required to register in Nebraska based on a registra-
    tion requirement from another state are outside the scope of
    this decision.
    CONCLUSION
    We read SORA’s § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) to require registra-
    tion in Nebraska where an individual is required to regis-
    ter in another village, town, city, state, territory, common-
    wealth, or other jurisdiction of the United States, regardless
    of whether the registration in the other jurisdiction is based
    on a juvenile adjudication. Based on our interpretation of
    § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv), we determine that there was a sufficient
    factual basis for Clemens’ plea to attempted violation of
    SORA, and we reject his claim that the plea was not made
    understandingly and voluntarily. We therefore find no error in
    the district court’s acceptance of Clemens’ plea or the sentence
    imposed upon him. Accordingly, we affirm Clemens’ convic-
    tion and sentence.
    A ffirmed.