State of Iowa v. Owen F. Benson ( 2018 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 17–0650
Filed October 19, 2018
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
OWEN F. BENSON,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Jeffrey L.
Poulson, Judge.
The defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision
that affirmed his convictions for assault causing bodily injury and child
endangerment. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Priscilla E. Forsyth, Sioux City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant
Attorney General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and Kristine
Timmins and Joshua Widman, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
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CHRISTENSEN, Justice.
In this appeal, Owen Benson contends he did not cross the line from
lawful corporal punishment to criminal conduct. Benson maintains there
was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for both assault
causing bodily injury and child endangerment because the State did not
prove his actions exceeded the scope of legal corporal punishment.
Similarly, he contends the district court abused its discretion in denying
his motion for a new trial because the verdict was contrary to the weight
of the evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude the evidence
was sufficient to support Benson’s convictions, and the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial.
Benson also claims that the jury instructions (1) misled the jury
because the district court failed to provide a marshaling instruction
explaining which form of intent applied to which charge, and (2) did not
adequately describe specific intent. For the reasons set forth below, we
conclude the jury instructions were prejudicially erroneous, and we
reverse Benson’s convictions and sentence and remand for new trial.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On March 6, 2016, Owen Benson was watching B.B., G.B., and
Z.B.—three of his fiancé’s children—until their father arrived to take them
to his home as part of an arranged custody agreement. The children were
approximately eleven, ten, and eight years old at the time. Benson joined
the children on the porch carrying the wooden handle from a toy
broomstick, upset about alleged damage the children caused to some
furniture. Benson subsequently hit B.B. and G.B. twice each on the
buttocks with the broom handle. Next, Benson hit Z.B. twice on the back
of his upper legs with the broom handle. The children’s father arrived soon
after to take them to his home.
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The next morning, the children’s father noticed bruises on the back
of Z.B.’s legs. G.B. and B.B. did not have bruises. The father
photographed the bruises and reported them to a school counselor. The
school counselor reported the bruises to the Iowa Department of Human
Services (DHS), and a child protective investigation commenced.
Ruth Stewart, the DHS investigator, conducted a home visit at
Benson’s home, where Benson admitted hitting Z.B. but declined to
answer her questions fully. When Stewart met with Z.B., she observed
bruises on the back of his legs that were “[a]pproximately three inches
long, maybe an inch or more in width, and the one specifically on his right
leg had a dark redness around it” similar to an outline. After observing
Z.B.’s bruises and speaking with Benson and his fiancé’s children, Stewart
contacted law enforcement and referred Z.B. to the Child Advocacy Center
at Mercy Medical Center in Sioux City for a forensic interview.
The forensic interview with Dr. Michael Jung from the Child
Advocacy Center revealed that Z.B.’s bruising was a “high-impact
acceleration/deceleration injury” resulting from an object. Dr. Jung noted
that the injury “wasn’t from sitting on something [and] it required
significant velocity or speed to injure the tissue in that manner.” Further,
he explained,
The central sparing, where there’s no bruising in the inner
part of the injury, is less injured than the surrounding tissue,
and that occurs when tissue is injured in a high-impact,
accelerating type of injury that actually shears the tissue on
the edge of the object, and it requires a fairly high velocity or
impact to do that.
Following the investigation, the State charged Benson with assault
causing bodily injury in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1(2)(a) and
708.2(2) (2016), a serious misdemeanor, and child endangerment in
violation of Iowa Code sections 726.6(1)(a) and 726.6(7), an aggravated
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misdemeanor, for hitting Z.B. The State did not charge Benson for hitting
B.B. or G.B. A jury convicted Benson of assault causing bodily injury and
child endangerment. Benson filed a motion for a new trial, arguing the
verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, and the district court
denied this motion at Benson’s sentencing hearing.
Benson appealed his convictions, presenting multiple claims on
appeal. First, he claimed there was insufficient evidence to support his
convictions since the evidence showed his actions were within the bounds
of legal corporal punishment. Second, he alleged the district court abused
its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial because the verdicts
were contrary to the weight of the evidence. Third, Benson argued the
district court erred by instructing the jury on both general and specific
intent without providing a marshaling instruction explaining which form
of intent applied to which charge. Finally, he asserted the jury
instructions did not adequately describe specific intent.
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court. It
concluded there was sufficient evidence to support Benson’s convictions,
especially given Benson’s testimony that he intended for the punishment
to “sting.” The court of appeals also determined the jury instructions were
not confusing or misleading since the marshaling instruction “clearly
stated the specified purpose in mind.” Benson sought further review,
which we granted.
II. Standard of Review.
We review claims of insufficient evidence for correction of errors at
law, “and we will uphold a verdict if substantial evidence supports it.”
State v. Ramirez, 895 N.W.2d 884, 890 (Iowa 2017). Substantial evidence
supports a verdict “if, ‘when viewed in the light most favorable to the State,
it can convince a rational jury that the defendant is guilty beyond a
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reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d 554, 563 (Iowa 2018)
(quoting State v. Reed, 875 N.W.2d 693, 705 (Iowa 2016)). Moreover, “[w]e
generally review rulings on motions for new trial asserting a verdict is
contrary to the weight of the evidence for an abuse of discretion.” Id. at
563–64 (quoting State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016)). An abuse
of discretion occurs when the district court “exercises its discretion on
grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable” in such a
manner that the district court’s decision “is not supported by substantial
evidence or . . . is based on an erroneous application of the law.” Id. at
564 (quoting State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Iowa 2016)).
“[W]e review challenges to jury instructions for correction of errors
at law.” Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 707 (Iowa 2016)
(quoting Anderson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 2005)). Erroneous
jury instructions warrant “reversal when prejudice results.” State v.
Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 138 (Iowa 2018). Prejudice results when jury
instructions mislead the jury or materially misstate the law. Id. We also
“review refusals to give a requested jury instruction for correction of errors
at law.” Alcala, 880 N.W.2d at 707. In doing so, we consider the jury
instructions as a whole rather than in isolation to determine whether they
correctly state the law. State v. Harrison, 914 N.W.2d 178, 188 (Iowa
2018).
III. Analysis.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Benson proclaims we should
reverse his convictions because there was insufficient evidence, and he
contends the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion
for a new trial since the verdicts were contrary to the weight of the
evidence. To convict Benson of assault causing bodily injury, the State
had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Benson committed an act
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“intended to cause pain or injury to, or which [was] intended to result in
physical contact which [was] insulting or offensive to [Z.B.], coupled with
the apparent ability to execute the act,” Iowa Code § 708.1(2)(a), and the
act caused “bodily injury” to Z.B., id. § 708.2(2). Moreover, to convict
Benson of child endangerment, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Benson was a “person having custody or control over a child”
who “[k]nowingly act[ed] in a manner that create[d] a substantial risk to
[the] child or minor’s physical, mental or emotional health or safety.” Id.
§ 726.6(1)(a).
Benson contends the State failed to demonstrate that his conduct
constituted an act intended to cause pain or injury or to result in offensive
physical conduct to support his conviction of assault causing bodily
injury. Likewise, he argues the State failed to demonstrate that his
conduct created a substantial risk to Z.B.’s health and safety to support
his conviction of child endangerment. Rather, Benson proclaims the
evidence only demonstrates that his actions constituted “legal corporal
punishment as allowed by Iowa law.”
“[P]arents have a right to inflict corporal punishment on their child,
but that right is restricted by moderation and reasonableness.” State v.
Arnold, 543 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Iowa 1996). When a parent’s conduct
surpasses “the line of reasonable correction, his or her conduct becomes
criminal.” Id. “The proper test is whether, under the particular
circumstances, the amount of force used or the means employed by the
parent rendered such punishment abusive rather than corrective in
character.” Id. This determination “varies with the age, physical
condition, and other characteristics of a child as well as with the gravity
of the child’s misconduct.” Id.
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Viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the State,” the
record contains substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict that
Benson is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of assault causing bodily
injury and child endangerment. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d at 563 (quoting
Ramirez, 895 N.W.2d at 890). Benson testified that he used the
broomstick handle because the children had previously “laughed and said
that didn’t hurt” when he spanked them with an open hand.
Consequently, he did more research into spanking and discovered
guidance from an online article that declared “you should use an object to
make [a spanking] sting.” Benson testified that he “implemented” that
guidance when he hit Z.B. with the broom handle, and a reasonable jury
could conclude from this testimony that Benson intended to cause pain,
injury, or offensive contact as well as a substantial risk to Z.B.’s health
and safety.
Further, there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s
conclusion that Benson’s use of force on Z.B. was “abusive rather than
corrective in character.” Arnold, 543 N.W.2d at 603. Z.B. was wearing
jean pants when Benson hit him with the broomstick, yet Z.B. had bruises
that were still visible four days after the incident. See id. at 603 (holding
there was sufficient evidence to support a child endangerment conviction
when the child’s bruises “were clearly visible three days after the
incident”). The bruises were “[a]pproximately three inches long, maybe an
inch or more in width, and the one specifically on his right leg had a dark
redness around it.” As Dr. Jung explained at trial, Z.B. sustained a “high-
impact acceleration/deceleration injury” that “required significant velocity
or speed to injure the tissue in that manner.” Though Benson contends
he did not spank Z.B. with the intent to injure him because his conduct
was only to discipline Z.B. for allegedly damaging furniture, “the jury [is]
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free to reject certain evidence, and credit other evidence.” Reed, 875
N.W.2d at 705 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Thomas, 847 N.W.2d
438, 442 (Iowa 2014)). Based on the evidence that Benson used the broom
handle because he wanted the use of force to “sting” and the severity of
the bruises, the State presented substantial evidence to “convince a
rational jury that defendant [was] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Wickes, 910 N.W.2d at 563 (quoting Ramirez, 895 N.W.2d at 890).
Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Benson’s motion for a new trial because the verdicts were not
contrary to the weight of the evidence. “A verdict is contrary to the weight
of the evidence only when ‘a greater amount of credible evidence supports
one side of an issue or cause than the other.’ ” Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 706
(quoting State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 135 (Iowa 2006)). “[A]
district court should only grant a motion for new trial ‘in the extraordinary
case in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict
rendered.’ ” Wickes, 910 N.W.2d at 570 (quoting Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 706).
This is not the rare case in which the verdicts run contrary to the
weight of the evidence. As we have already noted, there was substantial
evidence to support the jury’s finding that Benson was guilty of assault
causing bodily injury and child endangerment. This is true even without
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Thus,
the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Benson’s motion
for a new trial.
B. Jury Instructions Regarding Intent. Benson argues the jury
instructions did not properly inform the jury which form of intent to apply
to which charges, nor did they adequately convey the definition of “specific
intent.” The district court included the following marshaling instructions:
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INSTRUCTION NO. 14
To commit a crime, a person must intend to do an act
which is against the law. While it is not necessary that a
person knows that act is against the law, it is necessary that
the person was aware he or she was doing the act and he or
she did it voluntarily, not by mistake or accident. You may,
but are not required to, conclude a person intends the natural
results of his or her acts.
INSTRUCTION NO. 15
“Specific intent” means not only being aware of doing an
act and doing it voluntarily, but in addition, doing it with a
specific purpose in mind.
Because determining the defendant’s specific intent
requires you to decide what the defendant was thinking when
an act was done, it is seldom capable of direct proof.
Therefore, you should consider the facts and circumstances
surrounding the act to determine the defendant’s specific
intent. You may, but are not required to, conclude a person
intends the natural results of his or her acts.
INSTRUCTION NO. 16
The State must prove all of the following elements of
Assault Causing Bodily Injury:
1. On or about the 6th day of March, 2016, Owen Benson did
an act which was intended to cause pain or injury to [Z.B.] or
which was intended to result in physical contact which was
insulting or offensive to [Z.B.].
2. Owen Benson had the apparent ability to do the act.
3. Owen Benson’s act caused bodily injury to [Z.B.] as defined
in Instruction No. 19.
....
INSTRUCTION NO. 20
The State must prove all of the following elements of Child
Endangerment:
1. On or about the 6th day of March, 2016, Owen Benson was
a person having custody or control of [Z.B.]
2. [Z.B.] was under the age of fourteen years.
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3. Owen Benson acted with knowledge that he was creating a
substantial risk to [Z.B.’s] physical, mental, or emotional
health or safety.
....
Benson objected to the general-intent instruction, claiming it was
unnecessary since assault is a specific-intent crime. Benson also objected
to the instruction on specific intent and requested the court add language
informing the jury that “[s]pecific intent is present when from the
circumstances the offender must have subjectively desired the prohibited
result.” Bacon ex rel. Bacon v. Bacon, 567 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Iowa 1997)
(quoting State v. Redmon, 244 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Iowa 1976)). The district
court overruled Benson’s objections and refused to submit Benson’s
requested jury instruction. On appeal, Benson contends the inclusion of
instructions on both general intent and specific intent without a
marshaling instruction explaining which intent applied to which charge
misled the jury. He also challenges the district court’s refusal to include
his requested language in the instruction on specific intent, reasoning his
proposed language would have “more appropriately instruct[ed] the jury
as to the elements of the case.”
In order to determine whether the jury instructions misled the jury
or materially misstated the law, we must first examine the form of intent
required for both assault causing bodily injury and child endangerment.
Notably, we have never analyzed whether child endangerment requires
specific or general intent, though the district court appears to have
instructed the jury that it is a general-intent crime by stating that the State
had to prove Benson “acted with knowledge.” Specific intent exists “when
from the circumstances the offender . . . subjectively desired the prohibited
result,” whereas general intent is present “when from the circumstances
the prohibited result may reasonably be expected to follow from the
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offender’s voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective desire to have
accomplished such result.” State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Iowa
2010) (quoting Redmon, 244 N.W.2d at 797). This distinction parallels the
federal distinction between specific and general intent, as the United
States Supreme Court has declared, “ ‘[P]urpose’ corresponds loosely with
the common-law concept of specific intent, while ‘knowledge’ corresponds
loosely with the concept of general intent.” United States v. Bailey, 444
U.S. 394, 405, 100 S. Ct. 624, 632 (1980). Since Benson was charged with
child endangerment under Iowa Code section 726.6(1)(a), which requires
a person to act “knowingly,” the district court was correct to instruct the
jury that child endangerment is a general-intent crime. See Iowa Code
§ 726.6(1)(a).
In contrast, assault “includes a specific intent component.”
Fountain, 786 N.W.2d at 265. “Although in the past we have defined the
assault alternative in section 708.1(2) as a general intent crime,” we
overruled those cases and declared it a specific-intent crime in State v.
Heard, 636 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Iowa 2001). We based our holding in Heard
on the language of section 708.1(2), which requires intent to cause pain,
injury, offensive contact, or fear of injurious and immediate physical
contact. Id. at 231–32; see also Iowa Code § 708.1(2)(a)–(b).
Following Heard, the legislature amended the language of section
708.1, adding, “An assault as defined in this section is a general intent
crime.” State v. Bedard, 668 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Iowa
Code § 708.1(1) (2003)). However, we noted in Bedard that “this
amendment did not alter the substantive content of the statute as it
pertains to the element of the crime,” and the language regarding intent in
the statute remained an element of the offense. Id. at 601. We have
continued to focus “on the elements of the crime,” proclaiming in Fountain
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that assault “includes a specific intent component” because the elements
“include an act that is done to achieve the additional consequence of
causing the victim pain, injury[,] or offensive contact.” 786 N.W.2d at 265.
Thus, regardless of the legislature’s designation, assault substantively is
a specific-intent crime under section 708.1 based upon the language in
the statute. Id.
The issue in this case is whether the jury instructions “convey[ed]
the applicable law in such a way that the jury ha[d] a clear understanding
of the issues” before it. Rivera v. Woodward Res. Ctr., 865 N.W.2d 887,
892 (Iowa 2015) (quoting Thompson v. City of Des Moines, 564 N.W.2d 839,
846 (Iowa 1997)). That was not the case here. Based on our review of the
jury instructions as a whole, the district court’s failure to provide a
marshaling instruction explaining which form of intent applied to which
charge rendered the instructions confusing and misleading.
For example, the court of appeals concluded that the language of
Instruction No. 15 and Instruction No.16 clearly conveyed to the jury that
assault causing bodily injury required specific intent. In part, Instruction
No. 15 defined “specific intent” as an act done “with a specific purpose in
mind,” and Instruction No.16 proclaimed the State had to show Benson
did an act “intended to cause pain or injury to [Z.B.]” or “intended to result
in physical contact which was insulting or offensive to [Z.B.]” in order to
convict Benson of assault causing bodily injury. (Emphasis added.)
However, the court of appeals overlooked the impact of Instruction No. 14,
which instructed the jury that “[t]o commit a crime, a person must intend
to do an act which is against the law . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The
similarities between “intend[ing] to cause pain or injury to [Z.B.] [or]
intend[ing] to result in physical contact” and “intend[ing] to do an act”
create confusion about the form of intent applicable to assault causing
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bodily injury. This confusion could have been resolved with a marshaling
instruction explaining which form of intent applied to which charge, such
as:
INSTRUCTION NO. 15
[Concerning Instruction 16 only,] “specific intent” means
not only being aware of doing an act and doing it voluntarily,
but in addition, doing it with a specific purpose in mind . . . .
Moreover, the record contains instances in which statements made
to the jury during Benson’s trial may have created further confusion for
the jury as to the requisite intent for each charge. In its closing, the State
began to walk the jury through the elements of assault causing bodily
injury, noting,
[T]he State will have to prove that on or about the 6th day of
March, the defendant did an act which was intended to cause
pain or injury, the defendant had the apparent ability to do
the act, and that the defendant caused bodily injury to [Z.B.].
The State continued to discuss the elements of assault causing bodily
injury, explaining bodily injury then discussing intent. The State
explained,
[A]nd so going back to our main marshaling instruction,
looking at the elements we have to consider, the bodily injury
element is proven. So that leaves us with the question of did
the act—was the act intended to cause pain or injury?
You’re going to be instructed on intent in this case.
You’re going to be given the general criminal intent definition.
And the things you focus on there, basically was the defendant
aware that he was doing an act and did he do it voluntarily?
The Court is also going to instruct you on the specific
intent instruction under Iowa law. And that is not only
knowing that the defendant was aware he was doing an act,
he did it voluntarily, the State also has to show that the
defendant did the act with a specific purpose in mind.
By discussing both general and specific intent in its discussion on
the elements of assault causing bodily injury, the State may have blurred
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the jury’s understanding of the requisite form of intent for assault causing
bodily injury.
Similarly, the State argued on rebuttal,
The State’s argument is that the defendant consciously
was aware of his actions on March 6th and that those actions
constituted Assault Causing Bodily Injury and Child
Endangerment.
He acted with a specific purpose in mind when he picked
the stick up and struck [Z.B.] on the buttocks two times . . . .
(Emphasis added.) While the State argued Benson’s actions constituted
assault causing bodily injury—a specific-intent crime—if Benson
“consciously was aware of his actions,” the jury instruction on general
intent informed the jury that general intent is present when “the person
was aware he or she was doing the act.” These are essentially the same
descriptions, yet they discuss two different forms of intent. Thus, the State
incorrectly described to the jury the form of intent required to convict
Benson of assault causing bodily injury.
Upon reading the jury instructions as a whole, it is evident that the
district court’s refusal to submit Benson’s requested marshaling
instruction explaining which form of intent applied to which charge was
erroneous because the submitted jury instructions did not “convey the
applicable law in such a way that the jury ha[d] a clear understanding of
the issues.” Rivera, 865 N.W.2d at 892 (quoting Thompson, 564 N.W.2d
at 846). As a result, Benson was prejudiced because the instructions
misled the jury. See Coleman, 907 N.W.2d at 138.
In contrast, the district court did not err in refusing to submit
Benson’s requested jury instruction on specific intent. The district court
must submit “a requested jury instruction if it correctly states the
applicable law and is not embodied in other instructions.” Alcala, 880
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N.W.2d at 707 (quoting Sonnek v. Warren, 522 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Iowa 1994)).
Here, Benson’s requested jury instruction that “[s]pecific intent is present
when from the circumstances the offender must have subjectively desired
the prohibited result,” Bacon, 567 N.W.2d at 417 (quoting Redmon, 244
N.W.2d at 797), was already adequately conveyed in the jury instructions.
The district court instructed the jury that specific intent means “doing [an
act] with a specific purpose in mind.” This instruction was taken verbatim
from the Iowa State Bar Association’s Criminal Jury Instructions, and it
correctly states the law. See Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury
Instructions 200.2 (2016) (“ ‘Specific intent’ means not only being aware
of doing an act and doing it voluntarily, but in addition, doing it with a
specific purpose in mind.”). Thus, the district court’s denial of Benson’s
requested specific-intent instruction was not erroneous since the
submitted instructions already embodied the requested instruction and
accurately conveyed the law. Nevertheless, we reverse and remand
Benson’s case to the district court for a new trial due to the prejudicial
jury instructions that failed to inform the jury of the applicable form of
intent for each charge. See, e.g., State v. Hoyman, 863 N.W.2d 1, 19 (Iowa
2015) (“[C]ontradictory and confusing instructions will necessitate a new
trial.”).
IV. Conclusion.
We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for a new
trial for the aforementioned reasons.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.