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. An appellate court
reviews without deference a trial court’s interpretation of a Maryland Rule. See Davis v.
Slater,

383 Md. 599

, 604,

861 A.2d 78

, 80-81 (2004).
Maryland Rule 5-404(a)
Maryland Rule 5-404(a), concerning character evidence generally, provides:
(a) Character evidence. (1) Prohibited uses. Subject to subsections (a)(2)
and (3) of this Rule, evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not
admissible to prove that the person acted in accordance with the character or
trait on a particular occasion.
(2) Criminal and delinquency cases. Subsection (a)(2) of this Rule
applies in a criminal case and in a delinquency case. For purposes of
subsection (a)(2), “accused” means a defendant in a criminal case and an
individual alleged to be delinquent in an action in juvenile court, and “crime”
includes a delinquent act as defined by Code, Courts Article, § 3-8A-01.
(A) Character of accused. An accused may offer evidence of
the accused’s pertinent trait of character. If the evidence is
admitted, the prosecution may offer evidence to rebut it.
(B) Character of victim. Subject to the limitations in Rule 5-
412, an accused may offer evidence of an alleged crime
victim’s pertinent trait of character. If the evidence is admitted,
the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it.
(C) Homicide case. In a homicide case, the prosecutor may
offer evidence of the alleged victim’s trait of peacefulness to
rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness with
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regard to credibility may be admitted under Rules 5-607, 5-608, and 5-609.
Thus, the general rule under Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(1) is that “evidence of an individual’s
character or character trait is inadmissible to prove that[,] on a particular occasion, that
individual acted in accordance with that character trait.” Williams v. State,

457 Md. 551

,
564,

179 A.3d 1006

, 1014 (2018) (citation omitted). Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2), however,
sets forth three exceptions to that general rule of inadmissibility. See id. at 564, 179 A.3d
at 1014 (This Court referred to Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A) as providing a “commonly
known caveat to the general rule[.]”).
Analysis
Here, we hold that Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C) does not permit a prosecutor to
offer evidence of an alleged victim’s trait of peacefulness to rebut statements made by
defense counsel in opening statement because opening statements are not evidence, and
Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C) specifically requires that “evidence that the victim was the
first aggressor” be introduced before the prosecutor may rebut such evidence with
“evidence of the alleged victim’s trait of peacefulness[.]” (Emphasis added). Ford’s
counsel’s remarks during opening statement did not “open the door” for the prosecutor to
present evidence of Eltahir’s trait of peacefulness. This is so because, even if Ford’s
counsel’s remarks placed Eltahir’s actions and character at issue and somehow indicated
that Ford would perhaps offer evidence to prove that Eltahir was the aggressor, Maryland
Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C) definitively requires evidence that the victim was the first aggressor—
not merely a statement indicating that some evidence might possibly be introduced—to
trigger the State’s ability to rebut with evidence of the victim’s trait of peacefulness.
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Accordingly, the circuit court erred in concluding that Ford’s counsel had “opened the
door” for the State to present evidence of Eltahir’s trait of peacefulness, and in permitting
the State, over Ford’s objection, to elicit testimony in its case-in-chief from McQueen that
Eltahir was a “quiet, nice person[, n]ice to everybody[,]” and from Kane that Eltahir “was
a cool person[, h]e was never, you know nasty or hostile, or anything.” Nonetheless, we
conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
We begin by examining the plain language of Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C), which
simply provides that, in homicide cases, “the prosecutor may offer evidence of the alleged
victim’s trait of peacefulness to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.”
Maryland Rule 5-404(a) does not define the word “evidence” as used in Maryland Rule 5-
404(a)(2)(C), and, specifically, does not indicate whether “evidence” includes opening
statements for purposes of the Rule. Nor does Maryland Rule 5-404(a) provide the
meaning of the word “rebut.” Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to turn to the
“natural and ordinary meaning” of the terms “evidence,” “rebut,” and “rebuttal evidence.”
Wagner v. State,

445 Md. 404

, 417,

128 A.3d 1

, 9 (2015) (citation omitted). To ascertain
the natural and ordinary meaning of the terms, we look to dictionary definitions as a starting
point. See, e.g., Chow v. State,

393 Md. 431

, 445,

903 A.2d 388

, 396 (2006) (“[I]t is proper
to consult a dictionary or dictionaries for a term’s ordinary and popular meaning.”
(Citations omitted)).
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “evidence,” in relevant part, as follows:
1. Something (including testimony, documents, and tangible objects) that
tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact; anything presented
to the senses and offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact . 2. See fact
in evidence under FACT. 3. The collective mass of things, esp[ecially]
testimony and exhibits, presented before a tribunal in a given dispute .
Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Similarly, Merriam-Webster defines
“evidence,” in pertinent part, as:
something that furnishes proof: TESTIMONY
specifically: something legally submitted to a tribunal to ascertain the truth
of a matter[.]
...
something that furnishes or tends to furnish proof
especially: something (as testimony, writings, or objects) presented at a
judicial or administrative proceeding for the purpose of establishing the truth
or falsity of an alleged matter of fact[.]
Evidence, Merriam-Webster (2018), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
evidence [https://perma.cc/F2UP-RTYN].
These definitions demonstrate that the term “evidence” means testimony,
documents, objects, or exhibits that are offered during a judicial proceeding to prove or
disprove the existence of an alleged fact; i.e., evidence is something that is submitted to a
tribunal, in one of various forms, that tends to establish the truth or falsity of an alleged
fact. Thus, utilizing the ordinary definition of “evidence,” it is clear that opening
statements do not constitute evidence. Notably, the definitions of “evidence” do not
identify an opening statement as an example of “evidence”; rather, the definitions identify
testimony, writings/documents, objects, and exhibits as types of “evidence.” Put simply,
the term “evidence”—although encompassing a wide variety of things, such as testimony,
- 27 -
documents, or objects that are offered to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged
fact—does not encompass assertions that are made during opening statements. Such
statements do not, and are not, given to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact,
but instead are made to provide the fact-finder with a party’s overview of the case and a
preview of the evidence that is to be presented at trial.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “opening statement” as follows:
At the outset of a trial, an advocate’s statement giving the fact-finder a
preview of the case and of the evidence to be presented. [] Although the
opening statement is not supposed to be argumentative, lawyers —
purposefully or not — often include some form of argument. The term is
thus sometimes referred to as opening argument. — Also termed opening
address.
Opening Statement, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). And, Merriam-Webster
provides, in pertinent part, the following legal definition of “opening statement”: “a
statement to the jury by trial counsel before the presentation of evidence that usually
explains the nature of the case, the factual matters to be proven, and the evidence to be
presented and that summarizes the arguments to be made[.]” Opening Statement, Merriam-
Webster (2018), https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/opening%20statement [https://
perma.cc/CW3U-N6V8]. It is clear that an “opening statement” is a statement by counsel
made at the beginning of a trial, before the presentation of evidence, in which counsel
usually provides the fact-finder with an outline of the case, the evidence that is to be
presented, and the arguments that are to be made. In other words, an opening statement is
not itself evidence, as it is given prior to the presentation of evidence, and often includes a
preview of the evidence that counsel expects to present during trial.
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Additionally, consistent with the plain meaning of the terms “evidence” and
“opening statement,” this Court has long concluded that opening statements are not
evidence. See, e.g., Keller v. Serio,

437 Md. 277

, 288,

85 A.3d 283

, 289 (2014)
(“[O]pening statements are not evidence[.]” (Citation omitted)). Because it is well
established that opening statements are not evidence, the Maryland Criminal and Civil
Pattern Jury Instructions state as much. See MPJI-Cr 3:00 (“Opening statements and
closing arguments of lawyers are not evidence. They are intended only to help you to
understand the evidence and to apply the law.”); MPJI-Cv 1:7 (same).
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “rebut” as “[t]o refute, oppose, or
counteract (something) by evidence, argument, or contrary proof  .” Rebut, Black’s Law Dictionary
(10th ed. 2014). And, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “rebuttal evidence” as “[e]vidence
[that is] offered to disprove or contradict the evidence [that is] presented by an opposing
party[,]” and states “[r]ebuttal evidence is introduced in the rebutting party’s answering
case; it is not adduced, e.g., through cross-examination[,] during the case-in-chief of the
party [that is] to be rebutted.” Rebuttal Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
“Rebuttal evidence” is also defined as “evidence that tends to refute or discredit an
opponent’s evidence[.]”     Rebuttal Evidence, Merriam-Webster (2018), https://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/evidence       [https://perma.cc/F2UP-RTYN].          These
definitions demonstrate that the very concept of rebuttal evidence is to disprove or
contradict evidence that was presented by the opposing party; i.e., there must first be
evidence offered by one party before the other party may rebut it through rebuttal evidence.
- 29 -
Thus, the plain language of Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C) makes clear that a
prosecutor is not permitted to offer evidence of an alleged victim’s trait of peacefulness to
rebut statements that defense counsel makes during an opening statement. Rather, under
the plain language of Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C), there must first be evidence presented
by the defense that the victim was the aggressor before a prosecutor may offer rebuttal
evidence of the alleged victim’s trait of peacefulness. Stated otherwise, it is only the
introduction of evidence by the defense that can open the door for a prosecutor in a
homicide case to introduce evidence of the victim’s trait of peacefulness. To interpret
“evidence” to include “opening statement” would contradict the plain language of
Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C), and the plain meaning of the words. Nothing whatsoever
in Maryland Rule 5-404(a) indicates that “evidence” includes opening statements.
Although the plain language of Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C) is unambiguous, we
briefly look to the history and purpose of the Rule, which confirms that, under Maryland
Rule 5-404(a), a defendant must first offer evidence of the victim’s pertinent character
trait—not make assertions during an opening statement—to open the door for the State to
rebut that evidence. Title 5 of the Maryland Rules, entitled “Evidence,” became effective
on July 1, 1994. See Sessoms v. State,

357 Md. 274

, 285,

744 A.2d 9

, 15 (2000). As
originally adopted, Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C) was part of Maryland Rule 5-
404(a)(1)(B), which provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Character evidence generally. (1) In general. Evidence of a person’s
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving
action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: . . . (B)
Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim
of the crime offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the same,
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or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was
the first aggressor[.]
Md. R. 5-404 (1994) (emphasis added) (paragraph breaks omitted).
In 2010, this Court adopted amendments to Maryland Rule 5-404(a), resulting in
the current structure of Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A) through (C). See Court of Appeals
of Maryland, Rules Order at 9 (Oct. 20, 2010), available at https://www.mdcourts.gov/
sites/default/files/rules/order/ro165.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9L5-YA95].       On April 16,
2010, prior to the Rule’s amendment, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure conducted a meeting, at which Professor Lynn McLain described Maryland Rule
5-404(a) as follows:
As the current Rule exists, there are two separate boxes, one for the victim’s
character and one for the accused’s character. It is up to the defendant to
open up either one of those issues. If the defendant offers evidence of the
victim’s pertinent character traits, that opens the door to the
prosecution to rebut that evidence, but only the evidence of the victim’s
pertinent character traits.
Minutes of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Apr. 16, 2010, at
30 (emphasis added). Stated otherwise, the defendant controls the introduction of character
evidence by offering such evidence in the first instance; i.e., it is character evidence being
offered by the defendant—not an assertion made during opening statement—that triggers
or opens the door for the State to rebut that evidence under Maryland Rule 5-404(a).
Here, there was simply no evidence offered by Ford that Eltahir was the aggressor,
thereby triggering the State’s ability to offer evidence of Eltahir’s trait of peacefulness
under Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C). Instead, during opening statement, Ford’s counsel
- 31 -
set forth the defense’s theory of the case—self-defense—and stated, among other things,
that: Eltahir was “younger[,]” “faster[,]” “bigger[,]” “and stronger than [] Ford”; Eltahir,
not Ford, was “the person [who] initiate[d] any physical contact”; Ford was “reacting out
of fear, and [] he certainly wasn’t the aggressor”; and Ford “made an offhand verbal
comment but he was not the physical aggressor.” That Ford’s counsel asserted in opening
statement that Eltahir was the aggressor is wholly consistent with Ford claiming perfect
self-defense, which requires satisfaction of four elements, including that “[t]he accused
claiming the right of self-defense must not have been the aggressor or provoked the
conflict[.]” Porter v. State,

455 Md. 220

, 234-35,

166 A.3d 1044

, 1053 (2017) (citation
omitted). Despite Ford’s counsel’s assertions during opening statement that Ford was not
the aggressor and that he did not initiate physical contact, those assertions did not constitute
evidence that Eltahir was the first aggressor for the simple reason that opening statements
are not evidence. Stated otherwise, there was no evidence that Eltahir was the aggressor,
and, thus, Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C) was not triggered; i.e., the prosecutor could not
offer evidence of Eltahir’s trait of peacefulness.
Indeed, the State recognizes that opening statements are not evidence. The State
contends, however, that Ford’s counsel’s remarks during opening statement nevertheless
opened the door to the State being entitled to rebut those claims in its case-in-chief. We
disagree. In support of its contention, the State relies on a variety of cases, none of which
involved admission of rebuttal character evidence under Maryland Rule 5-404(a). For
example, in Snyder v. State,

361 Md. 580

, 586, 601-02,

762 A.2d 125

, 128-29, 137 (2000),
this Court stated in dicta, “for the guidance of the trial court on remand[,]” that the trial
- 32 -
court had not erred in allowing the State to introduce testimony that, seven months before
a murder, the defendant and the victim (his wife) had a physical dispute, and that, at some
point during the marriage, the defendant hit his wife. We determined that such evidence
was admissible under Maryland Rule 5-404(b), which governs other crimes and prior bad
acts evidence, to demonstrate motive. See

id. at 602, 611

762 A.2d at 137, 142

. In so
determining, we stated:
[E]ven if we agreed with the [defendant] that such acts are not admissible to
prove motive, evidence that the [defendant] hit his wife, as well as evidence
of more specific physical disputes, are admissible as rebuttal evidence. In
this case, the [defendant]’s attorney during opening statement reiterated the
[defendant]’s sworn statement to the police that the [defendant]’s
relationship with his wife was “great and getting better,” suggesting that it
was improbable that the [defendant] murdered his wife. The State was
entitled to rebut that evidence.

Id. at 611

762 A.2d at 142

.
As an initial matter, our statement in Snyder that the defendant had essentially
opened the door through his counsel’s opening statement to evidence of his relationship
with his wife as proof of motive was dicta and has no precedential value. Second, in
Snyder, we did not address whether, let alone hold that, remarks during counsel’s opening
statement may open the door for introduction of rebuttal character evidence under
Maryland Rule 5-404(a). Significantly, Maryland Rule 5-404(b) is materially different
from Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C), and provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts including delinquent acts . . . is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. Such evidence, however, may be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common
scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
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By its plain language, Maryland Rule 5-404(b), unlike Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C), does
not depend on the defendant first offering evidence to trigger the State’s ability to introduce
certain evidence and does not concern rebuttal evidence. Thus, the dicta in Snyder simply
is not applicable in interpreting Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C).
Similarly, we are unpersuaded by the State’s reliance on Hopkins v. State,

137 Md. App. 200

, 207-08,

768 A.2d 89

, 93-94 (2001), and Fullbright v. State,

168 Md. App. 168

,
182-85,

895 A.2d 1088

, 1096-97, cert. denied,

393 Md. 477

903 A.2d 416

 (2006), which
involved admission of anticipatory rehabilitation evidence of a State’s witness under
Maryland Rule 5-616(c), during direct-examination of the witness, in response to remarks
made by the defendants’ counsel during opening statements. Notably, Maryland Rule 5-
616(c) provides that “[a] witness whose credibility has been attacked may be rehabilitated”
through one of four different ways. Significantly, Maryland Rule 5-616(c)’s use of the
word “attacked” is much broader than Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C)’s reference to “rebut
evidence[,]” and arguably could encompass remarks that counsel makes during an opening
statement that “attack” a witness’s credibility. In any event, neither Hopkins nor Fullbright
addressed Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C), or whether opening statements may open the
door for the State to present rebuttal evidence of an alleged victim’s trait of peacefulness
in its case-in-chief. Simply put, Snyder, Hopkins, and Fullbright do not support the
position that remarks by defense counsel during opening statement can trigger Maryland
- 34 -
Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C).2
Likewise, we are unpersuaded by the State’s reliance on Terry v. State,

332 Md. 329

631 A.2d 424

 (1993), Martin v. State,

364 Md. 692

775 A.2d 385

 (2001), and Johnson
v. State,

408 Md. 204

969 A.2d 262

 (2009) for the contention that the State’s case-in-chief
may include rebuttal evidence to which the defense has opened the door through opening
statement. These cases are inapposite, and do not involve Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C).
2
We find no merit in the State’s reliance on Anderson v. State,

420 Md. 554

24 A.3d 692

 (2011) and Thomas v. State,

429 Md. 85

55 A.3d 10

 (2012) for the proposition
that remarks during opening statement may open the door for evidence that would
otherwise be inadmissible. In Anderson, 420 Md. at 566-67, 24 A.3d at 699, this Court
addressed admission of a witness’s prior consistent statement under Maryland Rules 5-
802.1(b) and 5-616(c), and noted those Rules “become applicable only if the defendant’s
opening statement and/or cross-examination of a State’s witness has opened the door to
evidence that is relevant (and now admissible) for the purpose of rehabilitation.” (Cleaned
up). Thomas, 429 Md. at 97, 55 A.3d at 16-17, involved admission of a witness’s prior
consistent statement pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-616(c) to rehabilitate the witness’s
credibility, and this Court quoted the above language in Anderson. As explained above,
Maryland Rule 5-616(c)’s use of the word “attacked” clearly encompasses remarks by
defense counsel during opening statement, and is thus broader than the language in
Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C). And, Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b) provides, in pertinent part:
The following statements previously made by a witness who testifies at the
trial . . . and who is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement
are not excluded by the hearsay rule: . . . A statement that is consistent with
the declarant’s testimony, if the statement is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against the declarant of fabrication, or improper influence or
motive.
(Paragraph break omitted). Like the word “attacked” in Maryland Rule 5-616(c), the term
“to rebut an express or implied charge” in Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b) contemplates remarks
made by counsel during opening statement, as counsel could, during opening statement,
set forth an express or implied charge of fabrication or improper influence or motive. In
other words, Maryland Rules 5-616(c) and 5-802.1(b) arguably extend to opening
statements as a trigger for admission of evidence. Indeed, neither Maryland Rule 5-616(c)
nor Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b) ties the triggering of admission of evidence to “evidence”
having already been admitted, as Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C) does.
- 35 -
In Terry,

332 Md. at 338-39

631 A.2d at 428-29

, this Court concluded that a trial court
erred in admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction, after remarks made by the
defendant’s counsel in opening statement. In so holding, we discussed the doctrine of
curative admissibility and opening the door, and stated that, “[w]hen explanatory or
curative evidence is admissible under either the ‘open door’ or ‘curative admissibility’
doctrine, the remedy must be proportionate to the malady.”

Id. at 338

631 A.2d at 428

.
In Martin,

364 Md. at 708-09

775 A.2d at 394-95

, this Court concluded that a trial court
erred in admitting evidence of the defendant’s consultation with an attorney to rebut an
assertion made by defense counsel in opening statement because the danger of unfair
prejudice “substantially outweighed any probative value[.]” In so holding, we explained
that “[t]he doctrine of curative admissibility permits otherwise irrelevant evidence to be
admitted in response to an adverse ruling or action[,]” and noted that, although “comments
made in opening statements are not evidence . . . , the general principles in allowing a party
to ‘meet fire with fire’ are applicable.”

Id. at 708

775 A.2d at 394

 (cleaned up).
Nevertheless, we explained that “[t]his doctrine of expanded relevance has its limits . . . as
the remedy must be proportionate to the malady.”

Id. at 708

775 A.2d at 394

 (cleaned up).
In Johnson,

408 Md. at 223-24

969 A.2d at 273

, this Court held that the trial court
should have sustained the defendant’s objection to the following question by the
prosecutor: “And some people believe that most of the currency in general circulation is
contaminated with drug residue and that therefore [a] canine will always alert to currency,
even currency in a bank. Based on your test of currency drawn from a bank, was that a
legitimate belief?” (Cleaned up). As one reason why this question was objectionable, we
- 36 -
explained:
[T]he question was unfairly prejudicial because it violated the rule against
the introduction of “anticipatory rehabilitation” and/or “strawman rebuttal”
evidence. Under this rule, unless the defendant’s opening statement and/or
cross-examination of a State’s witness has “opened the door” to evidence that
is relevant (and now admissible) for the purpose of either rehabilitation or
rebuttal, the State is prohibited from introducing during its case-in-chief—
and thereafter rebutting—such evidence in order to “bolster” that witness’s
testimony. Because this rule applies to expert testimony as well as to non-
expert testimony, the [trial c]ourt should have prohibited the State from
bolstering [an officer]’s testimony about the significance of the canine scan.

Id. at 226

969 A.2d at 274-75

 (cleaned up). Importantly, in Terry, Martin, and Johnson,
this Court did not conclude that the doctrine of curative admissibility, or opening the door,
applied generally to character evidence under Maryland Rule 5-404(a) or specifically to
rebuttal character evidence of a victim’s trait of peacefulness under Maryland Rule 5-
404(a)(2)(C). Indeed, none of these cases involved admission of character evidence
pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-404(a) and, thus, they are unpersuasive.
Nor are we convinced that Maryland Rule 5-611(a) somehow changes the result or
otherwise authorizes a trial court to permit the State to introduce evidence of the alleged
victim’s trait of peacefulness, pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C), in its case-in-
chief in response to remarks by defense counsel in opening statement. Maryland Rule 5-
611(a) provides: “The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of
time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.” To be sure,
Maryland Rule 5-611(a) generally authorizes a trial court to vary the order of proof, and,
- 37 -
specifically, the order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence. Nothing in
Maryland Rule 5-611(a), however, indicates that the provision overrides the specific
dictates of Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C), which creates a narrow exception to the general
rule of inadmissibility of character evidence to prove that an individual acted in accordance
with that character on a particular occasion. Indeed, Maryland Rule 5-611(a) does not
purport to expand a trial court’s discretion to permit the State to present rebuttal evidence
of an alleged victim’s trait of peacefulness in the State’s case-in-chief due to remarks made
by defense counsel in opening statement. Clearly, whatever discretion is afforded to the
trial court in the admission of rebuttal character evidence, that discretion must be exercised
within the limits set forth in Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C).
Having established that the circuit court erred in concluding that Ford’s counsel had
“opened the door” for the State to present evidence of Eltahir’s trait of peacefulness under
Maryland Rule 5-404(a)(2)(C), and in permitting the State, over Ford’s objection, to elicit
testimony in its case-in-chief from McQueen and Kane concerning Eltahir’s trait of
peacefulness, we must next explore whether the error was harmless. In Green v. State,

456 Md. 97

, 165,

171 A.3d 1162

, 1201 (2017), we explained the doctrine of harmless error as
follows:
Under the doctrine of harmless error, an appellate court does not reverse a
conviction based on a trial court’s error or abuse of discretion where the
appellate court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s
error or abuse of discretion did not influence the verdict to the defendant’s
detriment. Hall v. State,

437 Md. 534

, 540-41,

87 A.3d 1287

, 1291 (2014)
(quoting Perez v. State,

420 Md. 57

, 66,

21 A.3d 1048

, 1054 (2011))
(brackets omitted); see also Dorsey v. State,

276 Md. 638

, 659,

350 A.2d 665

, 678 (1976).
- 38 -
(Cleaned up). “The harmless error standard is highly favorable to the defendant, and the
burden is on the State to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and
did not influence the outcome of the case.” Perez,

420 Md. at 66

21 A.3d at 1054

 (cleaned
up). In this case, we conclude that the circuit court’s error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Here, there was a plethora of evidence adduced at trial demonstrating that Ford did
not act in self-defense in fatally stabbing Eltahir, such that we are satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the circuit court’s error was of no consequence with respect to the
jury’s verdict. Eyewitness testimony confirmed that Ford did not act in self-defense, and,
even if believed, Ford’s account does not establish the defense of self-defense. McQueen
testified that Ford began an unprovoked verbal altercation with Eltahir, and that, after
words were exchanged between Ford and Eltahir, Ford stood up and “got in [Eltahir]’s
face.” Ford initiated physical contact by hitting Eltahir, and Ford eventually hit Eltahir in
the chest. McQueen saw Ford begin to start “hitting” Eltahir again, and then she noticed
blood on Eltahir. Ford passed by McQueen, carrying a knife in his hand, with blood
running down his arm. McQueen identified Ford from a photographic array as the person
who stabbed Eltahir, and testified that there was no doubt in her mind that Ford stabbed
Eltahir. On cross-examination, McQueen testified that she “did see” Ford stab Eltahir.
And, on redirect-examination, McQueen testified that there was no blood on Eltahir’s shirt
when he arrived at the park bench, and that Ford was the only person to make physical
contact with Eltahir’s chest.
Kane testified that Ford instigated a verbal altercation with Eltahir, and he later saw
- 39 -
Ford and Eltahir engaging in a physical altercation, “pushing each other back and forth.”
At some point thereafter, Kane saw blood on Eltahir’s shirt; there had been no blood on
Eltahir’s shirt before the physical altercation with Ford, and nobody other than Ford had
touched Eltahir. Kane identified Ford from a photographic array as the person who stabbed
Eltahir, and told officers that he was “a hundred percent” sure about his identification.
Brown testified that, once Ford arrived at her home unannounced, and asked whether he
could stay because “he had got[ten] into a confrontation with a friend of his, or something.
And the friend hit him in his head, and he stabbed him.” Ford told Brown he was afraid to
go to the police “because the guy had hit him first, or something, and he had stabbed him.”
Ford told Brown he had stashed the knife “[t]hat he had stabbed the boy with” on his
mother’s property.
Detective Ballard testified that, after Ford was arrested and placed in the detective’s
unmarked vehicle, and without being told of the reason for his arrest, Ford made various
unsolicited statements, including that the people in Brown’s house “had nothing to do with
this[,]” “that there was nothing in there,” and “that he hid it in the county.” Ford also asked
Detective Ballard how Eltahir was doing. Additionally, parts of Detective Harding’s and
Detective McNemar’s interrogation of Ford were played for the jury, and the circuit court
admitted the recording and transcript into evidence. During the interrogation, Ford told
detectives that he saw women walk by and said to Eltahir: “Don’t – you getting all offensive
but you sleeping with them?” Ford said that Eltahir then “jumped up” and “clocked” him,
and that he said “[y]ou done messed up,” and then he “cut” Eltahir. Ford told detectives
that he “remember[ed] seeing the blood on [Eltahir] and him saying, ‘You cut me. You
- 40 -
f[***]ing cut me, you f[***]ing cut me.’” When asked by Detective Harding what he did
“with the knife that cut him[,]” Ford responded that he “hid it” on his “mother’s property.”
Detective Harding also asked whether Eltahir had knocked Ford out “or anything like
that[,]” and Ford answered: “No, it just hurt me and I went to swing and that’s all I
remember.”
Detective Harding testified that she arranged for officers to go to Ford’s mother’s
house to recover the knife that he had hidden. Dembia, the forensic chemist, took three
different samples from the knife, and testified that a major component of the sample from
the knife’s handle was consistent with Ford’s known DNA profile, and that the samples
from the stain on the blade and the areas around the blade matched Eltahir’s known DNA
profile and excluded Ford as the source of the DNA.
Overall, the evidence adduced by the State included the following: two
eyewitnesses—McQueen and Kane—who, among other things, saw the altercation
between Ford and Eltahir, testified that Ford instigated the altercation, testified that Ford
was the only person to have physical contact with Eltahir, and identified Ford from
photographic arrays as the person who stabbed Eltahir; Brown’s testimony that Ford told
her that he had stabbed a man who had hit him and then hidden the knife on his mother’s
property; Detective Ballard’s testimony that Ford had made unsolicited comments after
being arrested, including a statement that he had “hid it” and a question about how Eltahir
was doing; and, Dembia’s testimony that a major contributor of a sample from the handle
of knife that was recovered from Ford’s mother’s property matched Ford’s DNA profile,
and that samples from the blade matched Eltahir’s DNA profile.                Perhaps most
- 41 -
significantly, the recording and transcript of Ford’s interview by detectives were admitted
into evidence, and the jury heard and saw that Ford expressly admitted multiple times that
he had “cut” Eltahir after Eltahir allegedly hit him. Tellingly, Ford acknowledged to the
detectives that Eltahir’s allegedly hitting him had not “knocked [him] out” but only hurt
him. In other words, even if Ford’s statements to the detectives are credited, Ford
essentially admitted to using deadly force on Eltahir where Eltahir only hit him. Given the
eyewitness accounts of the circumstances under which Ford stabbed Eltahir showing that
Ford did not act in self-defense in stabbing Eltahir, and Ford’s description of the events to
detectives, we conclude that any error on the circuit court’s part in admitting testimony
from McQueen and Kane as to Eltahir’s trait of peacefulness during the State’s case-in-
chief was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.3
II. Evidence of Consciousness of Guilt
The Parties’ Contentions
Ford contends that the circuit court erred in permitting Brown to testify about his
reaction to being asked to leave her home as evidence of consciousness of guilt. Ford
argues that evidence that he cursed at Brown and slammed a door is not evidence of
consciousness of guilt and, thus, is inadmissible. Ford asserts that such evidence was “too
ambiguous and equivocal to” constitute evidence of consciousness of guilt. Ford maintains
3
We are aware that, during the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor called the
jury’s attention to McQueen’s and Kane’s testimony concerning Eltahir’s trait of
peacefulness, stating: “McQueen and Kane told you a little bit about [Eltahir]. They
described him as quiet. Kane was even able to say he was peaceful, that he was quiet,
easy[]going kind of guy.” Ford did not object. In any event, for the reasons discussed
above, the circuit court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
- 42 -
that the evidence was susceptible to multiple prejudicial interpretations, such as, for
example, that “he had a character trait for hot-temperedness or aggressiveness,” which
would lead “the jury to infer that [he] acted in conformity with that trait when he stabbed
Eltahir.” Ford contends that, in eliciting Brown’s testimony as consciousness of his guilt,
the State presented inadmissible character evidence about him.
Ford argues that, even if his reaction were relevant, its probative value was
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and therefore inadmissible. Ford asserts that
the danger of unfair prejudice was “obvious”—namely, that the jury would infer from his
reaction to Brown that he was hot-tempered or aggressive and that he stabbed Eltahir in
conformity with his temperament. Ford maintains that, to the extent that evidence of his
reaction reflected a consciousness of guilt, such evidence was cumulative and outweighed
by unfair prejudice.
The State responds that the circuit court properly permitted, as evidence of
consciousness of guilt, Brown’s testimony about Ford’s reaction to being told that he had
to leave Brown’s home. The State contends that the testimony was relevant and that the
danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh its probative value. The State
argues that Brown’s testimony was relevant to Ford’s guilty state of mind, and that Ford’s
post-crime conduct satisfied four inferences that are necessary for evidence to be
admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt. The State asserts that, if there were an
innocent explanation for his conduct—for example, he slammed the door and cursed
because Brown’s telling him to leave triggered hurt from the end of the relationship or
because it was a result of side effects of medication—Ford could have argued those
- 43 -
explanations before the jury, but did not. The State maintains that, even if Ford had
presented an innocent explanation contradicting the inference of guilt, such an explanation
would go to the weight—not the admissibility—of the State’s evidence.
The State contends that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. The State asserts that Brown’s testimony was both relevant and not
reasonably likely to produce such an emotional response that the danger of unfair prejudice
would substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews without deference a trial court’s conclusion as to whether
evidence is relevant. See Santiago v. State,

458 Md. 140

, 161,

181 A.3d 796

, 808 (2018).
An appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court’s determination as to
whether evidence is inadmissible under Maryland Rule 5-403. See id. at 161, 181 A.3d at
808.
Relevant Law
Maryland Rule 5-401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Pursuant to
Maryland Rule 5-402, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by constitutions, statutes, or the[
Maryland R]ules, or by decisional law not inconsistent with the[ Maryland R]ules, all
relevant evidence is admissible.     Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.”
“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
- 44 -
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” Md. R. 5-403.
“[I]f relevant, circumstantial evidence regarding a defendant’s conduct may be
admissible under M[aryland] Rule 5-403, not as conclusive evidence of guilt, but as a
circumstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt.” Decker v. State,

408 Md. 631

,
640,

971 A.2d 268

, 274 (2009) (cleaned up). In Decker,

id. at 640

, we
explained that evidence of consciousness of guilt “can take various forms, including flight
after a crime, escape from confinement, use of a false name, and destruction or concealment
of evidence.” (Cleaned up). In Decker,

id. at 641

, we explained that
“evidence need not be contemporaneous with the crime to be evidence of the defendant’s
consciousness of guilt.” (Cleaned up). Additionally, in Decker,

id. at 641

, we stated that any evidence contradicting an inference of guilt that is derived from
such flight “does not render the evidence of flight inadmissible, but is merely to be
considered by the jury in weighing the effect of such flight.” (Cleaned up).
In Decker,

id. at 641

, we elaborated on evidence of consciousness
of guilt, stating:
Consciousness of guilt evidence is considered relevant to the question
of guilt because the particular behavior provides clues to the person’s state
of mind, and state of mind evidence is relevant because the commission of a
crime can be expected to leave some mental traces on the criminal. Thus, by
application of the accepted test in Maryland for ascertaining relevancy, guilty
behavior should be admissible to prove guilt if we can say that the fact that
the accused behaved in a particular way renders more probable the fact of his
or her guilt.
- 45 -
As with other forms of circumstantial evidence, however, the
probative value of guilty behavior depends upon the degree of confidence
with which certain inferences may be drawn. There must be an evidentiary
basis, either direct or circumstantial, to link the defendant’s conduct to the
consciousness of guilt inference.
(Cleaned up). To determine whether evidence of post-crime conduct may be admissible as
consciousness of guilt where flight is concerned, this Court established the following test:
Under that test, the probative value of the evidence depends upon the degree
of confidence with which four inferences can be drawn: (1) from the
defendant’s behavior to flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; (3)
from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the crime
charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged
to actual guilt of the crime charged.

Id. at 642

971 A.2d at 275

 (cleaned up).
As one example, in Thomas v. State,

372 Md. 342

, 356-58,

812 A.2d 1050

, 1058-
59 (2002) (“Thomas I”), this Court held that evidence of the defendant’s refusal to submit
to a blood test over three years after the victim was killed, absent evidence that he was told
the test was related to the victim’s death—i.e., that the defendant was aware that law
enforcement wished to test his blood in connection with the murder investigation—was not
admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt. In so holding, we observed that the third
inference—“from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the crime
charged”—was not satisfied.

Id. at 354

812 A.2d at 1057

. We explained: “Knowledge
that the person is suspected of the charged crime is important because the value of the
conduct lies in the culprit’s knowledge that he or she has committed the charged offense
and in his or her fear of apprehension.”

Id. at 354

812 A.2d at 1057

. We further noted
that, in some instances, “a defendant’s conduct [had been held to be] too ambiguous and
- 46 -
equivocal to be admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt”—for example, this Court
had held that “evidence that the defendant failed to call the police to inquire about the status
of the investigation, even for seven years, [was] too ambiguous and equivocal to support
such inferences.”

Id. at 355

812 A.2d at 1058

 (cleaned up).
In Thomas I,

id. at 356

812 A.2d at 1058

, we explained that the following four
inferences would need to be drawn:
(1) from his resistance to the blood test, a desire to conceal evidence; (2)
from a desire to conceal evidence, a consciousness of guilt; (3) from a
consciousness of guilt, a consciousness of guilt of the murder of [the victim];
and (4) from a consciousness of guilt of the murder of [the victim], actual
guilt of the murder.
We determined that there was no evidence from which the jury could have drawn the third
inference because “there was absolutely no evidence from which the jury could conclude
that [the defendant] knew the blood sample was in any way connected to the [victim’s]
murder.”

Id. at 357

812 A.2d at 1059

. Accordingly, absent evidence from which the jury
could draw the third inference, evidence of the defendant’s refusal to submit to the blood
test “lack[ed] probative value and was inadmissible.”

Id. at 358

812 A.2d at 1059

.
In Thomas v. State,

397 Md. 557

, 561,

919 A.2d 49

, 52 (2007) (“Thomas II”), this
Court “revisit[ed] the question of whether [the defendant]’s refusal to provide a blood
sample demanded by police pursuant to a search warrant was admissible in evidence as
consciousness of guilt.” In Thomas II,

id. at 577

, we held that there was a
sufficient basis for the trial court to admit evidence of the defendant’s refusal as
consciousness of guilt. We explained that, on retrial in the defendant’s case, “the State
offered evidence sufficient to satisfy the third inference necessary to demonstrate
- 47 -
consciousness of guilt” when a detective testified that he told the defendant that “the
warrant and blood test were ‘in reference to [the victim]’s death.’”

Id. at 576

. Thus, there was “a reasonable basis” from which the jury could find that the defendant
was aware that law enforcement wanted his blood sample in connection with the murder
investigation.

Id. at 576-77

.
In so holding, we emphasized that, “[t]o be relevant, it is not necessary that evidence
of this nature conclusively establish guilt. The proper inquiry is whether the evidence could
support an inference that the defendant’s conduct demonstrates a consciousness of guilt. If
so, the evidence is relevant and generally admissible.”

Id. at 577

 (cleaned
up) (emphasis in original). We also rejected the defendant’s contention that “his reaction
[, i.e., refusing to submit to the blood test,] could have been due to religious objections or
fear of needles, the sight of blood, pain, or possible infection”—i.e., that there existed an
innocent explanation for his refusal.

Id. at 577

. We stated that, “[s]o long
as the proper foundation is laid, consciousness of guilt evidence may be relevant and
admissible.”

. As such, “[s]imply because there is a possibility
that there exists some innocent, or alternate, explanation for the conduct does not mean that
the proffered evidence is per se inadmissible.”

. We further
stated that, if there was innocent explanation for the defendant’s conduct, “it was
incumbent upon him to generate that issue[,]” but he failed to offer such an alternative
theory at trial.

. We concluded that the trial court properly
admitted evidence of the defendant’s refusal to submit to the blood test as evidence of
consciousness of guilt because “any possible prejudicial effect of [the defendant]’s struggle
- 48 -
to avoid the drawing of blood did not so clearly outweigh the probative value of the
evidence so as to render the [trial] court’s admission of the evidence an abuse of
discretion.”

Id. at 580

919 A.2d at 63

 (cleaned up).
Analysis
Here, we hold that the circuit court properly permitted Brown to testify about Ford’s
reaction to being told that he had to leave her home—that he “cursed [her] out, and he
slammed back the front door and left”—as evidence of consciousness of guilt. The circuit
court did not err in determining that this evidence was relevant, and that it did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or considerations of cumulative evidence.4
Evidence of Ford’s reaction to being told by Brown that he had to leave her home—
namely, that he “cursed” at Brown and then “slammed back the front door and left[,]” i.e.,
his post-crime conduct—was relevant to show Ford’s state of mind, in that he was staying
at Brown’s home to hide from law enforcement and did not want to leave because he
wanted to continue hiding out and elude capture. Ford’s reaction to being told that he could
not stay tended to show that he wanted to continue to hide from law enforcement because
he was guilty. Indeed, the fact that Ford behaved in this particular way rendered more
probable the fact that he was guilty. See Decker,

408 Md. at 641

 (cleaned
4
To be sure, the circuit court did not explicitly state that the evidence was relevant
and that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Nevertheless, in ruling that the evidence was admissible as evidence of
consciousness of guilt, the circuit court implicitly determined that the evidence was
relevant and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.
- 49 -
up). Thus, like flight after a crime, escape from confinement, and the like, Ford’s post-
crime conduct of hiding in his ex-girlfriend’s home and becoming upset that he was made
to leave was circumstantial evidence that was relevant “as a circumstance tending to show
a consciousness of guilt.”

Id. at 640

 (cleaned up).
All four inferences that we have established for the admission of evidence of post-
crime conduct as consciousness of guilt were satisfied in this case. See

id. at 642

971 A.2d at 275

. Specifically, from evidence of Ford’s reaction to being told that he could not stay
at Brown’s home, the jury could reasonably have drawn the following inferences: (1) from
Ford’s reaction to a desire to hide from law enforcement and elude capture; (2) from hiding
to consciousness of guilt; (3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness concerning the
crime charged, i.e., murder of Eltahir; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning the
crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged. Significantly, “[t]o be relevant, it is not
necessary that evidence of this nature conclusively establish guilt. The proper inquiry is
whether the evidence could support an inference that the defendant’s conduct demonstrates
a consciousness of guilt. If so, the evidence is relevant and generally admissible.” Thomas
II,

397 Md. at 577

 (cleaned up) (emphasis in original). Here, the evidence
of Ford’s reaction could support an inference that his conduct demonstrated consciousness
of guilt. Thus, the circuit court did not err in concluding that evidence of Ford’s reaction
was, indeed, relevant to show consciousness of guilt.
Ford contends that evidence of his reaction failed to satisfy the first inference
because there is an “alternative explanation” for his behavior that “is not a matter of
speculation”—namely, that he “had a character trait for hot-temperedness or
- 50 -
aggressiveness,” which would constitute inadmissible character evidence. Although Ford
focuses on having a temper as an alternative explanation for his reaction, he also posits that
there are other alternative explanations for his behavior, such as that his “reaction could
have been caused by the fact that he had not taken his daily medications[,]” or being told
to leave by Brown “could have triggered some hurt left over from the break-up of their
romantic relationship.” As we explained in Thomas II,

397 Md. at 578

, if
there is an innocent explanation for a defendant’s conduct, “it [i]s incumbent upon him [or
her] to generate that issue.” Ford had the opportunity to present evidence of an alternate
explanation for his reaction—notably, one that did not involve him having a character trait
for being hot-tempered or aggressive, as he claims—yet Ford did not avail himself of that
opportunity.
In any event, the circumstance that there is the possibility of an innocent explanation
for Ford’s reaction is insufficient to render Brown’s testimony inadmissible. See

id. at 578

 (“Simply because there is a possibility that there exists some innocent, or
alternate, explanation for the conduct does not mean that the proffered evidence is per se
inadmissible.”). Rather, “[s]o long as the proper foundation is laid, consciousness of guilt
evidence may be relevant and admissible.”

. Indeed, the question
is simply whether such “evidence could support an inference that the defendant’s conduct
demonstrates a consciousness of guilt[, and, i]f so, the evidence is relevant and generally
admissible.”

Id. at 577

 (cleaned up) (emphasis in original). In this case,
as explained above, the evidence of Ford’s reaction to being told that he could not stay at
Brown’s home could support an inference that his conduct demonstrated a consciousness
- 51 -
of guilt, and thus was relevant. As such, even if Ford had presented an innocent explanation
for his reaction that contradicted that inference of guilt, that would not mean that the
evidence of his reaction did not have a tendency to show consciousness of guilt. As we
noted in Decker, 408 Md. at 641,

, “any evidence contradicting the
inference of guilt [that is] derived from [post-crime conduct] does not render the evidence
. . . inadmissible, but is merely to be considered by the jury in weighing the effect of such”
post-crime conduct. (Cleaned up). In short, Ford could have offered, but did not offer,
evidence of an innocent explanation for his reaction to being told by Brown to leave, and,
even if he had, then it would have been up to the jury to weigh the effect of Ford’s reaction.
We are unpersuaded by Ford’s reliance on Thompson v. State,

393 Md. 291

901 A.2d 208

 (2006) and his contention that, in this case, “the proper inquiry [was] whether the
evidence also reasonably supports a highly prejudicial inference that [requires] treating the
evidence in a manner that would otherwise render the evidence inadmissible[,]” and, if so,
then such “evidence is too ambiguous and equivocal to [serve as] evidence of
consciousness of guilt evidence.” (Cleaned up). In Thompson,

id. at 294

901 A.2d at 209

,
this Court held that a trial court abused its discretion in giving a jury instruction on flight.
In that case, a detective investigating a shooting saw the defendant, who fit the description
of the shooter, on a bicycle; the detective ran toward the defendant, identified himself as
an officer, and yelled for him to stop; the defendant saw the detective, but pedaled away
from him; and, shortly thereafter, the defendant was apprehended, and officers recovered
a large amount of cocaine on the defendant. See

id. at 294

901 A.2d at 210

. Before trial,
the trial court ruled that the cocaine, the results of a chemical analysis, and the defendant’s
- 52 -
statements to officers concerning his possession of the drugs were inadmissible, and the
trial court dismissed the charges arising of out of his possession of controlled dangerous
substances. See

id. at 295

901 A.2d at 210

.
During a retrial on certain charges, a tape recording of the defendant’s statements
to officers that he fled was played for the jury, and a transcript of the statement was
admitted, without objection. See

id. at 296

901 A.2d at 211

. And, the detective from
whom the defendant had fled testified that the defendant saw him, but pedaled away when
he approached him. See

id. at 297

901 A.2d at 211

. This Court noted that, although the
defendant objected to the form of the questions, he did not object to the admission of
evidence concerning his flight from police. See

id. at 298

901 A.2d at 212

. At the
conclusion of the trial, over the defendant’s objection, the trial court gave a jury instruction
on flight. See

id. at 300

901 A.2d at 213

.
This Court held that the flight instruction was improper, explaining:
The gravamen of the issue is whether [the defendant] fled in an
attempt to avoid apprehension for the crimes for which he was on trial. In
the present case, the jury was not presented with evidence of what may have
been an alternative and at least a cogent motive for [the defendant]’s flight,
specifically that drugs were found on his person. During his interview with
police, [the defendant] asserted that he ran from them because he had drugs
in his possession, which, according to the State, amounted to eighty-six vials
of crack cocaine at the time of his arrest. He was in essence arrested in
flagrante delicto with respect to the crime of possession of controlled
dangerous substances. We find that this fact, which was known to all parties
involved although not revealed to the jury, undermines the confidence by
which the inference could be drawn that [the defendant]’s flight was
motivated by a consciousness of guilt with respect to the crimes for which he
was on trial in the present case; it provides a foundation for the alternate, and
equally reasonable, inference that [the defendant] fled due to the cocaine in
his possession, an action a person in his position may have taken irrespective
of whether he also shot and attempted to rob [one of the victims]. [The
- 53 -
defendant] thus was placed in a difficult situation where he must either not
object to the highly prejudicial evidence concerning his possession of a
significant amount of cocaine being introduced to the jury to explain his
flight (or perhaps forced to make a Hobson’s choice to introduce such
evidence himself), or decline to explain his flight and risk that the jury would
not infer an alternative explanation for his flight.

Id. at 313-14

901 A.2d at 221

 (footnotes omitted). We further explained:
Where the defendant possesses an innocent explanation that does not
risk prejudicing the jury against him, it would be expected that the defendant
would present his purported reasons for his flight to the jury. It is error,
however, for the trial [court] to give such an instruction in a case like the case
sub judice where the defendant would be prejudiced by the revelation of the
“guilty” explanation for his flight.

Id. at 315

901 A.2d at 222

.
Thompson is distinguishable from this case in several important respects, and is
ultimately of no assistance to Ford with respect to evidence of his reaction being admitted
as consciousness of guilt. Significantly, the issue in Thompson was the propriety of the
trial court’s giving of a jury instruction on flight. In this case, although the circuit court
gave a jury instruction on flight that was similar to the instruction given in Thompson,

id. at 300

901 A.2d at 213

, Ford did not object, nor has he raised any issue as to the propriety
of the flight instruction.5 Indeed, the issue here concerns the admissibility of Brown’s
testimony concerning how Ford reacted when she told him he could not stay at her home
as evidence of consciousness of guilt; a similar issue was not raised in Thompson. Indeed,
in Thompson, evidence of the defendant’s flight was admitted during the trial without
objection and the propriety of the instruction on flight was at issue. In Thompson,

id.

 at
We note that the circuit court’s flight instruction did not reference, as possible
5
evidence of Ford’s consciousness of guilt, his reaction to being told to leave Brown’s home.
- 54 -
313,

901 A.2d at 221

, the alternate explanation for the defendant’s flight was that he had
eighty-six vials of crack cocaine on his person at the time of his arrest—evidence of a crime
that would have been highly prejudicial to the defendant. By contrast, in this case, there
were any number of alternative or innocent reasons that Ford could have presented to the
jury to explain his reaction to being told to leave his ex-girlfriend’s home. In short, Ford
did not face the same Hobson’s choice that the defendant in Thompson did. And, although
flight is not at issue in this case, Ford’s behavior satisfied the test set forth in Decker for
the admission of post-crime conduct as evidence of consciousness of guilt.6
We conclude that the circuit court did not err in admitting evidence of Ford’s
6
For the same reason, we are unconvinced by Ford’s reliance on Bedford v. State,

317 Md. 659

566 A.2d 111

 (1989). In Bedford,

id. at 666

566 A.2d at 114

, the defendant,
who had been charged with first-degree murder, robbery, and rape, was scheduled to be
transported to a psychiatrist’s office outside of the prison complex. As part of a routine
procedure, he was strip-searched and found to have a four-inch piece of metal wire
sharpened to a point and wrapped in toilet paper in his long johns. See

id. at 666

566 A.2d at 114-15

. At trial, the officer who conducted the search testified that such instruments
were used to open handcuff locks, and the wire was admitted into evidence. See

id.

 at 666-
67,

. In this Court, the defendant argued that the wire could have been used
for other purposes contradicting a consciousness of guilt, such as “a defensive or offensive
weapon, [or] as a tool for intra-prison work activity[.]”

Id. at 667

. We
doubted that the wire could be used as a work tool, but “accept[ed] that its presence could
lead the jury to other inferences about” the defendant, explaining: “The jury could consider
it a weapon and view [the defendant] as being violent, or could see the defendant’s
possession of the wire as a breaking of the rules. Consequently, it could view [the
defendant] as a ‘bad man’ for breaking such a rule.”

Id. at 668

. As such,
we held: “Because the possession of the wire is so equivocal, we hold that its admission
into evidence was more prejudicial to [the defendant] than probative of an intent to escape
and should have been excluded.”

Id. at 668