In re Pers. Restraint of Gronquist , 429 P.3d 804 ( 2018 )

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SUSAN L. CARLSON
SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Personal No. 94971-9
Restraint of
EN BANC
DEREK E. GRONQUIST,
Petitioner. Filed; NOV 0 8 2018
YU,J. — This case asks how a release date is calculated for a person serving
consecutive sentences for felony sex offenses. In 1995, Derek Gronquist was
sentenced to three consecutive, 114-month terms oftotal confinement for three
counts of attempted first degree kidnapping with a special finding of sexual
motivation. In this personal restraint petition (PRP), Gronquist claims that his
sentence expired in 2016, so his continued total confinement is unlawful. The
Department of Corrections(DOC)maintains that Gronquist's sentence will not
expire until 2022 and that Gronquist must remain in total confinement until his
sentence expires or he gets approval for a release plan, whichever comes first. The
In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
parties' dispute arises from the way DOC tracks time served on consecutive,
determinate sentences for felony sex offenses.
Rather than tracking all consecutive terms as a single sentence, DOC tracks
each term separately. According to DOC's tracking system, when Gronquist had
only earned release time(ERT)remaining on a term of confinement, he reached
his early release date(ERD)for that term. On each term's ERD,DOC's tracking
system "stopped" that term,"tolled" the remaining ERT on that term, and started
Gronquist's next consecutive term. When Gronquist reached the ERD for his third
and final term, the tolled ERT periods for each of his prior terms became available
and started running again. Therefore, according to DOC's tracking system,
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Gronquist's PRP is not frivolous. DOC's tracking system is complicated, its
explanations have been confusing and contradictory, and it has not pointed to clear
legal authority directly supporting its position. However, Gronquist has not shown
that his continued total confinement is unlawful. He was sentenced to three
consecutive, 114-month terms, adding up to 342 months. DOC has no authority to
change the length of Gronquist's sentence or to run any portion of his consecutive
terms concurrently. Gronquist's proposed sentence structure, however, would
require it to do so. We therefore deny relief on Gronquist's PRP.
'These visual timelines are representational only and not drawn to scale. Additionally,
the parties' ERDs differ slightly, possibly due to adjustments made after DOC restored some
ERT that Gronquist had previously lost. The parties do not address this discrepancy in detail,
and it is not necessary to our resolution of the issue presented.
In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
BACKGROUND
A. Terminology
To provide clarity for the factual background, procedural history, and legal
analysis below, we first define the specific terminology used in this context.
1. "Community custody" and "community placement"
Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW,at
the time of Gronquisfs offenses,"community custody" referred to "that portion of
an inmate's sentence of confinement in lieu of earned early release time served in
the community subject to controls placed on the inmate's movement and activities
by the department of corrections."^ Former RCW 9.94A.030(4)(Laws OF 1993,
ch. 338, § 2). "Community placement" referred to all periods of community
custody and postrelease supervision. Id. at(5).
2. "Earned release time," or "ERT"
"The SRA contemplates that an offender may be released from total
confinement before serving the full sentence imposed by the court. This is
accomplished through 'earned release time.'" In re Pers. Restraint ofStuhr, 186
Wash. 2d 49, 52, 375 P.3d 1031 (2016). An offender in custody may accumulate
ERT "for good behavior and good performance, as determined by the correctional
^ We apply the SRA applicable at the time of Gronquist's offenses. RCW 9.94A.345.
However, we do not intend to imply that the result would be different pursuant to the current
version of the SRA.
In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
agency having jurisdiction." Former RCW 9.94A.150(1)(Laws OF 1992, ch. 145,
§ 8). The total amount ofERT a person may accumulate is capped by statute as a
percentage of his or her total sentence. Id. The applicable percentage depends on
the nature of the underlying offense. Gronquist's ERT is capped at 33 percent. In
re Pers. Restraint ofSmith, 139 Wash. 2d 199, 201, 208-09, 986 P.2d 131 (1999).
DOC calculates the maximum amount ofERT a person may accumulate
when the person first enters DOC custody. Stuhr, 186 Wash. 2d at 54. However,the
amount ofERT actually accumulated will fluctuate throughout the course of a
person's sentence. For instance, the person may lose ERT for disciplinary
infractions. Id. at 53. ERT may be lost on a prospective basis, and ERT that was
previously lost can be restored in accordance with DOC policy. Id.
Some offenders are entitled to early general release based on accumulated
ERT. Former RCW 9.94A.150(1). However, that is not true for felony sex
offenders such as Gronquist. Id. at(2). "Instead of general release, the Legislature
specified that [such individuals] may only become eligible for transfer to
community custody status." In re Pers. Restraint ofCrowder,97 Wn. App. 598,
600, 985P.2d 944(1999).
Sex offenders thus have no "protected liberty interest in early release to
community custody." In re Pers. Restraint ofMattson, 166 Wash. 2d 730, 733,214
P.3d 141 (2009). They may only become eligible for transfer to community
In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
custody in lieu of earned release, and "[t]he legislature granted DOC the authority
to develop a program structuring the guidelines for eligibility and release of sex
offenders into the community before expiration oftheir sentences." Id. at 743.
Pursuant to this authority, DOC has adopted Policy 350.200 (rev. Aug. 2,
2010), which requires sex offenders to submit a release plan for approval before
the offender can be transferred to community custody. Without an approved
release plan, the offender must serve his or her ERT in total confinement. In re
Pers. Restraint ofCapello, 106 Wash. App. 576, 579, 24 P.3d 1074(2001).
3. "Early release date," or "ERD"
ERD is a term DOC uses to refer to the date when all that remains on a term
of confinement is ERT. When a person serving a single term of confinement
reaches the ERD,the person either is generally released or may become eligible for
transfer to community custody, as discussed above.
Gronquist, however, is serving three consecutive terms. He could not be
transferred to community custody until he had served all periods oftotal
confinement on all three terms. Former RCW 9.94A.400(5)(Laws OF 1990, ch. 3,
§ 704). Therefore, on the ERD for Gronquist's first term, DOC started his second
term. Likewise, on the ERD for Gronquist's second term, DOC started his third
term. On the ERD for Gronquist's third and final term of confinement, he became
eligible for transfer to community custody.
In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
4. "Maximum expiration date"
DOC's internal tracking system and the parties' briefing use the phrase
"maximum expiration date" to refer to the date on which Gronquist can no longer
be held in total confinement pursuant to his judgment and sentence. The parties'
disagreement focuses on what this date is.
The phrase "maximum expiration date" does not appear in the SRA,and it
has not been used consistently in case law. For indeterminate sentences predating
the SRA, we have used "maximum expiration date" to refer to the last day of the
maximum prison term set by the sentencing court. E.g.,In re Pers. Restraint of
Knapp, 102 Wash. 2d 466, 468,687 P.2d 1145 (1984). However, in later appellate
cases considering determinate, SRA-based sentences,"maximum expiration date"
has been used to refer to the last day a person may be kept in prison on his or her
judgment and sentence if no ERT is accumulated. E.g., Blick v. State, 182 Wn.
App. 24, 27, 328 P.3d 952(2014).
Applying this later usage, DOC is correct in its assertion that the maximum
expiration date of Gronquist's sentences is on the last day of his three consecutive
sentences without any adjustment for ERT. But that is not what the parties actually
dispute. They agree that without ERT, Gronquist would have to stay in total
confinement until 2022. They dispute whether with ERT, Gronquist's continued
total confinement is unlawful.
In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
B. Factual background and procedural history
On December 6 and 7, 1993, Gronquist tried to force three different
teenagers into his car. State v. Gronquist, noted at 82 Wash. App. 1066, 1996 WL
470607, at * 1. He was ultimately convicted of three counts of attempted first
degree kidnapping with special findings of sexual motivation. Id. The special
findings of sexual motivation make each attempted kidnapping a sex offense.
Former 9.94A.030(29)(b).
Gronquist was given an exceptional sentence above the standard range of
three consecutive, 114-month terms of total confinement. He was also sentenced
to community placement "for two years or up to the period of earned release
awarded pursuant to [former] RCW 9.94A.150(1) and (2) whichever is longer."^
PRP, Attach. A, Ex. 1 (J. & Sentence, App. H).
Gronquist was taken into DOC custody on February 28, 1995. At that time,
DOC calculated his potential ERD as occurring in 2018 and his maximum
expiration date as occurring in 2022. These were hand-done calculations.
When DOC initially calculated Gronquist's ERD,it capped his potential
ERT at 15 percent of his sentence. However, in 1999, this court held that
^ Following In re Personal Restraint ofBrooks, 166 Wash. 2d 664, 211 P.3d 1023 (2009),
the judgment and sentence was "amended to provide that the total term of confinement of 342
months plus the term of community custody may not exceed the statutory maximum of 360
months for the three consecutive sentences imposed in this case." Answer to Mot. for Discr.
Review, App. C(Order Amending J. & Sentence, Ex. 3).
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In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
Gronquist was statutorily entitled to accumulate ERT at a rate of33 percent.
Smith, 139 Wash. 2d at 208-09. DOC therefore recalculated Gronquist's ERD,this
time using computer software, to August 9, 2013.
The new software also recalculated the maximum expiration date by adding
114 months to the date Gronquist was expected to begin serving his third and final
term of confinement. This resulted in a maximum expiration date of October 8,
2016. A classification referral completed in 2000 also reflects a maximum
expiration date in 2016, as does a calculation from July 2008.
Gronquist contends that this 2016 maximum expiration date is correct. DOC
contends it was the result of a software error. DOC later updated its software and
recalculated Gronquist's sentence, resetting the maximum expiration date to 2022.
Gronquist first learned of this recalculation around the time he reached his
ERD in 2013. He wrote multiple grievances and letters in protest, contending that
his final term of confinement expired in 2016, 114 months after he began serving
it. For support, Gronquist relied on In re Personal Restraint ofPaschke, 61 Wn.
App. 591, 811 P.2d 694(1991), and St. Peter v. Rhay, 56 Wash. 2d 297, 352 P.2d 806
(1960). Over the next two-and-a-half years, DOC consistently asserted that the
2022 maximum expiration date was correct, but its explanations were unclear,
inconsistent, and largely unsupported by relevant legal authority.
In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
Eventually, Gronquist filed a PRP with the Court of Appeals, requesting an
order resetting the maximum expiration date to 2016 and prohibiting DOC from
confining him after that date. DOC filed a response but did not cite Paschke, St.
Peter, or any other case responsive to Gronquist's claim. The Court of Appeals
therefore requested a supplemental response from DOC. DOC's supplemental
response distinguished Paschke and St. Peter but also directly conflicted with its
original response regarding how a maximum expiration date is calculated.
The acting chiefjudge for the Court of Appeals dismissed Gronquist's PRP,
and Gronquist sought discretionary review. DOC did not respond. Our
commissioner requested an answer because "[t]he department's shifting positions
have added to the conftision in calculating Mr. Gronquist's release date." Ruling,
In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9, at 3(Wash. Nov. 17, 2017). After
DOC filed its answer, this court granted review.
ISSUES
A. Should Gronquist's PRP have been referred to a panel ofjudges for a
decision on the merits?
B. Has Gronquist shown that he is being unlawfully restrained?
ANALYSIS
To obtain relief on his PRP, Gronquist has the burden of showing that he is
under an unlawful restraint. RAP 16.4(a); In re Pers. Restraint ofGrantham, 168
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In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
Wn.2d 204, 205,227 P.3d 285 (2010). He has not had a prior opportunity to
judicially appeal the issues presented, so he is not required to make any threshold
showing of prejudice. Stuhr, 186 Wash. 2d at 52. Gronquist's continued total
confinement is clearly a restraint, so our only question is whether Gronquist has
shown that it is unlawful. Id. We hold he has not.
A. Gronquist's PRP should have been referred to a panel ofjudges
Because the Court of Appeals' order dismissing Gronquist's PRP was
entered by the acting chiefjudge alone, we must infer that the acting chiefjudge
determined Gronquist's PRP to be frivolous. In re Pers. Restraint ofKhan, 184
Wash. 2d 679, 685, 363 P.3d 577(2015)(plurality opinion); RAP 16.11(b). A
frivolous PRP is one which "fails to present an arguable basis for collateral relief
either in law or in fact, given the constraints ofthe personal restraint petition
vehicle." Khan, 184 Wash. 2d at 686-87. Although Gronquist is not entitled to relief,
his PRP is not frivolous.
From November 1999 until July 2008, DOC calculated the maximum
expiration date of Gronquist's sentences to be in 2016. When Gronquist
challenged DOC's recalculation ofthe maximum expiration date to 2022,DOC
repeatedly failed to provide a clear, legally supported explanation to him or to the
courts considering his claim. And as shown by the analysis below, resolving the
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In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
merits requires parsing a complex system of sentencing statutes with no directly
controlling authority.
Gronquist's PRP presents an arguable basis for relief and can be decided
solely on the record presented. It should therefore have been referred to a panel of
judges on the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. RAP 16.11(b).
However,the failure to do so was remedied by our consideration of Gronquist's
motion for discretionary review. Khan, 184 Wash. 2d at 687. We now consider his
PRP on the merits and deny relief.
B. Gronquist has not met his burden of showing that his restraint is unlawful
Gronquist contends that DOC either(1) miscalculated his maximum
expiration date in violation of his judgment and sentence, and the SRA,or
(2)capped his ERT at 15 percent of his sentence in violation ofSmith and the
constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy. If Gronquist is correct on either
point, his continued total confinement is an unlawful restraint. RAP 16.4(c)(2).
To determine whether Gronquist is correct, we must interpret the SRA. Statutory
interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo. State v. Jones, 172 Wash. 2d
236, 242, 257 P.3d 616(2011).
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In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
1. DOC'S tracking system lawfully tolled the ERT on Gronquist's terms
of confinement
There is no provision in the SKA that explicitly allows (or forbids)tolling
ERT on consecutive sentences. However, statutory interpretation requires us to
consider '"the statutory scheme as a whole.'" Id. (quoting State v. Jacobs, 154
Wash. 2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005)). As a whole, the SRA makes it clear that
such tolling is lawful, while the sentence structure proposed by Gronquist is not.
a. Paschke does not apply
Gronquist relies primarily on Paschke, which held that the time remaining
on one sentence continues to run when a person is paroled to begin serving a
subsequent consecutive sentence. 61 Wash. App. at 595. However,Paschke
considered an indeterminate, pre-SRA sentence and, therefore, does not apply here.
In 1972, Paschke was "sentenced to consecutive maximum terms of 10 and
20 years" for "abduction and carnal knowledge," respectively. Id. at 592. In 1974,
he was paroled from the abduction sentence and began serving the carnal
knowledge sentence. Id. In 1978, he was paroled from the carnal knowledge
sentence but was convicted of rape the next year. Id. His parole was revoked,
"and his new minimum term was set at the maximum sentence expiration date.
The issue [was] when that date will be." Id. at 593.
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In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
The Court of Appeals held that Paschke's abduction sentence expired in
1982, 10 years from the date he began serving it. Id. at 594. Likewise, the carnal
knowledge sentence expired in 1994, 20 years from the date Paschke began serving
it. Id. "Thus,the latest date Mr. Paschke can be held is June 19, 1994." Id. at 595
(citing St. Peter, 56 Wash. 2d 297). The 8 years remaining on Paschke's abduction
sentence did not toll while he was serving the carnal knowledge sentence because
"[h]is sentence continues to run notwithstanding his parole." Id. (citing State v.
Jennings, 45 Wash. App. 858, 860, 728 P.2d 1064 (1986)).
If Gronquist were serving an indeterminate, pre-SRA sentence,Paschke
would control, and we would grant relief on his PRP. But Gronquist is serving a
determinate, SRA-based sentence, and parole does not apply to him. RCW
9.95.110,.115,.900. Instead of being released early from each of his terms of
confinement on parole, Gronquist began serving each consecutive term when all
that remained on the previous term was ERT. This is not just a difference in
wording. Parole and ERT are different concepts and subject to different laws.
"[Pjarole is not a right but a mere privilege conferred as an act of grace by
the state through its own administrative agency." January v. Porter, 75 Wn.2d
768,11A, 453 P.2d 876(1969). "One on parole from a final judgment and
sentence of imprisonment is not a free man." Id. at 776. Instead,"[h]is status on
parole has been aptly described as that of one who is simply serving his time
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In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
outside the prison walls." Id. Therefore, when the offender is paroled to begin
serving a subsequent consecutive sentence, the time on the underlying sentence
continues to run. Paschke, 61 Wash. App. at 595; Jennings, 45 Wash. App. at 860.
Meanwhile, as applied to felony sex offenders, ERT provides only that the
offender may become eligible to serve a portion of his or her sentence on
community custody, rather than in total confinement.
Paschke relied on the fact that the offender was released early on parole.
Gronquist was not. Therefore, Paschke''s analysis does not apply here, nor do the
statutes and precedent it relied on.
b. Gronquist's proposed sentence structure is not permitted by law
As shown by the visual timelines at the beginning of this opinion, Gronquist
argues that the ERT on his first term overlapped with the beginning of his second
term and the ERT on his second term overlapped with the beginning of his third
term. That sentence structure conflicts with Gronquist's judgment and sentence,
and the SRA. DOC is thus acting lawfully by refusing to apply it.
First, the overlap in Gronquist's proposed sentence structure necessarily
means that parts of each of his terms would be served concurrently; that is, he
would receive credit for two terms of confinement at the same time. This is
prohibited by Gronquist's judgment and sentence, which clearly requires each 114-
month term to be served consecutively, that is, one at a time. DOC must follow
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In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
this requirement because it "ha[s] no authority to either correct or ignore the final
judgment and sentence." Dress v. Dep't ofCorr., 168 Wash. App. 319, 329, 279
P.3d875 (2012).
Second, Gronquist's sentence structure would mean that his ERT would
actually reduce the length of his first two terms of confinement and therefore
would reduce the length of his overall sentence. As discussed above, the SRA
does not allow those convicted offelony sex offenses to reduce the length oftheir
sentences with ERT. And no offender may be released from confinement early,
except in compliance with the SRA. Former RCW 9.94A.150.
Third, in addition to reducing Gronquist's overall sentence, his proposed
sentence structure could reduce the amount oftime he must spend under
supervision in the community. As required by former RCW 9.94A.120(8)(b)
(Laws of 1993, ch. 31, § 3), Gronquist was sentenced to community placement
"for two years or up to the period of earned release awarded pursuant to [former]
RCW 9.94A.150(1) and (2) whichever is longer. PRP, Attach. A,Ex. 1 (J. &
Sentence, App. H)(emphasis added). Ifthe ERT on Gronquist's first two terms
expired while he was in total confinement, as he contends, then the longest amount
of time he might serve in the community would be less than the period ofERT he
actually accumulated. This conflicts with the explicit language of his judgment
16
In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
and sentence and the SRA. It also conflicts with the legislature's strong policy
favoring community custody for sex offenders. See Jones, 111 Wash. 2d at 246.
Because the sentence structure Gronquist advocates for is inconsistent with
his judgment and sentence and the SRA,DOC's refusal to apply it is lawful.
Gronquist therefore does not show that he is under an unlawful restraint.
c. DOC's tolling ofERT on Gronquist's consecutive sentences is
consistent with the SRA
Despite the unlawfulness of his proposed sentence structure, Gronquist is
correct on one important point: there is no SRA provision that explicitly allows
DOC to toll ERT on consecutive terms of confinement. However, absent an
expressly controlling statutory provision,"we analyze the statutory scheme" in
order "to achieve a harmonious total statutory scheme maintaining the integrity of
the respective statutes." Id. at 243. Here, tolling ofERT is consistent with the
SRA as a whole.
The closest thing to an on-point statute in the SRA is its provision that
"[a]ny period of supervision shall be tolled during any period oftime the offender
is in confinement for any reason." Former RCW 9.94A.170(3)(Laws of 1993, ch.
31, § 2). IfERT were a "period of supervision," this provision would easily
answer the question presented, but that is not necessarily the case.
17
In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
Former RCW 9.94A.170(3) distinguishes between periods of supervision
and periods in confinement. Thus, time spent in total confinement cannot be a
period of supervision. However, as discussed above, a person convicted offelony
sex offenses must serve his or her ERT in total confinement unless he or she has an
approved release plan. Therefore, the provision that any period of supervision
must toll while the offender is in confinement does not explicitly require tolling of
ERT on consecutive terms imposed for felony sex offenses.
Nevertheless, such tolling is implicitly allowed because "in the case of
consecutive sentences, all periods of total confinement shall be served before any
partial confinement, community service, community supervision, or any other
requirement or conditions of any of the sentences." Former RCW 9.94A.400(5).
Transfer to community custody is thus not possible until an offender has served all
of the total confinement time for every one of his or her consecutive terms.
It would be absurd if part of a sentence could expire before it was even
possible to begin serving it. Tolling ERT avoids such a result, and where possible,
we always interpret statutes to avoid absurd results. State v. McDougal, 120
Wash. 2d 334, 350, 841 P.2d 1232(1992). Thus, tolling of periods of eligibility for
community custody, in addition to actual periods of community custody, is entirely
consistent with the SRA as applied to Gronquist and is therefore lawful.
18
In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
2. Gronquist's additional arguments are without merit
With the court's permission, Gronquist raised two additional arguments in
his supplemental brief. We reject them both on their merits.
First, Gronquist contends that DOC's recalculation of his maximum
expiration date violated the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy, which
protects "against sentence adjustments that upset a defendant's legitimate
'expectation of finality in his sentence.'" Warnickv. Booher,425 F.3d 842, 847
(10th Cir. 2005)(quoting United States v. DiFrancesco,449 U.S. 117, 136, 101
S. Ct. 426,66 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1980)); see U.S. Const, amend. V. We do not doubt
that Gronquist had a subjective expectation that his sentence would expire in 2016
and that he would be released at that time. However, as discussed above, DOC did
not have any lawful authority to generally release Gronquist in 2016. Correcting
Gronquist's sentence calculations did not actually adjust his sentence and was
therefore not a double jeopardy violation.
Second, Gronquist raises a collateral estoppel argument based on In re
Personal Restraint ofJensen, an unpublished Court of Appeals opinion. Noted at
170 Wash. App. 1017, 2012 WL 3686270. He acknowledges Jensen cannot be cited
as precedent pursuant to GR 14.1(a), but contends that the same double jeopardy
issue was raised there and DOC lost on the merits, so DOC is collaterally estopped
from challenging Gronquist's double jeopardy argument here.
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In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
However, unlike Gronquist, the petitioner in Jensen was subjected to an
actual sentence adjustment. DOC revised Jensen's risk assessment and reduced his
ERT,"not only for the sentence he was then serving, but also for the three
sentences for which the department had certified his earned release time and
release dates." 2012 WL 3686270, at *1. This was unlawful because
former DOC policy applicable at the time provided that when a person was
transferred from one consecutive sentence to the next, DOC could not revoke ERT
that the person had accumulated on the first sentence. Id. at *4.
Gronquist's ERT was not retroactively revoked or reduced. Instead, DOC
recalculated the maximum expiration date of Gronquist's sentence based on lawful
tolling of his ERT. Jensen therefore did not consider an "identical" issue and
cannot be the basis for collateral estoppel here. Dot Foods, Inc. v. Dep't of
Revenue, 185 Wash. 2d 239, 254, 372 P.3d 747(2016), cert, denied, 137 S. Ct. 2156
(2017).
CONCLUSION
Gronquist's PRP is not frivolous, but his sentence has not expired and he
does not otherwise show that he is being unlawfully restrained. We therefore deny
relief on his PRP.
20
In re Pers. Restraint ofGronquist, No. 94971-9
WE CONCUR:
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