Responsibilities of W.F-L ( 2018 )

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
November 15, 2018
2018COA164
No. 17CA2370, Parental Responsibilities of W.F-L. — Family
Law — Parenting Time — Disputes Concerning Parenting Time
— Uniform Child-custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act —
Enforcement of Registered Determination
In this parenting time dispute, a division of the court of
appeals determines that the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction under the Uniform Child-custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act to enforce parenting time orders issued by a
Georgia court. The division further holds that, under section 14-
13-306(1), C.R.S. 2018, the district court was authorized to register
the Georgia orders and simultaneously begin proceedings to enforce
them. Thus, in addressing the father’s parenting time enforcement
request, the district court could consider events that occurred
before he sought to register the Georgia orders in Colorado.
Accordingly, the district court could consider the applicability of the
remedies set forth in section 14-10-129.5, C.R.S. 2018, including
modifying an existing parenting time order, requiring make-up
parenting time for an aggrieved parent, or requiring the
noncomplying parent to pay the other parent’s attorney fees.
The division also rejects mother’s contention that the appeal
should be rejected on grounds of mootness.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2018COA164
Court of Appeals No. 17CA2370
Elbert County District Court No. 16DR30008
Honorable Robert Raymond Lung, Judge
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning W.F-L., a Child,
and Concerning Shaun Edward Lee,
Appellant,
and
Suzanne Jean Flagge,
Appellee.
ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division I
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN
Terry and Fox, JJ., concur
Announced November 15, 2018
Paul Arnold, Guardian Ad Litem
The Bruntz Law Firm, LLC, G. Damon Bruntz, Parker, Colorado, for Appellant
Plog & Stein, P.C., W. Curtis Wiberg, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 Shaun Edward Lee (father) appeals the district court’s order
denying his motion to enforce a Georgia court’s order allocating
parenting time for his child with Suzanne Jean Flagge (mother). We
reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 The parties were never married but have one child together
who was born in 2004. A Georgia court entered a final order in
2011 and a modified parenting plan in 2012 concerning the child.
In 2014, mother and the child relocated to Colorado.
¶3 In 2016, father petitioned to register the 2012 Georgia
parenting plan in Colorado under section 14-13-305, C.R.S. 2018.
Mother responded, arguing that both the parenting plan and 2011
final order from Georgia needed to be registered in Colorado and
co-petitioning to register both orders.
¶4 Father then filed a verified motion under section 14-10-129.5,
C.R.S. 2018, alleging that mother was not permitting him to
exercise his parenting time or contact the child. He requested a
hearing and that the district court order additional terms to the
parenting plan to ensure mother’s compliance and that she pay his
costs and attorney fees incurred in bringing the action.
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¶5 Mother opposed father’s motion and moved to modify
parenting time, arguing that the parties’ circumstances had
changed such that the Georgia parenting plan no longer served the
child’s best interests.
¶6 At the final orders hearing, the district court entered an order
registering the Georgia orders in Colorado and adopted the parties’
stipulations for future parenting time.1 It further found that it
lacked jurisdiction to grant father the enforcement remedies he
sought and denied his section 14-10-129.5 motion.
¶7 Father’s appeal followed.
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Enforce the Georgia Orders
¶8 Father contends that the district court erred in finding that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction and therefore denying his section
14-10-129.5 motion. We agree.
A. Legal Standards
¶9 We review de novo whether the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child-custody Jurisdiction
1 The parties stipulated that the district court had jurisdiction to
register the Georgia orders in Colorado. However, they disagreed as
to whether the Colorado court had jurisdiction to enforce the prior
Georgia orders.
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and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to enforce the Georgia parenting
time orders. See Brandt v. Brandt, 2012 CO 3, ¶ 18, 268 P.3d 406,
410.
¶ 10 The UCCJEA governs a Colorado court’s enforcement of
parental responsibilities orders entered in other states. In re
Marriage of Dedie, 255 P.3d 1142, 1145-46 (Colo. 2011); see Title
14, art. 13, Prefatory Note; §§ 14-13-301 to -314, C.R.S. 2018. A
Colorado court shall enforce another state’s parental
responsibilities orders that are entered in conformity with the
UCCJEA. § 14-13-303(1), C.R.S. 2018; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(a) (2018) (“The appropriate authorities of every State shall
enforce according to its terms . . . any custody determination or
visitation determination made . . . by a court of another State.”).
¶ 11 Under section 14-13-305(1), a parental responsibilities
determination issued by a court of another state may be registered
in Colorado, “with or without a simultaneous request for
enforcement,” by following the steps in the statute. A Colorado
court may then “grant any relief normally available under” Colorado
law to enforce the registered parental responsibilities determination.
§ 14-13-306(1), C.R.S. 2018; see § 14-13-303(2); see also § 14-13-
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306 official cmt., C.R.S. 2018 (“A registered child-custody
determination can be enforced as if it was a child-custody
determination of this State.”).
¶ 12 Section 14-10-129.5(1), (2), and (4) permits a court — after a
hearing on a parent’s verified motion adequately alleging that the
other parent is not complying with a parenting time order — to
issue one or more of the following orders:
 imposing additional terms and conditions consistent with
the existing parenting time order;
 modifying the existing order;
 requiring either parent or both to participate in a parental
education program;
 requiring the noncomplying parent to post a bond to ensure
future compliance;
 requiring make-up parenting time for the aggrieved parent;
 finding the noncomplying parent in contempt of court and
imposing a fine or jail sentence; or
 requiring the noncomplying parent to pay the other parent’s
attorney fees and costs associated with the action.
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B. Analysis
1. Mootness
¶ 13 Initially, we reject mother’s argument that father’s appeal of
the denial of his enforcement motion is moot because the district
court adopted the parties’ stipulations to modify the Georgia
parenting time orders.
¶ 14 “An issue is moot when a judgment, if rendered, would have
no practical legal effect upon the existing controversy.” In re
Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 301 (Colo. App. 2005). We will not
render an opinion on the merits of an appeal that has become moot
because of subsequent events. Id. (finding original parenting time
orders moot because they were superseded by later modifying
orders such that an appellate decision on the original orders would
have no practical legal effect).
¶ 15 Father moved for specific remedies under section 14-10-129.5
after petitioning to register the Georgia orders in Colorado. He
asked for make-up parenting time to account for the time he
allegedly missed due to mother’s actions, that mother attend a
parental education program, that she post a bond to ensure her
future compliance with parenting time, and that she pay his costs
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and attorney fees. His requests are not mooted by the modification
order. Rather, they remain undecided and could have been ordered
in addition to modification. Indeed, the statute contemplates
modification as one potential remedy for a parenting time violation
in addition to other remedies, some of which father requested here.
See § 14-10-129.5(2)(b), (b.3), (c), (d) & (4).
¶ 16 Because father did not bring an independent action against
mother for tortious interference with his parenting time, mother’s
additional mootness argument that a two-year statute of limitations
would apply to such a claim is unpersuasive.
2. Order Denying Father’s Section 14-10-129.5 Motion
¶ 17 On registering the Georgia orders, the district court was
empowered to grant any enforcement relief normally available under
Colorado law as to those orders. See § 14-13-306(1); see also § 14-
13-303(2). This includes section 14-10-129.5 remedies.
¶ 18 Although, as mother argues, section 14-13-306 refers to the
court’s enforcement of “a registered child-custody determination”
from another state, see also § 14-13-305(3)(a), nothing in the
statute prevents the court from registering the Georgia orders and
then simultaneously beginning proceedings to enforce them. To the
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contrary, the UCCJEA contemplates “a simultaneous request for
enforcement” when a parental responsibilities order from another
state is registered in Colorado. § 14-13-305(1). Accordingly,
father’s enforcement request was not “premature,” nor was it “a
‘zombie’ pleading that was filed but not legally recognized,” as
mother argues. Rather, after registering the Georgia parenting time
orders, to which mother did not object, the district court was then
required to evaluate father’s concomitant enforcement motion,
determine whether his allegations were adequate, and, if so,
conduct a hearing and rule on his request for remedies. See § 14-
10-129.5(1)-(2); see also §§ 14-13-303, -306.
¶ 19 Contrary to mother’s argument, the district court did not first
dismiss father’s enforcement motion and then register the two
Georgia orders. Rather, the court’s written order and oral rulings
reflect the opposite chronology — the court registered the orders
before mistakenly concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to address
father’s section 14-10-129.5 motion. Thus, father was not required
to renew his motion after registration as mother suggests.
¶ 20 The court’s rationale for concluding that it lacked jurisdiction
was that it could not consider a parenting time enforcement request
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related to events that happened before the parties even sought to
register the Georgia orders in Colorado. The court contrasted this
circumstance with child support where accumulated arrears from
prior years can always be enforced even if they accumulated in
another state. It found that when dealing with parenting time, “[it]
can’t turn back time” and “create [a] forum during a time that [it]
didn’t have jurisdiction” to enforce a denial of parenting time.
¶ 21 However, looking back to determine whether a parent failed to
comply with parenting time and then imposing appropriate
sanctions to redress the violation is precisely the remedy that
section 14-10-129.5 provides for an aggrieved parent. On
registration of the Georgia orders, father was entitled to seek the
same remedies as if those orders had been entered in Colorado,
including section 14-10-129.5’s backward-looking remedies. See
§ 14-13-306(1) & official cmt. Accordingly, the court erred in
denying his motion.
¶ 22 Mother’s argument that such immediate enforcement of an
order from another state is only allowed in emergency situations
pursuant to section 14-13-308, C.R.S. 2018, is unpersuasive. That
statute allows for an immediate hearing and expedited enforcement
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of another state’s order — without registration of the order — if
necessary to ensure a child’s safety. See id. However, Colorado
courts still have a duty to enforce another state’s orders, and the
UCCJEA permits courts, on registering such orders, to enforce
them through any remedy available under Colorado law. See §§ 14-
13-303, -305(1), (3)(a), -306.
¶ 23 We also reject mother’s contention that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction because section 14-13-305(3)(a) provides that “a
registered determination is enforceable as of the date of the
registration in the same manner as a determination issued by a
court of this state.” If this provision were interpreted as mother
suggests, it would eviscerate the meaning of section 14-13-306(1),
discussed above, which provides that a Colorado court “may grant
any relief normally available under [Colorado law] to enforce a
registered child-custody determination made by a court of another
state.”
III. Conclusion
¶ 24 The order is reversed, and the case is remanded for the district
court to address father’s section 14-10-129.5 motion and, if
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appropriate, set a hearing to determine his request for sanctions,
including attorney fees and costs under section 14-10-129.5(4).
¶ 25 The provisions of the court’s order adopting the parties’
stipulations to modify parenting time were not appealed and thus
remain undisturbed.
JUDGE TERRY and JUDGE FOX concur.
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