People v. Gomez , 6 Cal. 5th 243 ( 2018 )


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  •          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
    CALIFORNIA
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    RUBEN PEREZ GOMEZ,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    S087773
    Los Angeles County Superior Court
    BA156930
    November 29, 2018
    Justice Liu filed the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice
    Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, Kruger,
    and Lui concurred.
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    S087773
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    Defendant Ruben Perez Gomez was sentenced to death in
    2000 for the first degree murders of Rajendra Patel and Raul
    Luna, Jr. He was also sentenced to life in prison without the
    possibility of parole for the double murder of Robert Acosta and
    Robert Dunton. This appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239,
    subd. (b); all undesignated statutory references are to this code.)
    We affirm the judgment in its entirety.
    I.   FACTS
    In an amended information filed on July 7, 1998, in Los
    Angeles County Superior Court, the district attorney charged
    Gomez with five counts of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)),
    six counts of second degree robbery (§ 211), and one count of
    kidnapping (§ 207). The amended information alleged personal
    firearm use enhancements in connection with each count.
    (Former §§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a).) The
    amended information also alleged multiple-murder, robbery,
    and kidnapping special circumstances. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3),
    (17).)
    The prosecution withdrew one of the robbery counts before
    trial, and the trial court dismissed one of the five remaining
    counts of robbery during trial. A jury convicted Gomez of four
    counts of first degree murder, two counts of second degree
    robbery, and one count of kidnapping. The jury found true the
    special circumstance allegation of multiple murder as well as
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    the special circumstance allegations of robbery and kidnapping
    in connection with the Patel murder. Although the jury
    convicted Gomez of the first degree murder of Luna, it acquitted
    him of the robbery of Luna and the associated robbery special
    circumstance and personal firearm use enhancement. The jury
    was unable to reach a verdict on the murder and robbery counts
    relating to the separate killing of Jesus Escareno; the trial court
    declared a mistrial on these counts, which the prosecution
    subsequently dismissed pursuant to section 1385.
    The penalty phase took place before the same jury. After
    two days of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of death
    for the murders of Luna and Patel, and of life without parole for
    the murders of Acosta and Dunton.
    A. Guilt Phase
    1. Prosecution Evidence
    a. The Salcedo Robbery
    Gomez and Xavier Salcedo knew each other from “growing
    up.” Salcedo testified that Gomez came to his home sometime
    in February 1997 and told Salcedo that he was out of jail and
    asked for money. Salcedo denied having any money. About two
    weeks later, around 11:00 p.m. on February 25, Gomez returned
    with two other men. Salcedo, his girlfriend, Silvia, and their
    three children were home. Salcedo had about $10,000 in cash in
    his bedroom closet.
    Salcedo testified that he heard someone knock on the back
    door and that he told them to come around to the front. When
    Salcedo opened the front door, Gomez and a second man forced
    their way into the house while a third man remained standing
    in the open doorway. Gomez told Salcedo, “I want to talk to you,
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    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    sit the fuck down.” Gomez sat on the couch next to Salcedo, and
    the second man stood facing them about four feet away. Gomez’s
    two confederates held their hands in their pockets, giving
    Salcedo the impression that they had guns. Gomez had a gun
    tucked into his waistband.
    Gomez said that Salcedo had “disrespected him” when he
    came to Salcedo’s house two weeks earlier to borrow money.
    Gomez pulled the gun from his waistband, pointed it at Salcedo,
    and told Salcedo to take off his jewelry. Salcedo handed over his
    gold bracelet, necklace, ring, and watch. Gomez told Salcedo to
    close the bedroom door so they could talk. Salcedo went to close
    the door and told Silvia, who was in the bedroom, that he was
    being robbed. Silvia testified that she called 911 from the
    bedroom.
    Salcedo further testified that he went back to the living
    room, where Gomez told him to “sit down” and to “shut up.”
    Gomez pointed the gun at Salcedo, asked if he had any money,
    and told him to “go get it.” Salcedo went to his bedroom, grabbed
    about $5,000, handed a gun to Silvia, and told her “if they come
    in here, protect yourself.” Salcedo returned to the hallway, gave
    Gomez the money, and the two went back into the living room.
    Salcedo pleaded with Gomez to give back the jewelry because it
    had been a gift from his parents. Gomez handed his gun to
    Salcedo while the second man in the living room looked on, but
    Salcedo handed it back and said, “I don’t want any problems.”
    Gomez gave back the jewelry, and the three men left with the
    cash. Salcedo locked the door, turned off the lights, and went
    back into the bedroom where Silvia was still on the phone with
    a 911 operator.
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    Salcedo told Silvia to “grab the kids and let’s go,” but the
    three men returned before Salcedo and his family could leave.
    The men demanded that Salcedo open the door or they would
    shoot though the walls. Silvia called 911 a second time from the
    bedroom. Salcedo looked out the window and saw a friend walk
    up to the house. The friend spoke with the three men. The men
    started knocking on the door again, and Gomez threatened to
    shoot through the walls. The police arrived; Gomez and the
    others ran off around the back.
    b. The Patel Murder
    In the early morning of May 27, 1997, Detective Sal La
    Barbera received an assignment to investigate the “northbound
    Terminal Island Freeway on-ramp between Anaheim and PCH.”
    When La Barbera arrived, the scene was already contained by
    police officers, who had found a body on the shoulder of the on-
    ramp, apparently shot and stabbed. Officers found blood about
    75 feet north of the victim’s body. Two days later, after
    recovering a missing persons flier on a telephone pole in
    Torrance, La Barbera identified the victim as Rajendra Patel.
    The officer spoke with Patel’s family and then verified Patel’s
    identity by checking his thumb print against the victim’s.
    A county medical examiner testified that Patel was shot
    once in the back of his head at close range, with the tip of the
    gun barrel making contact with his head. The medical examiner
    also testified that Patel received stab wounds in the face and
    neck, and one particularly deep stab wound in the chest. The
    medical examiner attributed Patel’s death to the gunshot wound
    and the deep stab wound. He further opined that Patel would
    have been able to walk or run 75 to 90 feet after receiving the
    deep stab wound, but not after receiving the gunshot wound.
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    Patel was last seen on May 25, 1997, around 9:00 p.m. at
    his home in La Palma. The victim’s son testified that his father
    left home in his white Toyota Camry, wearing a bracelet, a gold
    watch, and a chain. On May 28, 1997, a police officer discovered
    Patel’s car after being directed via radio call to locate a stolen
    vehicle in an alley in San Pedro. The interior of the car was
    found burned. A police department criminalist compared DNA
    extracted from blood found in the trunk of the Camry to Patel’s
    DNA and testified that the blood “could have come from Mr.
    Patel or any other individual with the same combination of
    genetic marker types.” The criminalist further testified that the
    relevant combination of genetic marker types “occurs
    approximately one in 60,000 individuals, so it’s fairly rare in the
    general population.”
    Witness No. 1 testified that Gomez had asked him to burn
    the white Camry. (Before trial, the prosecutor asked that
    Witness No. 1 and three other witnesses not be named in the
    record, although their real names were used during the
    proceedings. We likewise refer to these witnesses without
    naming them.) Witness No. 1 complied with Gomez’s request
    because they “were tight.” He took the car to an alley and then
    poured alcohol on the upholstery so that the vehicle’s interior
    would ignite when he threw a lit rag into the car. Witness No.
    1 believed the car was a “murder car” because Gomez had told
    him to “check the trunk good to make sure there wasn’t no blood
    in it.” Witness No. 1 also testified that three or four days before
    Gomez asked him to burn the car, Gomez said, “I hated to kill
    that guy because he had balls. He said ‘if you’re going to do it,
    go ahead and shoot me, motherfucker.’ ” According to Witness
    No. 1, Gomez later put “a hit” out on him “for not burning the
    white car completely” because Gomez “was worried about his
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    fingerprints.” Witness No. 1 testified that Gomez brought
    Patel’s watch and bracelet to Robert Dunton’s house at least one
    or two days before he burned Patel’s car.
    Witness No. 3 testified that Gomez brought Patel’s jewelry
    to Witness No. 3’s residence in Wilmington, where her husband
    traded narcotics for the jewelry. During the transaction, Gomez
    told Witness No. 3 and her husband that the jewelry was “from
    this Mexican man I have in the trunk of the car I just killed.”
    Witness No. 3 observed that a white car was parked in the
    driveway while Gomez was at her home. Witness No. 3 later
    pawned the watch and bracelet in Las Vegas, Nevada, on June
    5, 1997. The police collected Witness No. 3’s pawn slip when she
    was arrested for an unrelated crime on July 2, 1997. Police
    investigators subsequently recovered Patel’s jewelry from the
    Las Vegas pawn shop.
    The police also found three expended .40-caliber cartridge
    casings when investigating the crime scene on May 27, 1997.
    One of the cartridges was located between 90 and 100 feet from
    the body, the second “just a few feet shorter . . . probably only a
    three or four foot difference,” and the third within three feet of
    the body. These casings were later matched to a Smith and
    Wesson .40-caliber stainless steel semiautomatic handgun given
    to a police officer by Angel Rodriguez on June 8, 1997. During
    trial, a firearm examiner testified that his forensic analysis of
    the .40-caliber handgun revealed that it was the source of the
    expended casings found near Patel’s body. Witness No. 1 later
    identified the same handgun as the one Gomez carried “when he
    first started coming around [Dunton’s] house.”
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    c. The Escareno Murder
    On the morning of June 9, 1997, Detective Debra Winter
    and her partner arrived at a shopping center on Western Avenue
    in San Pedro to investigate a homicide. Winter testified that she
    saw the “body of a male Hispanic, approximately 30 years of age,
    lying face down” in an alcove behind the shopping center. The
    body had been discovered by a maintenance worker earlier that
    morning. The maintenance worker testified that “there was no
    body” when he arrived for his shift at 5:30 a.m., but that he
    discovered the body when he returned to the area between 7:30
    and 8:00 a.m.
    There was brain tissue on the victim’s suit and on the
    ground immediately surrounding the body. A fragment of glass
    was also recovered from the victim’s hair at the crime scene. A
    county medical examiner testified that the victim had been
    killed by a shotgun blast to the head from a distance of about
    one or two feet.
    No jewelry was found on the victim’s body, but there were
    indentations on the victim’s fingers where he had been wearing
    rings. One of the victim’s pockets was turned out, and Winter
    concluded that someone had rifled through it. Although there
    was no wallet or identification upon the victim’s person, the
    police discovered a business card for the restaurant Los Tres
    Cochinitos in the victim’s right front pocket. Workers at Los
    Tres Cochinitos examined a photograph of the victim and
    identified him as a regular customer who bussed tables at
    another restaurant. Upon visiting the victim’s workplace,
    Winter was able to identify the victim as Jesus Escareno.
    On June 11, 1997, two days after Escareno’s body was
    discovered, his car was found in San Pedro. Winter testified that
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    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    the car’s roof was dented from pellets that had been shot into
    the vehicle. Blood and brain matter were found between the
    passenger seat and the passenger side door. A vanity mirror in
    the visor had been shattered by a shotgun blast, which was
    consistent with the glass found in Escareno’s hair at the crime
    scene. Winter testified that in her opinion Escareno’s death did
    not occur where the car was found and that someone had driven
    the car following Escareno’s homicide.
    Diana Paul, a criminalist with the Los Angeles Police
    Department, performed a “bullet path determination” analysis
    on Escareno’s car. Paul examined the vehicle and found
    projectiles “consistent with a type of shot shell pellet known as
    double aught buck . . . typical of a 12 gauge shotgun.” Paul
    testified as to his finding that the projectiles traveled “upward
    and from the driver’s side toward the passenger side.” Paul
    further testified that this finding was consistent with a shotgun
    having been fired through the open driver’s side window and
    that her findings “could be consistent with only one shot” having
    been fired from the shotgun.
    Maria Rosales, Escareno’s sister, lived in Wilmington with
    her husband, her children, and Escareno. According to Rosales,
    Escareno normally worked as a busboy until 10:30 p.m. on
    Sundays. After work, he typically went out to Los Tres
    Cochinitos “to chat with his friends.” Escareno always carried a
    wallet. Rosales testified that on Sunday, June 8, 1997, Escareno
    came home after work, “slept for a while at home,” then went
    out. Teresa Nava, a waitress at Los Tres Cochinitos, confirmed
    that Escareno had been at the restaurant on June 9 and that he
    left the establishment around 4:10 a.m. That morning, Rosales
    “awoke with the sound of a gunshot,” which “coincided with the
    time [Escareno] usually arrived” at home.
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    Deanna Gallardo lived in the apartment directly upstairs
    from Escareno and Rosales. Gallardo was sleeping in bed when
    a gunshot sounded from “right in front of the apartment
    complex” at 4:42 a.m. on June 9. Gallardo and her husband ran
    to the front window where she saw “the red glare of the brakes”
    and heard “the skidding of a car.” Pero Hererra, who lived about
    four houses down from Escareno, was in his kitchen early that
    morning getting a drink of water when he also heard a gunshot.
    In an interview with Winter on July 2, 1997, Hererra said that
    from his kitchen window he had seen a car park alongside what
    looked like his neighbor’s car, that he saw a flash “coming from
    inside,” and that he heard a blast from a large gun or shotgun.
    Around this time, Witness No. 1 was living in San Pedro
    at Robert Dunton’s house. Witness No. 1 met Gomez through
    Dunton. Witness No. 1 and Gomez became friends and were
    “pretty tight for a while.” Witness No. 1 testified that he was
    driving Gomez around one evening and that Gomez “was looking
    for somebody to rob.” Gomez had in his possession a cut-down,
    break-open shotgun nicknamed “shorty” that belonged to
    Witness No. 1 and Dunton. They drove from San Pedro to
    Wilmington.
    Upon passing a bar, Gomez asked Witness No. 1, “Did you
    see that guy, with all them rings on his finger[s]?” The man with
    the rings drove off in a Ford Thunderbird; Witness No. 1 and
    Gomez followed him. After losing track of the car, the pair
    located it in front of an apartment complex in Wilmington. They
    pulled up next to the Thunderbird, and Gomez started talking
    to the driver in Spanish.
    According to Witness No. 1, the driver of the Thunderbird
    seemed tipsy because he was laughing a lot. Gomez told him, “I
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    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    got mucho huevos and mucho corazon.” Witness No. 1 explained
    this meant he had a lot of balls and a lot of heart. As the driver
    of the Thunderbird laughed, Gomez lifted the shotgun and fired
    one shot. Witness No. 1 testified that the driver “suddenly
    disappeared.” Gomez then told Witness No. 1 to drive the
    Thunderbird back to San Pedro so they could remove the rings
    from the victim’s fingers. When Witness No. 1 entered the
    driver’s side of the Thunderbird, he noticed that the victim’s
    head was over by the passenger door and his left foot was up
    behind the steering wheel. Gomez drove off while Witness No.
    1 moved the victim’s foot from behind the steering wheel.
    Witness No. 1 drove the Thunderbird a couple of blocks to a
    hamburger stand, parked it in a dirt lot, took the man’s wallet,
    and walked back to Dunton’s house in San Pedro. Witness No.
    1 spent $10 of the victim’s money on heroin before he arrived at
    Dunton’s house. When Dunton learned of this, he told Witness
    No. 1 that he “didn’t follow orders.” Witness No. 1 gave Gomez
    the victim’s remaining money, about $70.
    Witness No. 1 went back to the car; the body and keys were
    still inside. He drove the Thunderbird to an alley in San Pedro
    about a half block from Dunton’s house. Witness No. 1 returned
    to the house, and Gomez ordered him to retrieve the dead man’s
    jewelry. Witness No. 1 took rings and two watches off the body
    and brought them to Gomez. Gomez gave the items to Dunton,
    who told him that the items were costume jewelry. The jewelry
    was thrown away.
    Gomez subsequently told Witness No. 1 to dispose of the
    car and the body. Witness No. 1 testified that he drove the
    Thunderbird to the Park Plaza shopping center and left the body
    near two dumpsters “where somebody could find him.” He then
    drove the car back to an open garage in an alley near Dunton’s
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    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    house. Witness No. 1 parked the car, walked down the alley,
    took his blood-stained shirt off and threw it in a garbage can,
    and walked back to Dunton’s house.
    Later, after Gomez had been taken into custody, Winter
    and her partner paid him a visit “to determine the tattoos that
    he had.” Winter testified that she asked Gomez some routine
    questions as part of the booking procedure. According to Winter,
    Gomez made several statements that were not responsive to her
    questions. For example, he opined that the police “must be very
    busy” because “things were crazy” in the Harbor area lately.
    Gomez “talked about a guy up on Western, his head being shot
    off,” and he mentioned “a couple of guys that were shot and
    brains were splattered all over the place.” Gomez said these
    individuals couldn’t be identified and that their wallets were
    missing. Winter further testified that she had not released
    information to the press about Escareno’s wallet being missing.
    d. The Luna Murder
    At approximately 1:20 a.m. on June 10, 1997, Detective
    Jeffrey Lancaster was dispatched to a shooting at a residence in
    Torrance. Lancaster arrived to find the body of Raul Luna, Jr.
    “laying adjacent to a walkway that runs from the sidewalk to
    the front porch” of the house. He observed a gunshot wound on
    the left rear portion of Luna’s head but no other wounds. A live,
    12-gauge shotgun cartridge was found about 15 feet east of
    Luna’s body. Officers also located “a clear plastic baggie with a
    kind of white brown substance” near Luna’s knee, which was
    later identified as methamphetamine. Upon searching the
    residence, officers discovered more methamphetamine, an
    assault rifle, money, and “some other ammunition, .45 caliber.”
    Raul’s father later testified that Raul sold illegal drugs.
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    A county medical examiner performed an autopsy on
    Luna’s body and determined that the cause of death was a
    gunshot wound to the head fired from about six to 12 inches
    away. During trial, another medical examiner testified that
    photos of the decedent revealed a circular wound with tearing
    into and behind the left ear. The medical examiner described
    “fully burnt gunpowder” scattered around the skin near the
    shotgun wound hole and noted damage to the skin in the same
    area from the burnt gunpowder.
    Rudy Luna, Raul’s brother, testified that at approximately
    midnight on June 9, 1997, he arrived at the home he shared with
    Raul, another brother named Andy, his sister-in-law Alice, and
    his nephew Andrew. Rudy lay down to go to bed at 12:06 a.m.
    A few minutes later, he heard a “loud, muffled
    engine . . . sounding rough like a truck” before hearing a car pull
    up to the middle of the street directly in front of the Luna
    residence. Approximately three to five minutes later, Rudy
    heard “rustle noises” in front of his bedroom window, so he
    looked out. Rudy explained that he “didn’t see anything, so [he]
    laid back down, and then a minute after that [he] heard someone
    say, ‘there’s somebody in there, there’s someone in there.’ ” After
    a couple minutes, Rudy heard the same voice say “he’s here”; he
    then heard his brother Raul say “oh, shit.” Rudy next heard a
    gunshot and immediately lay down onto his bedroom floor.
    Eventually, Rudy walked to his kitchen window, which faces the
    front of the house. He did not see anybody but heard “a muffled
    garbled cough” and walked outside to find Raul “lying flat on his
    back bleeding from the head.”
    Charles Orr lived on the same street as the Luna family.
    On the night in question, Orr was working on his computer
    shortly after midnight when he heard “what sounded like an
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    explosion.” Orr assumed that the sound was a malfunctioning
    electrical transformer at the school down the street. “All of a
    sudden,” Orr heard running and “a kind of rattling noise,” so he
    looked out of his window to see someone “about [Orr’s] size”
    running eastbound in a “heavy footed” way. Orr left his house
    and walked down the street to follow the runner but did not see
    anyone.
    Around the same time, William Owens, a federal customs
    officer, was smoking a cigar across the street from his
    apartment, less than a mile east of the Luna residence. That
    night, Owens saw a man running eastbound toward him. The
    man asked Owens to “give him a ride to his girlfriend’s,” but
    Owens declined. The man continued to run eastbound. Owens
    soon called the Torrance Police Department and reported
    “hearing [a] gunshot about 1:00 a.m.” During the trial, Owens
    identified the running man as Ruben Gomez.
    Officer Steve Fletcher testified that upon canvassing the
    crime scene for possible witnesses, he spotted a silvery white
    and black Oldsmobile from the mid-1980s parked about a
    hundred yards south of the Luna residence. Fletcher noticed
    that the car windows were rolled down, the keys were still in the
    ignition, the hood was warm to the touch, and the tires were wet,
    “appearing as they just had been driven up through the water
    that was in the gutter.” Officers found a radio and a white
    plastic bag containing seven live 12-gauge shotgun rounds in the
    backseat of the vehicle.
    The vehicle was towed to an impound yard later that day,
    where Officer Brooke Mc Millan took additional photographs of
    the vehicle’s interior. Mc Millan fingerprinted both the interior
    and exterior of the car and collected 34 lifts. Two prints lifted
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    from the exterior surface of the passenger door belonged to a
    woman named Maria Baca. One print lifted from the rearview
    mirror matched Baca while the other matched another woman
    named Sandra Ruvalcaba. Seven prints from the driver’s
    window exterior matched Gomez and one matched Ruvalcaba.
    Finally, three prints from the driver’s door exterior matched
    Gomez.
    While the investigation into Luna’s death was ongoing,
    officers investigating the murders of Robert Acosta and Robert
    Dunton recovered a cellphone at Dunton’s house in San Pedro.
    Witness No. 1 testified that Gomez had brought the phone into
    Dunton’s house. The police were unable to identify fingerprints
    from the lifts taken from the cellular phone. But when
    Lancaster asked Luna’s father to identify the phone, he
    successfully matched the phone’s serial number with the serial
    number found on the phone’s packaging, which was stored at the
    Lunas’ residence.
    At trial, a custodian of records for AirTouch Cellular
    testified about 10 phone calls made after midnight from the
    telephone number registered to Raul Luna. Four calls were
    made to unknown numbers. Two calls were made to cab
    companies, one to a hotel in Wilmington, and one to Dunton. As
    discussed further below, Gomez had been staying at Dunton’s
    home “off and on for about a month.”
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    e. The Acosta and Dunton Murders
    Around 3:48 a.m. on July 1, 1997, police officers responded
    to a 911 call regarding a possible assault with a deadly weapon
    at 332 West O’Farrell Street in San Pedro. After knocking on
    the front door and receiving no response, and after trying
    unsuccessfully to open the front door, the officers accessed the
    home through a back door and discovered dead bodies inside.
    Detective Olivia Joya and her partner Detective Scott
    Masterson were assigned to investigate the matter around 4:20
    a.m. They found the body of Robert Acosta on the living room
    floor and the body of Robert Dunton on a living room sofa.
    Masterson testified that Acosta’s head was a “very short
    distance” from the front door. Joya testified that four spent
    Remington shotgun shell casings, a bag of shotgun shells, the
    sawed-off wood stock of a shotgun, a metal tube, drugs and drug
    paraphernalia, and a cellphone were all recovered from the
    scene. As noted above, the cellphone was later traced to Raul
    Luna.
    An autopsy of Acosta’s body determined that he had been
    killed by a single shotgun wound to the neck and that the
    shotgun had been placed “at the throat in some contact” with
    the neck. Dunton’s autopsy revealed that he had been killed by
    a shotgun wound to the back of the head, although Dunton
    received three shotgun wounds in total.
    Manuel Hernandez, who lived in the residence
    immediately to the west of Dunton’s home, told investigators
    that he heard what sounded like three gunshots at about 3:15
    a.m. on July 1, 1997. When he peeked outside of his window,
    Hernandez saw that Dunton’s house was dark and that one man
    came out of the back door and ran down a walkway toward
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    O’Farrell Street. The man was between five feet, six inches to
    five feet, eight inches tall; the parties stipulated that Gomez is
    six feet, two inches tall and that Arthur Grajeda, Gomez’s
    codefendant as to the Acosta and Dunton charges, is five feet,
    eight inches to five feet, ten inches tall. Hernandez then heard
    a car start nearby. He subsequently noticed someone turn on
    the lights in the Dunton residence and say “oh, my god” before
    leaving the house through the back door.
    Witness No. 1 testified that he was present in the home
    when Acosta and Dunton were shot and that he was the person
    who placed the 911 call. Witness No. 1 had known Acosta and
    Dunton since approximately 1975. For several months prior to
    the killings, Witness No. 1 lived with Dunton at Dunton’s
    residence on O’Farrell Street. Witness No. 1 paid Dunton some
    rent and helped him by “working the door” and letting people
    into the home to buy drugs from Dunton. Dunton weighed
    around 500 pounds and had difficulty getting up from the couch
    to answer the door. Witness No. 1 first met Gomez about a
    month before Acosta and Dunton were killed, when Gomez came
    to the house to buy drugs. Gomez and Dunton became friends,
    and Gomez began napping and showering at Dunton’s house
    within a week or two of his first visit.
    During the week before Acosta and Dunton were shot, a
    man who went by “Boxer” came to Dunton’s house two days in a
    row. On the first visit, Boxer complained, “You ain’t paying your
    taxes and they’re getting on me because I’m not doing my job.”
    The next day, Boxer returned with his girlfriend and another
    person. He threatened Gomez with a machete while the other
    two held him back. He then took $100 and a small chrome
    handgun from Gomez. When Gomez complained about the gun,
    Boxer said, “Well, I’ll give it back to you.” Gomez then called
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    someone in Wilmington and said he “need[ed] a gun, any kind of
    gun” and insisted that it was a matter of “life or death.”
    Someone brought over a shotgun, and Gomez and Witness No. 1
    cut six inches from the barrel and cut the stock off to make it
    easier to conceal.
    The night before Acosta and Dunton’s murder, Witness
    No. 1 and Gomez drove to a location in Wilmington known as
    “the third world” or “the junk yard” where drug dealing took
    place. Witness No. 1 flashed some money and offered to buy
    crack cocaine from a drug dealer. When the dealer presented
    the drugs, Gomez drew the cut-down shotgun and took the drugs
    without paying.
    Gomez and Witness No. 1 subsequently drove back to
    Dunton’s house. Gomez said to Witness No. 1, “They sent
    somebody to fuck [Dunton] and [Acosta] up.” Upon entering
    Dunton’s house, the pair found Acosta, Dunton, and Grajeda
    seated inside. Gomez and Witness No. 1 sat down at a table; the
    cut-down shotgun was placed on the table. Grajeda was seated
    on a small couch facing Dunton and held a different
    shotgun — the weapon that Witness No. 1 and Dunton referred
    to as “shorty.” Dunton sat on a large couch facing the door, and
    Acosta was standing near the door. Witness No. 1 subsequently
    left the room to prepare some crystal methamphetamine in his
    bedroom.
    From his bedroom, Witness No. 1 heard Dunton say, “If I
    got to go, I’m going to go like a man.” Grajeda said, “You know
    the rules,” and Gomez added, “Yeah, forward and backward.”
    Gomez then said, “Don’t point that at me. I don’t like people
    pointing things at me.” Thereafter, Witness No. 1 heard about
    four gunshots, running footsteps, and a bump against the
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
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    washing machine near the back door. Witness No. 1 went into
    the living room and saw Acosta lying by the front door and
    Dunton seated on the couch with his head to the side.
    Witness No. 1 went out the back door and rode his bicycle
    toward a convenience store to call 911. On the way, he passed a
    business where his friend worked, and he went in and called
    911. He then continued to the convenience store. Witness No.
    1 testified that he was afraid to go back to Dunton’s house
    because he “figured they would . . . come back and get me.” But
    during an interview with Detective Joya and Detective
    Masterson on July 2, 1997, Witness No. 1 said that he had gone
    out to get something to eat and had come home to find the
    bodies. In court, Witness No. 1 acknowledged this discrepancy
    and explained: “Because both of them was gone and I was
    there . . . I was afraid it might look like I did it.”
    Witness No. 2 testified that he had known Grajeda, who
    was dating Witness No. 2’s niece, for about four to five years.
    Witness No. 2 had also known Dunton and Acosta for about 30
    years; Dunton lived behind Witness No. 2’s mother’s house. The
    day before Acosta and Dunton were shot, Witness No. 2 went to
    Donald Jauez’s house around 3:30 or 4:00 p.m. Grajeda was
    already there, along with four to six other people, having drinks.
    Witness No. 2 testified that he heard Grajeda say that Gomez
    was supposed to be collecting taxes for the Mexican Mafia and
    that “[Dunton] wasn’t paying up, [Gomez] wasn’t paying up.”
    Witness No. 2 recalled Grajeda saying he would “go over there
    and take care of [Gomez].”
    Grajeda then asked Witness No. 2 to drive him to Dunton’s
    house because Grajeda “wanted to go check out the place.”
    Witness No. 2 complied. They arrived at Dunton’s house around
    18
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    4:30 or 5:00 p.m. Gomez answered the door and they went
    inside. Witness No. 1, Witness No. 2, Gomez, Grajeda, and
    Dunton were all present. Witness No. 2 and Grajeda stayed 20
    or 30 minutes and made small talk. Gomez was “nervous” and
    “was walking back and forth.” Witness No. 2, suspecting that
    another person may have been in the bedroom, said to Grajeda,
    “Let’s get out of here. It don’t look right.”
    Grajeda and Gomez walked outside, followed by Witness
    No. 2. Grajeda and Gomez went over to a vehicle and talked for
    a few minutes. Acosta arrived, greeted them, and went inside
    the house. Witness No. 2 drove Grajeda back to Jauez’s house
    and dropped him off around 5:30 p.m. During the drive, Grajeda
    asked Witness No. 2 to come back at 8:00 p.m. to pick him up
    and drive him back to Dunton’s house. Grajeda told Witness No.
    2 that he intended to kill Gomez and possibly Dunton if Dunton
    “didn’t pay up his taxes.” Witness No. 2 agreed to return at 8:00
    p.m.
    Around 6:00 p.m., Witness No. 2 went to his mother’s
    apartment. He told his girlfriend that Grajeda was going to call
    and instructed her to say that Witness No. 2 was asleep and that
    she would not wake him. Witness No. 2 did not see Grajeda
    again until about two days after Acosta and Dunton had been
    killed. Witness No. 2 told Grajeda that “[Acosta] and [Dunton]
    got killed,” and Grajeda said that he “did it.”
    Witness No. 4, Gomez’s cousin, testified that she saw
    Gomez on July 2, 1997, for the first time in about eight years.
    Sometime in the late afternoon, Gomez knocked on the door to
    her home in Long Beach and said that he needed a place to stay.
    He was carrying a bag and “kind of a big gun” that resembled
    the shotgun that he and Witness No. 1 had cut down and
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    removed the stock from. Witness No. 4 subsequently left Gomez
    in her house and walked to her friend’s house, where she
    eventually called the police.
    Around 3:00 or 3:30 a.m., Gomez was arrested at Witness
    No. 4’s home without incident. Upon searching the residence,
    officers discovered the cut-down shotgun. Three of four
    fingerprints lifted from the shotgun matched Gomez. Daniel
    Rubin, a criminalist with the Los Angeles Police Department’s
    Firearms Analyst Unit, testified that four spent cartridges
    discovered at Dunton’s house were fired by the shotgun
    confiscated from Gomez during his arrest, and that one live
    round recovered from Dunton’s house was “the type of shot
    cartridge that could be loaded in and fired by” the shotgun.
    Rubin further noted that a metal tube found at Dunton’s
    residence “could have been a part of the barrel of [the] shotgun.”
    On July 7, 1997, detectives acting on information provided by
    Witness No. 1 recovered a cut-off shotgun stock from a trashcan
    in Dunton’s kitchen.
    Witness No. 5, Acosta’s wife, testified that Gomez called
    her after his arrest and asked her to come visit him at the county
    jail. At the jail, Gomez denied killing Acosta and Dunton, and
    told Witness No. 5 that he knew “that he had left fingerprints
    all over the house and even fingerprints on [Dunton’s] face, and
    he even kissed him.” Gomez also acknowledged that he was “the
    last person there” when Acosta and Dunton were killed.
    Witness No. 5 further testified that she found a note
    between the pages of a Bible five days after Acosta’s death. The
    handwritten note was signed by Acosta in his full name and his
    street name “Spider.” She testified that she and Acosta “always”
    left notes for each other, but that Acosta had never left a note
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    for her signed with his full name. Witness No. 5 said that the
    note “meant something serious,” so she turned it over to the
    detectives investigating Acosta’s death. The note read as
    follows: “6-30.97 [¶] Tuesday morning [¶] Monday nite 1.20 [¶]
    Went to meet [¶] Shady La Rana [¶] don’t like the [¶] meeting
    at Big Huero [¶] Robert Acosta [¶] Spider.” (“Shady La Rana”
    was Grajeda’s nickname, and “Big Huero” referred to Dunton.)
    The prosecution also presented expert testimony from
    Sergeant Richard Valdemar about the history and practices of
    the Mexican Mafia.        Valdemar recounted some of his
    observations from surveilling Mexican Mafia meetings,
    including the fact that murder was a primary topic of
    conversation. He further stated that the Mexican Mafia had a
    “reputation for seeking out witnesses and killing them” and that
    loyal Mexican Mafia members “would use any means possible to
    delay, obstruct or reverse any kind of a criminal prosecution
    against its members.” Moreover, after viewing Gomez’s tattoos,
    Valdemar testified that Gomez was “a member of the East Side
    Wilmas gang, Ghost Town Locos, which is a subset, and
    surrenos.” He had previously stated “[t]hat members of the East
    Side Wilmas gang . . . align themselves with the Mexican
    Mafia.”
    Valdemar also explained that individuals can be placed
    “on a green light list” and that “gang members have a green light
    or the authorization to assault and murder whoever is on that
    list.” Valdemar noted that “all dope dealers who operate in the
    area controlled by the street gangs that are controlled by [the
    Mexican Mafia] pay taxes,” and agreed with the prosecution
    that a “Hispanic street gang member who by reason of his
    tattoos was professing allegiance to [the Mexican Mafia]” and
    “was robbing dope dealers in San Pedro and Wilmington and not
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    turning over those proceeds to [the Mexican Mafia]” would likely
    be placed on the green light list and specifically designated to be
    killed. He further explained that someone on the green light list
    might be given an assignment for a “suicide run” where the
    individual murders someone else on behalf of the Mexican Mafia
    so as to be removed from the list. Valdemar also noted that the
    Mexican Mafia often “used someone close to the victim to either
    approach them or actually carry out the murder.”
    During a break in Valdemar’s testimony, one of the jurors
    sent a note to the trial court judge, that read as follows: “Judge,
    I have a question! What about jury members. Are we at risk?”
    Additionally, at the end of guilt phase deliberations, the jury
    sent a note signed by the foreperson to the court, stating that
    the jurors were “concerned about possible harassment or
    problems after we are dismissed once the verdicts are read.” The
    trial court subsequently rearranged the jurors’ parking and
    provided for them to be escorted to their cars.
    2. Defense Evidence
    a. The Patel Murder
    When Gomez was arrested on July 2, 1997, the police did
    not find any .40-caliber pistols on his person. Nor did the police
    recover such handguns at the crime scenes of the Luna,
    Escareno, or Acosta and Dunton murders. Besides the three
    shell casings of the .40-caliber pistol found near Patel’s body,
    officers also discovered a disposable lighter from which no prints
    of Gomez were recovered.
    During the investigation, Detective La Barbera had
    experts take foot impressions from the ground. La Barbera
    testified that after having learned that officers from Long Beach
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    and the California Highway Patrol had already been to the
    crime scene, he originally chose not to have the castings
    analyzed, believing the prints belonged to the police officers
    present at the scene. La Barbera later had the plaster casts and
    photographs of the shoe prints at the crime scene compared to
    boots confiscated from Gomez during his arrest even though
    “these boots . . . did not or could not have made the shoe or boot
    impressions located at the scene.”
    Additionally, La Barbera had requested fingerprint,
    serology, and arson experts to conduct an investigation of Patel’s
    car. None of the fingerprints lifted from the vehicle were linked
    to Gomez. The serologist was unable to match the blood in
    Patel’s car to Gomez. Officers also recovered various personal
    items from the car, including a flashlight that did not belong to
    Patel and other “trace evidence” such as a rope and bungee
    cords, none of which “c[a]me back to Ruben Gomez.” The police
    did not find knives, scissors, or shears in the trunk of Patel’s car.
    b. The Escareno Murder
    The defense introduced a local newspaper article on the
    Patel murder, dated May 27, 1997, indicating that no
    identification was found on the body.        Detective Winter
    confirmed that the Escareno murder was also “covered in their
    local paper.” The defense also introduced two newspaper
    articles concerning the Escareno homicide that were included in
    the murder book prepared by the detectives that investigated
    Escareno’s murder. Defense Exhibit L, dated June 18, 1997, and
    entitled “A Gruesome Discovery in SP Alley,” recounted the
    discovery of Escareno’s car and described the blood and brain
    matter found in the car. Defense Exhibit M, dated June 10,
    1997, and entitled “Man Found Slain at SP Shopping Center,”
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    stated that a victim was found with a massive gunshot wound
    to the head in a shopping center on Western Avenue, that
    jewelry had been taken from both hands, and that robbery
    appeared to be a motive. The article also stated that the victim
    was killed at the shopping center.
    The defense recalled Detective Winter, who testified that
    she had interviewed Witness No. 1 on July 24, 1997. During the
    interview, Witness No. 1 said that Gomez “always drove.”
    Witness No. 1 would ask Gomez for permission to carry the
    shotgun because Gomez was driving, and sometimes Gomez
    would let him. Witness No. 1 also told Winter that Dunton
    would give “some of the jewelry that would come into the house”
    to “some of the females that would come around.” Witness No.
    1 described jewelry that Dunton had given to some girls, and
    Winter indicated in her testimony that the description sounded
    like Escareno’s jewelry. He also indicated that Gomez had
    several guns, including a single shot 12-gauge shotgun and a
    pump shotgun. Winter also interviewed Witness No. 1 on
    August 20, 1997. Witness No. 1 told Winter that he had been
    involved in the Escareno murder and that he was with Gomez
    at the time.
    c. The Luna Murder
    During trial, Rudy Luna testified that he did not recognize
    the voice he heard outside his bedroom window. Rudy
    acknowledged that he personally knew Gomez prior to Raul’s
    death.
    Detective Lancaster later directed officers to compare the
    boots taken from Gomez to the plaster shoe casts made at the
    Luna crime scene. There was “no similarity at all” between the
    boots and the casts, which appeared to have been made by an
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    “athletic type of shoe.” Nor did the casts taken from the crime
    scene produce any evidence significant to the investigation.
    Charles Orr, one of the prosecution’s witnesses, described
    the man he saw running shortly after the shooting as “dark-
    skinned but not Black.” During trial, Orr did not characterize
    Gomez as having dark skin.
    William Owens, another one of the prosecution’s witnesses
    who had “five or six seconds” of interaction with the running
    man, testified that the man seemed Central American and had
    “a deep heavy Spanish or Hispanic accent.” Owens estimated
    that the man stood around “five-nine, five-ten,” weighed “maybe
    180, 200” pounds, had a “light complexion” and “a facial
    structure . . . from [the] Central America region,” and spoke
    with a “heavy Spanish or Hispanic accent.” Owens further
    reported that the running man wore jeans and a red and blue
    nylon jacket. Owens did not notice any tattoo markings but
    described the runner’s hairstyle as a “marine-type” “crewcut”
    and said that the runner had a trimmed, “medium mustache.”
    Lancaster showed Owens a six-pack of photos that
    contained a picture of Gomez. Lancaster did not have Owens
    circle, date, and sign the photograph, as he customarily did to
    verify the identification because Lancaster did not feel Owens
    had accurately identified the individual who had committed the
    crime. Lancaster testified that Owens “never conclusively
    indicated that [the photograph] was [of] the suspect,” only that
    Owens indicated “he somewhat resembled the suspect.” Owens
    claimed to have identified the runner with “75 to 85 percent
    accuracy.” During trial, Owens pointed to Gomez in the
    courtroom when asked to identify the running man.
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
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    Wilcox testified that Gomez’s prints did not match the
    latent prints lifted from the Oldsmobile at the crime scene.
    Wilcox further testified that it is generally impossible to “put a
    time date as to the appearance of that fingerprint on that
    particular object . . . unless there is some type of outside specific
    force that acts on that fingerprint.” Further, all six of the
    fingerprint lifts taken from the cellphone recovered by the police
    were “badly smeared or basically not of sufficient quality to do
    the latent print comparison.” Wilcox was not directed to
    perform fingerprint analysis on lifts taken from other surfaces
    besides the vehicle and cellphone.
    At trial, Lancaster testified that the Oldsmobile was not
    registered to Gomez. He also acknowledged that prints lifted
    from the radio found inside the vehicle, prints from the baggie
    found near Luna’s body, prints from an ATM card found near
    Luna’s body, and prints lifted from a gold chain and cross
    around Luna’s neck did not match Gomez’s prints.
    d. The Acosta and Dunton Murders
    The defense recalled Detective Joya, who testified that the
    cut-off barrel and wood stock of the shotgun linked to the Acosta
    and Dunton murders were sent to the crime lab, but she could
    not recall if any of the prints matched Gomez. Joya also testified
    that she interviewed Witness No. 1 on July 15, 1997, and August
    20, 1997. During the July 15 interview, Witness No. 1 told Joya
    “[Gomez] had told him that they’re going to send someone over
    to fuck up [Dunton] and [Acosta].” In the interview on August
    20, Witness No. 1 told Joya “that [Gomez] told him that
    they — that they have their orders for [Dunton] and [Acosta].”
    Witness No. 1 did not indicate to Joya that by using the term
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    “they,” Gomez was referring to himself. Joya further testified
    that “they” was a reference to a group of people.
    The defense also recalled Detective Winter, who testified
    that she interviewed Witness No. 1 on July 24, 1997. During
    the interview, Witness No. 1 said that Gomez “always drove.”
    Witness No. 1 would ask Gomez for permission to carry the
    shotgun, because Gomez was driving, and that sometimes
    Gomez would let him. During this same interview, Witness No.
    1 told Winter that Dunton asked him to get rid of Boxer.
    B. Penalty Phase
    1. Prosecution Evidence
    The prosecution’s aggravation case consisted of testimony
    concerning Gomez’s prior felony convictions and violent criminal
    activity. The prosecution first presented evidence that Gomez
    had been convicted of a 1991 robbery. The victim, Jorge Lucho,
    testified that Gomez approached him when he was walking
    home late at night. Gomez threatened Lucho with a pointed
    screwdriver and demanded his wallet. Lucho turned over the
    wallet, which contained only one dollar; Gomez said Lucho
    “surely was carrying more money and that [Lucho] should go
    with him to the alley to try and get some more.” At that point,
    Lucho was able to run away, but he heard Gomez threaten to
    kill him if he didn’t give any more money. Police officers
    thereafter discovered Gomez hiding behind a mattress in a
    metal shed in the backyard of a house several blocks from where
    he had confronted Lucho. Upon arresting Gomez, the police
    officers found a “homemade metal sharp object” on Gomez’s
    person. The arresting officer testified that Gomez “had a
    bewildered look, eyes wide open.” Gomez was transported to the
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    general hospital, where he was diagnosed as being under the
    influence of an opiate.
    The prosecution next introduced evidence that while
    incarcerated for the 1991 robbery and a separate drug charge,
    Gomez was convicted of assault and possession of a deadly
    weapon.
    Finally, the prosecution presented evidence relating to
    several violent incidents that occurred when Gomez was in
    custody awaiting trial in the instant case. Deputy Sheriff Chad
    Millan testified that in June 1998, he escorted Gomez to the
    hallway to search him for hidden contraband or weapons.
    Gomez “was instructed to strip out of his underwear,” was then
    “waist chained,” and “asked to do a squat down and a cough too
    and release anything that might be secreted in his anus.”
    Gomez initially did not comply and then pulled an object from
    “between his buttocks.” Fearing that the object was a weapon,
    Gomez was ordered to drop the object; when Gomez refused to
    do so, Millan sprayed him with pepper spray. Gomez turned
    away, began peeling paper “covering off what seemed like the
    blade,” and ran down the hallway. Millan followed him and
    confronted him, kicking him in the back of the head. Gomez
    turned around, said “fuck you, punk,” and stabbed Millan three
    times in the rib and knee with a shank.
    Deputy Sheriff Timothy Vanderleek testified that he
    responded to a disturbance in Gomez’s cell in November 1999.
    When he entered the cell, he had liquid that smelled like urine
    thrown on his face. Deputy Sheriff Frank Montoya testified that
    he had several violent interactions with Gomez in December
    1999, while Gomez was jailed during his trial. Montoya
    encountered Gomez walking back from court carrying a large
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    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    bag of candy, which was not authorized because Gomez had been
    placed in the “high security discipline” cell. Montoya confronted
    Gomez and advised him that he could not possess the candy
    until he “gets out of discipline”; this caused Gomez to get angry
    and start shouting profanities. When Montoya attempted to
    grab the bag, Gomez turned around and head butted him. After
    Gomez was brought to the ground, Gomez said, “You fucked up,
    Montoya. You fucked up. I’m going to kill you. I’m going to kill
    you and I’m going to kill every deputy here.”
    The next day, Montoya let Gomez out of the locked shower
    area and asked him to show Montoya his hands. Montoya
    testified that Gomez “thrust” his hand “through the bars toward
    [Montoya’s] office,” and that Gomez was holding “a plastic
    handled comb with the teeth cut out, and there was a razor fixed
    to it, like a slashing instrument.” Gomez was unable to reach
    Montoya with his weapon, so he “started breaking the razor and
    the plastic comb into little pieces and threw it down the shower
    drain.” As he did that, Gomez said, “fuck you . . . I’m going to
    kill you. I might have missed you this time, or I’ll get you later
    or I’ll get some other deputy that’s slower.” Montoya testified at
    trial that he maintained daily contact with Gomez after these
    two incidents; although Gomez continued to threaten Montoya,
    he did not try to attack him physically again. Another deputy
    at the jail, Keith Holly, testified that he went to Gomez’s cell to
    inform Gomez that he had been found guilty of various offenses
    in violation of jail disciplinary rules, and that Gomez would
    therefore lose various privileges for 30 days. Gomez responded,
    “Fuck this discipline time. I should have fucking slashed
    Montoya’s throat when I had a chance. . . . Just wait until those
    fucking deputies take me to court and I’ll slash one of those
    fuckers.”
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    2. Defense Evidence
    The defense first offered the testimony of Michael Pickett,
    a regional administrator for the Department of Corrections.
    Pickett testified that a defendant like Gomez “can only be
    assigned to a Level 4 institution” and would most likely be sent
    to the most secure classification of facility, known as a “Security
    Housing Unit” or “SHU.” Pickett explained that “it’s not a
    perfect world at a Level 4 prison” despite the high security and
    that homicides as well as assaults occurred at such facilities.
    Based on what he knew about Gomez, Pickett predicted that
    Gomez would be moved to the Corcoran SHU facility or the
    Pelican Bay State Prison SHU facility, where he would be
    confined to a cell for roughly 23 hours per day. He would leave
    his cell only for exercise in a yard adjacent to the SHU or for
    medical and legal visits, during which he would be shackled and
    escorted by a guard. Pickett also testified that all visits with a
    Level 4 SHU inmate are “non-contact,” meaning there would be
    a Plexiglas partition between the inmate and the visitor. On
    cross-examination, Pickett detailed a race-related riot that
    occurred at Pelican Bay State Prison the previous morning.
    Pickett also opined that there is a higher level of violence at the
    more highly secured prison facilities because the inmates in
    such facilities are more violent. Pickett further testified that
    murders and violent assaults have been ordered by prison gang
    members in the SHUs against prisoners in the general
    population.
    The defense also presented the testimony of Gomez’s
    sister, Mercedes Sanabria. She testified that Gomez has three
    children under the age of 12 and that she has brought the
    children to visit Gomez at the county jail. Sanabria further
    testified that the children love their father and that she loves
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    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    her brother. She said to the jury “that despite what my brother
    has done, we are real sorry, but we all love him, and we just
    don’t want him to be executed.”
    II.     PRETRIAL ISSUES
    A. Preemptive Denial of Gomez’s Right to Self-
    Representation
    Nine months before jury selection, Gomez invoked his
    right to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 
    422 U.S. 806
    . At that time, the court warned him, “[Y]ou can’t go
    back and forth on this. If you want to represent yourself, that’s
    fine. That’s going to cause a delay in the proceedings, and you
    just can’t keep switching back and forth between being
    represented by counsel and representing yourself.” After
    determining that Gomez’s waiver of the right to counsel was
    knowing and intelligent, the court granted Gomez pro se status.
    But two weeks later, Gomez expressed his desire to “relinquish”
    his pro se status and asked that the court reappoint counsel.
    The following colloquy ensued:
    “THE COURT:          Is that what you want to do, Mr. Gomez?
    “GOMEZ:              Yes.
    “THE COURT:          I told you before you can’t switch back
    and forth.
    “GOMEZ:              I know that.
    “THE COURT:          I’m going to hold you to this kind of a
    change. I think it’s a good change for
    you. I think you’re doing the right thing.
    All I’m saying is I’m not going to let you
    bounce back and forth. You have a right
    to represent yourself, I recognize that
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    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    and gave that to you, and as of this
    moment you do represent yourself. And
    it’s better for you and it’s better for me
    as well to have an attorney who knows
    the rules and will effectively represent
    you to do that for you. So at this point
    you understand that if I’m going to
    change back, this is a final change.
    “GOMEZ:           I understand that, yeah.
    “THE COURT:       And that’s what you want to do?
    “GOMEZ:           Yes, sir.
    “THE COURT:       Okay. Mr. Nardoni is appointed then.”
    Gomez argues that this colloquy amounted to a
    preemptive denial of Gomez’s constitutional right to self-
    representation. Quoting People v. Windham (1977) 
    19 Cal.3d 121
    , 128, he contends that when “ ‘a motion to proceed pro se is
    timely interposed, a trial court must permit a defendant to
    represent himself upon ascertaining that he has voluntarily and
    intelligently elected to do so, irrespective of how unwise such a
    choice might appear to be.’ ” Because the court gave Gomez the
    impression that he could not ask to represent himself, he argues,
    he never had the opportunity to invoke such a right, even if such
    requests had been timely. But because Gomez never re-invoked
    his Faretta right, he cites to our decisions in People v. Dent
    (2003) 
    30 Cal.4th 213
     (Dent) and People v. Lancaster (2007) 
    41 Cal.4th 50
    , 69–70 (Lancaster) as precedent for the proposition
    that where the court entirely forecloses the possibility of future
    self-representation, Faretta is violated.
    In Dent, the defendant’s appointed counsel failed to show
    up on time for the first day of trial. (Dent, 
    supra,
     
    30 Cal.4th at
    32
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    p. 216.) After “delineat[ing] the history of defense counsel’s
    requests for continuances and failure to appear on the record,”
    the trial judge indicated that he would continue the trial once
    again and relieved the defendant’s attorneys as counsel of
    record. (Ibid.) He then advised the defendant that he “ ‘must
    be represented by attorneys that are senior trial attorneys. And
    you have got to have people here to represent you. You cannot
    represent yourself in this matter.’ ” (Ibid.) When the defendant
    asked to say something in response, the trial judge prevented
    him from doing so without attorneys present. (Ibid.) Later,
    after the defendant suggested that he would prefer to represent
    himself rather than receive new counsel, the trial judge flatly
    stated that he was “ ‘not going to let him proceed pro. per. . . .
    Not in a death penalty murder trial.’ ” (Id. at p. 217.) The trial
    court proceeded to appoint new counsel, and the defendant did
    not renew his Faretta motion. (Dent, at p. 217.) On this record,
    we held that “the trial court’s response was not only legally
    erroneous but also unequivocal, and foreclosed any realistic
    possibility defendant would perceive self-representation as an
    available option.” (Id. at p. 219.)
    Lancaster distinguished Dent on the ground that Dent
    “involved [an] outright denial of the right [to self-
    representation].” (Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 70.) In
    Lancaster, as here, the defendant had vacillated between self-
    representation and the right to counsel. After the fourth such
    change of heart, the court similarly admonished the defendant:
    “ ‘I do need to advise Mr. Lancaster that you cannot continue to
    change between representing yourself and having appointed
    counsel represent you. The reason for it is that we’ve got to move
    forward, and that doesn’t allow us to do that. [¶] I think it’s a
    very wise move on your part, as I said. . . . But having originally
    33
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    had an attorney, gone pro per, had an attorney, gone pro per,
    now you’re back to an attorney, I can’t let you continue to change
    from one to the other. It has to be a permanent decision on your
    part. [¶] Even if at some point you have some disagreement with
    what Mr. Rothman is doing, you can’t just say now I’m back pro
    per. That’s a decision for the court to make, and it probably
    would not be in your favor.’ ” (Id. at p. 69.)
    We rejected the defendant’s argument that the court’s
    comments were “a ‘preemptive denial’ of his Faretta right,”
    noting that in light of “the court’s protracted grappling with the
    logistics of providing defendant with discovery materials and
    access to legal resources, the court’s concern with his repeated
    alternation between self-representation and the services of
    counsel was warranted.” (Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 69.)
    We held that “[t]he court’s reference to the need for a ‘permanent
    decision’ . . . did not entirely foreclose the possibility of
    defendant’s future self-representation.” (Ibid.) Rather, “it told
    him it would make a decision on any renewed application,
    though the request would probably not be viewed with favor.”
    (Ibid.)
    The instant case is more similar to Lancaster than Dent.
    In Lancaster, the court warned the defendant that “ ‘you cannot
    continue to change’ ” because “ ‘we’ve got to move forward,’ ”
    although the decision to request counsel was “ ‘wise.’ ”
    (Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 69.) Here, the court said, “I’m
    going to hold you to this kind of change,” and “it’s a good change
    for you.” When Gomez first asked to represent himself, the court
    had already warned Gomez that he could not “go back and forth
    on this” because “[t]hat’s going to cause a delay in the
    proceedings.” But, unlike in Dent, the court expressly told
    Gomez that “[y]ou have the right to represent yourself if you
    34
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    make a knowing and intelligent waiver of your right to counsel”
    and “[i]f you want to represent yourself, that’s fine,” and the
    court granted Gomez’s initial request to proceed in propia
    persona.
    Gomez seizes on subtle distinctions in wording to argue
    that while the court in Lancaster “did not entirely foreclose the
    possibility of defendant’s future self-representation” (Lancaster,
    
    supra,
     41 Cal.4th at p. 69), here the court told him unequivocally
    that future requests for self-representation would be denied.
    But this misunderstands the import of Lancaster, which held
    that the trial court’s comments, taken in context, could not be
    characterized as a preemptive denial of the defendant’s Faretta
    right. (Lancaster, at p. 69.) Lancaster did not hold that had the
    trial court’s comments been phrased in more certain terms, such
    comments would have amounted to reversible error. Instead,
    we commented that the trial court’s reference to a “permanent”
    decision may have been “precipitous” due to the fact that trial
    was not imminent, but “the impropriety was slight” and did not
    cause fundamental error. (Id. at pp. 69–70.) As we explained,
    these admonitions are generally inadvisable but also reflect “the
    difficulties posed by [a] defendant’s intermittent assumptions of
    his own defense” and thus constitute an understandable
    “attempt to discourage defendant from perpetuating those
    difficulties.” (Id. at p. 70.)
    That a trial court may directly deny a Faretta request
    when it is designed “to frustrate the orderly administration of
    justice” (People v. Marshall (1997) 
    15 Cal.4th 1
    , 23) suggests
    that courts are not foreclosed from preemptively discouraging
    such requests when it identifies a pattern of vacillation that,
    over time, will harm the progress of trial and the defendant’s
    ability to put on a defense. When considered in context, the trial
    35
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    court’s statement that “this is a final change” did not
    “unequivocal[ly] . . . foreclose[] any realistic possibility [Gomez]
    would perceive self-representation as an available option”
    (Dent, 
    supra,
     30 Cal.4th at p. 219). Therefore, the trial court’s
    warning, while inadvisable in its assertion that any chance
    would be “final,” was not erroneous.
    B. Trial Court’s Hypothetical During Voir Dire
    Regarding Credibility of Accomplice Testimony
    During jury selection, the prosecution was interested in
    probing prospective jurors’ feelings regarding the propriety of
    exchanging testimony against another for prosecutorial
    leniency. Page 12 of the jury questionnaire asked: “How do you
    feel about the situation in which the prosecution decides not to
    prosecute one person in exchange for that person’s testimony
    against another person?” The court asked follow-up questions
    of those who expressed hesitation or distaste for such practices,
    and pressed jurors to explicate their feelings in greater detail.
    When a juror did not understand the question, the court
    offered the following hypothetical as “an example of the kind of
    thing which [the court] think[s] makes some sense to people at
    least. [¶] That is say there’s a bank robbery situation. There
    are two people involved, one stands outside as a lookout. The
    other bank robber actually goes in to rob the bank, and in the
    process kills somebody. [¶] We’ve got good evidence supposedly
    in this hypothetical as to the person standing outside. We know
    that person is a lookout and can be convicted for participating
    in the bank robbery and is actually responsible under the law
    for the robbery and the killing that occurred in the bank. But
    the real person that pulled the trigger is the second person, and
    law enforcement is more concerned about that person than the
    36
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    one that stood outside. [¶] Do you see a problem with the idea
    of granting some lenience to this person that stood outside as a
    lookout, saying that that person is either going to agree to a
    lesser penalty or perhaps even be immunized entirely in order
    to get that person’s testimony against the actual bank robber?”
    Gomez argues that the trial court’s attempts to elucidate
    the significance of the questionnaire’s inquiry into accomplice
    testimony “improperly informed jurors that the prosecution
    would only grant leniency to the less culpable party involved in
    a crime.” Although counsel did not object to this hypothetical
    during voir dire, Gomez argues that the relevant exchanges
    between the court and prospective jurors amounted to
    instructional error. (People v. Dunkle (2005) 
    36 Cal.4th 861
    ,
    929–930 [“[W]e do not deem forfeited any claim of instructional
    error affecting a defendant’s substantial rights.”].) We disagree.
    The trial court’s hypothetical was clearly meant to expand upon
    and explain the significance of the questionnaire’s inquiry. To
    the extent that the hypothetical may have suggested that the
    trial court had personal confidence in the prosecutor’s choice
    with respect to whom to prosecute, counsel could have objected.
    But counsel did not. Accordingly, Gomez has forfeited this
    claim. (People v. Fuiava (2012) 
    53 Cal.4th 622
    , 653 [“[A]
    defendant may not challenge on appeal alleged shortcomings in
    the trial court’s voir dire of the prospective jurors when the
    defendant, having had the opportunity to alert the trial court to
    the supposed problem, failed to do so.”].)
    On the merits, the trial court did not err. By describing
    the underlying logic for why a prosecutor might exercise
    leniency with respect to one accomplice in exchange for
    testimony, the trial court’s manifest intention was to add
    greater granularity to the questionnaire. Each time the trial
    37
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    court engaged a prospective juror with the hypothetical, it was
    expressly framed in relation to page 12 of the voir dire
    questionnaire. The court described the hypothetical as an
    “example” that “makes some sense to people,” suggesting that
    the trial court did not personally hold the views that it
    described. Its evident purpose was to draw out the prospective
    jurors’ views as to the propriety of exchanging testimony for
    prosecutorial leniency, not to personally vouch for the
    prosecution’s choice of defendant. Moreover, the trial court later
    instructed the jury about evaluating witness credibility in the
    instant case, which further clarified that any views suggested
    by the hypothetical were irrelevant.
    C. Motion for Severance of Counts and Separate
    Trials
    Gomez argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
    denying his motion to sever his trial from his codefendant’s trial
    and his motion to sever his charges. Gomez claims that these
    alleged errors, “both alone and in combination,” violated his
    rights to due process, a fair trial, a reliable guilt and penalty
    determination, and his right to be free from cruel and unusual
    punishment under both the federal and state Constitutions.
    Before trial, Gomez first moved to sever his trial for the
    murders of Robert Acosta and Robert Dunton from that of
    codefendant Arthur Grajeda. Gomez then moved to sever his
    counts, seeking a joint trial on the charges arising from the
    Acosta and Dunton murders and the Jesus Escareno murder,
    and separate trials for the Xavier Salcedo robbery, the Rajendra
    Patel murder, and the Raul Luna murder.
    The trial court considered Gomez’s motions together and
    denied them both. After stating that it was “obvious . . . that the
    38
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    defendants should be tried together on [the Acosta and Dunton
    counts],” the court found that the counts against Gomez were
    “tied closely together in time and to some extent in location” as
    well as “in the manner in which the executions took place”; the
    same witness would testify in the Escareno case and the Acosta
    and Dunton case; the robbery charges involved similar items;
    the Luna and Escareno homicides involved cars; and Luna’s
    stolen cellphone was used to call Dunton’s house, where Gomez
    occasionally stayed. Although the court expressed concern with
    the number of crimes that Gomez was charged with, it
    ultimately concluded that the crimes “are so well tied together
    that . . . they should be tried together.”
    1. Motion to Sever Trial from Codefendant’s Trial
    We have frequently recognized the Legislature’s
    preference for joint trials. (E.g., People v. Souza (2012) 
    54 Cal.4th 90
    , 109; see § 1098 [“When two or more defendants are
    jointly charged with any public offense . . . they must be tried
    jointly, unless the court order[s] separate trials.”].) Factors that
    may bear on a trial court’s decision to order separate trials
    include “ ‘an incriminating confession, prejudicial association
    with codefendants, likely confusion resulting from evidence on
    multiple counts, conflicting defenses, or the possibility that at a
    separate trial a codefendant would give exonerating
    testimony.’ ” (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 
    34 Cal.4th 1
    , 40, quoting People v. Massie (1967) 
    66 Cal.2d 899
    , 917.)
    Severance may also be appropriate where “ ‘there is a serious
    risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of
    one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable
    judgment about guilt or innocence.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2008) 
    43 Cal.4th 415
    , 452, quoting Zafiro v. United States (1993) 
    506 U.S. 39
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    534, 539.) “If we conclude the trial court abused its discretion,
    reversal is required only if it is reasonably probable the
    defendant would have obtained a more favorable result at a
    separate trial.” (People v. Burney (2009) 
    47 Cal.4th 203
    , 237.)
    But, “[e]ven if a trial court’s severance or joinder ruling is correct
    at the time it was made, a reviewing court must reverse the
    judgment if the ‘defendant shows that joinder actually resulted
    in “gross unfairness” amounting to a denial of due process.’ ”
    (People v. Mendoza (2000) 
    24 Cal.4th 130
    , 162, quoting People v.
    Arias (1996) 
    13 Cal.4th 92
    , 127.)
    Gomez argues that he should have been tried separately
    from Grajeda because Grajeda sought to blame the Acosta and
    Dunton murders on Gomez, whom Grajeda characterized as
    “violent, paranoid and drug crazed.”            But, as Gomez
    acknowledges, “ ‘[a]ntagonistic defenses do not per se require
    severance, even if the defendants are hostile or attempt to cast
    the blame on each other.’ ” (People v. Tafoya (2007) 
    42 Cal.4th 147
    , 162 (Tafoya); see also Zafiro v. United States, supra, 506
    U.S. at pp. 538–539.) And we have previously suggested that
    antagonistic defenses require severance only where “ ‘ “the
    conflict is so prejudicial that [the] defenses are irreconcilable,
    and the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone
    demonstrates that both [defendants] are guilty.” ’ ” (People v.
    Carasi (2008) 
    44 Cal.4th 1263
    , 1297–1298, quoting People v.
    Hardy (1992) 
    2 Cal.4th 86
    , 168.)
    Gomez does not contend that such a conflict exists here.
    Rather, he claims that Grajeda received an inherent
    “advantage” as “a ‘lesser’ participant” in the crime. Such an
    advantage, Gomez argues, necessarily “work[s] to the
    disadvantage of a ‘greater’ participant, and indeed the very
    existence of such advantages and disadvantages undermines
    40
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    the principle of individual guilt.” But this argument merely
    homes in on one aspect of Grajeda’s antagonistic defense, i.e.,
    that Grajeda played a lesser role than Gomez in murdering
    Acosta and Dunton. And “ ‘[i]f the fact of conflicting or
    antagonistic defenses alone required separate trials, it would
    negate the legislative preference for joint trials and separate
    trials “would appear to be mandatory in almost every case.” ’ ”
    (People v. Thompson (2016) 
    1 Cal.5th 1043
    , 1081.)
    Gomez also claims that he was prejudiced during the
    penalty phase because the jury knew that the prosecution had
    sought the death penalty for him but not for Grajeda. We have
    previously rejected this argument (Tafoya, 
    supra,
     42 Cal.4th at
    pp. 163–164), and Gomez offers no reason why we should revisit
    our precedent here. Accordingly, we reject Gomez’s claims that
    the trial court should have severed his trial from Grajeda’s.
    2. Motion to Sever Counts
    Section 954 allows for the joint trial of “two or more
    different offenses connected together in their commission . . . or
    two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or
    offenses.” Where joinder is proper under section 954, “[t]he
    burden is on the party seeking severance to clearly establish
    that there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the
    charges be separately tried.” (People v. Soper (2009) 
    45 Cal.4th 759
    , 773.) In determining whether a court abused its discretion
    in declining to sever properly joined charges, we first consider
    “the cross-admissibility of the evidence in hypothetical separate
    trials.” (Id. at p. 774.) If the evidence is cross-admissible, then
    this “is normally sufficient to dispel any suggestion of prejudice
    and to justify a trial court’s refusal to sever properly joined
    charges.” (Id. at pp. 774–775.) If not, then we also consider
    41
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    “(1) whether some of the charges are particularly likely to
    inflame the jury against the defendant; (2) whether a weak case
    has been joined with a strong case or another weak case so that
    the totality of the evidence may alter the outcome as to some or
    all of the charges; or (3) whether one of the charges (but not
    another) is a capital offense, or the joinder of the charges
    converts the matter into a capital case.” (Id. at p. 775.)
    Moreover, “[e]ven if a defendant fails to demonstrate the trial
    court’s joinder ruling was an abuse of discretion when it was
    made, reversal may nonetheless be required if the defendant can
    demonstrate that ‘the joint trial resulted in such gross
    unfairness as to amount to a due process violation.’ ” (People v.
    Landry (2016) 
    2 Cal.5th 52
    , 77.)
    Gomez concedes that all of his counts were properly joined
    under section 954 and that he should have been tried for the
    Acosta, Dunton, and Escareno murders in the same proceeding.
    But he contends that each of the remaining cases should have
    been tried separately because the evidence underlying those
    cases was not cross-admissible; the Acosta, Dunton, and
    Escareno murders were particularly inflammatory; the evidence
    linking Gomez to the Luna and Patel murders was weaker than
    the evidence linking him to the other crimes; and the Luna
    murder did not initially involve a capital crime, whereas the
    other murders did.
    In denying Gomez’s motion for discretionary severance,
    the trial court noted that a shotgun was used in the Acosta,
    Dunton, Escareno, and Luna murders; Witness No. 1 was a
    witness to the Acosta, Dunton, and Escareno murders; and
    Luna’s cell phone was used to call Dunton’s house, where
    “Gomez was at least a part time resident.” The trial court was
    also aware that the prosecution planned to tie the Salcedo
    42
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    robbery to its broader theory that “Gomez was ripping off dope
    dealers in the Harbor area.”
    Even if cross-admissibility alone did not justify the trial
    court’s denial of Gomez’s severance motion, the balance of the
    remaining factors does not show that the trial court abused its
    discretion. (See People v. Simon (2016) 
    1 Cal.5th 98
    , 123
    (Simon) [“Although cross-admissibility of evidence is often an
    independently sufficient condition justifying a trial court’s
    denial of severance, it is not a necessary one.”].) First, neither
    the Acosta and Dunton double homicide nor the Escareno
    homicide was more inflammatory than the other crimes.
    Although evidence of gang membership can be particularly
    inflammatory (see, e.g., People v. Williams (1997) 
    16 Cal.4th 153
    , 193) and the prosecution’s theory of the Acosta and Dunton
    murders was that they were gang related, we do not agree that
    the jury would have been more inflamed by that crime than the
    murder of Patel, who appeared to be unknown to Gomez, or the
    murder of Luna, who was murdered at the home that he shared
    with his family. And although the Salcedo robbery did not
    involve a murder, “the animating concern underlying this factor
    is not merely whether evidence from one offense is repulsive,”
    but “ ‘ “whether strong evidence of a lesser but inflammatory
    crime might be used to bolster a weak prosecution case’ on
    another crime.” ’ ” (Simon, at p. 124.) The Salcedo robbery does
    not raise such a concern because, as Gomez acknowledges, the
    trial court was aware that the victim’s testimony would be
    offered in that case.
    Second, the Luna and Patel cases were not so weak as to
    risk prejudicial joinder. Although the other cases may have
    been supported by eyewitness testimony, more substantial
    forensic evidence, or both, “a mere imbalance in the evidence
    43
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    between the joined crimes does not signal a risk that one charge
    will be prejudicially bolstered.” (People v. Johnson (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 734
    , 752.) And the trial court was aware that
    substantial evidence linked Gomez to the Luna and Patel
    murders, including evidence showing that Gomez was near
    Luna’s home around the time of his murder and that Gomez had
    possession of Patel’s jewelry and car.
    Third, although the Luna murder was not initially
    charged as a capital crime, this factor does not carry substantial
    weight in favor of finding prejudice. Even if the Luna murder
    had been tried separately, Gomez still would have faced the
    death penalty based on the other murders. Thus, joining
    Gomez’s charges “neither converted the entire matter into a
    capital case nor bolstered the possibility of [Gomez] receiving a
    death sentence.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 128.)
    We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in denying Gomez’s motion for four separate trials.
    Moreover, upon reviewing “events after the court’s ruling,” we
    do not find that “joinder actually resulted in ‘gross unfairness’
    amounting to a denial of [Gomez’s] constitutional right to fair
    trial or due process of law.” (People v. Merriman (2014) 
    60 Cal.4th 1
    , 46.) Despite the trial’s relative length and complexity,
    and even if the prosecution’s closing arguments occasionally
    “encouraged the jury to aggregate the evidence,” the record does
    not suggest that the jury was unable to decide each count
    separately as it was specifically instructed to do. Indeed,
    although an “error in denying severance cannot be saved by the
    fact that the jury was unable to agree on a verdict as to
    [improperly joined charges]” (People v. Smallwood (1986) 
    42 Cal.3d 415
    , 433), the fact that the jury acquitted Gomez of the
    charge that he robbed Luna and could not reach a verdict on the
    44
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    Escareno charges does tend to show that “the jury was capable
    of, and did, differentiate among [Gomez’s] crimes” (People v.
    Jones (2013) 
    57 Cal.4th 899
    , 927; see Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
    p. 130).
    Accordingly, we are not convinced it was “ ‘reasonably
    probable that the jury was influenced [by the joinder] in its
    verdict of guilt.’ ” (People v. Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at
    p. 49.) Nor are we convinced by Gomez’s unsupported claim that
    his right to a reliable penalty phase determination was violated.
    III.   GUILT PHASE ISSUES
    A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    1. The Luna Murder
    Gomez argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict
    him of the murder of Raul Luna. In his view, the evidence at
    best showed that two people were present in Raul Luna’s front
    yard when he was murdered but did not show Gomez shot Luna.
    “When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
    conviction is challenged on appeal, we review the entire record
    in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
    whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
    solid value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the
    defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Elliott
    (2013) 
    53 Cal.4th 535
    , 585 (Elliott).) Our review must “presume
    in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury
    could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.” (People v.
    Manibusan (2013) 
    58 Cal.4th 40
    , 87.) Even where, as here, the
    evidence of guilt is largely circumstantial, our task is not to
    resolve credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts, nor is it to
    inquire whether the evidence might “ ‘be reasonably reconciled
    45
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    with the defendant’s innocence.’ ” (Id. at p. 92; see People v.
    Maury (2003) 
    30 Cal.4th 342
    , 403.) The relevant inquiry is
    whether, in light of all the evidence, a reasonable trier of fact
    could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
    doubt. (People v. Towler (1982) 
    31 Cal.3d 105
    , 117–118.)
    Gomez argues that “there was no evidence at all that
    Gomez shot Luna.” The evidence showed that a car pulled up to
    Raul Luna’s residence and then drove away. Rudy Luna
    testified that he then heard two men talking to one another
    immediately before the murder and that one of the accomplices
    identified Raul Luna before shooting him in the head. This
    evidence suggests that Luna was murdered through a joint
    undertaking of two accomplices. That they were speaking to one
    another at the time of the murder indicated that they were
    working together. And that one of the accomplices specifically
    identified Raul Luna immediately before he was murdered
    suggests that he was the intended target of the coperpetrators’
    criminal objectives. So even without indicating who was the
    shooter, substantial evidence suggested that the two worked
    together to deliberately murder Raul Luna according to a
    predetermined plan.
    To prove that a defendant is an accomplice the
    prosecution must show that the defendant acted “with
    knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with
    an intent or purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or
    facilitating commission of, the offense. ” (People v. Beeman
    (1984) 
    35 Cal.3d 547
    , 560.) “The aider and abettor doctrine
    merely makes aiders and abettors liable for their accomplices’
    actions as well as their own. It obviates the necessity to decide
    who was the aider and abettor and who the direct perpetrator or
    to what extent each played which role.” (People v. McCoy (2001)
    46
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    
    25 Cal.4th 1111
    , 1120.)        Here, the jury need not have
    unanimously agreed on which accomplice personally shot Luna
    and which aided or abetted the murder. (See People v.
    Santamaria (1994) 
    8 Cal.4th 903
    , 918 [“[A]s long as each juror
    is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty
    of murder as that offense is defined by statute, it need not decide
    unanimously by which theory he is guilty. [Citations.] More
    specifically, the jury need not decide unanimously whether
    defendant was guilty as the aider and abettor or as the direct
    perpetrator.”].)
    The sole issue in dispute as to Gomez’s sufficiency
    challenge is whether Gomez was one of the two accomplices, and
    substantial evidence places Gomez at the crime scene at the
    time of the murder. The evidence connected Gomez to both the
    Oldsmobile that was likely used as part of the murder’s
    commission and the surrounding area of Luna’s residence
    immediately after the murder. First, investigators found
    Gomez’s fingerprints on an Oldsmobile parked about 150 to 200
    yards from the crime scene. The car was conspicuously parked
    with the windows down, key in the ignition, with a warm engine,
    and with wet tires — all evidence suggesting the car had been
    recently driven. Seven unspent 12-gauge shotgun shells, which
    matched the unspent shotgun shell discovered near Luna’s
    body, were found in the back of the car and connected the vehicle
    to the murder. And Luna’s neighbor, William Owens, testified
    that he saw Gomez running down the street around the time of
    Luna’s murder.
    Further, the evidence tended to show that Gomez used
    Luna’s cell phone immediately after Luna’s murder. Over the
    course of five hours after Luna’s death, 10 calls were made from
    Luna’s cell phone; the last call was made to Dunton’s house,
    47
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    where Gomez occasionally stayed, suggesting that Gomez used
    Luna’s phone to call home. And Witness No. 1 testified that
    Gomez had brought Luna’s phone to Dunton’s apartment.
    In sum, the record contains substantial evidence that
    Luna’s murder was the object of a joint criminal effort
    perpetrated by two men working in concert. Substantial
    evidence showed that Gomez was one of these men and therefore
    could properly be convicted of first degree murder without a
    specific finding that he personally was the shooter. The jury’s
    verdict — finding Gomez guilty of first degree murder but
    declining to convict him of the firearm enhancement — is
    supported by substantial evidence.
    2. The Patel Murder
    Gomez argues that “[n]o physical or forensic evidence
    linked Gomez to the Patel killing” and that “[t]he only evidence
    connecting [him] to the crimes against Patel . . . was the highly
    unreliable testimony of Witnesses #1 and #3,” which Gomez
    argues is “incredible as a matter of law.” He seizes upon Witness
    No. 1’s checkered past, highlighting his prolonged drug
    addiction and regular association with drug traffickers, as well
    as his apparent readiness to lie to authorities during the course
    of their investigations. He adds that the government gave
    Witness No. 1 a $30 per diem during the trial, despite his
    admissions outside of the presence of the jury that he was
    willing to feign hallucinations in order to collect Social Security
    benefits for mental disability, a fact that would tend to show
    that Witness No. 1 would not hesitate to lie in exchange for
    government benefits.
    “In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing
    court resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary
    48
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    conflicts.” (People v. Young (2005) 
    34 Cal.4th 1149
    , 1181
    (Young).) Witness No. 1 may not have been an ideal witness for
    the prosecution, but his testimony indicated that Gomez
    possessed Patel’s car after his murder and that Gomez believed
    he needed to destroy inculpatory evidence of Patel’s murder that
    could be found within. Moreover, Witness No. 1 testified that
    Gomez admitted to murdering Patel, stating that he “hated to
    kill that guy.” Nothing about this testimony is “physically
    impossible or inherently improbable” (Young, at p. 1181), nor
    can Witness No. 1’s story be discounted without resort to
    “ ‘ “ ‘inferences or deductions’ ” ’ ” about his motivations to
    perjure himself (People v. Thompson (2010) 
    49 Cal.4th 79
    , 124).
    His “testimony [could have been] vulnerable to impeachment for
    numerous reasons” (People v. Brown (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 86
    , 105),
    such as his hallucinations (whether real or fabricated) and his
    role as an accomplice after the fact of the crime. But these
    “ ‘doubts about the credibility of the in-court witness should be
    left for the jury’s resolution.’ ” (People v. Hovarter (2008) 
    44 Cal.4th 983
    , 996.)
    Gomez also argues that the testimony of Witness No. 1 and
    Witness No. 3 “contradicted each other in significant respects”
    such that neither could be believed. He points out that while
    Witness No. 3’s testimony suggested that Gomez exchanged
    Patel’s jewelry for drugs the same night of the murder, Witness
    No. 1 testified that Gomez brought the jewelry to Dunton’s
    house and left it there overnight. In essence, Gomez argues that
    because Witness No. 1 and Witness No. 3 gave conflicting
    accounts of the time that Gomez possessed Patel’s jewelry, we
    must conclude that their testimony was “physically impossible.”
    But “[r]esolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the
    testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact” (Young,
    49
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181) in the “absence of patent falsity,
    inherent improbability, or other reason to question [the
    testimony’s] validity” (People v. Prunty (2015) 
    62 Cal.4th 59
    , 90).
    Despite the various reasons for discounting Witness No.
    1’s credibility and the minor conflicts between Witness No. 1’s
    and Witness No. 3’s testimony, sufficient evidence supported the
    jury’s determination of guilt. Patel’s body was discovered near
    the Terminal Island Freeway on-ramp without his white Camry
    or jewelry. Investigators found a trail of blood stretching 75 feet
    from Patel’s body, which was consistent with the county medical
    examiner’s testimony that Patel could have walked or run 75
    feet after receiving his stab wounds, but not after receiving the
    gunshot wound to the head, as well as with the spent shell
    casings found both near Patel’s body and around 90 to 100 feet
    away. Although the precise timeline of when Gomez arrived at
    Witness No. 3’s home is unclear, she did testify that she saw a
    white car parked in the driveway while Gomez was there.
    Moreover, Witness No. 1 testified that Gomez eventually asked
    him to burn the car in an apparent attempt to destroy evidence
    that would inculpate Gomez. Witness No. 1 was instructed to
    inspect the trunk “to make sure there wasn’t no blood in it,” and
    Dunton testified that Gomez was worried about his fingerprints.
    As noted, Witness No. 1 testified that before Gomez asked him
    to burn the car, Gomez expressed that he had “hated to kill that
    guy.” Two days after investigators found Patel’s body, they
    found his car with its interior burnt.
    In sum, a rational jury could have credited Witness No. 1’s
    and Witness No. 3’s testimony that Gomez admitted to the
    crimes against Patel, despite their inconsistencies, and could
    also rationally conclude that Gomez possessed the car
    immediately after Patel’s murder and attempted to destroy
    50
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    evidence of the crimes. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s
    finding that Gomez is guilty of kidnapping, robbing, and
    murdering Patel.
    3. The Acosta and Dunton Murders
    Gomez argues that although the evidence presented
    supported the jury’s finding that Gomez used a shotgun to kill
    Acosta and Dunton, there is insufficient evidence to support a
    jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation. The thrust of
    the prosecution’s case for premeditation was that Grajeda and
    Gomez’s Mexican Mafia ties required them to kill Acosta and
    Dunton for their failure to pay “taxes” to the gang. But Gomez
    argues that it was he who was marked for violent retaliation,
    undermining the possibility that he cooperated with Grajeda to
    execute Acosta and Dunton. Rather than coldly following the
    dictates of the Mexican Mafia’s rules, Gomez argues that he
    acted rashly out of fear those rules would be turned upon him.
    First degree murder “has the additional elements of
    willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation which trigger a
    heightened penalty.” (People v. Chiu (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 155
    ,
    166.) These elements require “more than a showing of intent to
    kill; the killer must act deliberately, carefully weighing the
    considerations for and against a choice to kill before he or she
    completes the acts that caused the death.” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “The true
    test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the
    reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity
    and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.” ’ ”
    (People v. Koontz (2002) 
    27 Cal.4th 1041
    , 1080, citing People v.
    Mayfield (1997) 
    14 Cal.4th 668
    , 767.) We have previously noted
    that evidence of planning, motive, and manner of killing is often
    relevant to this inquiry. (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 
    42 Cal.4th 51
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    379, 419–420 (Halvorsen), citing People v. Anderson (1968) 
    70 Cal.2d 15
    , 26–27; accord People v. Sandoval (2015) 
    62 Cal.4th 394
    , 424.)
    The evidence supported the conclusion that Gomez was at
    least aware of a calculated plan to execute Acosta and Dunton.
    Witness No. 2 observed Gomez and Grajeda having a private
    conversation the day before the murder. As Witness No. 1 and
    Gomez approached the apartment, Gomez stated that “they sent
    somebody to fuck [Dunton] and [Acosta] up.” And the moments
    immediately preceding the murders strongly suggested that
    Gomez was part of this calculated plan and that he intended to
    enforce Mexican Mafia rules. Witness No. 1 testified that
    Gomez was sitting at the dining room table with a pump shotgun
    in front of him, while Grajeda held the shotgun belonging to
    Dunton and Witness No. 1. Grajeda said “[y]ou know the rules,”
    to which Gomez added “[y]eah, forward and backward.” Dunton
    responded, “if I got to go, I’m going to go like a man.” Witness
    No. 1 then heard four shots and footsteps as Grajeda and Gomez
    fled the scene.
    There was also evidence of motive. Both Gomez and
    Grajeda had ties to the Mexican Mafia. Sergeant Valdemar
    testified that someone who was placed on a “green light list,” i.e.,
    marked for assault or murder by the Mexican Mafia, could
    remove him or herself from the list by carrying out a murder on
    the Mexican Mafia’s behalf. Witness No. 2 testified that on the
    evening before Acosta and Dunton’s murder, Grajeda told him
    that he wanted to take care of Gomez for failing to pay taxes to
    the gang. Witness No. 2 and Grajeda then went to Dunton’s
    house, where Witness No. 2 noticed that Gomez was “nervous”
    and “walking back and forth,” and as noted, Gomez and Grajeda
    had a private conversation. When Witness No. 2 and Grajeda
    52
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    drove away, Grajeda again stated that he wanted to kill Gomez
    and possibly Dunton if he didn’t pay his taxes. This evidence is
    consistent with the prosecution’s theory that Gomez killed
    Acosta and Dunton on behalf of the Mexican Mafia in order to
    remove himself from the green light list discussed by Valdemar.
    Finally, the manner of killing tended to show that Gomez
    acted with premeditation and deliberation: Acosta and Dunton
    were shot from close range in the head or neck. (See Halvorsen,
    supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 422 [victims “were shot in the head or
    neck from within a few feet, a method of killing sufficiently
    ‘ “particular and exacting” ’ to permit an inference that
    defendant was ‘acting according to a preconceived design’ ”].)
    As for Gomez’s claim that his role in the Acosta and
    Dunton murders was an instant reaction to being targeted for
    violent retaliation, the tenor of the conversation between
    Acosta, Dunton, Grajeda, and Gomez was suggestive of a
    situation over which Grajeda and Gomez had control. Dunton’s
    words that “if I got to go, I’m going to go like a man” indicated
    resignation to a death he believed to be imminent due to the
    circumstances, an inference that would not have been lost on
    Gomez. Grajeda’s reference to the “rules” requiring the killing
    of Acosta and Dunton was affirmed and adopted by Gomez,
    indicating that he had undertaken to apply Mexican Mafia rules
    in concert with Grajeda. These facts are inconsistent with the
    notion that Gomez acted rashly out of fear that he was about to
    be executed. There is also little indication that Acosta and
    Dunton attempted to fire upon Gomez first, even though Acosta
    was armed at the time of his death. Since our task is not to
    “resolve[] . . . credibility issues [or] evidentiary conflicts”
    (Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181), and because we consider
    the evidence in the “light most favorable to the judgment”
    53
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    (Elliott, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 585), we conclude there was
    sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of premeditation
    and deliberation.
    B. Gomez’s Refusal to Appear in Court
    One morning of trial, Gomez refused to come to court,
    eventually causing a 38-minute delay in the day’s proceedings.
    The court required presentation of evidence concerning Gomez’s
    refusal to attend the proceedings and instructed the jury that it
    could consider this evidence as tending to prove consciousness
    of guilt. Gomez argues that the trial court’s instruction and
    admission of the evidence not only constituted an abuse of
    discretion, but also violated his federal and state constitutional
    rights. He further claims that the trial court failed to act as a
    neutral arbiter, thus violating his constitutional rights to due
    process.
    1. Background
    On December 14, 1999, the second day of his trial, Gomez
    refused to go to court for trial. The guard assigned to his cell
    block alerted the court, which issued an extraction order. Upon
    hearing of the order, Gomez got up and voluntarily came to
    court. As a result of his delay, that day’s proceedings started 38
    minutes late.
    Before the jury was seated, the trial judge apprised the
    parties of the situation and then said, “At some point this is
    probably information that is going to go to the jury.” He
    continued, “It’s now 40 minutes after the starting time was set,
    so I’m not sure what the options are, but it does seem to me that
    at least it will come out eventually in the penalty phase.” When
    the jurors were seated, he informed them that “the reason for
    54
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    the delay may well be presented to you later during the trial. If
    you’re frustrated by it, you’re no less frustrated than I was.”
    At the next break, defense counsel moved for a mistrial.
    He argued: “The court informed the jury that the reason for the
    delay may be brought out in trial at some later time. The
    inference that the court gave, and I think improperly gave to
    this jury, was that it was a result of one of these two
    defendants.” Even “if a delay was caused by Ruben Gomez,”
    counsel continued, “I can’t think of a reason how that would be
    admissible in the guilt phase of trial unless perhaps he were to
    testify.” The court disagreed and said that “[i]t does show a
    consciousness of guilt that Mr. Gomez . . . refused to come to
    court as the court had ordered, so the jury will find out about it
    one way or another through evidence.” The court then said it
    would “do even more than that if this happens again,” noting “I
    can call my own witnesses.” The court subsequently denied the
    motion for a mistrial.
    The next day, before the jury was seated, the trial court
    elaborated on its previous comments. “[T]he first point,” the
    court said, “is that a defendant in a capital trial has no right to
    be absent.” The court then explained that its research suggested
    that “evidence of conduct inconsistent with innocence may show
    consciousness of guilt.” Finally, it noted that “the court on its
    own motion may call witnesses and interrogate them under
    Evidence Code Section 775.” In sum, the court explained, “my
    concern is that I think it does show a consciousness of guilt that
    a defendant refuses to come to court . . . . [¶] Someone who is
    innocent will stay for trial in order to clear his name.”
    Defense counsel objected, distinguishing the cases cited by
    the court as concerning defendants escaping from custody or
    55
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    skipping bail. The trial court interjected: “No. The point is the
    refusal to come to court . . . . Someone who is guilty . . . has a
    reason not to come to court . . . . [¶] A person who is innocent
    will stay for trial in order to clear his name and win lawful
    liberty.” The court continued: “You may have another solution
    to this, but I don’t plan to let it go. I don’t plan to let either
    defendant play with the court and the jury and say I’m going to
    come when I’m ready. . . . I was here until 8 o’clock last night
    doing research on the computer trying to find a case exactly in
    point, and I didn’t find one. So I’m going to be a pioneer.” The
    court added: “We’re going to have witnesses testify . . . [¶] what
    we will have is evidence on the subject, and the jury then can
    draw its own conclusion as to why a defendant refuses to come
    to court.”
    The court then held a hearing regarding the admissibility
    of the proposed testimony outside the presence of the jury under
    Evidence Code section 402. The prosecution and the defense
    examined Deputy Sheriff John Ganarial, who had been assigned
    to take Gomez to court on the morning of December 14, 1999.
    Ganarial testified that Gomez said “fuck court” several times
    when Ganarial asked him to get ready for court around 5:50 a.m.
    After Ganarial told him several more times to get ready, Gomez
    responded, “They bring me back whenever they want, I’ll go to
    court whenever I want.” Ganarial testified that Gomez was
    ultimately escorted from the cell to court around 9:00 a.m. that
    morning. Ganarial further testified that Gomez had otherwise
    been “cooperative as far as being transported . . . to the court for
    purposes of trial.” After Ganarial’s testimony, the court said, “I
    do think that the initial incident that we were talking about on
    December 14th showed a consciousness of guilt.” Defense
    counsel then repeated his objection to the evidence and argued
    56
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    that no precedent holds that the jury may infer consciousness of
    guilt from an in-custody defendant’s refusal to attend trial. At
    the end of the hearing, the trial court ruled that Ganarial’s
    testimony was admissible to show consciousness of guilt.
    On the sixth day of trial, the prosecution called Ganarial
    to testify before the jury about Gomez’s delay. Ganarial
    explained that on the morning in question, he attempted several
    times to get Gomez to leave his cell for court to no avail.
    Ganarial then notified the court bailiff of Gomez’s refusal; the
    bailiff subsequently informed him that there was an extraction
    order for Gomez. Soon after being informed of this order, Gomez
    voluntarily came to court. In the course of his testimony,
    Ganarial also said that Gomez was housed in a disciplinary unit
    of the jail, that he was waist-chained and handled by a
    “movement team” when he was transported to court, that he was
    fed through a slot in his cell door, and that on the morning in
    question, he responded to Ganarial’s wake-up calls with “fuck
    court” multiple times. After the court excused Ganarial, the
    defense moved to strike the testimony as irrelevant, which the
    court denied.
    At the conclusion of the trial, the judge gave the following
    instruction to the jury: “If you find that the defendant Gomez
    voluntarily absented himself from this trial by refusing to come
    to court, you may consider that as a circumstance tending to
    prove a consciousness of guilt. That conduct, however, is not
    sufficient by itself to prove guilt, and its weight and significance,
    if any, are for you to decide.”
    57
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    2. Improper Instruction and Admission of Evidence
    as to Gomez’s Consciousness of Guilt
    a. Forfeiture
    Reviewing courts will generally not consider a challenge
    to the admissibility of evidence unless there was a “ ‘ “specific
    and timely objection in the trial court on the same grounds
    sought to be urged on appeal.” ’ ” (People v. Champion (1995) 
    9 Cal.4th 879
    , 918, quoting People v. Raley (1992) 
    2 Cal.4th 870
    ,
    892; see Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) The Attorney General
    contends that Gomez objected only under Evidence Code section
    352, thus forfeiting any other challenges to the admission of
    evidence regarding Gomez’s refusal to come to court.
    We disagree. The record shows that counsel argued
    repeatedly and at length that the admission of the evidence
    would constitute state-law error. First, in moving for a mistrial
    on the basis of the trial court’s initial statements to the jury,
    defense counsel argued, “If a delay was caused by Ruben Gomez,
    I can’t think of how that would be admissible in the guilt phase
    of trial.” Then, after the court initially expressed its intention
    to introduce evidence of Gomez’s delay, defense counsel
    responded, “I’d ask the court to reconsider its legal analysis of
    the situation,” and began to argue that the delay could not
    support an inference of consciousness of guilt before being cut
    off by the court. And after the section 402 hearing, defense
    counsel had another extended argument over whether Gomez’s
    delay showed a consciousness of guilt. At that point, defense
    counsel also raised the issue of character evidence, noting that
    the evidence was “prejudicial because it’s another form . . . of
    the court or the prosecution putting on character evidence when
    you can’t really do that.” Finally, after Ganarial’s testimony
    58
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    before the jury, counsel moved to “strike his testimony as being
    irrelevant to the charges for what Gomez is presently on trial.”
    But even if these objections were not specific enough to be
    preserved for appeal, Gomez’s claims would still be reviewable.
    “Reviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing
    to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been
    futile . . . .” (People v. Welch (1993) 
    5 Cal.4th 228
    , 237.) Here,
    the record suggests that the trial court would have rejected any
    objection to the testimony. During the initial argument, the
    court told defense counsel, “You may have another solution to
    this, but I don’t plan to let it go,” and explained that even if it
    could not “find a case exactly in point,” it was “going to be a
    pioneer.” The trial court added: “I’m not going to let this go.
    I’m not going to let the defendants control the court.” Then,
    after hearing Ganarial’s testimony at the section 402 hearing,
    the court told defense counsel, “I have no doubt but what it
    shows a consciousness of guilt.” It was reasonable for defense
    counsel to believe, based on the trial court’s statements, that any
    further objections regarding the admission of the evidence
    would be futile. For this reason too, Gomez’s evidentiary claims
    are not forfeited.
    Neither is Gomez’s challenge to the jury instruction
    forfeited. We have held that objections at trial are not necessary
    to preserve appellate review of allegedly erroneous
    consciousness of guilt instructions. (See People v. Hannon
    (1977) 
    19 Cal.3d 588
    , 600; § 1259.) In any case, defense counsel
    argued at length that no authority supported the trial court’s
    conclusion that Gomez’s refusal to come to court possibly
    indicated consciousness of guilt.
    59
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    Finally, Gomez has not forfeited his constitutional claims.
    In People v. Partida (2005) 
    37 Cal.4th 428
    , we explained that,
    although a defendant is barred from bringing due process claims
    on grounds distinct from those raised at trial, “defendant may
    argue an additional legal consequence of the asserted
    error . . . is a violation of due process.” (Id. at p. 438.) The
    defendant in Partida had unsuccessfully objected at trial to the
    admission of evidence under section 352. On appeal, he argued
    that the trial court’s rejection of this argument violated his due
    process rights; this Court held that his claim was not forfeited.
    (Partida, at pp. 438–439.) Here, Gomez argued at trial that the
    consciousness of guilt instruction was unsupportable by
    evidence of his delay and that this evidence was irrelevant, more
    prejudicial than probative, and impermissible character
    evidence. On appeal, he argues that the trial judge’s rejection
    of these arguments violated his due process rights — that is, he
    argues that “an additional legal consequence of the asserted
    error” was a violation of his due process rights. (Id. at p. 438.)
    As in Partida, “[t]his he may do.” (Id. at p. 439.)
    b. Merits
    “ ‘It is an elementary principle of law that before a jury can
    be instructed that it may draw a particular inference, evidence
    must appear in the record which, if believed by the jury, will
    support the suggested inference.’ ” (People v. Alexander (2010)
    
    49 Cal.4th 846
    , 920–921.) “No evidence is admissible except
    relevant evidence” (Evid. Code, § 350), and “relevant evidence”
    is defined as “evidence . . . having any tendency in reason to
    prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
    determination of the action” (id., § 210). “The most common
    evidentiary device” is the “permissive inference,” “which
    60
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    allows — but does not require — the trier of fact to infer the
    elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and
    which places no burden of any kind on the defendant.” (County
    Court of Ulster County, N.Y. v. Allen (1979) 
    442 U.S. 140
    , 157
    (Ulster County).)
    We have not before considered whether a defendant’s brief
    refusal to attend trial proceedings may give rise to an inference
    of consciousness of guilt. But, as the Attorney General points
    out, we have previously held in different circumstances that a
    defendant’s absence from trial can support such an inference. In
    People v. Carrera (1989) 
    49 Cal.3d 291
    , we held that evidence
    concerning a defendant’s escape from prison after being arrested
    and charged was admissible as indicating a consciousness of
    guilt. (Id. at pp. 313–314; see People v. Schafter (1911) 
    161 Cal. 573
     [evidence of a plan to escape prison while awaiting trial was
    admissible as showing a consciousness of guilt].) And in People
    v. Snyder (1976) 
    56 Cal.App.3d 195
    , the Court of Appeal
    concluded that after the defendant skipped bail and missed the
    guilt phase of his trial, the trial court properly instructed the
    jury that it could consider the defendant’s absence in
    determining his guilt. (Id. at p. 199; see People v. Sherren (1979)
    
    89 Cal.App.3d 752
     [finding no error in the trial court taking
    judicial notice that the out-of-custody defendant missed two
    pretrial hearings and instructing the jury that flight can show a
    consciousness of guilt].) These holdings are reflected in the
    pattern jury instruction that says flight, attempted flight,
    escape, or attempted escape after the commission of a crime
    “may be considered . . . in deciding whether a defendant is guilty
    or not guilty.” (CALJIC No. 2.52.)
    Gomez argues that his temporary refusal to attend trial is
    analogous to other situations in which we have indicated that a
    61
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    jury should not be permitted to consider a defendant’s absence.
    In People v. Sully (1991) 
    53 Cal.3d 1195
    , the defendant yelled at
    jurors after they found him guilty of murder and he informed
    the court that he would continue to disrupt the proceedings if he
    were present. (Id. at p. 1238.) The court subsequently allowed
    the defendant to be absent from the penalty phase, which
    resulted in a capital sentence. (Id. at p. 1240.) On appeal, we
    held that although the trial court informed the jury that the
    defendant was voluntarily absent, “[a]n instruction to disregard
    defendant’s absence would have been proper on defendant’s
    timely request.” (Id. at p. 1241.)
    We reaffirmed Sully and extended its holding to the guilt
    phase of trial in People v. Medina (1995) 
    11 Cal.4th 694
    . There,
    the defendant was disruptive during his murder trial’s guilt
    phase and was allowed to leave; he chose to remain absent for
    the duration of the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. (Id. at
    p. 737.) On appeal, he argued that the court on its own initiative
    should have instructed the jury to disregard his absence. (Id. at
    p. 739.) Citing Sully, we held that the trial court had no duty to
    instruct the jury to disregard the defendant’s absence but
    suggested that such an instruction would have been proper if
    requested. (Id. at p. 740.)
    We conclude that this case has more in common with the
    Sully line of cases than the cases cited by the Attorney General
    involving prison escapes and skipping bail. Unlike the absences
    in Carrera or Snyder, Gomez’s brief refusal to attend court was
    not an attempt to elude prosecution or punishment. Ganarial’s
    testimony suggests that Gomez intended merely to disrupt the
    proceedings temporarily. Ganarial recounts Gomez saying,
    “They bring me back whenever they want, I’ll go to court
    whenever I want.” This disruptive intent is further supported
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    by the obscenities that Gomez repeatedly directed at the court
    during the delay.
    The Attorney General presents two additional theories for
    why evidence of Gomez’s delay could support a permissive
    inference of consciousness of guilt. First, he cites several cases
    that have held that in-custody defendants’ efforts to prevent the
    production of evidence could support an inference of
    consciousness of guilt. (See, e.g., People v. Watkins (2012) 
    55 Cal.4th 999
    , 1027 [defendant’s refusal to participate in a lineup
    could indicate consciousness of guilt]; People v. Farnam (2002)
    
    28 Cal.4th 107
    , 164 [defendant’s refusal to provide a hair or
    blood sample]; People v. Ellis (1966) 
    65 Cal.2d 529
    , 536–539
    [defendant’s refusal to provide a voice sample].) These cases are
    supported by a series of pattern jury instructions regarding
    efforts to fabricate or suppress evidence. (See CALJIC No. 2.03
    [making false or misleading statements about the charged crime
    can support an inference of consciousness of guilt]; CALJIC No.
    2.04 [trying to fabricate evidence or induce false testimony can
    support an inference of consciousness of guilt]; CALJIC No. 2.05
    [authorizing someone else to fabricate evidence can support an
    inference of consciousness of guilt]; CALJIC No. 2.06
    [attempting to suppress adverse evidence can support an
    inference of consciousness of guilt].)
    These cases and jury instructions concern situations in
    which a defendant seeks to interfere with evidence, presumably
    out of fear that it would incriminate them. Here, by contrast,
    Gomez attempted neither to thwart the production of evidence
    nor to fabricate false evidence.
    The Attorney General also urges that we apply a line of
    cases upholding permissive inferences where the prosecution
    63
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    presented evidence of defendants acting in ways that innocent
    people would not. For example, we upheld a permissive
    inference of consciousness of guilt based on the fact that the
    defendant had tattooed the number “187,” the Penal Code
    section defining murder, on his forehead after the alleged
    murder was committed because “it would be unlikely that an
    innocent person would so advertise his connection to murder.”
    (People v. Ochoa (2001) 
    26 Cal.4th 398
    , 438, abrogated on
    another point as recognized in People v. Harris (2008) 
    43 Cal.4th 1269
    , 1306; see also People v. Hartsch (2010) 
    49 Cal.4th 472
    ,
    505.) But this case presents a different scenario; there is no
    reason to think Gomez’s refusal to come to court was indicative
    of his consciousness of guilt. He may simply have been tired; as
    Ganarial testified, inmates on trial are woken before 6:00 a.m.
    Or he may have been frustrated by the trial process and wanted
    to assert more control over it. Cases like Ochoa do not support
    the Attorney General’s argument that evidence of Gomez’s delay
    was properly admissible to support an inference of
    consciousness of guilt.
    In sum, the evidence concerning Gomez’s brief refusal did
    not have a “tendency in reason to prove” consciousness of guilt;
    it therefore should have been excluded as irrelevant. (Evid.
    Code, § 210.)
    For the same reasons, the admission of this evidence and
    the jury instruction violated Gomez’s rights to due process. “The
    due process clauses of the federal Constitution . . . require a
    relationship between the permissively inferred fact and the
    proven fact on which it depends.” (People v. Mendoza, supra, 24
    Cal.4th at p. 180.)       Permissive inferences are therefore
    constitutionally suspect when, “under the facts of the case, there
    is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted
    64
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    by the inference.” (Ulster County, 
    supra,
     442 U.S. at p. 157.) In
    other words, “ ‘[a] permissive inference violates the Due Process
    Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason
    and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the
    jury.’ ” (People v. Yeoman (2003) 
    31 Cal.4th 93
    , 131, quoting
    Francis v. Franklin (1985) 
    471 U.S. 307
    , 314–315.) Here, the
    trial court’s proposed inference—that Gomez’s brief refusal to
    attend trial proceedings reflected consciousness of guilt—was
    “ ‘not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the
    proven facts before the jury.’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, the trial court’s
    decision to admit evidence regarding Gomez’s refusal to attend
    court and its jury instruction on consciousness of guilt violated
    Gomez’s constitutional rights to due process.
    c. Prejudice
    Although the trial court erred in allowing the jury to
    consider the circumstances of Gomez’s brief absence, we
    conclude that the errors were harmless under the applicable
    state and federal standards. (People v. Watson (1956) 
    46 Cal.2d 818
    , 836 (Watson); People v. Brown (1988) 
    46 Cal.3d 432
    , 447–
    448 (Brown); Chapman v. California (1967) 
    386 U.S. 18
    , 24
    (Chapman).) Gomez contends that the trial court’s errors, “by
    [their] nature, provided an all-purpose rejoinder . . . to jurors’
    doubts about Gomez’s guilt” and “invited jurors [at the penalty
    phase] to assuage any lingering doubts about Gomez’s guilt with
    the thought that if Gomez himself knew he was guilty, he must
    be.”    Gomez also argues that Deputy Sheriff Ganarial’s
    testimony regarding the manner by which Gomez was held in
    custody and brought to court was inherently prejudicial.
    But the fact that the jury did not find Gomez guilty on all
    counts suggests that the trial court’s errors did not have the
    65
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    sweeping effect that Gomez contends.            Moreover, the
    prosecution did not rely significantly on Gomez’s absence or the
    circumstances surrounding that absence and made no mention
    of the episode during its closing argument.
    Further, in light of the considerable evidence presented
    over the months-long trial, we conclude that the trial court’s
    errors did not carry material weight at the guilt phase. Salcedo
    himself testified that Gomez robbed him at his home. Forensic
    evidence gathered from a nearby car placed Gomez in the area
    of Raul Luna’s house around the time of his murder, as did the
    testimony of Luna’s neighbor, William Owens. Luna’s cellphone
    was used to call Robert Dunton’s house, where Gomez had been
    staying, and Witness No. 1 testified that Gomez brought the
    phone to Dunton’s house, where it was later recovered by the
    police. Moreover, both Witness No. 1 and Witness No. 3 testified
    as to Gomez’s role in the crimes against Rajendra Patel, and
    their accounts were consistent with the forensic evidence
    gathered on the freeway on-ramp and from Patel’s car. Witness
    No. 1 also testified that Gomez was present at the murders of
    Acosta and Dunton, and the testimony of Witness No. 1, Witness
    No. 2, and Sergeant Valdemar tended to show that Gomez killed
    Acosta and Dunton on behalf of the Mexican Mafia. Detective
    Winter also testified that in the course of investigating the
    murder of Jesus Escareno, Gomez mentioned “a couple of guys
    that were shot and brains were splattered all over the place,”
    which matched the description of the Acosta and Dunton
    murders. And Gomez’s fingerprints were found on a shotgun
    that matched the spent cartridges found at the Acosta and
    Dunton murder scene.
    We are also not convinced that the trial court’s errors
    influenced the jury’s decision at the penalty phase. Gomez was
    66
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    accused of committing five murders in less than two months,
    and the jury convicted him of committing four of those murders.
    The prosecution also offered substantial evidence concerning
    additional violent acts committed by Gomez, both before the
    crimes at issue here and while in jail awaiting trial for those
    crimes, none of which Gomez disputed. In contrast, the defense
    presented relatively little mitigation evidence, consisting solely
    of expert testimony regarding high security state prisons and
    the testimony of his sister.
    In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s
    errors did not affect the jury’s verdicts in this case. (Watson,
    supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 447–
    448; Chapman, 
    supra,
     386 U.S. at p. 24.)
    3. Claim of Trial Court Bias
    Gomez claims that the trial court not only erred in
    admitting the evidence regarding his brief refusal to attend trial
    and permitting the jury to infer consciousness of guilt from it,
    but also demonstrated improper judicial bias in violation of his
    constitutional rights.
    As with Gomez’s other claims, the Attorney General
    argues that Gomez’s failure to raise the trial court’s bias below
    precludes us from considering it on appeal. But we have held
    that a defendant’s failure to object to judicial bias “does not
    preclude review . . . when objecting would be futile.” (People v.
    Sturm (2006) 
    37 Cal.4th 1218
    , 1237.) In particular, we reasoned
    in Sturm that “the evident hostility between the trial judge and
    defense counsel” left defense counsel in the fundamentally
    unfair position of either objecting to the judicial misconduct and
    risking retaliation against his client or sacrificing the claim on
    review. (Ibid.)
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    The record reveals a similarly unfair choice for defense
    counsel here. As described above, the trial judge was clear in
    his intent to present the evidence concerning Gomez’s refusal to
    attend court. In response to defense counsel’s argument that
    the brief absence was irrelevant to Gomez’s consciousness of
    guilt, the trial judge referred to a time he had jailed a lawyer
    after trial on contempt charges and then said, “All I’m saying is
    that you challenged me, and I’m responding to the challenge.”
    He continued, “You did move for a mistrial making it a major
    issue . . . . This is what I’m doing.” Given the trial court’s
    expressed intentions, it is reasonable to believe that any
    objection concerning judicial bias would have futile. Thus,
    Gomez has not forfeited his claim that the trial court failed to
    serve as a neutral arbiter.
    Nevertheless, we reject the claim on its merits. We have
    explained that trial judges violate due process when they
    “ ‘officiously and unnecessarily usurp[] the duties of the
    prosecutor’ ” and appear to be “ ‘allying . . . with the
    prosecution.’ ” (People v. Clark (1992) 
    3 Cal.4th 41
    , 143 (Clark),
    quoting People v. Campbell (1958) 
    162 Cal.App.2d 776
    , 787.)
    But in reviewing such claims, our role “ ‘is not to determine
    whether the trial judge’s conduct left something to be desired,
    or even whether some comments would have been better left
    unsaid. Rather, we must determine whether the judge’s
    behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair,
    as opposed to a perfect, trial.’ ” (People v. Snow (2003) 
    30 Cal.4th 43
    , 78.)
    Although we are troubled by the trial judge’s insistence on
    being “a pioneer” and his encouragement of Ganarial’s
    testimony, his actions do not amount to a constitutional
    violation. To be sure, the trial judge might have “ ‘officiously
    68
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    and unnecessarily usurp[ed] the duties of the prosecutor’ ” if he
    had introduced evidence as to Gomez’s delay on behalf of the
    court, as originally discussed. (Clark, 
    supra,
     3 Cal.4th at
    p. 143.) But the judge did not do so here. Indeed, he recognized
    the problems that would arise if the court called Ganarial, so the
    prosecution agreed to call Ganarial to testify before the jury as
    a prosecution witness.
    We also disagree with Gomez’s claim that the trial court
    improperly arranged for the presentation of Ganarial’s
    testimony “in an effort to punish Gomez for his disrespect to the
    court.” We cannot say, based on this record, that the trial court
    admitted the evidence and instructed the jury on consciousness
    of guilt out of a desire to harm or disadvantage Gomez. Rather,
    the trial court appears to have acted pursuant to its duty to
    control the trial proceedings (§ 1044) and under the erroneous
    but honest belief that a defendant’s refusal to attend trial was
    relevant evidence as to a defendant’s consciousness of guilt.
    In sum, we reject Gomez’s claim that the trial court failed
    to serve as a neutral arbiter. In so doing, we emphasize that
    although Evidence Code section 775 permits trial courts to call
    witnesses and interrogate them on its own motion, judges
    should resort to this power only where they “ ‘ “believe[] that
    [they] may fairly aid in eliciting the truth, in preventing
    misunderstanding, in clarifying the testimony or covering
    omissions, in allowing a witness his right of explanation, and in
    eliciting facts material to a just determination of the cause.” ’ ”
    (People v. Hawkins (1995) 
    10 Cal.4th 920
    , 948.) Although
    “ ‘[s]ection 1044 . . . vests the trial court with broad discretion to
    control the conduct of a criminal trial’ ” (People v. Bryant, Smith
    and Wheeler (2014) 
    60 Cal.4th 335
    , 386, quoting People v.
    Calderon (1994) 
    9 Cal.4th 69
    , 74–75), such discretion must be
    69
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    exercised impartially in order to protect defendants’
    constitutional rights to due process and to a fair trial. Trial
    courts may employ different methods in order to ensure that a
    disruptive defendant does not derail a trial; for example, as it
    did here, the court may impose a standing extraction order to
    compel a defendant to attend proceedings. What a trial court
    cannot do is permit the jury to infer guilt in a manner not
    countenanced by law.
    C. Admission of Expert Testimony on the Mexican
    Mafia
    Gomez challenges the expert testimony of Sergeant
    Richard Valdemar regarding the Mexican Mafia as more
    prejudicial than probative, and as violative of his constitutional
    rights to due process and a fair trial. Although Gomez concedes
    that “some gang evidence may have probative value where a
    crime is alleged to be gang-related and the gang evidence is
    offered to prove motive,” he claims that Valdemar’s “testimony
    about the Mexican Mafia and about shocking crimes committed
    on its behalf . . . ranged far beyond any proper purpose, serving
    only to instill fear [among the jurors].” As evidence of the
    testimony’s inflammatory nature, Gomez points to notes passed
    by members of the jury to the trial court asking whether the
    jurors were “at risk” of gang violence and expressing “concern[]
    about possible harassment or problems after [the jurors] are
    dismissed once the verdicts are read.”
    We have previously noted that “[e]vidence of the
    defendant’s gang affiliation — including evidence of the gang’s
    territory, membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices,
    criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the like — can help prove
    identity, motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of
    70
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the
    charged crime. [Citations.]” (People v. Hernandez (2004) 
    33 Cal.4th 1040
    , 1049.) But, “even where gang membership is
    relevant, because it may have a highly inflammatory impact on
    the jury trial courts should carefully scrutinize such evidence
    before admitting it.” (People v. Williams, 
    supra,
     16 Cal.4th at
    p. 193.) On appeal, Gomez does not argue that the trial court
    should have excluded Valdemar’s testimony in its entirety.
    Rather, Gomez contends that portions of the testimony were not
    relevant to establish Valdemar’s expertise or to prove the
    prosecution’s theory that Gomez killed Acosta and Dunton on
    the Mexican Mafia’s behalf.
    Assuming Gomez did not forfeit his claims by failing to
    make more timely or specific objections below (see People v.
    Valdez (2012) 
    55 Cal.4th 82
    , 129, fn. 30 [“ ‘Because the question
    whether defendants have preserved their right to raise this
    issue on appeal is close and difficult, we assume [they] have
    preserved their right, and proceed to the merits.’ ”]), we conclude
    that portions of Valdemar’s testimony should have been
    excluded as irrelevant, but that the admission of this testimony
    did not affect the verdicts.
    First, we agree with Gomez that parts of Valdemar’s
    testimony offered to prove Valdemar’s “expertise” on gangs were
    more prejudicial than probative, and should have been excluded.
    Gomez points specifically to Valdemar’s testimony that “just
    about every crime that you can imagine that’s committed on the
    outside in some way was committed [by gang members] on the
    inside of the [county] jail facility,” including “assaults, battery,
    murder, the making of contraband weapons, the transportation,
    sales and use of narcotics, robbery, extortion and rape.” Gomez
    further challenges Valdemar’s statement that “a small minority,
    71
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    normally members of hard core gangs were creating much of the
    problems that we were experiencing, so by isolating these people
    and placing them in special units, we eliminated a lot of the
    assaults that were going on.”
    This evidence went well beyond its stated purpose of
    demonstrating that Valdemar had “contact with gang members
    in the [county] jail,” which had already been established by
    Valdemar’s earlier testimony describing the nature of his work
    and his “interaction with gang members in the county jail while
    [he was] a deputy assigned to the county jail.” Moreover, to the
    extent that the Attorney General contends this evidence was
    necessary to help the jury “understand the complex rules of the
    Mexican Mafia” and to “explain why [Gomez] would comply with
    Mexican Mafia orders,” we disagree that these portions of
    Valdemar’s testimony were more than “tangentially relevant”
    (People v. Cox (1991) 
    53 Cal.3d 618
    , 660, disapproved of on other
    grounds by People v. Doolin (2009) 
    45 Cal.4th 390
    , 421, fn. 22)
    to that purpose. This portion of Valdemar’s testimony discussed
    general gang activity in county jails rather than the specific
    activity of the Mexican Mafia outside of those jails.
    We further agree with Gomez that Valdemar’s testimony
    regarding “the history of the Mexican Mafia, in particular where
    and when it started and how it started,” as well as Valdemar’s
    statement that a certain movie “fairly accurately depicts the
    early years of the Mexican Mafia,” were not “ ‘necessary to
    furnish the jury a context for understanding [the prosecution’s]
    theory’ ” (People v. Masters (2016) 
    62 Cal.4th 1019
    , 1063,
    quoting People v. Roberts (1992) 
    2 Cal.4th 271
    , 299) regarding
    the Acosta and Dunton murders. That the prosecution believed
    that Gomez murdered Acosta and Dunton on behalf of the
    Mexican Mafia did not open the door to any and all evidence
    72
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    regarding the gang. (Cf. Masters at p. 1064 [finding no abuse of
    discretion where the trial court admitted gang-related evidence
    pertinent to a particular crime but “made a painstaking effort to
    exclude [irrelevant or unduly prejudicial] evidence”].) In the
    absence of any apparent connection between the testimony
    regarding the early history of the Mexican Mafia and the Acosta
    and Dunton murders several decades later, and in light of the
    generally inflammatory nature of this gang-related evidence,
    the challenged testimony should have been excluded.
    But we decline to find that the trial court erred by
    admitting the other portions of Valdemar’s testimony that
    Gomez challenges on appeal. The testimony indicating that
    murder was the primary topic of conversation at Mexican Mafia
    meetings surveilled by Valdemar, and the testimony suggesting
    that there have been “several instances . . . in the history of the
    Mexican Mafia” of “a brother kill[ing] another,” was relevant to
    explain why Gomez would kill Acosta and Dunton, with whom
    he occasionally lived. Moreover, in light of our conclusion in
    People v. Gonzales (2006) 
    38 Cal.4th 932
    , 944–947 (Gonzales),
    that the trial court did not err by admitting expert testimony
    opining generally on the possibility that gang members may
    intimidate witnesses and commit perjury, we similarly find no
    error in the trial court’s admission of testimony suggesting that
    “people will come into court and lie for [a Mexican Mafia]
    associate or . . . member” and “that the [Mexican Mafia] expects
    that loyal gang members would use any means possible to delay,
    obstruct or reverse any kind of a criminal prosecution against
    its members.” Much like the expert who testified in Gonzales,
    the expert here did not opine about any individual witness’s
    credibility, but rather focused his testimony on the Mexican
    Mafia’s general reputation.
    73
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    In any event, we also disagree with Gomez that the
    admission of any of the challenged testimony affected the
    outcome of the case. Gomez argues that the jury relied on the
    testimony as impermissible character evidence and that the
    testimony caused the jurors to decide the entire case, including
    Gomez’s punishment, based on fear. But, as Gomez concedes,
    the court properly admitted evidence suggesting that Gomez
    killed Acosta and Dunton on behalf of the Mexican Mafia, so the
    jury would have learned about the gang and at least one of its
    violent practices even if the challenged testimony had been
    excluded. As for Gomez’s contention that the testimony created
    an “atmosphere of fear” among the jurors such that they acted
    out of “concern for their own safety,” Gomez fails to explain how
    the jurors’ deliberations or verdicts at the guilt phase or the
    penalty phase were influenced by fear or purported safety
    concerns, and we cannot readily discern how the outcome was
    affected ourselves. In light as well of the substantial evidence
    presented during both the guilt and the penalty phase (see ante,
    at pp. 67–68), we conclude that the trial court’s error does not
    warrant reversal.      (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 836;
    Chapman, 
    supra,
     386 U.S. at p. 24.)
    D. Admission of Acosta Note
    Gomez claims that the trial court’s admission of the note
    left by Acosta to his wife violated Gomez’s rights under the
    confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal
    Constitution. (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 38
    (Crawford).) In his closing argument, the prosecutor described
    this note as “the testimony of Robert Acosta from his grave” and
    argued that Acosta wrote it to inform the reader that he was
    74
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    going to Dunton’s apartment for a meeting with Grajeda, “a
    known Mexican Mafia associate.”
    The Attorney General argues that Gomez forfeited his
    confrontation clause claim because he objected only on hearsay
    grounds, relying primarily on People v. Riccardi (2012) 
    54 Cal.4th 758
    , 827, fn. 33. But we overruled Riccardi on this point
    in People v. Rangel (2016) 
    62 Cal.4th 1192
     (Rangel), where we
    held that a defendant in a case tried before Crawford, like
    Gomez, “does not forfeit a Crawford challenge by failing to raise
    a confrontation clause objection at trial.” (Rangel, at p. 1215;
    see People v. Clark (2016) 
    63 Cal.4th 522
    , 563.)
    In Crawford, the high court held that the Sixth
    Amendment prohibits the admission of a witness’s “testimonial”
    out-of-court statements offered for their truth unless the
    witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior
    opportunity for cross-examination. (Crawford, 
    supra,
     541 U.S.
    at pp. 59–60.) There is no dispute that Acosta was unavailable
    at trial and that Gomez had no prior opportunity to cross-
    examine him. Accordingly, Gomez’s confrontation clause claim
    turns solely on the question whether the Acosta note was
    testimonial.
    As we recently observed, “[t]hroughout its evolution of the
    Crawford doctrine, the high court has offered various
    formulations of what makes a statement testimonial but has yet
    to provide a definition of that term of art upon which a majority
    of justices agree.” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 
    63 Cal.4th 665
    ,
    687.) Nevertheless, “we have discerned two requirements.
    First, ‘the out-of-court statement must have been made with
    some degree of formality or solemnity.’ [Citation.] Second, the
    primary purpose of the statement must ‘pertain[] . . . in some
    75
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    fashion to a criminal prosecution.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Leon
    (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 569
    , 603, quoting People v. Lopez (2012) 
    55 Cal.4th 569
    , 581–582.) More specifically, the primary purpose
    test asks whether the statements at issue “are given in the
    course of an interrogation or other conversation whose
    ‘ “primary purpose . . . is to establish or prove past events
    potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” ’ (Rangel,
    supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1214.) In its most recent application of
    the primary purpose test, the high court cautioned that
    “[s]tatements made to someone who is not principally charged
    with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are
    significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given
    to law enforcement officers.” (Ohio v. Clark (2015) __ U.S. __
    [
    135 S.Ct. 2173
    , 2182]; see also Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
    p. 694, fn. 19.)
    We conclude that the Acosta note was not testimonial
    because the record does not establish that Acosta left the note
    for his wife for purposes of criminal investigation or prosecution.
    According to Gomez, the fact that Acosta left the note in a Bible,
    memorialized the date and time, and signed the note with his
    full name supports a finding that the statements in the note
    were testimonial “because they were made with the intent that
    they would be communicated to law enforcement and used in
    court.” But there are equally plausible alternative explanations
    that do not suggest a testimonial intent. Acosta may have
    simply wanted his wife to know what had happened if he did not
    return from the meeting, or he may have wanted her to pass the
    note along to associates who could retaliate against Gomez and
    Grajeda. That the note referred to Grajeda and Dunton by their
    “street names” rather than their full names is an additional
    reason to believe that the note was not specifically intended for
    76
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    law enforcement. This is not a scenario where the evidence
    clearly indicates that the recipient was merely a conduit for
    conveying the declarant’s statements to the police. (Cf. State v.
    Jensen (2007) 
    299 Wis.2d 267
    , 286 [a letter addressed to police
    and given to a friend with directions to send to police if
    “ ‘anything happen[ed]’ ” to her was testimonial].) In view of the
    high court’s guidance that statements “made to someone who is
    not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting
    criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial”
    (Ohio v. Clark, supra, 135 S.Ct. at p. 2182), we conclude that the
    Acosta note was not testimonial and therefore reject Gomez’s
    confrontation clause claim.
    Even if the Acosta note were testimonial, any error was
    harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Delaware v. Van Arsdall
    (1986) 
    475 U.S. 673
    , 680; Chapman, 
    supra,
     386 U.S. at p. 24.)
    The note does not mention Gomez, and there is no dispute that
    Gomez participated in the killing of Acosta and Dunton.
    Nevertheless, Gomez contends that the Acosta note was the only
    evidence corroborating Witness No. 1’s testimony that Grajeda
    was present at Dunton’s apartment; without this evidence,
    Gomez continues, the prosecution’s theory that Gomez
    committed a premeditated and deliberate killing at the behest of
    Grajeda would have been severely undermined. But, as
    explained above (see ante, at pp. 53–54), there is significant
    evidence showing that Gomez murdered Acosta and Dunton as
    part of a calculated plan on behalf of the Mexican Mafia, none of
    which relies on the Acosta note. By contrast, little if any
    evidence indicates that Acosta and Dunton attempted to attack
    Gomez first and that Gomez shot them out of fear. Gomez
    suffered no prejudice even assuming that the admission of the
    Acosta note was error under Crawford.
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    E. Griffin Error
    In his closing argument, the prosecutor discussed evidence
    that corroborated Witness No. 1’s testimony implicating Gomez
    in the Escareno murder. In particular, the prosecutor pointed
    to Detective Winter’s trial testimony that Gomez “knew facts of
    the case which had not been revealed to the press” — namely,
    that the victims’ “wallets were missing.” He noted that the
    defense had presented only a couple of news articles and that
    “those articles don’t give Ruben Gomez enough information to
    have told this to Detective Winter.” The prosecutor then said
    “there’s something even more important”: “There is absolutely
    no evidence that Ruben Gomez saw those articles. There is
    absolutely no evidence that Ruben Gomez read those articles.
    There is absolutely no evidence that Ruben Gomez reads any
    newspaper.”
    Gomez contends that the prosecutor’s comments violated
    Griffin v. California (1965) 
    380 U.S. 609
     (Griffin). Griffin held
    that “the prosecution may not comment upon a defendant’s
    failure to testify on his or her own behalf. Its holding does not,
    however, extend to bar prosecution comments based upon the
    state of the evidence or upon the failure of the defense to
    introduce material evidence or to call anticipated witnesses.”
    (People v. Bradford (1997) 
    15 Cal.4th 1229
    , 1339 (Bradford); see
    People v. Brady (2010) 
    50 Cal.4th 547
    , 565–566.) At the same
    time, “we have held that a prosecutor may commit Griffin error
    if he or she argues to the jury that certain testimony or evidence
    is uncontradicted, if such contradiction or denial could be
    provided only by the defendant, who therefore would be required
    to take the witness stand.” (Bradford, at p. 1339.)
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
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    The prosecutor’s comments do not amount to Griffin error.
    The prosecutor did not refer to Gomez’s decision not to testify.
    Rather, the prosecutor commented that the defense had failed
    “to introduce material evidence” — that is, evidence that Gomez
    had read about the Escareno murder in the newspaper.
    (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1339.) Although Gomez
    argues that only his own testimony could have contradicted the
    prosecutor’s claim that Gomez did not read the articles or
    newspapers in general, Gomez could have presented other
    evidence to that effect. As the trial court explained, “[t]here
    could, for example, have been evidence that [Gomez] subscribed
    to the San Pedro Pilot, that he was an avid reader and others
    around him, anyone associated with him knew that he read the
    paper and commented to others about reading.” Accordingly,
    the prosecutor did not violate Griffin by referring to Gomez’s
    failure to introduce such evidence.
    F. Admonitions Regarding Notetaking and Read-
    back of Testimony
    Gomez argues that by sternly advising the jury against
    “not taking enough notes,” the trial court “elevated the
    importance of juror notetaking over observation of the
    witnesses” and therefore interfered with the jury’s “unique and
    exclusive responsibility and power to evaluate the credibility of
    witnesses.” Gomez highlights a number of admonitions by the
    trial judge, including that he would be “very discouraged” to “see
    jurors just sitting there with their notes in their laps . . . and it
    won’t be recorded in your memories because you aren’t trying to
    take those notes”; that the “thing that infuriates [the trial court]
    the most about jurors is when they first go in to deliberations
    and the first hour or two [the court] get[s] a note sent out saying
    [the jury] want[s] a reread of the testimony . . . ”; that jurors
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
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    should “take a lot of notes”; and that taking notes was part of
    their “job in recording the information.” He also suggests that
    the trial court tried to discourage the read-back of testimony by
    not only failing to state expressly that the jury had a right to
    rehear testimony, but also noting that any such requests could
    not be accommodated immediately. Gomez says the trial court’s
    actions violated section 1138 as well as the right to due process,
    the right to a fair trial, the right to present a defense, the right
    to counsel, the right to a jury trial, the right to confront
    witnesses against him, and the right to a reliable and
    unanimous verdict in a capital case.
    We begin by noting that because Gomez did not object to
    the trial court’s admonitions or request a clarifying instruction
    at trial, his claims are forfeited on appeal. (People v. Livingston
    (2012) 
    53 Cal.4th 1145
    , 1168–1169.) In any case, the trial
    court’s various statements about the importance of taking notes
    and about the read-back of testimony did not amount to error.
    Although section 1137 approves of the practice of juror
    notetaking, we have cautioned that notetaking implicates
    certain risks, namely, that “ ‘more significance will be placed by
    the jurors on their notes . . . than on their own independent
    recollection. The notes may accentuate irrelevancies and ignore
    more substantial issues and evidence. . . . [T]he juror with the
    best notes will unduly influence and possibly mislead the other
    jurors.’ [Citation.] Furthermore, note-taking may ‘distract the
    jurors’ attention from the proceedings. . . . While taking notes,
    the jurors may also not pay sufficient attention to the behavior
    of witnesses and may thus be unable to properly assess their
    credibility.’ ” (People v. Whitt (1984) 
    36 Cal.3d 724
    , 746, quoting
    People v. DiLuca (1982) 85 App.Div.2d 439, 444–445 [
    448 N.Y.S.2d 730
    , 734].) In Whitt, we acknowledged that other
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
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    jurisdictions “found error in [a court’s] failure to give [a]
    cautionary instruction” regarding the risks of note taking, but
    we merely opined that giving such an instruction is “the better
    practice.” (Whitt, at p. 747.)
    We have since held that the trial court is not required to
    give such an instruction. (People v. Marquez (1992) 
    1 Cal.4th 553
    , 578.) Here the trial court’s warnings, in context, could not
    have been understood as an instruction that jurors should
    prioritize notetaking at the expense of their duty to make
    credibility determinations. To the contrary, the trial court
    emphasized that the purpose of notetaking was to “refresh your
    own recollections of what goes on during the trial” and to help
    the jury “keep all of this organized in your minds.” It also
    “caution[ed]” that jurors should “not . . . take so many notes that
    [they]’re not watching and listening as the evidence is being
    presented,” that they “should watch the witness while they’re
    testifying as well,” and that they should not “have [their] head[s]
    buried in [their] notes all the time.”
    The court’s emphasis on notetaking did not direct the jury
    to elevate notetaking over observing the witnesses and evidence,
    but rather served to caution the jury that notetaking can
    supplement credibility determinations and ensure that jury
    deliberations would not be impeded by needless requests for the
    read-back of testimony. Nor do we read the court’s statements
    as discouraging the read-back of testimony; there was no risk
    that the jurors were unaware that they could request the read-
    back of testimony if they decided that they needed it. The trial
    court did not err.
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
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    G. Alleged Instructional Errors
    1. Instructions on Deciding Degree of Murder
    The trial court instructed the jury that if it found Gomez
    guilty of murder, it had to determine whether the murder was
    of the first or second degree. The trial court then instructed the
    jury with the 1996 version of CALJIC No. 8.71 as follows: “If
    you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously
    agree that the crime of murder has been committed by a
    defendant, but you unanimously agree that you have a
    reasonable doubt whether the murder was of the first or of the
    second degree, you must give the defendant the benefit of that
    doubt and return a verdict fixing the murder as of the second
    degree.”
    Gomez claims that the trial court unconstitutionally
    skewed the jurors’ deliberations toward first degree murder by
    giving this instruction because it presents first degree murder
    as “the default verdict . . . unless the jurors unanimously agree[]
    that they ha[ve] a reasonable doubt about the degree of murder.”
    He argues that this error was compounded by the trial court’s
    failure to give CALJIC No. 17.11, which instructs the jury that
    if you “have a reasonable doubt as to whether [the crime] is of
    the first or second degree, you must find [the defendant] guilty
    of that crime in the second degree.”
    In People v. Moore (2011) 
    51 Cal.4th 386
    , we said “the
    better practice is not to use the 1996 revised version[] of CALJIC
    [No.] 8.71 . . . , as the instruction[] carr[ies] at least some
    potential for confusing jurors about the role of their individual
    judgments in deciding between first and second degree murder.”
    (Id. at p. 411.) But “[w]e did not hold in Moore that the 1996
    revised version[] of CALJIC [No.] 8.71 . . . [was] erroneous.”
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
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    (People v. Salazar (2016) 
    63 Cal.4th 214
    , 246 (Salazar).) Rather,
    we declined to address the merits of defendant’s claim because
    we concluded any error was harmless beyond a reasonable
    doubt. (Moore, at p. 412.)
    More recently, we rejected a defendant’s challenge to the
    use of the 1996 version of CALJIC No. 8.71, concluding that “[n]o
    logical reading of the instructions leads to a compelled verdict of
    first degree murder.” (Salazar, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 247.) We
    noted that the jury was also given CALJIC No. 17.40, which
    states that each juror has a duty to decide the case for herself,
    and CALJIC No. 8.74, which provides: “ ‘Before you may return
    a verdict in this case, you must agree unanimously not only as
    to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, but also if you
    should find him guilty of an unlawful killing, you must agree
    unanimously as to whether he was guilty of murder of the first
    degree, murder of the second degree, or voluntary
    manslaughter.’ ” (Salazar, at p. 247.) Thus, even if the
    language in CALJIC No. 8.71 was confusing standing alone, we
    held that “the instructions were not erroneous in this case when
    considered with the rest of the charge to the jury.” (Id. at
    p. 248.)
    For similar reasons, we conclude that no such
    instructional error occurred here. As in Salazar, the trial court’s
    other instructions dispelled any potential confusion that may be
    present in CALJIC No. 8.71. (See People v. Delgado (2017) 
    2 Cal.5th 544
    , 573–574 [“We have long held that ‘the correctness
    of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of
    the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or
    from a particular instruction.’ ”].) In this case, the trial court
    instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 17.40, which emphasizes
    that individual jurors should not “decide any question in a
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    particular way because a majority of the jurors or any of them
    favor that decision.” And the jury was also instructed with
    CALJIC No. 8.74, which makes clear that the jury must “agree
    unanimously” as to the degree of murder before returning a
    verdict. We thus reject Gomez’s claim.
    2. CALJIC No. 17.41.1
    Gomez argues that the trial court should not have
    instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1 because doing so
    violated his federal constitutional rights. The instruction
    provided: “The integrity of a trial requires that jurors at all
    times during their deliberations conduct themselves as required
    by these instructions. Accordingly should it occur that any juror
    refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the
    law or to decide the case based on penalty or punishment or any
    other improper basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors to
    immediately advise the court of the situation.”
    Gomez concedes that although we disapproved the use of
    CALJIC No. 17.41.1 in future trials in 2002 (see People v.
    Engelman (2002) 
    28 Cal.4th 436
    , 449), we have repeatedly held
    “that giving the instruction, although ill-advised, does not
    violate a defendant’s constitutional rights” (People v. Souza,
    supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 121; see also People v. Nelson (2016) 
    1 Cal.5th 513
    , 553–555; People v. Brady (2010) 
    50 Cal.4th 547
    ,
    587; People v. Wilson (2008) 
    44 Cal.4th 758
    , 805–806). Gomez
    provides no persuasive reason for us to revisit that precedent
    here.
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
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    3. Series of Guilt Phase Instructions that Allegedly
    Undermine the Requirement of Proof Beyond a
    Reasonable Doubt
    Gomez contends that a series of standard guilt phase
    instructions (CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, 2.51, 8.20,
    8.83) unconstitutionally undermined and diluted the
    requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Acknowledging that we have previously rejected such claims,
    Gomez invites us to reconsider our prior holdings. (See, e.g.,
    People v. Whalen (2013) 
    56 Cal.4th 1
    , 70; People v. Friend (2009)
    
    47 Cal.4th 1
    , 53; People v. Howard (2008) 
    42 Cal.4th 1000
    , 1024–
    1026.) We decline to do so. As we have explained, “[e]ach of
    these instructions ‘is unobjectionable when, as here, it is
    accompanied by the usual instructions on reasonable doubt, the
    presumption of innocence, and the People’s burden of proof.’ ”
    (People v. Kelly (2007) 
    42 Cal.4th 763
    , 792, quoting People v.
    Nakahara (2003) 
    30 Cal.4th 705
    , 715.)
    4. Kidnapping Instruction
    The jury convicted Gomez of kidnapping Patel and found
    true the kidnapping special circumstance. Gomez argues that
    the trial court provided an erroneous instruction regarding the
    element of asportation, violating his constitutional rights to due
    process.
    Section 207, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part:
    “[e]very person who forcibly . . . steals or takes, or holds,
    detains, or arrests any person in this state, and carries the
    person . . . into another part of the same county is guilty of
    kidnapping.” (See People v. Morgan (2007) 
    42 Cal.4th 593
    , 605
    (Morgan).) Although the kidnapping statute does not specify
    any minimum distance that the victim must be carried, we have
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    interpreted it to require movement of a “substantial distance”
    (id. at p. 606), not “a distance that is ‘trivial’ ” (People v.
    Stanworth (1974) 
    11 Cal.3d 588
    , 601).
    Before 1999, this “asportation standard [was] exclusively
    dependent on the distance involved.” (People v. Martinez (1999)
    
    20 Cal.4th 225
    , 233; see People v. Caudillo (1978) 
    21 Cal.3d 562
    ,
    572–574, overruled by Martinez, at p. 229.) But in Martinez, we
    held that the jury should instead consider the “totality of the
    circumstances” in determining whether the victim was moved
    for a “substantial distance,” including factors like “whether that
    movement increased the risk of harm above that which existed
    prior to the asportation, decreased the likelihood of detection,
    and increased both the danger inherent in a victim’s foreseeable
    attempts to escape and the attacker’s enhanced opportunity to
    commit additional crimes.” (Martinez, at p. 237; see also People
    v. Castaneda (2011) 
    51 Cal.4th 1292
    , 1319.) We further held
    that the Martinez standard “could not be applied retroactively,
    because it effected an unforeseeable enlargement of the factual
    basis for determining what constitutes a ‘substantial distance’
    under the kidnapping statute, and the defendant did not have
    fair warning of the enlargement.” (Castaneda, at p. 1319.)
    Although the kidnapping here occurred in 1997, the trial
    court instructed the jury with the 1999 version of CALJIC No.
    9.50, which incorporates the Martinez asportation standard. As
    the Attorney General concedes, this was error. Nevertheless, we
    agree with the Attorney General that the error was harmless
    beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether Patel had been moved a
    substantial distance while he was alive was never in dispute at
    trial; the only disputed question was the identity of the
    kidnapper. After the close of evidence, the prosecutor “invite[d]
    the defense to concede that Patel was kidnapped so that you
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    don’t have to spend any appreciable time on that issue. That
    would leave only the issue of who was the kidnapper for you to
    decide.” In his argument, defense counsel said, “I will concede
    there was a robbery, I will concede it was a murder, and I will
    concede it was a kidnapping. . . . The issue, as I believe [the
    prosecutor] concedes himself, is whether or not [Gomez] is the
    person that committed the murder, committed a robbery and
    committed the kidnapping of Mr. Patel.”
    Moreover, defense counsel’s concession was reasonable in
    light of the evidence: Patel had been locked in the trunk of his
    car, and his body was found on a freeway on-ramp that was not
    easily accessible on foot. The medical examiner testified that
    Patel would have been able to walk or run 75 to 90 feet after
    receiving the deep stab wound to his chest, but not after
    receiving the gunshot wound to his head; consistent with this
    testimony, the police found a trail of blood extending 75 feet
    from Patel’s body, as well as spent shell casings as close as three
    feet from Patel’s body and as far as 90 to 100 feet away from his
    body. In contrast, there is no evidence tending to show that
    Patel encountered his killer on the freeway on-ramp, as Gomez
    suggests. We thus conclude that the trial court’s instructional
    error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
    5. Alleged Vagueness of Definition of Simple
    Kidnapping
    As noted above, we have interpreted section 207 to require
    movement of a “substantial distance” (Morgan, supra, 42
    Cal.4th at p. 606), not “a distance that is ‘trivial’ ” (id. at p. 607).
    The jury here was thus instructed that, in order to find Gomez
    guilty of kidnapping, it must find that “[t]he movement of the
    other person in distance was substantial in character.”
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    Gomez claims that this “substantial distance” element
    was unconstitutionally vague and thus warrants reversal of his
    conviction and sentence. Gomez admits that we rejected this
    precise argument in Morgan, and we do so again here. As we
    explained in Morgan, “case law in effect at the time of
    defendant’s offense provided adequate guidance as to what
    distances would be considered ‘substantial’ under the simple
    kidnapping statute.” (Morgan, supra, 42 Cal. 4th at p. 607,
    citing People v. Caudillo (1978) 
    21 Cal.3d 562
    , 573–574; People
    v. Green (1980) 
    27 Cal.3d 1
    , 67; People v. Stender (1975) 
    47 Cal.App.3d 413
    , 423.) Because Gomez “had fair notice of what
    was and what was not proscribed under our statute for simple
    kidnapping at the time of his offense,” his vagueness claim fails.
    (Morgan, at p. 607.)
    IV.    PENALTY PHASE ISSUES
    A. Jury’s Consideration of Evidence Relating to the
    Escareno Murder
    After the close of the prosecution’s case at the guilt phase,
    the defense moved to dismiss the Escareno charges for
    insufficient evidence and enter a judgment of acquittal pursuant
    to section 1181.1. The trial court denied the motion. After the
    jury deadlocked on the Escareno counts, the trial court declared
    a mistrial as to those counts. (The prosecution ultimately
    dismissed the Escareno counts at the conclusion of the trial.
    (See § 1385.))
    Before the penalty phase closing arguments, the trial
    court told the jury that it wanted “to mention something special
    about counts 6 and 7, or 6 in particular, the allegation of the
    murder of Jesus Escareno. One thing I want to make clear to
    you in advance is that that is no longer one of the circumstances
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    of the crime.” The trial court continued: “[T]hose jurors who
    concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
    guilty of the murder of Mr. Escareno are permitted to consider
    that as an aggravating factor under factor (b), prior acts of
    violence. The other jurors that did not find that to be true
    beyond a reasonable doubt cannot consider that as an
    aggravating factor. [¶] So as you discuss aggravating and
    mitigating circumstances, those of you that believe that the
    evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Gomez
    murdered Jesus Escareno can consider that as an aggravating
    factor. You cannot require or insist or suggest that jurors that
    did not reach that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt can
    consider that as an aggravating factor.” (See § 190.3, subd. (b).)
    During his penalty phase closing argument, the
    prosecutor said: “I respectfully submit to you that in considering
    the circumstances of the crime that bear on what penalty
    [Gomez] should receive, look at the frequency with which he
    killed. He killed five people in 37 days. . . . [¶] You must agree
    unanimously on the penalty, but not on which aggravating
    circumstances are true. [¶] And therefore as the court already
    pointed out, for those of you who do not — did not believe that
    we proved Escareno’s murder beyond a reasonable doubt, then
    you may not consider that he killed five people in 37 days, you
    are limited to considering that he killed four people in 37 days.
    Those of you who believe that we did prove Ruben Gomez
    murdered Jesus Escareno beyond a reasonable doubt, you may
    consider as an aggravating circumstance that he killed five
    people in 37 days.” Defense counsel did not refer to the Escareno
    killing in his closing argument.
    In its final written penalty phase instructions, the court
    instructed the jury: “Evidence has been introduced for the
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    purpose of showing that the defendant has committed the
    following     criminal    acts:         [¶] . . . Murder   of    Mr.
    Escareno . . . Before a juror may consider any criminal acts as
    an aggravating circumstance in this case, a juror must first be
    satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did, in
    fact, commit the criminal acts. A juror must — may not consider
    any evidence of any other criminal acts as an aggravating
    circumstance. [¶] It is not necessary for all jurors to agree. If
    any juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    criminal activity occurred, that juror may consider that activity
    as a fact in aggravation. If a juror is not so convinced, that juror
    must not consider that evidence for any purpose. [¶] As to the
    unadjudicated criminal acts [¶] . . . The defendant is presumed
    to be innocent until the contrary is proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt.”
    Gomez advances two claims arising out of the trial court’s
    decision to permit individual jurors to consider evidence relating
    to the Escareno murder at the penalty phase. First, he claims
    the trial court erred in denying his section 1118.1 motion to
    dismiss the Escareno charges for insufficient evidence. If the
    trial court had properly granted that motion, Gomez argues, no
    jurors could have considered the Escareno evidence when
    determining whether to impose the death penalty. Second, he
    claims that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the penalty
    phase jurors that they could not consider the Escareno murder
    as an aggravating factor unless they found that the accomplice
    testimony was corroborated by independent evidence. We
    address each claim in turn.
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    1. Denial of Section 1118.1 Motion
    Section 1118.1 provides that in a criminal jury trial, “the
    court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion, at the
    close of the evidence on either side and before the case is
    submitted to the jury for decision, shall order the entry of a
    judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses
    charged . . . if the evidence then before the court is insufficient
    to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on appeal.”
    “ ‘The standard applied by a trial court in ruling upon a motion
    for judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1 is the same
    as the standard applied by an appellate court in reviewing the
    sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, that is,
    “whether from the evidence, including all reasonable inferences
    to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the
    existence of each element of the offense charged.” ’ ” (People v.
    Stevens (2007) 
    41 Cal.4th 182
    , 200, quoting People v. Crittenden
    (1994) 
    9 Cal.4th 83
    , 139, fn. 13.) We review the denial of a
    section 1181.1 motion de novo. (People v. Cole (2004) 
    33 Cal.4th 1158
    , 1213.)
    Again, Gomez contends that the evidence was insufficient
    to support a conviction on the Escareno charges, such that no
    reasonable juror could have been convinced of the truth of such
    evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular, Gomez
    argues that the prosecution failed to sufficiently corroborate the
    testimony of Witness No. 1, his alleged accomplice, which was
    the centerpiece of the prosecution’s case as to the Escareno
    murder.
    Section 1111 provides: “A conviction can not be had upon
    the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such
    other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient
    if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the
    circumstances thereof.” An “accomplice” is “one who is liable to
    prosecution for the identical offense charged against the
    defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the
    accomplice is given.” (Ibid.) In order for the jury to rely on an
    accomplice’s testimony, “ ‘[t]he corroborating evidence may be
    circumstantial or slight and entitled to little consideration when
    standing alone, and it must tend to implicate the defendant by
    relating to an act that is an element of the crime. The
    corroborating evidence need not by itself establish every
    element of the crime, but it must, without aid from the
    accomplice’s testimony, tend to connect the defendant with the
    crime.’ ” (People v. Abilez (2007) 
    41 Cal.4th 472
    , 505.)
    It is undisputed that with respect to the Escareno murder,
    Witness No. 1 was an “accomplice” within the meaning of section
    1111, and Witness No. 1’s testimony identified Gomez as
    Escareno’s killer. Thus, the only question is whether the
    prosecution presented to the jury sufficient corroborating
    evidence connecting Gomez with the Escareno murder.
    Although the evidence of corroboration presented by the
    prosecution was not overwhelming, we find it sufficient for
    purposes of section 1118.1. The primary corroboration evidence
    presented at trial was Detective Winter’s testimony indicating
    that Gomez knew details about the murder that were not public
    knowledge. Winter testified that after Gomez was arrested
    regarding the Acosta and Dunton murders, she questioned him
    at Harbor Jail about matters unrelated to the Escareno murder.
    According to Winter, Gomez then volunteered that he had heard
    “about a guy up on Western, his head being shot off, a female
    that had been killed and wrapped and disposed in a dumpster,
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    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    a couple of guys that were shot and brains were splattered all
    over the place and that these individuals couldn’t be identified.”
    Winter further testified that Gomez then said “that when he had
    talked about the individuals not being identified, their wallets
    were missing,” although no information had yet been released
    to the press that Escareno’s wallet had been stolen. This
    statement to Winter, the Attorney General argues,
    “corroborated [Witness No. 1’s] testimony that [Gomez] killed
    Escareno.”      The Attorney General also identifies as
    corroborating evidence the fact that some of the victims of the
    other murders Gomez allegedly committed were also shot with
    a 12-gauge shotgun, and that all the alleged killings occurred in
    the same general area during a month-long period.
    Gomez argues on appeal that the Winter statement is
    insufficient for our present purposes because Gomez did not
    specifically identify the Escareno murder when discussing the
    missing wallets; it is common knowledge that homicide victims
    are usually robbed; Witness No. 1 did not testify that he told
    Gomez he had taken Escareno’s wallet; and the defense
    introduced evidence of newspaper articles indicating that it was
    public knowledge that the murder victim had no identification.
    But these arguments simply present one interpretation of the
    evidence; they do not suggest that it would be unreasonable to
    draw the opposite inference from the evidence, as the Attorney
    General urges. When reviewing whether “substantial evidence”
    supports the trial court’s decision to allow individual jurors to
    consider the Escareno murder at the penalty phase, the
    “relevant inquiry . . . remains whether any reasonable trier of
    fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
    doubt.” (People v. Towler, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 118.) Gomez’s
    alternative argument that the evidence was insufficient because
    93
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    Witness No. 1 was not a credible witness similarly fails because
    “[i]n deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court
    resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts.”
    (Young, 
    supra,
     34 Cal.4th at p. 1181.)
    Mindful of the standard of review here, we find that
    Winter’s statement, along with the evidence regarding the
    similar murders, sufficiently corroborated Witness No. 1’s
    testimony. The trial court did not err in denying Gomez’s
    section 1118.1 motion as to the Escareno murder or in allowing
    jurors to consider that crime at the penalty phase on the limited
    basis it described.
    2. Instructional Error
    Alternatively, Gomez claims that the trial court erred in
    failing to reinstruct the jurors at the penalty phase on the
    requirement that independent evidence must corroborate
    accomplice testimony. Gomez contends that this error was
    compounded by the trial court’s admonition that the jurors
    should disregard guilt phase instructions that were not repeated
    at the penalty phase.
    We have held that “the general rules requiring accomplice
    instructions apply at the penalty phase as well as the guilt
    phase of a capital trial.” (People v. Williams (1997) 
    16 Cal.4th 153
    , 275; see People v. Nelson (2011) 
    51 Cal.4th 198
    , 217 [“The
    accomplice corroboration requirement applies to the penalty
    phase as well.”].) Although the Attorney General does not
    dispute that the trial court failed to provide specific instructions
    concerning the accomplice corroboration requirement during the
    penalty phase, he nonetheless contends that this failure does
    not constitute error because the court “clearly told the jury [that]
    only those jurors who already found appellant guilty of the
    94
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    Escareno murder at the guilt phase, necessarily based on the
    proper accomplice instructions given at the guilt phase, could
    consider these crimes as aggravating evidence.”
    We hold that any error was harmless here. (Brown, supra,
    46 Cal.3d at pp. 447–448; Chapman, 
    supra,
     386 U.S. at p. 24.)
    Gomez argues that “[t]he Escareno murder was the single most
    aggravating circumstance relied on at the penalty phase.” But
    the Escareno murder was just one of five murders offered as
    aggravation evidence at the penalty phase, and the jury had
    unanimously agreed that Gomez was guilty of four of those
    murders. Further, although Gomez contends that the details
    regarding the Escareno murder were especially prejudicial, the
    prosecutor did not focus on this incident in his closing argument;
    rather, he primarily discussed the Patel murder and Gomez’s
    violent behavior against jail guards and other inmates.
    Moreover, both the prosecutor and the trial court told the jury
    that only those jurors who had found beyond a reasonable doubt
    that Gomez murdered Escareno could consider the Escareno
    murder as an aggravating factor. Finally, as discussed further
    above (see ante, at p. 68), the prosecution offered substantial
    evidence concerning other violent acts committed by Gomez, and
    the defense presented relatively little mitigation evidence. We
    find no reasonable possibility that the instructional error
    affected the jury’s penalty determination.
    B. Admission of Evidence of Jail Guards’ Ethnic
    Background
    As noted, Deputy Sheriff Millan testified, as part of the
    prosecution’s penalty phase case, that Gomez stabbed him with
    a shank while in custody. At the end of its direct examination,
    the prosecutor asked Millan, “What is your ancestry?” Millan
    95
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    replied that he was “Mexican American.” The prosecutor asked
    Deputy Sheriff Montoya the same question, who likewise
    responded that he was “Mexican American.” During his penalty
    phase closing argument, the prosecutor said, “We’ve shown this
    man’s history of past violence, and we’ve shown that this man’s
    conduct while in custody is not the result of a racial or ethnic
    conduct, because his conduct, his violent behavior was not
    directed just at Vanderleek but also against Montoya and
    Millan, so that has nothing to do with it.”
    Gomez claims that the admission of evidence concerning
    the two jail guards’ ethnic backgrounds allowed the jury to
    improperly consider race at the sentencing phase, thus violating
    his federal and state constitutional rights. By contrast, the
    Attorney General argues that the deputies’ ancestry was
    relevant to Gomez’s future dangerousness. (See People v.
    Romero and Self (2015) 
    62 Cal.4th 1
    , 53 [holding that a
    prosecutor may argue “that a defendant will be dangerous in the
    future based on evidence admitted under factors (a)-(c)” of
    section 190.3].) According to the Attorney General, “[t]he
    prosecutor in no way asked the jury to consider appellant’s race
    to determine the penalty” but “merely argued that appellant
    was dangerous and would attack jail staff and inmates without
    regard to their race or ethnicity.”
    As the high court has said, the race of the defendant is
    “totally irrelevant to the sentencing process,” and the jury’s
    consideration of race as a factor in favor of the death penalty is
    “constitutionally impermissible.” (Zant v. Stephens (1983) 
    462 U.S. 862
    , 885; see People v. Bacigalupo (1993) 
    6 Cal.4th 457
    ,
    477.) Similarly, “[t]he Constitution prohibits racially biased
    prosecutorial arguments.” (McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 
    481 U.S. 279
    , 309, fn. 30; see People v. Cudjo (1993) 
    6 Cal.4th 585
    , 625
    96
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    (Cudjo) [“Prosecutorial argument that includes racial references
    appealing to or likely to incite racial prejudice violates the due
    process and equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth
    Amendment to the federal Constitution.”].)
    We conclude that the trial court’s admission of the
    evidence regarding the guards’ ethnicities, as well as the
    prosecutor’s argument relating to it, was improper. The
    Attorney General claims that the jury here was not asked to
    consider race because the prosecutor argued that Gomez lacked
    racial animus in attacking jail guards — that is, that Gomez
    attacked jail guards who shared his ethnic background as well
    as those who did not.         But the prosecutor’s argument
    nonetheless suggested that the jury could or should engage in
    the following race-based reasoning: Gomez posed a greater risk
    of future danger, and thus was more deserving of the death
    penalty, because he was willing to attack other Mexican
    Americans. Indeed, the objectionable implication of this line of
    argument is that the evidence concerning Gomez’s jailhouse
    attacks would have been less aggravating if he had only
    attacked individuals who did not share his ethnicity. In any
    case, “[b]ecause racial prejudice can strongly compromise a
    juror’s impartiality [citations], even neutral, nonderogatory
    references to race are improper absent compelling justification.”
    (Cudjo, 
    supra,
     6 Cal.4th at pp. 625–626; see McFarland v. Smith
    (2d Cir. 1979) 
    611 F.2d 414
    , 417 [“To raise the issue of race is to
    draw the jury’s attention to a characteristic that the
    Constitution generally commands us to ignore. Even a reference
    that is not derogatory may carry impermissible connotations, or
    may trigger prejudiced responses in the listeners that the
    speaker might neither have predicted nor intended.”]; State v.
    Varner (Minn. 2002) 
    643 N.W.2d 298
    , 305 [“Even statements
    97
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    made without a biased intent may have a negative effect when
    it comes to issues of race.”].)
    Although we find no justification for the prosecutor’s
    argument concerning the jail guards’ ethnic backgrounds, we
    conclude that the admission of this evidence did not prejudice
    Gomez. As in Cudjo, the racial reference here “was a brief and
    isolated remark,” and “there was no continued effort by the
    prosecutor to call attention to defendant’s race or to prejudice
    the jury against him on account of race.” (Cudjo, supra, 6
    Cal.4th at p. 626.) Further, Gomez did not dispute the evidence
    establishing that he had violently attacked jail guards on
    numerous occasions, not to mention evidence of previous violent
    felony convictions. And, again, Gomez’s mitigation evidence
    consisted solely of expert testimony regarding the security
    environment at high security state prisons and his sister’s plea
    for mercy. We are thus persuaded that any error is harmless.
    (Brown, supra, at pp. 447–448; Chapman, 
    supra,
     386 U.S. at
    p. 24.)
    C. Instructional Error Concerning “Biblical
    References”
    Immediately after the defense’s penalty phase closing
    argument, the trial court gave the jury the following instruction:
    “I do want to emphasize again as I’ve done before that you’re not
    to bring anything to the deliberation process. Jurors are
    sometimes tempted in this phase of the case to refer to biblical
    references. Don’t bring the Bible and, don’t refer to those. You’ll
    be guided by your own conscience and the law.” Gomez claims
    the trial court violated his federal constitutional rights by
    forbidding the jury from “referring to biblical references” when
    considering whether to impose the death sentence.
    98
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    Gomez did not object to the instruction in the trial court.
    But, as the Attorney General acknowledges, the forfeiture rule
    “does not apply when . . . the trial court gives an instruction that
    is an incorrect statement of the law.” (People v. Hudson (2006)
    
    38 Cal.4th 1002
    , 1012.) Because that is what Gomez contends
    happened here, we turn to the merits of his claim.
    “ ‘The jury system is an institution that is legally
    fundamental but also fundamentally human. Jurors bring to
    their deliberations knowledge and beliefs about general matters
    of law and fact that find their source in everyday life and
    experience.’ ” (People v. Riel (2000) 
    22 Cal.4th 1153
    , 1219.)
    “That jurors may consider their religious beliefs during penalty
    deliberations,” we have said, “is also to be expected.” (People v.
    Lewis (2001) 
    26 Cal.4th 334
    , 389.) “At the penalty phase, jurors
    are asked to make a normative determination — one which
    necessarily        includes        moral        and        ethical
    considerations — designed to reflect community values.”
    (People v. Danks (2004) 
    32 Cal.4th 269
    , 311 (Danks).) In sum, it
    is not improper for a juror to consider “personal religious,
    philosophical, or secular normative values” during penalty
    deliberations. (Ibid.)
    At the same time, we have made clear that “[p]enalty
    determinations are to be based on the evidence presented by the
    parties and the legal instructions given by the court. . . . not by
    recourse to extraneous authority.” (People v. Sandoval (1992) 
    4 Cal.4th 155
    , 194.)      “[R]eliance on religious authority as
    supporting or opposing the death penalty” is thus
    impermissible. (Ibid.) Accordingly, we have held that “bringing
    biblical passages into the jury room and reading them aloud
    during deliberation constitutes misconduct.”          (People v.
    99
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    Williams (2006) 
    40 Cal.4th 287
    , 333; Danks, 
    supra,
     32 Cal.4th
    at p. 308; People v. Mincey (1992) 
    2 Cal.4th 408
    , 466–467.)
    Gomez admits that the court’s instruction that jurors not
    “bring the Bible” into deliberations was correct. But he contends
    that the instructions went too far by forbidding jurors from even
    considering “biblical references,” which erroneously suggested
    that jurors who “engaged in moral reasoning illustrated by or
    rooted in Biblical passages would be committing misconduct.”
    Gomez argues the error is particularly prejudicial because it
    undermined the defense’s closing argument emphasizing the
    moral decision before the jury, which counsel suggested would
    be “better expressed to you by a priest, a rabbi or a minister or
    even a philosopher.”
    The trial court’s instructions are not a model of clarity.
    But we agree with the Attorney General that the court’s
    prohibition on “refer[ing] to biblical references,” understood in
    context, precluded only the use of biblical texts during
    deliberations; it did not preclude the jury from relying on
    personal religious beliefs. The instructions thus correctly stated
    the law.
    “ ‘When an appellate court addresses a claim of jury
    misinstruction, it must assess the instructions as a whole,
    viewing the challenged instruction in context with other
    instructions, in order to determine if there was a reasonable
    likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in an
    impermissible manner.’ ” (People v. Jennings (2010) 
    50 Cal.4th 616
    , 677, quoting People v. Wilson (2008) 
    44 Cal.4th 758
    , 803–
    804.) The trial court’s prohibition on “biblical references”
    followed its instruction that “you’re not to bring anything to the
    deliberation process,” suggesting that the jury understood the
    100
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    instruction as a whole as forbidding extrinsic sources of law or
    evidence — of which biblical references were merely an
    example — during deliberations. This conclusion is supported
    by the trial court’s statement that he wanted to “emphasize
    again as I’ve done before.” The jury was likely to understand
    this statement as a reference to the court’s guilt phase
    instruction that the jury “cannot refer to” “a religious text of
    some kind, a bible or something like that” because it is “outside
    information.”
    The court also gave a number of instructions that made
    clear that jurors could rely on their personal conscience and
    moral values when considering whether to impose the death
    penalty. Immediately after the challenged instruction, the trial
    court said: “You’ll be guided by your own conscience and the
    law.” The court later instructed the jury that “[a] mitigating
    circumstance is any fact, condition or event which does not
    constitute a justification or excuse for the crime in question, but
    may be considered as an extenuating circumstance in
    determining the appropriateness of the death penalty.” The
    court then said that, in weighing the aggravating and mitigating
    factors, “[y]ou are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic
    value you deem appropriate to each and all of the factors you are
    permitted to consider.” Gomez argues that this general
    instruction concerning moral values did not cure the court’s
    error in giving the specific instruction regarding biblical
    references. But that argument presupposes that the latter
    instruction referred to biblical reasoning instead of biblical
    texts, an argument we have rejected.
    In any case, it is not reasonably likely that the jury
    understood the trial court’s brief statement regarding “biblical
    references” to mean that they could not rely on their personal
    101
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    religious beliefs during deliberations. We thus conclude that no
    instructional error occurred here. Nevertheless, we caution that
    trial courts, in prohibiting jurors from bringing religious texts
    to penalty phase deliberations, should be careful to ensure that
    they are not improperly interfering with the jurors’ ability to
    consider their religious and other personal beliefs and values.
    D. Challenges to the Death Penalty
    Gomez argues that a death sentence cannot be imposed
    unless the jury finds the defendant guilty “beyond all possible
    doubt.” But, as Gomez acknowledges, we have previously
    rejected the argument that “evidence of guilt must be stronger
    in a capital case than in a noncapital case.” (People v. Lewis
    (2009) 
    46 Cal.4th 1255
    , 1290, fn. 23.) He offers no compelling
    reason for us to revisit that conclusion.
    We likewise reject Gomez’s argument that his death
    sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because the robbery
    and special circumstances in this case permitted the jury to
    impose the sentence for an accidental or unforeseeable killing.
    As Gomez recognizes, we have “repeatedly held that, consistent
    with Eighth Amendment principles, neither intent to kill nor
    reckless indifference to life is a required element of the felony-
    murder special circumstance when the defendant is the actual
    killer.” (People v. Taylor (2010) 
    48 Cal.4th 574
    , 661; see, e.g.,
    People v. Watkins (2012) 
    55 Cal.4th 999
    , 1033; People v.
    Martinez (2010) 
    47 Cal.4th 911
    , 966–967; Young, 
    supra,
     34
    Cal.4th at p. 1204.)
    Gomez raises additional constitutional challenges to
    California’s capital sentencing scheme, all of which we have
    previously considered and rejected.      Gomez provides no
    102
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    persuasive reason to revisit our decisions, and we thus reject his
    challenges in accordance with the following precedent:
    We have held that section 190.2 “ ‘ “adequately narrows
    the class of murderers subject to the death penalty” ’ ” and thus
    does not violate the Eighth Amendment. (People v. Masters,
    supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1077 (Masters); People v. Cunningham
    (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 609
    , 671; People v. Ramos (2004) 
    34 Cal.4th 494
    , 532–533.)
    Both this court and the high court have held that the
    current application of section 190.3, factor (a), is constitutional.
    (Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 
    512 U.S. 967
    , 976; People v.
    Johnson (2016) 
    62 Cal.4th 600
    , 655; People v. Rountree (2013)
    
    56 Cal.4th 823
    , 860.)
    “ ‘Nothing in the federal Constitution requires the penalty
    phase jury to make written findings of the factors it finds in
    aggravation and mitigation; agree unanimously that a
    particular aggravating circumstance exists; find all aggravating
    factors proved beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance
    of the evidence; find that aggravation outweighs mitigation
    beyond a reasonable doubt; or conclude beyond a reasonable
    doubt that death is the appropriate penalty.’ ” (People v.
    Williams (2013) 
    58 Cal.4th 197
    , 295 (Williams); see People v.
    Jackson (2016) 
    1 Cal.5th 269
    , 373 (Jackson); Masters, supra, 62
    Cal.4th at p. 1076; People v. D’Arcy (2010) 
    48 Cal.4th 257
    , 308.)
    Likewise, “ ‘[w]e have repeatedly held that “CALJIC No.
    8.88 provides constitutionally sufficient guidance to the jury on
    the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors.”
    [Citations.] We have rejected the claim that the instruction
    unconstitutionally fails to inform the jury that, in order to
    impose the death penalty, it must find that aggravating
    103
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    circumstances outweigh mitigating ones beyond a reasonable
    doubt. [Citation.] Under our precedent, “the trial court need
    not and should not instruct the jury as to any burden of proof or
    persuasion at the penalty phase.” [Citation.]’ ” (Masters, supra,
    62 Cal.4th at p. 1076; People v. Peoples (2016) 
    62 Cal.4th 718
    ,
    769–770; Williams, 
    supra,
     58 Cal.4th at p. 295.) We have also
    held “the phrase ‘so substantial’ [in CALJIC No. 8.88] is not
    impermissibly vague.” (People v. Lomax (2010) 
    49 Cal.4th 530
    ,
    595; see Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 373.)
    “ ‘Defendant was not entitled to an instruction regarding
    a presumption of life.’ [Citation.]” (People v. DeHoyos (2013) 
    57 Cal.4th 79
    , 150; see Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1078.)
    “ ‘The use of certain adjectives such as “extreme” and
    “substantial” in the list of mitigating factors in section 190.3
    does not render the statute unconstitutional.’ ” (Jackson, supra,
    1 Cal.5th at pp. 372–373; Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1077;
    People v. Carrasco (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 924
    , 971 (Carrasco).)
    “ ‘CALJIC No. 8.85 is both correct and adequate.’
    [Citation] The sentencing factors set out in CALJIC No. 8.85
    are not unconstitutionally vague or arbitrary, and the trial court
    is not required to delete inapplicable sentencing factors from the
    instruction.” (Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 372, quoting
    People v. Valencia (2008) 
    43 Cal.4th 268
    , 309 and citing People
    v. Famalaro (2011) 
    52 Cal.4th 1
    , 43.)
    We have held that a trial court may refuse to instruct the
    jury not to consider the deterrent or nondeterrent effect of the
    death penalty “where ‘neither party raise[s] the issue of either
    the cost or the deterrent effect of the death penalty . . . .’ ”
    (People v. Zamudio (2008) 
    43 Cal.4th 327
    , 371, quoting People v.
    Brown (2003) 
    31 Cal.4th 518
    , 566.)
    104
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    “Neither intercase proportionality nor disparate sentence
    review is constitutionally compelled.” (Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th
    at p. 373; People v. Banks (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 1113
    , 1207; People
    v. Eubanks (2011) 
    53 Cal.4th 110
    , 154.) “Moreover, ‘capital and
    noncapital defendants are not similarly situated and therefore
    may be treated differently without violating’ a defendant’s right
    to equal protection of the laws, due process of law, or freedom
    from cruel and unusual punishment.” (Carrasco, supra, 59
    Cal.4th at p. 971, quoting People v. Manriquez (2005) 
    37 Cal.4th 547
    , 590.)
    “ ‘The alleged inconsistency between regular imposition of
    the death penalty and international norms of human decency
    does not render that penalty cruel and unusual punishment
    under the Eighth Amendment [citation]; nor does “regular”
    imposition of the death penalty violate the Eighth Amendment
    on the ground that “ ‘[i]nternational law is a part of our law’ ”
    [citation]. To the extent defendant contends the errors . . . that
    occurred at his trial also violate international law, his claim fails
    because we have found no such errors . . . . International law
    does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in accordance
    with state and federal constitutional and statutory
    requirements. [Citations.]’ ” (Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at
    pp. 1077–1078, quoting People v. Lee (2011) 
    51 Cal.4th 620
    ,
    654.)
    E. Cumulative Error
    Gomez contends that the cumulative effect of the trial
    court’s errors deprived him of his due process rights under the
    federal and state Constitutions and therefore warrant reversal.
    Although we have concluded that the trial court committed a
    number of harmless errors, we conclude there is no reasonable
    105
    PEOPLE v. GOMEZ
    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
    possibility that these errors, considered cumulatively, affected
    the jury’s verdicts.
    V.     CONCLUSION
    We affirm the judgment.
    LIU, J.
    We Concur:
    CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
    CHIN, J.
    CORRIGAN, J.
    CUÉLLAR, J.
    KRUGER, J.
    LUI, J.*
    *
    Administrative Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal,
    Second Appellate District, Division Two assigned by the Chief
    Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
    Constitution.
    106
    See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
    Name of Opinion People v. Gomez
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished Opinion
    Original Appeal XXX
    Original Proceeding
    Review Granted
    Rehearing Granted
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Opinion No. S087773
    Date Filed: November 29, 2018
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Court: Superior
    County: Los Angeles
    Judge: William R. Pounders
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Counsel:
    Lynne S. Coffin and Laura S. Kelly, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief
    Assistant Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster and David A.
    Voet, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
    Laura S. Kelly
    4521 Campus Drive, #175
    Irvine, CA 92612
    (949) 737-2042
    David A. Voet
    Deputy Attorney General
    300 South Spring Street, Suite 1700
    Los Angeles, CA 90013
    (213) 576-1338
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S087773

Citation Numbers: 240 Cal. Rptr. 3d 315, 6 Cal. 5th 243, 430 P.3d 791

Judges: Liu

Filed Date: 11/29/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (59)

Faretta v. California , 95 S. Ct. 2525 ( 1975 )

People v. Gonzalez , 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 237 ( 2006 )

People v. Alexander , 49 Cal. 4th 846 ( 2010 )

People v. Lewis , 46 Cal. 4th 1255 ( 2009 )

People v. Bacigalupo , 6 Cal. 4th 457 ( 1993 )

County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen , 99 S. Ct. 2213 ( 1979 )

People v. Ramos , 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575 ( 2004 )

People v. Cudjo , 6 Cal. 4th 585 ( 1993 )

People v. Sandoval , 4 Cal. 4th 155 ( 1992 )

People v. Burney , 47 Cal. 4th 203 ( 2009 )

State v. Varner , 2002 Minn. LEXIS 311 ( 2002 )

People v. Manriquez , 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 340 ( 2005 )

People v. Hudson , 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 632 ( 2006 )

Griffin v. California , 85 S. Ct. 1229 ( 1965 )

People v. Danks , 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 767 ( 2004 )

People v. Lee , 51 Cal. 4th 620 ( 2011 )

People v. Lancaster , 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 608 ( 2007 )

People v. Nakahara , 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 223 ( 2003 )

People v. Abilez , 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 526 ( 2007 )

People v. Hawkins , 10 Cal. 4th 920 ( 1995 )

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