State v. Reynolds , 2018 Ohio 4942 ( 2018 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as State v. Reynolds, 
    2018-Ohio-4942
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    MADISON COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,                                       :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                          :      CASE NO. CA2018-02-005
    :           OPINION
    - vs -                                                       12/10/2018
    :
    WESLEY T. REYNOLDS,                                  :
    Defendant-Appellant.                         :
    CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM MADISON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    Case No. CRI20170041
    Stephen J. Pronai, Madison County Prosecuting Attorney, Rachel M. Price, Nicholas A.
    Adkins, 59 North Main Street, London, Ohio 43140, for plaintiff-appellee
    Beck Legal Services, Ltd., Robert J. Beck, Jr., P.O. Box 204, Marysville, Ohio 43040, for
    defendant-appellant
    RINGLAND, J.
    {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Wesley Reynolds, appeals his conviction and sentence in
    the Madison County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons detailed below, we affirm.
    {¶ 2} On December 1, 2016, appellant was indicted on three counts for his conduct
    involving the trafficking of drugs. On March 9, 2017, appellant was indicted on two additional
    counts of felony theft.
    Madison CA2018-02-005
    {¶ 3} Appellant was arraigned, and the matter was set for a jury trial. On the day of
    trial, appellant pled guilty to the three drug trafficking counts contained in the initial
    indictment: (1) trafficking in drugs in the vicinity of a juvenile in violation of R.C. 2925.03, a
    fourth-degree felony, (2) aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03, a fourth-
    degree felony, and (3) aggravated trafficking in drugs in the vicinity of a juvenile in violation of
    R.C. 2925.03, a third-degree felony. In addition, appellant pled guilty to an amended
    misdemeanor count of theft, a violation of R.C. 2913.02, a first-degree misdemeanor. The
    remaining theft count was dismissed.
    {¶ 4} The trial court ordered a presentence investigation report. Appellant failed to
    meet with probation staff for the report. Appellant reported that the failure was due to his
    incarceration due to a probation violation.
    {¶ 5} On January 23, 2018, the trial court sentenced appellant to 12 months
    incarceration on count one, 12 months incarceration on count two, and 30 months
    incarceration on count three.1 Appellant's aggregate sentence was four and one-half years.
    Appellant now appeals, raising two assignments of error for review.
    {¶ 6} Assignment of Error No. 1:
    {¶ 7} THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR BY FAILING TO ADVISE THE DEFENDANT OF
    THE IMPACT OF A GUILTY PLEA ON DEFENDANT'S APPELLATE RIGHTS.
    {¶ 8} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that his guilty plea was not
    knowing, intelligent, or voluntary because he was not advised of the impact of a guilty plea on
    his appellate rights. We find no merit to appellant's argument.
    {¶ 9} When a defendant enters a guilty plea in a criminal case, the plea must be
    knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. State v. Butcher, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-
    1. Appellant was sentenced to "time served" on the remaining misdemeanor theft charge.
    -2-
    Madison CA2018-02-005
    10-206, 
    2013-Ohio-3081
    , ¶ 8. "Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the
    plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution."
    State v. Payne, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-12-219, 
    2016-Ohio-5470
    , ¶ 7. To ensure that a
    defendant's guilty plea is knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made, the trial court must
    engage the defendant in a plea colloquy pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C). 
    Id.
    {¶ 10} As relevant here, pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the trial court may not accept a
    defendant's guilty plea without first addressing the defendant personally and:
    (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
    voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and
    of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the
    defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of
    community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
    (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
    defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no
    contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may
    proceed with judgment and sentence.
    (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
    understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights
    to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have
    compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant's
    favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant's guilt
    beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant
    cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
    {¶ 11} A guilty plea is invalid if the trial court does not strictly comply with Crim.R.
    11(C)(2)(c), which requires the trial court to verify the defendant understands the
    constitutional rights he is waiving. State v. Shavers, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-05-119,
    
    2015-Ohio-1485
    , ¶ 9. However, the trial court need only substantially comply with the
    nonconstitutional notifications required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). 
    Id.
     Under the
    substantial compliance standard, the appellate court must review the totality of the
    circumstances surrounding the defendant's plea and determine whether the defendant
    subjectively understood the effects of his plea. State v. Givens, 12th Dist. Butler No.
    -3-
    Madison CA2018-02-005
    CA2014-02-047, 
    2015-Ohio-361
    , ¶ 12.
    {¶ 12} On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to advise him of
    the impact of a guilty plea on his appellate rights. Thus, appellant maintains that he was not
    "fully informed of the consequences of his plea, and, as such, the plea was not valid."
    However, this court has previously held that the failure to inform a defendant that a guilty plea
    waives certain rights on appeal is not one of the specifically enumerated rights the trial court
    is required to discuss during the Crim.R. 11 colloquy. State v. Moxley, 12th Dist. Madison
    No. CA2011-06-010, 
    2012-Ohio-2572
    , ¶ 13.
    {¶ 13} Following review of the record, we find that appellant's plea was knowingly,
    intelligently, and voluntarily entered. The record reveals that the trial court strictly complied
    with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and substantially complied with the nonconstitutional notifications
    required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). Appellant affirmatively stated that he understood his
    rights and entered his guilty plea. As a result, we find appellant's plea was knowingly,
    voluntarily, and intelligently given. Furthermore, we note that appellant fails to identify any
    error in the proceedings that could have been remedied if properly advised of his appellate
    rights. This court has previously rejected claims where there is a failure to identify prejudice
    regarding the notification of appellate rights. See e.g., State v. Wolf, 12th Dist. Clermont No.
    CA2016-05-027, 
    2016-Ohio-8103
    , ¶ 10 (affirming denial of postconviction). As a result,
    appellant's first assignment of error is not well-taken and is overruled.
    {¶ 14} Assignment of Error No. 2:
    {¶ 15} THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR BY IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE PRISON
    SENTENCES.
    {¶ 16} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by
    imposing consecutive sentences. We disagree.
    {¶ 17} This court reviews felony sentences pursuant to the standard of review set
    -4-
    Madison CA2018-02-005
    forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) to determine whether the imposition of those sentences is clearly
    and convincingly contrary to law. State v. Julious, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-12-224,
    
    2016-Ohio-4822
    , ¶ 8. Pursuant to that statute, an appellate court may modify or vacate a
    sentence only if, by clear and convincing evidence, "the record does not support the trial
    court's findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
    State v. Harp, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2015-12-096, 
    2016-Ohio-4921
    , ¶ 7. A sentence is
    not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court considers the purposes and
    principles of sentencing as set forth in R.C. 2929.11, as well as the seriousness and
    recidivism factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, and sentences a defendant within the permissible
    statutory range. State v. Brandenburg, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2014-10-201 and CA2014-
    10-202, 
    2016-Ohio-4918
    , ¶ 9.
    {¶ 18} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a trial court must engage in a three-step
    analysis and make certain findings before imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Dillon,
    12th Dist. Madison No. CA2012-06-012, 
    2013-Ohio-335
    , ¶ 9. First, the trial court must find
    that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish
    the offender. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). 
    Id.
     Second, the trial court must find that consecutive
    sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the
    danger the offender poses to the public. 
    Id.
     Third, the trial court must find that one of the
    following applies:
    (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
    while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a
    sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or
    2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control
    for a prior offense.
    (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part
    of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two
    or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or
    unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses
    committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately
    -5-
    Madison CA2018-02-005
    reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
    (c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
    consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
    future crime by the offender.
    R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c).
    {¶ 19} "A trial court satisfies the statutory requirement of making the required findings
    when the record reflects that the court engaged in the required analysis and selected the
    appropriate statutory criteria." State v. Setty, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2013-06-049 and
    CA2013-06-050, 
    2014-Ohio-2340
    , ¶ 113. In imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court
    is not required to provide a word-for-word recitation of the language of the statute or
    articulate reasons supporting its findings. 
    Id.
     Nevertheless, the record must reflect that the
    trial court engaged in the required sentencing analysis and made the requisite findings. 
    Id.
    The court's findings must thereafter be incorporated into its sentencing entry. State v. Ahlers,
    12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-06-100, 
    2016-Ohio-2890
    , ¶ 10.
    {¶ 20} Here, the record reflects that the trial court made the findings required by R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4) when it ordered appellant's sentences to be served consecutively. The trial
    court noted that the offenses were more serious because they were committed as an offense
    for hire or as part of organized criminal activity and counts one and three were committed in
    the vicinity of a juvenile. The court also noted that appellant posed a high risk of recidivism.
    Appellant has a lengthy criminal history that includes several prior felony and misdemeanor
    convictions over the past 20 years. Appellant has not responded favorably to sanctions
    previously imposed for criminal convictions. The trial court also found that there were no
    factors that mitigated his conduct.
    {¶ 21} The trial court later memorialized the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings within its
    sentencing entry. From the trial court's statements at the sentencing hearing and the
    language used in the sentencing entry, it is clear that the trial court complied with the dictates
    -6-
    Madison CA2018-02-005
    of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). As a result, we find appellant's second assignment of error to be
    without merit and it is hereby overruled.
    {¶ 22} Judgment affirmed.
    HENDRICKSON, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.
    -7-