State v. Seckinger , 301 Neb. 963 ( 2018 )


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    01/11/2019 08:07 AM CST
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    STATE v. SECKINGER
    Cite as 
    301 Neb. 963
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
    K athy A. Seckinger, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed December 28, 2018.   No. S-17-1099.
    1.	 Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Motions to Suppress:
    Appeal and Error. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
    suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment, an
    appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. Regarding histori-
    cal facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings for clear
    error, giving due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by the
    trial judge. But whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment
    protections is a question of law that an appellate court reviews indepen-
    dently of the trial court’s determination.
    2.	 Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure. Both the Fourth Amendment
    to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution
    guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
    3.	 ____: ____. Under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
    article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution, the ultimate touchstone is
    one of reasonableness.
    4.	 Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Warrantless Searches.
    Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article
    I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution, searches and seizures must not be
    unreasonable, and searches without a valid warrant are per se unreason-
    able, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
    exceptions.
    5.	 Search and Seizure: Warrantless Searches: Motor Vehicles. Among
    the established exceptions to the warrant requirement is the automobile
    exception.
    6.	 Search and Seizure: Warrantless Searches: Probable Cause: Motor
    Vehicles. The automobile exception to the warrant requirement applies
    when a vehicle is readily mobile and there is probable cause to believe
    that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the vehicle.
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    7.	 Motor Vehicles: Words and Phrases. A vehicle is readily mobile
    whenever it is not located on private property and is capable or appar-
    ently capable of being driven on the roads or highways.
    8.	 Search and Seizure: Probable Cause: Words and Phrases. Probable
    cause to search requires that the known facts and circumstances are
    sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable prudence in the belief that
    contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.
    9.	 Search and Seizure: Probable Cause: Appeal and Error. An appel-
    late court determines whether probable cause existed under an objective
    standard of reasonableness, given the known facts and circumstances,
    but appellate courts should avoid an excessively technical dissection of
    the factors supporting probable cause.
    10.	 Probable Cause: Words and Phrases. Probable cause is a flex-
    ible, commonsense standard that depends on the totality of the
    circumstances.
    11.	 ____: ____. The concept of probable cause, as the name implies, is
    based on probabilities. It requires only a probability or substantial
    chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.
    12.	 Probable Cause: Police Officers and Sheriffs. To find probable cause,
    officers are not required to rule out all innocent explanations for suspi-
    cious facts.
    13.	 Probable Cause: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Motor Vehicles.
    Probable cause may result from any of the senses, and an officer is
    entitled to rely on his or her sense of smell in determining whether con-
    traband is present in a vehicle.
    14.	 Search and Seizure: Probable Cause: Police Officers and Sheriffs:
    Motor Vehicles: Controlled Substances. Objectively, the smell of
    burnt marijuana tells a reasonable officer that one or more persons in a
    vehicle recently possessed and used the drug. The officer need not know
    whether the amount possessed is more than 1 ounce in order to have
    probable cause to suspect criminal activity in the vehicle.
    15.	 Search and Seizure: Warrantless Searches: Probable Cause: Police
    Officers and Sheriffs: Motor Vehicles. When an officer with sufficient
    training and experience detects the odor of marijuana emanating from a
    vehicle that is readily mobile, the odor alone furnishes probable cause
    to suspect contraband will be found in the vehicle and the vehicle may
    be lawfully searched under the automobile exception to the warrant
    requirement.
    Appeal from the District Court for Scotts Bluff County: Leo
    P. Dobrovolny, Judge. Affirmed.
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    STATE v. SECKINGER
    Cite as 
    301 Neb. 963
    Darin J. Knepper, Deputy Scotts Bluff County Public
    Defender, for appellant.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Nathan A. Liss
    for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Stacy, J.
    NATURE OF CASE
    Kathy A. Seckinger appeals her felony conviction for pos-
    session of methamphetamine. She assigns error to the denial
    of a motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless
    search of her car and argues that the smell of marijuana com-
    ing from inside the car did not provide sufficient probable
    cause to support the search. We affirm the judgment of the
    district court.
    BACKGROUND
    On January 9, 2017, a Nebraska State Patrol trooper was
    on patrol in Gering, Nebraska, when a green car accelerated
    into an intersection directly in front of her. The trooper and
    another motorist had to brake hard to avoid an accident, and
    the trooper initiated a traffic stop. The stop and the events
    immediately preceding it were recorded on the trooper’s dash-
    board camera.
    When the trooper approached the driver’s side to make
    contact, she noticed the odor of burnt marijuana coming from
    inside the car. The driver was identified as Seckinger. The
    trooper confronted Seckinger about the smell and asked if
    there was marijuana in the car. Seckinger said no, but volun-
    teered that she had recently smoked a cigarette. The trooper
    repeated that she smelled marijuana and asked Seckinger if
    she had been around anyone smoking marijuana; Seckinger
    said she had not. Finally, the trooper asked if there might
    have been marijuana in the car previously. Seckinger again
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    responded no and added that she would not consent to
    a search.
    The trooper had Seckinger step out of the car and con-
    ducted a search. No marijuana was found in the car, but the
    trooper discovered more than 4 grams of methamphetamine.
    Seckinger was placed under arrest and charged with the
    Class IV felony of knowingly or intentionally possessing
    methamphetamine. She entered a plea of not guilty and moved
    to suppress the evidence found during the search, arguing
    there was no probable cause for either the traffic stop or the
    search of her car.
    At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trooper and
    Seckinger were the only witnesses to testify. They both testi-
    fied about the odor of marijuana, but their testimony differed
    considerably. On direct examination by her attorney, Seckinger
    denied there was any odor of marijuana coming from her car
    when it was stopped: “[Counsel:] Does the interior of your car
    smell like marijuana? [Seckinger:] No. Q. Did it ever smell
    like marijuana? A. No. Q. Why not? A. There has not been
    no marijuana in my vehicle at all. Q. Do you use marijuana?
    A. No.”
    In contrast, the trooper testified she noticed the distinctive
    odor of marijuana emanating from the car as soon as she con-
    tacted the driver. The trooper testified she received academy
    training on detecting the odor of marijuana and also testified
    about her experience detecting the smell of burnt and raw
    marijuana during prior traffic stops. The trooper explained
    that Seckinger’s car was stopped because it pulled across four
    lanes of traffic and nearly caused an accident, and based on the
    trooper’s experience, drivers who “do that kind of thing” are
    sometimes impaired by alcohol or drugs. Consequently, when
    the trooper smelled marijuana coming from inside the car, she
    decided there was probable cause to search it.
    After considering the evidence, the district court overruled
    Seckinger’s motion to suppress. The court found that both the
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    traffic stop and the subsequent search of the car were sup-
    ported by probable cause. In finding probable cause to search
    the car, the court relied on our opinion in State v. Watts1 for
    the proposition that the smell of marijuana, standing alone,
    has long been held to furnish probable cause for a warrantless
    search of a motor vehicle where there is sufficient foundation
    as to the expertise of the officer in recognizing the smell. The
    court found the trooper had expertise in detecting the odor of
    marijuana and found credible her testimony that she smelled
    marijuana coming from inside Seckinger’s car during the traf-
    fic stop.
    After the motion to suppress was overruled, a bench trial
    was held on stipulated facts. Seckinger did not renew her
    objection to the legality of the traffic stop, but did renew her
    objection to the search of her car. That objection was overruled,
    and Seckinger was found guilty of possession of methamphet-
    amine. She was sentenced to 2 years’ probation and ordered to
    pay court costs. Seckinger filed a timely appeal, and we moved
    the case to our docket on our own motion.2
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    Seckinger assigns error to the overruling of her motion to
    suppress, arguing the odor of marijuana standing alone no
    l­onger provides probable cause to search a vehicle.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to sup-
    press based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment,
    an appellate court applies a two-part standard of review.3
    Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the
    trial court’s findings for clear error, giving due weight to the
    1
    State v. Watts, 
    209 Neb. 371
    , 
    307 N.W.2d 816
     (1981).
    2
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106
    (3) (Supp. 2017).
    3
    State v. Thalken, 
    299 Neb. 857
    , 
    911 N.W.2d 562
     (2018).
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    inferences drawn from those facts by the trial judge.4 But
    whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment pro-
    tections is a question of law that an appellate court reviews
    independently of the trial court’s determination.5
    ANALYSIS
    On appeal, Seckinger does not challenge the legality of
    the stop, the duration of the investigation, or the scope of the
    subsequent search. Nor does she challenge the trial court’s fac-
    tual finding that, during the investigation, the trooper detected
    the odor of marijuana emanating from inside Seckinger’s
    car. The sole issue on appeal is whether the odor of mari-
    juana, standing alone, furnished probable cause to support the
    warrantless search of Seckinger’s car. We limit our analysis
    accordingly, and begin with a review of the governing consti-
    tutional principles.
    [2-5] Both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
    and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution guarantee
    against unreasonable searches and seizures.6 The ultimate
    touchstone is one of reasonableness.7 Searches and seizures
    must not be unreasonable, and searches without a valid war-
    rant are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically
    established and well-delineated exceptions.8 Among the estab-
    lished exceptions to the warrant requirement is the “‘automo-
    bile exception.’”9
    [6,7] The automobile exception to the warrant require-
    ment applies when a vehicle is readily mobile and there is
    4
    See, id.; State v. Rocha, 
    295 Neb. 716
    , 
    890 N.W.2d 178
     (2017).
    5
    Thalken, 
    supra note 3
    .
    6
    See, State v. Barbeau, ante p. 293, 
    917 N.W.2d 913
     (2018); State v.
    Dalland, 
    287 Neb. 231
    , 
    842 N.W.2d 92
     (2014).
    7
    See Rocha, 
    supra note 4
    .
    8
    
    Id.
    9
    
    Id. at 746
    , 890 N.W.2d at 202. Accord California v. Carney, 
    471 U.S. 386
    ,
    
    105 S. Ct. 2066
    , 
    85 L. Ed. 2d 406
     (1985).
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    probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of
    a crime will be found in the vehicle.10 A vehicle is readily
    mobile whenever it is not located on private property and “is
    capable or apparently capable of being driven on the roads
    or highways.”11
    [8-12] Probable cause to search requires that the known
    facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a person of
    reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence
    of a crime will be found.12 An appellate court determines
    whether probable cause existed under an objective standard
    of reasonableness, given the known facts and circumstances,
    but appellate courts should avoid an excessively technical dis-
    section of the factors supporting probable cause.13 Probable
    cause is a flexible, commonsense standard that depends on the
    totality of the circumstances.14 The concept of probable cause,
    as the name implies, is based on probabilities.15 It “‘requires
    only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not
    an actual showing of such activity.’”16 Thus, to find probable
    cause, officers are not required to rule out all innocent explana-
    tions for suspicious facts.17
    For decades, this court has consistently held that officers
    with sufficient training and experience who detect the odor
    of marijuana emanating from a vehicle have probable cause
    on that basis alone to search the vehicle under the automobile
    10
    See Rocha, 
    supra note 4
    .
    11
    
    Id. at 755
    , 890 N.W.2d at 207.
    12
    J.P. v. Millard Public Schools, 
    285 Neb. 890
    , 
    830 N.W.2d 453
     (2013).
    13
    State v. Botts, 
    299 Neb. 806
    , 
    910 N.W.2d 779
     (2018).
    14
    See 
    id.
    15
    See Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 231, 
    103 S. Ct. 2317
    , 
    76 L. Ed. 2d 527
    (1983) (“‘[i]n dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name implies,
    we deal with probabilities’”).
    16
    District of Columbia v. Wesby, ___ U.S. ___, 
    138 S. Ct. 577
    , 586, 
    199 L. Ed. 2d 453
     (2018).
    17
    See Botts, 
    supra
     note 13 (citing Wesby, 
    supra note 16
    ).
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    exception to the warrant requirement.18 We first articulated this
    rule in the 1977 case State v. Benson.19
    In Benson, a van pulling a trailer was stopped after troop-
    ers noticed an irregularity on the van’s license plate. During
    the investigation, one trooper detected the strong smell of
    marijuana coming from the trailer. The trooper asked the
    van’s driver to open the trailer, but the driver claimed not to
    know the lock combination. The trooper called the county
    attorney’s office to obtain a search warrant and was told no
    warrant was needed. The trooper then searched the trailer
    and discovered 119 pounds of marijuana. We upheld the con-
    stitutionality of the warrantless search, reasoning that “[t]he
    great majority of courts which have currently passed upon
    the issue have held that the smell of marijuana was alone
    sufficient to furnish probable cause to search a vehicle with-
    out a warrant, at least where there is sufficient foundation as
    to expertise.”20
    [13] A few years later in State v. Daly,21 we reiterated the
    rule that the odor of marijuana coming from a vehicle is suf-
    ficient standing alone to furnish probable cause to search the
    vehicle. In Daly, a pickup was stopped by a trooper for speed-
    ing. While walking around the pickup, the trooper smelled the
    odor of marijuana coming from the bed of the pickup, which
    was covered by a fiberglass shell. The trooper confronted the
    driver about the marijuana smell, but the driver denied there
    was marijuana in the pickup and declined consent to search.
    A warrantless search revealed 582 pounds of marijuana in
    18
    See, e.g., Watts, 
    supra note 1
    ; State v. Ruzicka, 
    202 Neb. 257
    , 
    274 N.W.2d 873
     (1979); State v. Daly, 
    202 Neb. 217
    , 
    274 N.W.2d 557
     (1979); State
    v. Kretchmar, 
    201 Neb. 308
    , 
    267 N.W.2d 740
     (1978), overruled on other
    grounds 
    203 Neb. 663
    , 
    280 N.W.2d 46
     (1979); State v. Benson, 
    198 Neb. 14
    , 
    251 N.W.2d 659
     (1977). Accord State v. Reha, 
    12 Neb. App. 767
    , 
    686 N.W.2d 80
     (2004).
    19
    Benson, 
    supra note 18
    .
    20
    
    Id. at 18
    , 
    251 N.W.2d at 661-62
    .
    21
    Daly, 
    supra note 18
    .
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    the rear of the pickup. In affirming the trial court’s finding of
    probable cause to search the pickup, we noted the trooper had
    received basic training on detecting the smell of marijuana and
    had arrested more than 50 drivers for possession of marijuana
    after smelling it during a traffic stop. We quoted our holding
    in Benson and emphasized that probable cause may result from
    any of the senses and that an officer is entitled to rely on his or
    her sense of smell in determining whether contraband is pres-
    ent in a vehicle.22
    We adhered to this reasoning in State v. Ruzicka.23 There,
    a truck was stopped by a trooper for a broken taillight. While
    standing at the drivers’ window, the trooper noticed the smell
    of burnt marijuana coming from the driver’s compartment. The
    trooper asked permission to search, and the driver refused. A
    warrantless search of the truck revealed marijuana, metham-
    phetamine, and LSD. On appeal, the driver argued the smell of
    burnt marijuana coming from the driver’s compartment was not
    sufficient to provide probable cause to search the entire truck.
    We upheld the constitutionality of the search, observing that
    “[i]n a number of cases we have held that the odor of mari-
    juana coming from a vehicle is sufficient to furnish probable
    cause for a search of the vehicle.”24 We expressly rejected the
    suggestion that smelling burnt marijuana in the driver’s com-
    partment should have limited the scope of the search, explain-
    ing, “We know of no reason why there should be a distinction
    between the odor of burned and unburned marijuana in this
    type of situation.”25
    In State v. Watts,26 a driver was stopped by a trooper for
    speeding. While standing outside the open driver’s window,
    the trooper detected the smell of burnt marijuana. The trooper
    22
    
    Id.
    23
    Ruzicka, 
    supra note 18
    .
    24
    
    Id. at 258
    , 274 N.W.2d at 875.
    25
    Id. at 258-59, 274 N.W.2d at 875.
    26
    Watts, 
    supra note 1
    .
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    asked whether there was marijuana in the vehicle, and the
    driver answered there was not. The trooper asked permission
    to search the vehicle, and the driver declined. The trooper then
    looked into the back seat of the vehicle and observed in plain
    view a plastic bag of marijuana. The driver was arrested, and
    the rest of the vehicle was searched. In the trunk, the trooper
    discovered three large trash bags containing a total of 60
    pounds of marijuana. On appeal, we upheld the constitutional-
    ity of the warrantless search. We began our analysis by discuss-
    ing the U.S. Supreme Court cases recognizing the automobile
    exception to the warrant requirement. We then discussed our
    prior holdings on the smell of marijuana emanating from auto-
    mobiles, stating:
    We have constantly held that the smell of marijuana,
    standing alone, is sufficient to furnish probable cause for
    the warrantless search of a motor vehicle where, as here,
    there was sufficient foundation as to the expertise of the
    officer. . . . We have further held the odor of burned mari-
    juana coming from the driver’s compartment of a truck
    was sufficient probable cause to search the truck.27
    The driver in Watts conceded that under our prior cases,
    the trooper had probable cause to search the vehicle, but
    he argued that once the trooper discovered the small bag of
    marijuana in plain view in the back seat, he could search no
    further without additional facts to suggest marijuana might
    be found in the trunk. We soundly rejected this argument,
    reasoning:
    [I]t [is] just as logical to conclude that the finding of the
    small amount of marijuana in the passenger compart-
    ment, after being told by the defendant that none existed,
    simply served to substantiate the officer’s suspicions
    and furnish additional probable cause to make a com-
    plete search of the automobile. Having found a quantity
    of illicit drugs in one part of the automobile does not
    27
    Id. at 374, 
    307 N.W.2d at 819
    .
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    sensibly suggest the probability that no more such sub-
    stance is present.28
    In the instant appeal, Seckinger asks us to revisit this line of
    cases. Her primary contention is that the legalization of mari-
    juana in Colorado has eroded the legal premise of our prec-
    edent because, she contends, the odor of marijuana standing
    alone no longer suggests criminal activity. Thus, the question
    presented here is a narrow one: Does the odor of marijuana
    coming from a vehicle, standing alone, still provide probable
    cause to search the vehicle? We conclude it does.
    Before explaining our reasoning, we pause to observe that
    much of Seckinger’s brief is devoted to suggesting there could
    have been several noncriminal explanations for the odor of
    marijuana in her car. But none of the suggested explanations
    are supported by the record. Indeed, when the trooper con-
    fronted her about smelling marijuana, Seckinger offered no
    explanation at all—legal or otherwise—and simply denied the
    odor was present. But regardless of the explanation given to the
    trooper, we are unpersuaded by Seckinger’s legal argument on
    appeal. We find no merit to her suggestion that recent changes
    in Colorado’s marijuana laws compel a change in Nebraska’s
    settled jurisprudence.
    First, we state the obvious: Marijuana remains a con-
    trolled substance under both federal law29 and Nebraska law.30
    Because of marijuana’s legal status as contraband, a trained
    officer who detects the odor of marijuana emanating from a
    vehicle in Nebraska has firsthand information that provides
    an objectively reasonable basis to suspect contraband will be
    found in the vehicle. Assuming the vehicle is readily mobile,
    the odor of marijuana alone provides probable cause to search
    28
    
    Id.
    29
    See, 
    21 U.S.C. § 812
    (c) (2012); Gonzales v. Raich, 
    545 U.S. 1
    , 27, 
    125 S. Ct. 2195
    , 
    162 L. Ed. 2d 1
     (2005) (recognizing federal law “designates
    marijuana as contraband for any purpose”).
    30
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-405
    (c)(7) and 28-416(11) through (13) (Supp.
    2017).
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    the vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant
    requirement.31 And while there may be innocent explana-
    tions for the odor of marijuana inside a vehicle, the concept
    of probable cause is based on probabilities32 and does not
    require officers to rule out all innocent explanations for suspi-
    cious facts.33
    Moreover, similar to Nebraska courts, most state and fed-
    eral courts agree that the odor of marijuana alone furnishes
    probable cause for a warrantless search of the vehicle from
    which the odor emanates.34 Even among states that have passed
    laws allowing medical or recreational marijuana use, many
    courts continue to recognize that marijuana is contraband and
    that the odor of marijuana can provide probable cause to
    search a vehicle.35
    31
    See Watts, 
    supra note 1
    .
    32
    See Gates, 
    supra note 15
    .
    33
    See Botts, 
    supra note 13
    .
    34
    See, Annot., 
    114 A.L.R. 5th 173
    , §§ 5, 7, and 9 (2003) (and cases cited
    therein); Annot., 
    188 A.L.R. Fed. 487
    , § 7 (2003) (and cases cited therein).
    Accord 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
    Amendment § 3.6(b) (5th ed. 2012) (recognizing it is generally accepted
    that smell of marijuana, whether raw or burnt, is sufficiently distinctive to
    afford probable cause to search particular place from which odor emanates).
    35
    See, e.g., Robinson, Williams & Spriggs v. State, 
    451 Md. 94
    , 
    152 A.3d 661
     (2017) (despite decriminalization of less than 10 grams of marijuana,
    marijuana remains contraband and odor of marijuana emanating from
    vehicle provides probable cause to search vehicle); State v. Cheatham,
    
    240 Ariz. 1
    , 
    375 P.3d 66
     (2016) (although Arizona Medical Marijuana
    Act created limited exception to laws proscribing marijuana, odor of
    marijuana alone supports probable cause to search car unless totality of
    circumstances suggest marijuana possession complies with act); People v.
    Zuniga, 
    372 P.3d 1052
     (Colo. 2016) (despite California’s legalization of 1
    ounce or less of marijuana, odor of marijuana still relevant to totality of
    circumstances test and can contribute to probable cause determination);
    United States v. White, 
    732 Fed. Appx. 597
     (9th Cir. 2018) (despite
    Nevada’s legalization of medical marijuana, smell of marijuana emanating
    from vehicle still provides probable cause for warrantless search because
    nonmedical marijuana remains contraband).
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    [14] Finally, Seckinger’s argument is similar to one we
    recently rejected in State v. Perry.36 In Perry, we were con-
    cerned with whether there was probable cause to arrest the
    occupants of the vehicle and not whether there was probable
    cause to search the vehicle. But similar to Seckinger’s argu-
    ment, the defendant’s argument in Perry was that our line of
    cases analyzing probable cause based on the odor of marijuana
    was no longer good precedent. In Perry, the defendant argued
    the cases analyzing the odor of marijuana had been decided at
    a time when the possession of any amount of marijuana was a
    crime; because possession of less than an ounce of marijuana is
    now an infraction under Nebraska law,37 the defendant in Perry
    suggested the smell of marijuana alone no longer furnished
    probable cause to suspect criminal activity in the vehicle. We
    rejected this argument and concluded the change in penalty
    was immaterial to our probable cause jurisprudence, reasoning:
    Objectively, the smell of burnt marijuana tells a rea-
    sonable officer that one or more persons in the vehicle
    recently possessed and used the drug. The officer need
    not know whether the amount possessed is more than 1
    ounce in order to have probable cause to suspect criminal
    activity in the vehicle.38
    [15] Similarly, we reject Seckinger’s suggestion that a
    change in other states’ criminal laws regarding marijuana are
    material to the probable cause holdings announced in Benson,
    Daly, Ruzicka, and Watts. We instead adhere to these holdings
    and reiterate the general rule that when an officer with suf-
    ficient training and experience detects the odor of marijuana
    emanating from a vehicle that is readily mobile, the odor alone
    furnishes probable cause to suspect contraband will be found
    in the vehicle and the vehicle may be lawfully searched under
    the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
    36
    State v. Perry, 
    292 Neb. 708
    , 
    874 N.W.2d 36
     (2016).
    37
    See § 28-416(13).
    38
    Perry, 
    supra note 36
    , 
    292 Neb. at 722
    , 874 N.W.2d at 46.
    - 976 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    301 Nebraska R eports
    STATE v. SECKINGER
    Cite as 
    301 Neb. 963
    Here, the trooper testified credibly that she smelled mari-
    juana emanating from inside Seckinger’s car during a traffic
    stop. The trooper had training and experience in detecting the
    odor of marijuana, and Seckinger’s car was readily mobile
    when it was searched. On this record, we agree with the dis-
    trict court that the odor of marijuana coming from inside the
    car furnished probable cause to suspect contraband would be
    found in the car, and we conclude the warrantless search of
    the car was lawful under the automobile exception to the war-
    rant requirement. Seckinger’s motion to suppress was prop-
    erly overruled.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
    district court.
    A ffirmed.