Ross Barker v. Iowa Department of Public Safety , 922 N.W.2d 581 ( 2019 )

1/25/2019 8:15:25 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 17–0488
Filed January 25, 2019
ROSS BARKER,
Appellant,
vs.
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
Appellee.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark D. Cleve,
Judge.
The defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision
and the judicial review decision of the district court upholding the Iowa
Department of Public Safety’s determination that defendant must register
for life on the sex offender registry. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS
VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED.
Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and John R. Lundquist,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
2
CHRISTENSEN, Justice.
This appeal presents a unique set of circumstances under which the
defendant, Ross Barker, maintains a 2015 court of appeals opinion
concluding the district court properly sentenced him to ten years on the
sex offender registry precludes the Iowa Department of Public Safety (DPS)
from requiring him to now register as a sex offender for life. Barker pled
guilty to assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, an aggravated
misdemeanor, in 2008. The district court informed him at his sentencing
hearing that he was only required to register as a sex offender for ten years
when he was actually subject to lifetime registration. Barker sought
postconviction relief after the county sheriff informed him he was required
to register as a sex offender for life. The district court dismissed Barker’s
application as untimely. However, the court of appeals reached the merits
of Barker’s claim on appeal in 2015 and concluded he could not show his
postconviction-relief counsel was ineffective for failing to argue his plea
was not knowing and voluntary because he was misinformed about the
length of his required registration. Specifically, the court of appeals
determined Barker was not misinformed about the length of his required
registration since he was only required to register as a sex offender for ten
years.
Barker subsequently sought the DPS’s determination of his sex
offender registration requirements. The DPS found Barker was subject to
lifetime registration and declined to accept the 2015 court of appeals’
decision that he was only required to register for ten years. Barker filed a
petition for judicial review of the DPS’s decision, and the district court and
court of appeals both affirmed the DPS’s determination based on their
conclusion that they lacked the authority to determine the length of his
sex offender registration requirements. On further review, Barker invokes
3
the doctrine of issue preclusion and argues the DPS must accept the 2015
court of appeals decision regarding the length of his sex offender
registration. We agree based on the distinct facts of his case. For the
reasons set forth below, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals,
reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case to the DPS
for further consideration in conformity with our opinion.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On March 14, 2008, Ross Barker pled guilty to assault with intent
to commit sexual abuse, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa
Code section 709.11 (2007). While there is no record of his guilty plea
beyond the plea forms, the district court informed Barker at his sentencing
hearing that he would “be required to be on the Sex Offender Registry for
a period of ten years.” On May 12, 2008, the district court entered a
corrected order to include the ten-year special sentence required pursuant
to Iowa Code section 903B.2.
When Barker was released from prison on July 9, 2013, the county
sheriff informed him that he was required to register as a sex offender for
life rather than ten years. Barker subsequently filed a motion to correct
an illegal sentence that the district court treated as an untimely
application for postconviction relief and dismissed. Barker appealed this
dismissal, arguing, among other claims, that his postconviction counsel
was ineffective in failing to argue his guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary since the district court affirmatively misled him regarding the
duration of the sex offender registry requirement.
In 2015, the court of appeals affirmed the postconviction court’s
judgment on the merits of the case rather than the timeliness of the
application, explaining,
4
Because of the plea Barker entered under section 709.11, an
aggravated misdemeanor, the district court properly imposed
the special sentence pursuant to section 903B.2. In addition,
under section 692A.106, Barker was required to be placed on
the Sex Offender Registry for a period of ten years, not a
lifetime as Barker mistakenly asserted in his PCR application.
Barker v. State, No. 14–1178, 2015 WL 5287142, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Sept. 10, 2015). We denied Barker’s further review application.1
Thereafter, Barker filed an application for determination of his registration
requirements with the DPS in which he sought the DPS’s acceptance of
the court of appeals’ decision that he was only required to register as a sex
offender for ten years. The DPS denied Barker’s application, finding he
was subject to mandatory lifetime registration pursuant to Iowa Code
section 692A.106 since he was convicted for an aggravated offense.
Barker filed a petition for judicial review in district court, claiming
the DPS committed reversible error within the meaning of the Iowa
Administrative Procedure Act when it determined he was required to
register for life on the sex offender registry. The district court
acknowledged Barker “received incorrect information as to his 692A
registration requirements at multiple points during his criminal
prosecution.” Yet, relying on State v. Bullock, 638 N.W.2d 728, 735 (Iowa
2002), the district court found the DPS correctly determined Barker must
register as a sex offender for life because “the determination of the length
of any required [sex offender] registration is an administrative decision
initially committed to the Department of Public Safety.” Therefore, the
district court concluded both the district court and court of appeals in
2015 lacked the authority to determine the length of Barker’s registration
1Barkerargued in his application for further review that the court of appeals erred
and he was actually subject to lifetime registration.
5
requirement. Barker appealed, which we transferred to the court of
appeals.
On appeal, Barker conceded the DPS correctly determined the
length of registration for his offense. However, Barker maintained his plea
was not knowing and voluntary because he was misled about the duration
of his registration requirement and trial counsel was ineffective in advising
him about the consequences of his plea. Barker also claimed that the
doctrine of issue preclusion applied, so the 2015 court of appeals’ decision
that he was only required to register as a sex offender for ten years
precluded the DPS from imposing a lifetime sex offender registration
requirement. The court of appeals denied Barker’s requests for relief,
noting issue preclusion did not apply because “Bullock makes ‘apparent
that the determination of the length of any required registration is an
administrative decision initially committed to the department of public
safety.’ ” The court of appeals did not address whether Barker’s plea was
knowing and voluntary. Barker sought further review, which we granted.
II. Standard of Review.
“We apply the standards set forth in Iowa Code chapter 17A in our
judicial review of agency decision-making to determine whether our
conclusion is the same as the district court.” Brewer-Strong v. HNI Corp.,
913 N.W.2d 235, 242 (Iowa 2018). “The district court may properly grant
relief if the agency action prejudiced the substantial rights of the petitioner
and if the agency action falls within one of the criteria listed in section
17A.19(10)(a) through (n).” Id. (quoting Brakke v. Iowa Dep’t of Nat. Res.,
897 N.W.2d 522, 530 (Iowa 2017)). The party challenging the agency
action bears the burden of demonstrating the action prejudiced his or her
rights and the agency action falls under section 17A.19(10)(a) through (n).
Hawkeye Land Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 847 N.W.2d 199, 207 (Iowa 2014).
6
We will affirm the district court judgment if we reach the same conclusion.
Brewer-Strong, 913 N.W.2d at 242. “Whether the elements of issue
preclusion are satisfied is a question of law.” Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Van
Haaften, 815 N.W.2d 17, 22 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Grant v. Iowa Dep’t of
Human Servs., 722 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Iowa 2006)). Thus, the agency’s
decision on this issue is not binding, and we “may substitute our own
interpretation of the law for the agency’s.” Grant, 722 N.W.2d at 173.
III. Analysis.
Barker acknowledges the court of appeals’ 2015 determination that
he was only required to register as a sex offender for ten years was
incorrect but maintains it precludes the DPS from subjecting him to
lifetime registration on the sex offender registry. 2 In Bullock, we explained
the court’s role in the sex offender registration process. 638 N.W.2d at
735. In that case, the district court merged the defendant’s sexual-abuse
conviction into his burglary conviction and sentenced him to an
indeterminate term of imprisonment for the burglary. Id. at 729. The
district court also ordered the defendant to register as a sex offender for
life. Id. The defendant directly appealed the district court’s order requiring
lifetime registration as a sex offender. Id. We vacated the defendant’s
sentence because the sentencing court lacked authority to determine the
duration of the defendant’s future registration. Id. at 735.
In doing so, we noted the court’s involvement in the registration
process is limited to two purposes: “(1) to informing convicted defendants
2Barker pled guilty to assault with intent to commit sexual abuse in violation of
Iowa Code section 709.11, an aggravated misdemeanor. See Iowa Code § 709.11 (2007).
Under Iowa Code chapter 692A, a violation of section 709.11 is an aggravated offense.
Id. § 692A.1(e) (now found at § 692A.101(a)(5) (2017)). Pursuant to section 692A.106, a
sex offender convicted of an aggravated offense must “register for life.” Iowa Code
§ 692A.106(5) (2017) (previously section 692A.2(5)).. Nevertheless, even life registration
is not necessary “for life” because the offender “may file an application in district court
seeking to modify the registration requirements under” chapter 692A. Id. § 692A.128(1).
 7
who are not sentenced to confinement of their duty to register and (2) to
the collection of specified information from such defendants.” Id.
(emphasis omitted). We concluded “that the determination of the length
of any required registration is an administrative decision initially
committed to the Department of Public Safety.” Id. Since the defendant
had not applied to the DPS for a determination of his registration
requirements, we held the extent of the defendant’s registration
requirements were not ripe for review. Id. Both the district court and
court of appeals found Bullock controlling in their decisions that Barker
was not entitled to relief because the courts lacked authority to alter
Barker’s registration requirement.
Though this case similarly encompasses the court’s authority to
determine the length of a defendant’s required registration on the sex
offender registry, it does so in a different context. Bullock dealt with a
direct appeal of a defendant’s sentence and the authority of a sentencing
court to determine the duration of a defendant’s sex offender registration
requirements. Id. at 729, 735. In contrast, in 2015, Barker’s
postconviction claim on appeal challenged the knowing and voluntariness
of his plea because “he was not informed he would be on the sexual abuse
registry for his lifetime.” Barker, 2015 WL 5287142, at *2. Instead of
asking for specific performance of the ten-year registration requirement
contained in his plea deal, Barker sought a new trial. Thus, he was not
asking the court to sentence him to a length of registration for which it did
not have authority to determine. Ultimately, this is a matter of whether
the court of appeals in 2015 had the authority to determine Barker’s plea
was knowing and voluntary and whether that decision has preclusive
effect. Since the court of appeals had the authority to determine whether
Barker’s plea was knowing and voluntary, the outcome of this case hinges
8
on whether the doctrine of issue preclusion applies. See, e.g., State v.
Thomas, 659 N.W.2d 217, 220–21 (Iowa 2003) (examining defendant’s
claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary since he was
misinformed during his plea colloquy).
Issue preclusion is a type of res judicata that prohibits parties “from
relitigating in a subsequent action issues raised and resolved in [a]
previous action.” Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 815 N.W.2d at 22 (alteration in
original) (quoting Soults Farms, Inc. v. Schafer, 797 N.W.2d 92, 103 (Iowa
2011)). Issue preclusion applies to legal and factual issues. Grant, 722
N.W.2d at 174. This doctrine furthers “judicial economy and efficiency by
preventing unnecessary litigation” while protecting parties from
“relitigating identical issues with identical parties or those persons with a
significant connected interest to the prior litigation.” Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co.,
815 N.W.2d at 22 (quoting Winnebago Indus., Inc. v. Haverly, 727 N.W.2d
567, 571–72 (Iowa 2006)). Moreover, it “tends to prevent the anomalous
situation, so damaging to public faith in the judicial system, of two
authoritative but conflicting answers being given to the very same
question.” Id. (quoting Grant, 722 N.W.2d at 178). For a previous
determination to have preclusive effect in a subsequent action, the party
claiming issue preclusion must establish the following elements:
(1) the issue in the present case must be identical, (2) the
issue must have been raised and litigated in the prior action,
(3) the issue must have been material and relevant to the
disposition of the prior case, and (4) the determination of the
issue in the prior action must have been essential to the
resulting judgment.
Id. (quoting Soults Farms, Inc., 797 N.W.2d at 104).
Barker has established all four elements of issue preclusion based
on the rare circumstances of his case. First, the crux of the issue in
Barker’s current case is identical to the relevant issue in his 2015 appeal:
9
whether Barker was misinformed about his sex offender registration
requirements when the district court informed him at his sentencing
hearing that he only had to register as a sex offender for ten years. Second,
the present issue was raised and litigated in Barker’s 2015 appeal. Both
the 2015 court of appeals case and the present case stem from Barker’s
argument that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he
was misled about the length of his sex offender registration requirements
at the time he agreed to the plea. The court of appeals in 2015 found
Barker could not establish any error occurred since the district court
properly informed him that he was only required to register as a sex
offender for ten years. Barker, 2015 WL 5287142, at *2–3.
Third, the duration of Barker’s sex offender registration requirement
was material and relevant to the disposition of his 2015 case. The court
of appeals explicitly relied on the length of registration that the district
court told Barker at his sentencing hearing in rejecting Barker’s claim that
his plea was not knowing and voluntary. Fourth, the required length of
Barker’s sex offender registration was essential to the disposition of his
prior case. The court of appeals concluded its 2015 opinion by stating,
Barker cannot establish any error occurred. While he claims
he was given a lifetime registry requirement, he has provided
no evidence of this assertion. Rather, pursuant to the court
documents within this record, the proper sentence was
imposed. Thus, Barker cannot prove that, but for counsel’s
failure to properly frame his claim [as a claim that his plea
was not knowing and voluntary], the postconviction court
would have denied the State’s motion to dismiss.
Id. at *3.
Nevertheless, even when a party has established all the elements of
issue preclusion, the doctrine still may not apply when a recognized
exception to the doctrine covers the situation. One such exception occurs
when “[a] new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the
10
quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts or by
factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between them.” Grant, 722
N.W.2d at 175 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(3), at 273
(Am. Law Inst. 1982)). We first adopted this exception in Heidemann v.
Sweitzer, 375 N.W.2d 665 (Iowa 1985). There, we applied the exception
and found issue preclusion did not prevent the Iowa Department of
Transportation (DOT) from independently determining whether an
arresting officer properly followed implied consent procedures after the
district court had already determined the arresting officer failed to do so
in a criminal trial. Heidemann, 375 N.W.2d at 668. We did so because
the legislature enacted chapter 321B to specifically provide the DOT “with
jurisdiction to revoke a driver’s license for refusal to submit to chemical
testing under Iowa’s implied consent statute.” Id. Thus, the DOT had
“special competency to resolve” license revocation proceeding issues, and
its “administrative decision-making authority should not be undercut by
the fortuitous circumstance that a parallel criminal proceeding may result
in an evidentiary ruling concerning compliance with implied consent
requirements.” Id.
More recently, we applied this exception in Grant, in which we held
prior judicial adjudications determining an incident of child abuse
occurred did not bind the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) to
prevent it from making its own independent findings about the credibility
of the child abuse report. 722 N.W.2d at 177. We did so because the
legislature would not have provided the DHS with the duties to determine
the accuracy of child abuse reports and maintain the child abuse registry
“without recognizing the existence of a special competency to perform this
responsibility.” Id. “Thus, it [was] evident that our legislature designed
11
the correction process so that issues relating to the correction of erroneous
matters in assessment reports would be decided by the DHS.” Id.
The DPS maintains this exception applies to the DPS determination
about Barker’s length of registration since the legislature has provided
DPS with the jurisdiction to determine whether sex offenders are subject
to registration requirements. See Iowa Code § 692A.116. However, this
argument overlooks dispositive factual differences between this case and
Heidemann and Grant. Unlike the DOT’s special competency regarding
driver’s license revocation proceedings or the DHS’s special competency to
assess and maintain child abuse reports, there is no special competency
specific to the DPS required to determine whether a criminal offense meets
the statutory definition of “aggravated offense” for sex offender registration
purposes. Courts already have the authority to determine whether a
defendant’s crime falls within the definition of a sexual offense that would
require sex offender registration. Iowa Code § 692A.126(1); Kruse v. Iowa
Dist. Ct., 712 N.W.2d 695, 699–700 (Iowa 2006). Additionally, courts
inform “convicted defendants who are not sentenced to confinement of
their duty to register.” Bullock, 638 N.W.2d at 735 (emphasis omitted). In
this case, it does not require agency expertise to determine whether
assault with intent to commit sexual abuse is an aggravated offense
requiring lifetime registration since section 692A.101(1)(a)(5) explicitly
lists it as an aggravated offense and section 692A.106(5) requires sex
offenders convicted of an aggravated offense to “register for life.” Iowa Code
§ 692A.106(5); see also id. § 692A.101(1)(a)(5). Consequently, the
exception to the doctrine of issue preclusion does not apply.
Further, we reject the DPS’s claim that issue preclusion is
inapplicable because the DPS was not “afforded a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue in the action relied upon” in Barker’s claim of issue
12
preclusion. Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 126 (Iowa
1981). Issue preclusion was previously limited by the doctrine of
mutuality of parties. Harris v. Jones, 471 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Iowa 1991).
We “abandoned the strict doctrine of mutuality in both offensive and
defensive uses of issue preclusion.” Id. Nevertheless, we remain mindful
of the purposes of issue preclusion, including our desire to protect parties
from “relitigating identical issues with identical parties or those persons
with a significant connected interest to the prior litigation.” Emp’rs Mut.
Cas. Co., 815 N.W.2d at 22 (quoting Winnebago Indus., Inc., 727 N.W.2d
at 571–72); see also Harris, 471 N.W.2d at 819–20. In this case, the
state—not the DPS—was a party to both Barker’s criminal prosecution and
his subsequent postconviction action. Yet, neither this case nor Barker’s
prior cases at issue involving the state require special agency expertise or
representation since both the 2015 court of appeals opinion and this case
merely require the court to determine whether Barker’s offense met the
statutory definition of an “aggravated offense.” Thus, the lack of mutuality
between the parties in Barker’s prior litigation and this case does not
prevent us from applying the doctrine of issue preclusion.
Alternatively, the DPS contends that even if the exception to issue
preclusion does not apply, “a new determination is warranted in order to
take account of an intervening change in applicable legal context” based
on the 2009 amendments to Iowa’s sex offender statute that went into
effect a year after Barker entered his plea. State v. Anderson, 338 N.W.2d
372, 375 (Iowa 1983) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(2),
at 273). However, assault with intent to commit sexual abuse has
consistently been listed as an aggravated offense requiring lifetime
registration both before and after these amendments occurred. Compare
Iowa Code § 692A.1(e) (2007), with id. § 692A.101(1)(a)(5) (2017); compare
13
id. § 692A.2(5) (2007), with id. § 692A.106(5) (2017). Thus, the 2009
amendments do not warrant a new determination in this case. Neither
does Barker’s failure to seek a modification of his registration status
according to the procedures set forth in section 692A.128, as the DPS
claims, since this case did not originate from Barker’s request for the court
to modify his registration status. Rather, it originates from Barker’s
postconviction request for a new trial and claim on appeal that
postconviction counsel was ineffective in failing to claim Barker’s plea was
not knowing and voluntary since he was misinformed about the length of
his registration requirements.
Finally, we reject the DPS’s argument that Barker cannot challenge
the DPS’s determination of his registration term since his claim is not ripe
until he has completed the full ten years on the sex offender registry. 3 “A
case is ripe for adjudication when it presents an actual, present
controversy, as opposed to one that is merely hypothetical or speculative.”
Bullock, 638 N.W.2d at 734 (quoting State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d
575, 578 (Iowa 2000)). The ripeness doctrine exists
to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect
the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative
decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete
way by the challenging parties.
State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 627 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Iowa Dist. Ct.,
616 N.W.2d at 578). In arguing Barker’s claim is not ripe while asking the
court to defer to the DPS’s determination of Barker’s registration
requirements, the DPS attempts to have its cake and eat it, too. The DPS
had no issue with ripeness when it determined Barker was subject to
3Notably, at oral argument, counsel for the DPS stated he was “not necessarily
here to advocate for that position.”
14
lifetime sex offender registration although he had not completed his full
ten years on the registry. Yet, it now asks us to refrain from ruling on the
length of Barker’s registration because it is not ripe.
In any event, Barker’s case is ripe for adjudication. As we have
already noted, the court of appeals had to examine Barker’s registration
requirements and whether he was properly informed of the registration
period in order to rule on his 2015 appeal. Barker continues to seek
postconviction relief, as his current postconviction claim, in which he
argues his guilty plea was invalid because he was misled about the length
of registration, has been stayed pending the outcome of his judicial review
of the DPS’s decision in this case. The length of Barker’s registration is
essential to determining the validity of his plea, and he should not have to
put his postconviction efforts on hold until he has completed the full ten
years on the registry before he can seek a determination about the length
of his registration. Barker’s claim of issue preclusion involves “an actual,
present controversy,” and he is already feeling the effects of the DPS’s
determination in a concrete way since it directly affects his postconviction
claim. Wade, 757 N.W.2d at 627. Therefore, this issue is ripe for review.
IV. Conclusion.
For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude the 2015 court of
appeals’ decision that Barker was only subject to ten years on the sex
offender registry has preclusive effect over the DPS’s determination. Thus,
we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the
district court, and remand the case to the DPS for further consideration in
conformity with our opinion.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.