People v. Bass ( 2019 )

Digitally signed by
Reporter of
Decisions
Reason: I attest to
Illinois Official Reports the accuracy and
integrity of this
document
Appellate Court Date: 2019.01.23
13:11:56 -06'00'
People v. Bass, 2018 IL App (1st) 152650Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption AUBREY BASS, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. First District, Second Division
Docket No. 1-15-2650
Filed October 30, 2018
Rehearing denied December 5, 2018
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 10-C4-40621; the
Review Hon. Gregory R. Ginex, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Roxanna A. Mason, of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg,
Tasha-Marie Kelly, and Matthew Connors, Assistant State’s
Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices Pucinski and Hyman concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant Aubrey Bass appeals the trial court’s order granting the State’s motion to
dismiss his postconviction petition for relief filed under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act)
(725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2012)). He contends that his postconviction counsel did not
provide reasonable assistance. We disagree and affirm.
¶2 Following a jury trial, Bass was convicted of (i) possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver and (ii) possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to 12 years’
imprisonment. The evidence at trial established that on May 15, 2010, Maywood police
officers Dennis Diaz and Weldon Cobos patrolled an apartment complex on the 1700 block of
St. Charles Avenue in Maywood in an unmarked police car. The officers patrolled the
apartment complex periodically at the request of the owner of the building, Don Duenes.1 In
the course of their patrol, they approached and spoke with Bass, who was standing with
another man. The officers identified themselves as police. Bass stated that he did not reside at
the complex and was “just enjoying the weather” and later left.
¶3 The officers continued patrolling and, about 10 minutes later, observed Bass in the
courtyard of the apartment complex. As they approached, Bass turned to walk away and threw
a plastic bag to the ground. The bag contained nine individually-wrapped “rocks” of suspected
cocaine. The officers arrested Bass, who had $103 on his person. After giving Bass Miranda
warnings, Bass told the officers the name of the person that usually sold him cocaine. He stated
that he would purchase a quarter ounce for $200 and sell it for $350 in order to make $150
profit. The recovered substances weighed 1.320 grams and tested positive for cocaine. The
jury found Bass guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and
possession of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced Bass as a Class X offender to 12
years’ imprisonment.
¶4 On direct appeal, Bass argued (1) the trial court violated his sixth amendment right to
counsel of his choice when it allowed his privately retained attorney to withdraw prior to trial
without giving a reason; (2) his conviction for possession should be vacated under the one-act,
one-crime rule; (3) his mittimus should be corrected to reflect only his conviction for
possession with intent to deliver; and (4) he should have received a mandatory supervised
release (MSR) term of two, rather than three, years. This court affirmed Bass’s conviction for
possession with intent to deliver and his MSR term but vacated his conviction for possession
under the one-act, one-crime rule and ordered the mittimus corrected. People v. Bass, 2013 IL
App (1st) 111992-UB. The Illinois Supreme Court later denied Bass’s petition for leave to
appeal. People v. Bass, No. 116312 (Ill. Sept. 25, 2013).
¶5 On December 24, 2013, Bass filed a pro se postconviction petition under the Act.2 In his
petition, Bass argued, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) file various
1
Duenes’s last name is also spelled “Duenas” throughout the record.
2
The record reveals Bass also filed a pro se section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment (735
ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)) on January 11, 2012, and a pro se “petition for a rehearing” on January 20,
2012. The petition for rehearing refers to a request for “relief from judgment,” which was purportedly
denied on December 16, 2011. Copies of these handwritten petitions are included in the record.
However, neither party mentions them, and the record is silent regarding whether they were ruled on.
-2-
pretrial motions, including “Motion To Quash Arrest, Motion To Suppress Evidence, Motion
in Limine, Motion For DNA/Forensic Analysis…etc,” and (2) interview and call as witnesses
Duenes and John Shines, who would have testified that Bass had permission to be at the
residence where he was arrested.
¶6 On February 28, 2014, the trial court advanced Bass’s petition for second stage
proceedings and appointed the public defender’s office to represent him. During four status
hearings between July 2014 and January 2015, appointed counsel informed the court that he
needed more time to investigate Bass’s claims because he was not able to locate one of the
witnesses named in the petition. At a November 23, 2014, status, counsel further informed the
court that he spoke with Bass several weeks earlier, went through the petition with him, and
obtained from Bass “the name of somebody to contact regarding an issue of being an invitee in
this apartment complex,” whom counsel had not yet located.
¶7 On April 17, 2015, Bass’s counsel filed a certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 651(c) (eff. Dec. 1, 1984), stating that he consulted with Bass by phone and letter “to
ascertain his claims of a deprivation of his constitutional rights”; he examined the trial and
sentencing transcripts, and interviewed witnesses named in Bass’s petition; and he examined
Bass’s pro se petition, found it adequately stated Bass’s contentions of constitutional
deprivations, and was therefore declining to amend the petition.
¶8 The State filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing, in relevant part, that Bass failed to
attach affidavits of the potential witnesses, Duenes and Shines, and that his ineffective
assistance claims failed under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668(1984). Postconviction counsel did not respond in writing to the State’s motion to dismiss. At a
hearing on August 7, 2015, Bass’s counsel stated:
“I did file my certificate. I did not amend or supplement Mr. Bass’ petition. ***
And I am, in essence, standing on Mr. Bass’ petition. I would like to note for the record,
Judge, that I did contact the two witnesses named in Mr. Bass’s petition—*** Mr.
Shines and Mr. Duenas [sic]. I also contacted a third individual that Mr. Bass told me
about, all of whom he identifies as potential witnesses in a potential motion to quash
and suppress the arrest. And based on my conversations with all these individuals,
Judge, I was not able to get any affidavits or attach any affidavits to the petition. With
that, Judge, I would rest on Mr. Bass’s pro se petition.”
¶9 The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. Bass timely appealed.
¶ 10 On appeal, Bass does not argue the merits of his petition and, as a result, has forfeited any
argument that his claims of constitutional deprivation were meritorious. People v. Cotto, 2016
IL 119006, ¶ 49; Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018) (“Points not argued are forfeited
***.”). Consequently, Bass rests his claim for relief solely on his contention that he did not
receive the reasonable assistance of counsel provided for under the Act. In particular, Bass
claims that postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance by failing to amend his
petition to include affidavits from Duenes and Shines, explain the absence of those affidavits,
or move to withdraw pursuant to People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192 (2004). Bass argues that Rule
651(c) requires postconviction counsel to make any necessary amendments to defendant’s
pro se petition for an adequate presentation of his contentions and, here, postconviction
The postconviction hearing transcript does contain brief references to other earlier pro se section
2-1401 petitions apparently filed by Bass and denied by different judges.
-3-
counsel’s failure to obtain the witness affidavits resulted in a failure to adequately present
Bass’s allegations in violation of Rule 651(c).
¶ 11 The Act provides for a three-stage process by which a defendant may assert his conviction
was the result of a substantial denial of his constitutional rights. People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d
56, 71 (2008). When, as here, a petition has been advanced to second stage proceedings, an
indigent defendant is entitled under the Act to representation by appointed counsel. 725 ILCS
5/122-4 (West 2012); People v. Lander, 215 Ill. 2d 577, 583 (2005). Postconviction counsel is
required to provide defendant with a “ ‘reasonable level of assistance.’ ” Lander, 215 Ill. 2d at
583 (quoting People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 364 (1990)). The reasonable assistance,
provided as a matter of “legislative grace” (People v. Hardin, 217 Ill. 2d 289, 299 (2005)), is a
less rigorous standard than constitutional guarantee of effective assistance under Strickland.
People v. Zareski, 2017 IL App (1st) 150836, ¶ 50 (citing Cotto, 2016 IL 119006, ¶ 29).
¶ 12 The parameters of the reasonable assistance postconviction petitioners are provided under
the Act are codified in Rule 651(c). Under this rule, postconviction counsel has a duty to
consult with defendant to ascertain his contentions of constitutional deprivation, examine the
trial record, and, when necessary, amend the pro se petition to adequately present defendant’s
contentions. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 472 (2006). Counsel’s fulfillment of these
duties is evidenced by a certificate attesting to counsel’s compliance with the rule. Ill. S. Ct. R.
651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013); Lander, 215 Ill. 2d at 584. The filing of a Rule 651(c) certificate
creates a rebuttable presumption that postconviction counsel rendered reasonable assistance.
People v. Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307, ¶ 19.
¶ 13 We review de novo both the trial court’s dismissal of Bass’s postconviction petition
without an evidentiary hearing (Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473) and the interpretation of a
supreme court rule, including whether counsel fulfilled his duties under Rule 651(c) (People v.
Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 41-42 (2007)).
¶ 14 Bass’s counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate, and accordingly, we presume that he
provided his client reasonable assistance. Bass therefore has the burden to rebut this
presumption by demonstrating that postconviction counsel failed to substantially comply with
the requirements of Rule 651(c). Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307, ¶ 19. Bass reasons that
because his lawyer failed to amend the petition to include affidavits from the witnesses he
identified or explain their absence and because, without those affidavits, Bass’s petition was
facially deficient, his lawyer did not provide reasonable assistance. Obviously, Bass’s
argument begs the question since he presumes (without any support in the record) that
counsel’s failure to amend his petition was the result of some deficiency in his lawyer’s
performance rather than an inability to substantiate Bass’s claims.
¶ 15 The record reveals that counsel informed the court on multiple court dates that he was
attempting to locate the potential witnesses named in Bass’s pro se petition. Counsel further
informed the trial court that he met with and went through the petition with Bass and received
and examined the record. Ultimately, counsel stated that he interviewed three witnesses,
including the two named in Bass’s petition, and “was not able to get any affidavits or attach
any affidavits to the petition.” The record demonstrates that counsel fulfilled all the obligations
Rule 651(c) imposes on postconviction counsel.
¶ 16 Despite ample evidence in the record that counsel performed all the duties imposed by
Rule 651(c), Bass claims that because his attorney did not amend his petition by attaching
affidavits or other evidence, which was necessary to cure defects on the face of the petition, he
-4-
did not receive the reasonable assistance of counsel he was entitled to. But obviously, not every
petition can be amended to state a substantial constitutional claim.
¶ 17 Citing Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, Bass further claims that if, after interviewing the witnesses,
counsel determined that they did not support Bass’s version of events and so the claim of
constitutional deprivation in the petition was without merit, counsel was obligated to
withdraw. According to Bass, counsel’s failure to either amend the petition or withdraw
deprived him of the reasonable assistance of counsel.
¶ 18 We note the inconsistency in the arguments presented here and in Greer. In Greer, the
defendant argued that the trial court deprived him of the reasonable assistance of counsel
because it allowed his lawyer to withdraw and, on appeal, argued that counsel appointed to
represent a postconviction petitioner could not be permitted to withdraw because the Act did
not specifically permit it. Id. at 205-06. The supreme court disagreed and found that fulfillment
of appointed counsel’s obligation to make any “necessary” amendments to a pro se petition did
not “require postconviction counsel to advance frivolous or spurious claims on defendant’s
behalf. If amendments to a pro se postconviction petition would only further a frivolous or
patently nonmeritorious claim, they are not ‘necessary’ within the meaning of [Rule 651(c)].”
Id. at 205. Yet, here Bass argues that his lawyer’s failure to withdraw produced the same result:
he was deprived of the reasonable assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to withdraw
as he was obligated to do.
¶ 19 In Greer, the defendant’s pro se postconviction petition advanced to the second stage by
default because it was not brought to the trial court’s attention within 90 days of filing (725
ILCS 5/122-2.1 (West 2000)), so “there was never an initial determination as to [the] merits of
the petition.” Greer, 212 Ill. 2d at 200. As the supreme court noted, a lawyer appointed to
represent a postconviction petitioner whose petition escapes first-stage review, may determine,
after fulfilling the obligations imposed by Rule 651(c), that the petition is, in fact, frivolous and
patently without merit. Id. at 206. Under those circumstances, Greer concluded it was
untenable to require the lawyer to continue to represent the petitioner. Id. at 205. Here, the trial
court concluded at the first stage that Bass’s pro se petition was not frivolous and patently
without merit 3 and so passed it to second stage review. When, after conducting his
investigation, Bass’s lawyer determined that he could not obtain affidavits or other evidence to
support it, the petition did not ipso facto become frivolous or patently without merit, but it
nevertheless remained defective, and counsel determined he was unable cure that defect. Bass
offers nothing to suggest that his lawyer’s conclusion was wrong or that he acted unreasonably
3
The gravamen of Bass’s petition was that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a
motion to suppress when witnesses identified by Bass could have testified that he had permission to be
at the apartment complex where he was arrested. But, of course, permission to be on the premises is
legally irrelevant to whether police had probable cause to arrest Bass when they saw him throwing a
plastic bag, later determined to contain narcotics, to the ground. Given the extremely low bar for first
stage determinations set by our supreme court (see People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (2009) (at first
stage, the petition must be given a liberal construction and courts must use a “lenient eye, allowing
borderline cases to proceed” (internal quotation marks omitted))), we do not view the trial court’s
decision to advance the petition to the second stage as an indication that the court had analyzed and
endorsed the legal significance of the facts pled in the petition, which was defective on its face. Rather,
we view the decision as reflecting the court’s desire to afford Bass the benefit of review by appointed
counsel.
-5-
in declining to amend. Accordingly, Bass has not sustained his burden to overcome the
presumption that attaches to counsel’s Rule 651(c) affidavit.
¶ 20 Of course, the unspoken sequitur to Bass’s reformulation of Greer presumes that had his
lawyer withdrawn, the court would have appointed new counsel to represent him. But nothing
in the Act, nor in any case interpreting the statutory provision for reasonable assistance of
counsel, contemplates such a result. People v. Thomas, 2013 IL App (2d) 120646, ¶ 7 (“[T]he
import of the Greer court’s reasoning is that, once an attorney appointed to represent a
defendant in a postconviction proceeding has withdrawn ***, there will be no further statutory
right to counsel, at least in the absence of unusual circumstances.”). In fact, the procedure
approved in Greer (a motion for withdrawal accompanied by a brief in accordance with Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), setting forth the reasons why counsel has concluded the
postconviction petition is without merit) forecloses this possibility. Put another way, if the
lawyer appointed to represent a postconviction petitioner determines, after fulfilling his or her
obligations under Rule 651(c), that the petition cannot be amended, defendant has received the
reasonable assistance of counsel the Act contemplates and his entitlement to the assistance of
counsel is at an end. People v. Norton, 203 Ill. App. 3d 571, 574 (1990). And whether
appointed counsel elects to withdraw and inform the court of the reasons why the petition lacks
merit or instead elects to stand on the pro se petition, the result is the same; defendant’s
unamended petition will be dismissed.
¶ 21 Bass also contends his lawyer’s failure to withdraw deprived him of the ability to defend
his postconviction pro se. But again, this argument presumes, without any support in the
record, that Bass’s counsel failed to discuss with him the results of his investigation and
Bass’s options for proceeding with the petition. Bass could rationally have decided that he was
better off having postconviction counsel appear for him than to have his lawyer file an Anders
brief explaining to the court why the claims raised in the petition were without merit. See
People v. Kuehner, 2015 IL 117695, ¶ 21 (motion to withdraw filed by postconviction counsel
must address the lack of merit in all claims of constitutional deprivation raised in petitioner’s
pro se petition).
¶ 22 Counsel provided reasonable assistance to Bass by investigating the claims he raised in his
postconviction petition. Bass does not articulate a basis—and we see none—for the contention
that a failure to seek leave to withdraw when counsel’s investigation does not yield the
necessary support for a petitioner’s claims of constitutional deprivation constitutes
“unreasonable assistance” under the Act. Withdrawal of Bass’s appointed counsel would leave
him where he started: with a postconviction petition lacking in any evidentiary support. We
therefore reject Bass’s argument that he was denied reasonable assistance of postconviction
counsel under Rule 651(c).
¶ 23 Affirmed.
-6-