In re Children of Tiyonie R. ( 2019 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2019 ME 34Docket: Aro-18-392
Argued: February 20, 2019
Decided: March 5, 2019
Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE CHILDREN OF TIYONIE R.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Tiyonie R. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Presque
Isle, Nelson, J.) terminating her parental rights to her two children. She
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s findings of
parental unfitness. We affirm the judgment.
[¶2] The Department of Health and Human Services initiated child
protection proceedings as to both children on April 25, 2017, alleging neglect
by the mother.1 See 22 M.R.S. § 4032 (2018). The court (O’Mara, J.) issued a
preliminary protection order that day placing the children in the Department’s
1 A single child protection petition was filed as to both children, naming the putative father of
each as well as the children’s custodian at the time—the mother’s boyfriend. The two matters were
later severed (O’Mara, J.) and proceeded separately until again consolidated (Soucy, J.) for purposes
of the hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights.
By a judgment entered on December 19, 2018, the court also terminated the parental rights of
the younger child’s father, and no appeal was taken from that judgment. Child protection
proceedings as to the older child’s father are pending in the District Court. Only the termination of
the mother’s parental rights is at issue in this appeal.
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custody. See 22 M.R.S. § 4034 (2018). The mother waived her right to a
summary preliminary hearing, see 22 M.R.S. § 4034(4), and she later agreed to
the entry of an order (Daigle, J.) finding jeopardy to the children based on
neglect and the threat of physical harm due to the mother’s mental health
issues, exposure of the children to domestic violence, and maintenance of
unsuitable living conditions, see 22 M.R.S. §§ 4002(6), 4035, 4036 (2018). In
March of 2018, the Department petitioned for the termination of the mother’s
parental rights to both children. See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2018). After a
testimonial hearing, the court (Nelson, J.) made the following findings of fact,
which are supported by competent record evidence. See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4054,
4055 (2018).
[¶3] The mother and the children came to Maine in 2017 to live with the
mother’s boyfriend but soon moved into a homeless shelter. The mother and
the boyfriend’s relationship involved domestic violence on multiple occasions;
after one such incident, the mother was hospitalized in a crisis unit, and she was
charged with and pleaded guilty to assault. Thereafter,
[t]he children were left in the care of [the boyfriend] and he
subjected the children to . . . abuse . . . . [The mother] failed to
protect the children from the jeopardy posed by the domestic
violence situation, her inability to manage her own significant
mental health issues, and subjected the children to maltreatment
by a partner, who had previously physically abused her.
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[The mother] was diagnosed with Major Depressive
Disorder, Recurrent. [She] has continually struggled to effectively
manage her own mental health issues throughout the duration of
this case. Her numerous hospitalizations reflect that fact that her
mental state is extremely fragile and her life is susceptible to major
disruptions. In light of the children’s ages and reliance on others
for their care, such instability is harmful to the children.
[The mother] has not only subjected the children to
maltreatment by others, she has herself made a threat to kill both
children. She made the threat to her former partner when he was
attempting to leave her. She threatened to drown both children. . . .
This behavior combined with the substantial evidence regarding
[the mother’s] inability to manage her mental health issues creates
great risk to the health and welfare of the children, if they were in
her care.
. . . .
. . . . It is all that [the mother] can do to try to attend to her
own mental health issues and her personal needs. She has had only
marginal success for brief periods during the pendency of this case.
She simply does not have the capacity to care for the children while
struggling to care for herself.
. . . .
. . . . In the fall of 2017, [the mother] abandoned her efforts in
Maine to reunify with her children and headed south to be with her
family. On her way, she experienced a tremendous detour in the
form of an extended psychiatric stay in New Hampshire after an
episode while in transit. Thereafter, [the mother] did not
meaningfully participate in reunification efforts . . . . From October
of 2017, to the date of the hearing on the petition for termination
of parental rights, [the mother] had no contact with the children. . . .
. . . .
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. . . . In light of the children’s ages and their need for stability,
predictability and adequate care, they simply cannot wait to see if
at some point in the future [the mother] makes sufficient progress
in dealing with her issues to consider moving forward with
reunification. Unfortunately, such progress is extremely unlikely
based on her past patterns of behaviors.
Due to the oldest child’s own past traumas and present diagnoses, “lack of
permanency for this child is of particular import.” The children have been with
their current foster family since May of 2017; they are closely bonded to their
foster parents and are thriving in their care.
[¶4] Based on these findings, the court found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the mother is “unwilling or unable to protect the child[ren] from
jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time which is
reasonably calculated to meet the child[ren]’s needs,” 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i); is unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the
children “within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the child[ren]’s
need[s],” 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii); and has failed to make a good faith
effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the children, see 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(iv). The court further determined that termination of the
mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. See 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).
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[¶5] The mother timely appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting all three grounds of parental unfitness. See 22 M.R.S.
§ 4006 (2018); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1). She points out that she participated in
reunification services until October of 2017 and argues that there is insufficient
evidence to establish that she cannot become a fit parent “within a time which
is reasonably calculated to meet the child[ren]’s needs” because the parental
rights of the older child’s father have not been terminated, and therefore both
children are not yet eligible for adoption in any event. 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).
[¶6] We conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to support
the court’s findings as to all three grounds of parental unfitness. See In re
Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶ 10, 154 A.3d 1199 (stating that we review the court’s
findings of parental unfitness “for clear error and will reverse a finding only if
there is no competent evidence in the record to support it, if the fact-finder
clearly misapprehends the meaning of the evidence, or if the finding is so
contrary to the credible evidence that it does not represent the truth and right
of the case” (quotation marks omitted)). As the mother acknowledges, the
court must examine from the child’s perspective—not the parent’s—the time
within which the parent can take responsibility for a child and protect that child
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from jeopardy. See 22 M.R.S. § 4050 (2018); In re Child of Ronald W., 2018 ME
107, ¶ 11, 190 A.3d 1029. These children have been in the Department’s
custody for almost two years. In those two years, the mother has made little to
no progress with her significant mental health issues and none is likely in the
foreseeable future. More recently, she declined to engage in any rehabilitation
or reunification services, and, by the time of the hearing, she had not seen her
children in several months.2 Although the mother offered contradictory
evidence regarding her fitness as a parent, the weight and credibility of that
evidence was for the trial court’s determination. See In re Child of Ronald W.,
2018 ME 107, ¶ 11, 190 A.3d 1029.
[¶7] The fact that the older child’s father’s parental rights have not been
terminated is also no basis to conclude that the mother’s parental rights were
erroneously terminated. Although the pending proceeding as to the older
child’s father may prevent the immediate adoption of that child, see 18-A M.R.S.
§ 9-302(a)(2), (b) (2018), the termination of a father’s parental rights is not a
factual predicate to the termination of the mother’s parental rights, see 22
M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2). Moreover, a parent whose rights have been terminated
2 This evidence also supports the court’s determination that termination of the mother’s parental
rights is in the children’s best interests, and we discern no abuse of discretion in that conclusion. See
In re Child of Troy C., 2018 ME 150, ¶ 8, 196 A.3d 452 (stating that we review the court’s best interest
finding for clear error or an abuse of discretion).
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has no interest in post-termination proceedings, 22 M.R.S. § 4056(1), (3)
(2018), and “[t]he termination of one parent’s rights shall not affect the rights
of the other parent,” 22 M.R.S. § 4056(2) (2018). Thus, the termination or
nontermination of one parent’s rights may be of no moment in the
determination of whether it is appropriate to terminate the other parent’s
rights.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
John W. Tebbetts, Esq., Tebbetts Law Office, LLC, Presque Isle, for appellant
mother
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Presque Isle District Court docket numbers PC-2017-7 and PC-2018-1
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY