Randy L. Thornton v. Matthew Pietrzak, Stephanie Buttz, Eric Lee, and Dianna Johnson , 120 N.E.3d 1139 ( 2019 )

FILED
Mar 19 2019, 8:31 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
Michael Ghosh MATTHEW PIETRZAK AND
The Ghosh Law Office, LLC STEPHANIE BUTTZ
Carmel, Indiana Tara L. Gerber
Office of Corporation Counsel
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Randy L. Thornton, March 19, 2019
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-PL-1356
v. Appeal from the
Marion Superior Court
Matthew Pietrzak, Stephanie The Honorable
Buttz, Eric Lee, and Dianna John F. Hanley, Judge
Johnson,1 The Honorable
Ian L. Stewart, Commissioner
Appellees-Defendants.
Trial Court Cause No.
49D11-1402-PL-3833
Kirsch, Judge.
1
We note that the State of Indiana; Indiana Department of Correction; Marion County, Indiana; and City of
Indianapolis were all original parties in this case but were previously dismissed from the case before the
underlying proceedings involved in the present case.
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[1] Randy L. Thornton (“Thornton”) appeals the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Matthew Pietrzak (“Pietrzak”), Stephanie Buttz (“Buttz”)
(together, “Appellees”), Eric Lee (“Lee”), and Dianna Johnson (“Johnson”),
who are all probation officers.2 Thornton raises the following restated issue for
our review: whether the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in
favor of Appellees because they are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In August 2006, Thornton pleaded guilty to Class C felony possession of
cocaine in Cause No. 49G20-0605-FC-81612 (“Cause 81612”). He was
sentenced by the Marion Superior Court Criminal Division (“the sentencing
court”) to six years with two years executed and four years suspended.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 25, 65. The sentencing order ordered Thornton to
serve two of those suspended years on probation following the executed portion
of his sentence. Id. On August 6, 2007, the sentencing court issued an order
requiring Thornton to begin his two-year probation period for the Class C
Felony. Id. at 27, 66.
2
Thornton concedes that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Lee and Johnson because they
were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for their actions regarding a memorandum filed on April 15, 2008.
Therefore, only Pietrzak and Butts are Appellees in this case.
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[4] On February 7, 2008, Thornton was sentenced to three years executed in an
unrelated case, Cause No. 49G06-0702-FA-28198 (“Cause 28198”). Id. at 76-
77. On April 15, 2008, Lee, who was a probation officer in the Marion County
Probation Department (“the probation department”), wrote a memo to the
sentencing court from Cause No. 81612 that stated, in its entirety: “On 2-7-08,
Mr. Thornton was given an executed sentence under Cause [28198] of 3 years.
His Probation will resume under Cause [81612] when his executed portion is
completed.” Id. at 65-66, 81. This memo was approved and signed by Lee’s
supervisor, Johnson. Id. The sentencing court did not take any action
regarding this memo. Id. at 86.
[5] On August 20, 2010, Pietrzak, another probation officer, filed a notice of
probation violation, which was reviewed by Buttz, another probation officer,
and informed the sentencing court that Thornton had been arrested and charged
with a new offense earlier that month. Id. at 27-28, 65-66, 91. Pietrzak noted,
as Lee and Johnson had noted in their April 2008 memo, that Thornton’s
probation in Cause 81612 had been paused while he served time for his
conviction in Cause 28198 and then resumed on April 5, 2010 upon completion
of his sentence for that conviction. Id. at 91. Pietrzak’s notice of probation
violation stated in pertinent part, “Mr. Thornton was continued on Probation
on 4/5/10 after serving an executed sentence on another case.” Id.
[6] An evidentiary hearing was held on the probation violation on February 10,
2011. At the hearing, Thornton argued that his August 2010 arrest did not
violate the terms of his probation because his probation had ended in August
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2009. Id. at 67. The sentencing court rejected that argument, found that
Thornton had violated his probation, and ordered his previously-suspended
four-year sentence executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. Id. at 28,
67.
[7] While incarcerated, Thornton filed a motion to correct the erroneous probation
revocation and sentence. On May 10, 2012, a hearing was held on Thornton’s
motion, and the sentencing court vacated the February 10, 2011 revocation of
probation, stating in pertinent part:
The court being duly advised in the premises, the court sets aside
the revocation of defendant’s probation due to the fact that it’s
unclear whether the defendant’s probation was tolled during the
serving of an unrelated executed sentence. The court finding no
case law on this issue, the court construes the law against the
state and in favor of the defendant. Wherefore, the revocation is
vacated, and the defendant is ordered released.
Id. at 30.
[8] On January 30, 2014, Thornton filed a complaint, alleging state tort claims and
claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against several parties, including the
Appellees. On July 7, 2014, the Appellees and the other remaining defendants
filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the complaint was filed past the statute of
limitations, that Thornton had failed to timely submit a tort claim notice, and
that the defendants were immune. On August 21, 2014, the trial court granted
the motion to dismiss the action.
[9] Thornton appealed, and a panel of this court affirmed, finding:
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Thornton alleges no tortious conduct, malicious motive, or illegal
acts by these defendants, who each acted within the scope of
their employment as probation officers. The complaint alleges
only that Lee presented the court with a mundane memorandum
related to Thornton’s probation, Johnson signed this
memorandum in her supervisory capacity, Pietrzak filed a notice
of probation violation, and Buttz reviewed and signed the notice.
Following a probation hearing, at which Thornton presented his
argument that he was no longer on probation, the court revoked
Thornton’s probation and sent him to prison.
The fact that Thornton’s probation revocation was later vacated
does not lead to the conclusion that the named probation officers
committed a tort or intentionally or recklessly deprived him of
his constitutional rights. As a matter of law, the complaint does
not allege any facts with respect to the named probation officers
upon which the trial court could have granted relief.
Thornton v. State, No. 49A02-1409-PL-662, (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2015).
Thornton sought transfer with the Indiana Supreme Court, contending only
that his claims against Pietrzak, Buttz, Lee, and Johnson under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983 were improperly dismissed. Thornton v. State, 43 N.E.3d 585 (Ind.
2015). Our Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of Thornton’s claims, finding
that his complaint had stated a claim for relief under section 1983 because the
complaint alleged that Pietrzak, Buttz, Lee, and Johnson had taken actions
“which constituted ‘unconstitutional deprivations of liberty and violations of
due process.’” Id. at 587. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings. Id. at 588.
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[10] On remand, the Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, contending
that they did not deprive Thornton of his constitutional rights and that they are
immune from liability under section 1983 as quasi-judicial officers of the
criminal court. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 33-49. A hearing on the Appellees’
motion for summary judgment was held on May 17, 2018, and the trial court
took the matter under advisement. On May 18, 2018, the trial court issued its
order granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees. Thornton now
appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[11] When reviewing the grant of summary judgment, our standard of review is the
same as that of the trial court. FLM, LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 973 N.E.2d
1167, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Wilcox Mfg. Grp., Inc. v. Mktg. Servs. of
Ind., Inc., 832 N.E.2d 559, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)), trans. denied. We stand in
the shoes of the trial court and apply a de novo standard of review. Id. (citing
Cox v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 848 N.E.2d 690, 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). Our
review of a summary judgment motion is limited to those materials designated
to the trial court. Ind. Trial Rule 56(H); Robson v. Tex. E. Corp., 833 N.E.2d
461, 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Summary judgment is appropriate
only where the designated evidence shows there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
T.R. 56(C). For summary judgment purposes, a fact is “material” if it bears on
the ultimate resolution of relevant issues. FLM, 973 N.E.2d at 1173. We view
the pleadings and designated materials in the light most favorable to the non-
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moving party. Id. Additionally, all facts and reasonable inferences from those
facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party. Id. (citing Troxel Equip.
Co. v. Limberlost Bancshares, 833 N.E.2d 36, 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans.
denied). The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of
any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue, at which point the burden
shifts to the non-movant to come forward with contrary evidence showing an
issue for the trier of fact. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014).
[12] A trial court’s grant of summary judgment is clothed with a presumption of
validity, and the party who lost in the trial court has the burden of
demonstrating that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. Henderson v.
Reid Hosp. and Healthcare Servs., 17 N.E.3d 311, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans.
denied. We will affirm upon any theory or basis supported by the designated
materials. Id. When a trial court grants summary judgment, we carefully
scrutinize that determination to ensure that a party was not improperly
prevented from having his or her day in court. Id.
[13] Thornton argues that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in
favor of Appellees. He contends that there were genuine issues of material fact
precluding Appellees’ entitlement to quasi-judicial immunity from his claims.
Specifically, Thornton asserts that Appellees are not entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity because they exceeded the scope of their authority as probation
officers by failing to maintain accurate records and providing the sentencing
court in Cause 81612 with knowingly false information.
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[14] It is well-settled that judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suits
for money damages for all actions taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, unless
those actions are taken in the complete absence of any jurisdiction. D.L. v.
Huck, 978 N.E.2d 429, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing H.B. v. State of Ind.-
Elkhart Div. of Family & Children, 713 N.E.2d 300, 302 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999),
trans. denied). The underlying purpose of the immunity is to preserve judicial
independence in the decision-making process. Id.
[15] The same policy justifies granting immunity to non-judicial officers who
perform quasi-judicial functions. Id. “This quasi-judicial immunity is given to
people ‘performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that
these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.’” Id.
(quoting H.B., 713 N.E. 2d at 302). Courts, however, are reluctant to apply
quasi-judicial immunity too broadly. “[I]f the ‘acts do not involve the judicial
process so that a fear exists that freedom of judicial decision-making may be
stifled,’ then the person or act in question should not be shielded by immunity.”
Id. (quoting Lake Cty. Juvenile Court v. Swanson, 671 N.E.2d 429, 435 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996), trans. denied).
[16] In determining whether a person is entitled to the benefit of judicial immunity,
we use the functional approach established by the United States Supreme Court
and look to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the person
who performed it. Id. (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988)). The
act of executing or enforcing a court order is a function integral to judicial
proceedings. Mendenhall v. City of Indianapolis, 717 N.E.2d 1218, 1226 (Ind. Ct.
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Ohio App. 1999) (citing Newman v. Deiter, 702 N.E.2d 1093, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998), trans. denied, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 931 (1999)), trans. denied. Thus, a non-
judicial officer who acts in furtherance of a valid court order is entitled to
judicial immunity. Id. at 1226-27.
[17] The question here is whether Appellees’ actions were so integral to or
intertwined with the judicial process that, in performing them, Appellees would
be considered an arm of the court and, therefore, immune. Appellees are
probation officers who “serve at the pleasure of the appointing court and are
directly responsible to and subject to the orders of the court.” Ind. Code § 11-
13-1-1(c). Pursuant to statute, probation officers have mandatory duties,
including, to “notify the court when a violation of a condition of probation
occurs” and to “keep accurate records of cases investigated by [them] and of all
cases assigned to [them] by the court and make these records available to the
court upon request.” Ind. Code § 11-13-1-3(7), (9).
[18] Thornton contends that Appellees’ actions of keeping inaccurate records
regarding the status of his probation in Cause 81612 and filing of a false notice
of probation violation exceeded the scope of Appellees’ authority as probation
officers and resulted in his wrongful incarceration for the violation of his
probation.
[19] In Cause 81612, Thornton’s two-year probation period began on August 6,
2007, when the sentencing court issued an order for probation to start.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 27, 66. Under this original order, Thornton’s probation
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period would have expired on August 6, 2009. However, on February 7, 2008,
Thornton was sentenced to three years executed in an unrelated case, Cause
28198, and on April 15, 2008, Lee wrote a memo to inform the sentencing court
from Cause No. 81612 about this new sentence, stating, in part, “[Thornton’s]
Probation will resume under Cause [81612] when his executed portion is
completed.” Id. at 65-66, 76-77, 81.3 The sentencing court took no action on
this memo. Id. at 86.
[20] On August 20, 2010, Appellees filed a notice of probation violation, which
informed the sentencing court that Thornton had been arrested and charged
with a new offense earlier that month. Id. at 27-28, 65-66, 91. Appellees noted
the same thing Lee and Johnson had noted in their April 2008 memo: that
Thornton’s probation in Cause 81612 had been paused while he served time for
his conviction in Cause 28198 and then resumed on April 5, 2010 upon
completion of his sentence. Id. at 91. Thornton’s probation was revoked, he
was ordered to serve his previously-suspended sentence, and after he filed a
motion to correct the erroneous probation revocation and sentence, the
sentencing court vacated the revocation of probation. In doing so, the
sentencing court stated that, “it’s unclear whether the defendant’s probation
was tolled during the serving of an unrelated executed sentence[, and] finding
3
Thornton concedes that Lee and Johnson, who reviewed and signed the April 15, 2008 memo, are entitled
to quasi-judicial immunity against his claims for their actions concerning the memo because they were acting
under the authority of the original sentencing order in Cause 81612.
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no case law on this issue, the court construes the law against the state and in
favor of the defendant.” Id. at 30.
[21] Thornton asserts that, because the sentencing court vacated his probation
violation, Appellees were not acting in furtherance of a valid court order when
they filed the probation violation in August 2010. However, the sentencing
court, in vacating the probation violation, did not find that Appellees acted in
violation of the original sentencing order or that they exceeded their statutory
authority in filing the notice of probation violation. The sentencing court,
instead, found that it was unclear whether Thornton’s probation was tolled
when he served his sentence in Cause 28198 and that there was no caselaw on
the issue. Because of this ambiguity, Appellees did not knowingly file a false
probation violation and keep inaccurate records regarding the status of
Thornton’s probation. To the contrary, they followed their statutory duty to
notify the court when a violation of a condition of probation occurred pursuant
to the original sentencing order in Cause 81612 and their belief that Thornton
was still on probation at the time he committed new offenses because his
probation had been tolled when he served an executed sentence in an unrelated
case. After Appellees filed the notice of probation violation, an evidentiary
hearing was held, at which, Thornton argued that his August 2010 arrest did
not violate the terms of his probation because his probation had ended in
August 2009. Id. at 67. The sentencing court rejected that argument and found
that Thornton had violated his probation. Id. at 28, 67. Based on this, we
conclude that, in filing the notice of probation violation, Appellees were
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“performing [a task] so integral or intertwined with the judicial process” that
they should be “considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.” See
D.L., 978 N.E.2d at 433. Appellees are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, and
the trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in their favor.
[22] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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