In re Interest of Maximus B. , 302 Neb. 365 ( 2019 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
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    04/05/2019 12:06 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    302 Nebraska R eports
    IN RE INTEREST OF MAXIMUS B.
    Cite as 
    302 Neb. 365
    In   re I nterest ofM aximus B., a child
    under  18 years of age.
    State of Nebraska, appellant,
    v. M aximus B., appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed March 1, 2019.    No. S-18-410.
    1.	 Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Determination of a juris-
    dictional issue which does not involve a factual dispute is a matter of
    law which requires an appellate court to reach its conclusions indepen-
    dent from a trial court.
    2.	 Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. In a juvenile case,
    as in any other appeal, before reaching the legal issues presented for
    review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has
    jurisdiction over the matter before it.
    3.	 Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
    (Reissue 2016), the three types of final orders which may be reviewed
    on appeal are (1) an order which affects a substantial right and which
    determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order affecting
    a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order
    affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an action
    after judgment is rendered.
    4.	 Juvenile Courts: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. A proceeding
    before a juvenile court is a “special proceeding” for appellate purposes.
    5.	 Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Numerous factors determine when
    an order affects a substantial right for purposes of appeal. Broadly,
    these factors relate to the importance of the right and the importance
    of the effect on the right by the order at issue. It is not enough that the
    right itself be substantial; the effect of the order on that right must also
    be substantial.
    6.	 Final Orders. Whether the effect of an order is substantial depends
    on whether it affects with finality the rights of the parties in the sub-
    ject matter.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    302 Nebraska R eports
    IN RE INTEREST OF MAXIMUS B.
    Cite as 
    302 Neb. 365
    7.	 Juvenile Courts: Minors. The substantial right of the State in a juve-
    nile proceeding is derived from its parens patriae interest, and the State
    has a right to protect the welfare of its resident children.
    Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County:
    Douglas F. Johnson, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
    Donald W. Kleine, Douglas County Attorney, Elizabeth
    McClelland, Mark P. Hanna, and Joseph Fabian, Senior
    Certified Law Student, for appellant.
    No appearance for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Miller-Lerman, J.
    NATURE OF CASE
    The State of Nebraska appeals the order of the separate
    juvenile court of Douglas County which vacated a previous
    adjudication order based on acceptance of a “plea of no con-
    test” to allegations made by the State against Maximus B.
    in an amended petition filed under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247
    (Reissue 2016). Specifically, the juvenile court determined that
    a “plea of no contest” is not a permitted answer under Neb.
    Rev. Stat. § 43-279 (Reissue 2016), where the petition alleges
    that the child is a juvenile violator under § 43-247. We con-
    clude that the juvenile court’s order which vacated its previous
    order of adjudication and set the matter for further proceedings
    was not a final order appealable by the State, and we therefore
    dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    On October 6, 2017, the State filed a petition in the juve-
    nile court alleging that Maximus, born in August 2002, was
    within § 43-247, because in May, he had committed sexual
    assault in the first degree, a Class II felony under Neb. Rev.
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    IN RE INTEREST OF MAXIMUS B.
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    302 Neb. 365
    Stat. § 28-319(1)(a) (Reissue 2016). On November 1, Maximus
    appeared in court and entered a denial to the allegations in the
    State’s petition. On November 16, the juvenile court filed a
    pretrial order in which it, inter alia, set a date for an adjudica-
    tion hearing.
    On January 25, 2018, the date the juvenile court had set for
    adjudication, the State filed an amended petition in which it
    alleged that Maximus was a juvenile violator under § 43-247,
    because in May 2017, he had committed the offense of disturb-
    ing the peace, a Class III misdemeanor under Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 28-1322 (Reissue 2016). Maximus and his parents appeared
    before the juvenile court. It should be noted that the juvenile
    court judge who presided at the January 25 adjudication was
    not the same judge who had presided at Maximus’ first appear-
    ance at which a pretrial order had been filed and who subse-
    quently vacated the adjudication order.
    At the adjudication hearing, Maximus stated that he wished
    to enter a “plea of no contest” to the allegations in the amended
    petition. After questioning Maximus and his parents and after
    determining that the State had presented a sufficient factual
    basis, the juvenile court accepted Maximus’ “plea of no con-
    test” and found him to be under its jurisdiction. The court set
    a date for a disposition hearing. The court filed an order that
    same day setting forth its findings and orders.
    The disposition hearing was held on March 22, 2018. The
    juvenile court heard arguments regarding disposition and took
    the matter under advisement. On March 27, the juvenile court
    filed an order in which it stated that it had reviewed the case
    procedural history and noted that Maximus had entered a
    “no contest plea” to the allegations in the amended petition.
    The court noted that although Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-279.01(3)
    (Reissue 2016) allowed the court in an abuse or neglect case
    to “accept an in-court admission, an answer of no contest, or a
    denial from any parent, custodian, or guardian,” § 43-279 did
    not allow an alleged juvenile violator to enter a no contest plea.
    The court noted that § 43-279 limited the juvenile violator to
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    IN RE INTEREST OF MAXIMUS B.
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    302 Neb. 365
    an admission or denial. See § 43-279(1) and (2). The court
    therefore vacated the January 25 adjudicatory finding and
    order. As a result of its ruling which vacated the previous order
    of adjudication, the court stated that the disposition hearing
    was moot, and it set a date for a formal pretrial hearing.
    The State appeals the March 27, 2018, order which vacated
    the January 25 adjudication order.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    The State claims, consolidated and restated, that the juve-
    nile court erred when it determined that a plea of no contest
    is not permitted under § 43-279 and vacated the order of
    adjudication.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] Determination of a jurisdictional issue which does not
    involve a factual dispute is a matter of law which requires
    an appellate court to reach its conclusions independent from
    a trial court. Sandoval v. Ricketts, ante p. 138, 
    922 N.W.2d 222
    (2019).
    ANALYSIS
    [2] In a juvenile case, as in any other appeal, before reach-
    ing the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an
    appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the
    matter before it. In re Interest of Paxton H., 
    300 Neb. 446
    , 
    915 N.W.2d 45
    (2018). We conclude that the March 27, 2018, order
    from which this case arises is not a final order appealable by
    the State, and we therefore dismiss this appeal.
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.01 (Reissue 2016), which gov-
    erns appellate jurisdiction for orders of the juvenile courts, is
    applicable to this case. Section 43-2,106.01(1) provides in part
    that “[a]ny final order or judgment entered by a juvenile court
    may be appealed to the Court of Appeals in the same manner
    as an appeal from district court to the Court of Appeals.” And
    § 43-2,106.01(2) provides that “[a]n appeal may be taken by
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    . . . (d) The county attorney or petitioner, except that in any
    case determining delinquency issues in which the juvenile has
    been placed legally in jeopardy, an appeal of such issues may
    only be taken by exception proceedings pursuant to sections
    29-2317 to 29-2319.” Reading these subsections together, it is
    clear that whether the State seeks appellate review by appeal—
    as in this case—or by exception proceedings, the order or
    judgment must be final as required under the introductory
    language of § 43-2,106.01(1). We therefore consider whether
    the juvenile court’s order which vacated its earlier order was a
    final order that was appealable by the State, and we need not
    consider whether the appropriate path was by appeal or excep-
    tion proceedings.
    [3,4] Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2016), the
    three types of final orders which may be reviewed on appeal
    are (1) an order which affects a substantial right and which
    determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order
    affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding,
    and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on sum-
    mary application in an action after judgment is rendered. In re
    Interest of Zachary B., 
    299 Neb. 187
    , 
    907 N.W.2d 311
    (2018).
    Neither the first nor third category applies here, and therefore,
    we examine whether under the second category, the juvenile
    court’s order is an order affecting a substantial right made dur-
    ing a special proceeding. A proceeding before a juvenile court
    is a “special proceeding” for appellate purposes, see 
    id., and therefore,
    in order to determine whether the March 27, 2018,
    order is a final order, we must determine whether the order
    affected a substantial right of the State.
    [5,6] Numerous factors determine when an order affects a
    substantial right for purposes of appeal. In re Interest of Noah
    B. et al., 
    295 Neb. 764
    , 
    891 N.W.2d 109
    (2017). Broadly,
    these factors relate to the importance of the right and the
    importance of the effect on the right by the order at issue. 
    Id. It is
    not enough that the right itself be substantial; the effect
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    IN RE INTEREST OF MAXIMUS B.
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    of the order on that right must also be substantial. 
    Id. Whether the
    effect of an order is substantial depends on whether it
    affects with finality the rights of the parties in the subject
    matter. 
    Id. [7] We
    have recognized that the substantial right of the State
    in a juvenile proceeding is derived from its parens patriae
    interest and that the State has a right to protect the welfare
    of its resident children. See 
    id. So, the
    inquiry in the present
    case is whether the March 27, 2018, order substantially dimin-
    ished the right of the State to pursue its obligations regard-
    ing Maximus.
    We recently considered appealability in In re Interest of
    Noah B. et 
    al., supra
    . In that case, the State sought to appeal an
    order in which the juvenile court had dismissed a supplemental
    petition seeking adjudication under § 43-247(3)(a) based on
    allegations that a parent had subjected his children to sexual
    abuse. We determined that the order affected a substantial right
    of the State and was a final, appealable order, because the
    “order dismissed the supplemental petition in its entirety with
    no leave to amend, thus foreclosing the State from pursuing
    adjudication and disposition on grounds of sexual abuse, and
    preventing the State from seeking to protect the children from
    such abuse.” In re Interest of Noah B. et 
    al., 295 Neb. at 775
    ,
    891 N.W.2d at 119-20.
    By contrast, the March 27, 2018, order in this case vacated
    the prior order of adjudication, but it did not dismiss the
    operative petition for adjudication, and instead, it set a date
    for further proceedings in the case. In the instant matter, the
    terms of the March 27 order did not foreclose the State from
    pursuing adjudication and disposition based on the allegations
    regarding Maximus, and consequently, it did not affect with
    finality the rights of the State.
    CONCLUSION
    We conclude that the juvenile court’s order vacating its
    previous order of adjudication and setting a date for further
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    IN RE INTEREST OF MAXIMUS B.
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    proceedings in the case was not a final order appealable
    by the State. We therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of
    jurisdiction.
    A ppeal dismissed.
    Freudenberg, J., concurring.
    I write separately only to note concern regarding a juvenile
    court’s acceptance of a nolo contendere or no contest plea in
    certain proceedings. Statutorily, there are limited responses
    available to juveniles after petitions are filed in juvenile court
    alleging violations under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(1), (2),
    (3)(b), or (4) (Reissue 2016). Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-279(1)
    (Reissue 2016) allows a juvenile to enter an admission to
    all or part of the allegations made in the petition. Section
    43-279(2) sets forth the juvenile court procedures when juve-
    niles deny the allegations contained in the petition or stand
    mute. However, the Legislature has not established the option
    for a juvenile to enter a nolo contendere or no contest
    response under this statute. This statutory absence is further
    highlighted by the Legislature’s decision in Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 43-279.01 (Reissue 2016) to make no contest pleas avail-
    able to parents, custodians, or guardians in § 43-247(3)(a) and
    (6) proceedings.
    While such issue is not reached in the majority opinion,
    I felt it important to highlight the relevant statutory lan-
    guage which would have been considered had the issue been
    reached.