Mitchell v. City of Cedar Rapids , 926 N.W.2d 222 ( 2019 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 18–0124
Filed April 5, 2019
JERIME ERON MITCHELL and BRACKEN ANN MITCHELL,
Appellees,
vs.
CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS, IOWA, and OFFICER LUCAS JONES,
Individually and in His Official Capacity,
Appellants.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Patrick R.
Grady, Judge.
Defendants in civil action arising from police shooting appeal
discovery rulings denying protective order for police investigative reports.
AFFIRMED.
Wilford H. Stone and Gregory T. Usher of Lynch Dallas, P.C.,
Cedar Rapids, and Elizabeth D. Jacobi, City Attorney’s Office,
Cedar Rapids, for appellants.
Laura M. Schultes, Pressley Henningsen, and Emily Anderson of
RSH Legal, P.C., Cedar Rapids, and Larry R. Rogers Jr. of Powers, Rogers
& Smith, LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for appellees.
2
WATERMAN, Justice.
In this interlocutory appeal, we revisit the interplay between our
civil discovery rules and a confidentiality provision in the state Freedom
of Information Act, Iowa Code section 22.7(5) (2018), to determine
whether the district court abused its discretion by compelling the
defendants to produce police investigative reports without a protective
order preventing disclosure to the public. This tort action arises out of a
late-night traffic stop. A Caucasian police officer fired gunshots while
struggling with an African-American motorist. The gunshot wounds
rendered the motorist a quadriplegic. The police department released the
dash cam video of the incident to the public. The video went viral on
social media, 1 and the shooting attracted intense media attention. A
year earlier, the same officer had fatally shot another man, a Caucasian,
fleeing a traffic stop. No criminal charges were filed in either incident.
The plaintiffs, the injured motorist and his wife, sued the police
officer and the City for compensatory and punitive damages. The
plaintiffs sought discovery of the police investigative reports, which the
defendants offered to produce subject to a protective order prohibiting
disclosure to the media or other nonparties. The district court, noting
the police investigation had been completed and involved no confidential
informants, denied the motion for protective order but limited the order
compelling production to reports prepared within ninety-six hours of the
incident, excluding police internal review records. We granted the
defendants’ application for interlocutory appeal.
1The dash cam video on one website alone was viewed over 832,000 times.
PoliceActivity, Police Dashcam Video in Shooting that Paralyzed Jerime Mitchell, YouTube
(Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fexMzfomUok.
3
On our review, we affirm. Litigants suing the government
ordinarily may obtain relevant records through discovery
notwithstanding confidentiality provisions in Iowa Code section 22.7, but
a protective order may be required precluding disclosure to nonparties.
Police investigative reports do not lose their confidential status when the
investigation closes. But section 22.7(5) includes an exemption from
confidentiality for basic facts about the incident, subject to a legislatively
prescribed balancing test. Our precedent also uses a balancing test.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the requested
protective order. The district court balanced the competing interests in
confidentiality and transparency through its ninety-six-hour time limit, a
carve-out for police internal review records, and directives to handle
remaining confidentiality issues by redaction or further proceedings.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On November 1, 2016, Police Officer Lucas Jones was on night
shift patrol for the Cedar Rapids Police Department. At 1:17 a.m., he
saw a truck driving with a broken rear license plate light. 2 Officer Jones
pulled the truck over, approached on foot, and asked the driver for his
license and registration. The driver, Jerime Mitchell, complied. Officer
Jones and Mitchell dispute what happened over the next two minutes.3
Mitchell got out of the truck and resisted Officer Jones’s efforts to
handcuff him. The two men wrestled to the ground. Officer Jones’s
police dog, Bane, joined the fray. Mitchell forced his way up and back
2“A citation issued for failure to have . . . a rear registration plate light . . . shall
first provide for a seventy-two hour period within which the person charged with the
violation shall replace or repair the . . . light.” Iowa Code § 321.385A(1)(b). If the light
is replaced within the time period, the citation is expunged. Id. § 321.385A(2).
3The microphone Officer Jones wore on his uniform was not functioning during
the traffic stop, and the only audio from the incident was recorded by the microphone in
the squad car.
4
into his driver’s seat and began driving off with Officer Jones clinging to
the open door. Officer Jones unholstered his handgun and fired three
shots before jumping or falling off the moving truck. A bullet wound
near Mitchell’s cervical spine left him paralyzed from the neck down.
The incident received widespread media coverage and intense
public interest. 4 Protesters marched on city hall demanding the release
of the squad car’s dash camera footage, which the City released to the
public. The Linn County Attorney convened a grand jury to review the
incident, but no criminal charges were filed against Officer Jones or
Mitchell.
In February 2017, Mitchell and his spouse, Bracken, filed this civil
action against Officer Jones individually and the City of Cedar Rapids
alleging negligence, assault and battery, intentional infliction of
emotional distress and seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
4Kevin Barry, Special Report: What’s Different One Year After Jerime Mitchell Was
Shot, CBS2/FOX28 (Nov. 1, 2017), https://cbs2iowa.com/news/local/special-report-
whats-different-one-year-after-jerime-mitchell-was-shot [https://perma.cc/3EXH-
VXHC]; Sarah Boden, Cedar Rapids Police Officer Won’t Be Indicted, Some Say Grand
Jury Should Have Been Postponed, Iowa Pub. Radio (Dec. 7, 2016),
https://www.iowapublicradio.org/post/cedar-rapids-police-officer-wont-be-indicted-
some-say-grand-jury-should-have-been-postponed#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/WX79-
T2EW]; Enjoli Francis, Questions Linger After Dash-Cam Video of Man Being Shot by
Cedar Rapids Police During Traffic Stop Is Released, ABC News (Dec. 9, 2016),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/questions-linger-dashcam-video-man-shot-cedar/story?id
=44087880 [https://perma.cc/ZA7H-NHYH]; Michael Howell, Jerime Mitchell Refutes
Officer’s Account of Nov. Altercation, CBS2 Iowa (Dec. 8, 2016),
https://cbs2iowa.com/news/local/jerime-mitchell-refutes-officers-account-of-nov-
altercation [https://perma.cc/L25P-PGZ6]; No Charges Against White Iowa Police Officer
Who Paralyzed Black Man in Shooting, CBS News (Dec. 6, 2016),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/no-charges-for-lucas-jones-white-iowa-police-officer-
who-paralyzed-jerime-mitchell-in-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/QCC7-5D3X]; Staff
Editorial, Justice Talks Need Maximum Openness, The Gazette (Oct. 28, 2017),
https://www.thegazette.com/subject/opinion/staff-editorial/justice-talks-need-
maximum-openness-20171028 [https//perma.cc/F337-KFKR]; Makayla Tendall, Talks
Continue on Community Policing, Racial Profiling in Cedar Rapids, The Gazette (Dec. 14,
2017), https://www.thegazette.com/subject/news/government/talks-continue-on-
community-policing-racial-profiling-in-cedar-rapids-20171214 [https://perma.cc/
N2QN-PJ9K].
5
The Mitchells allege that the City is vicariously liable for Officer Jones’s
actions. The defendants filed separate answers denying liability. The
parties proceeded with discovery.
The Mitchells requested the law enforcement investigative reports
for the November 2016 shooting, as well as for an October 20, 2015
officer-involved shooting. During the 2015 incident, Officer Jones
responded to another officer’s call to assist with a traffic stop and search
of Jonathan Gossman, a Caucasian. Gossman fled on foot. Officer
Jones released Bane. The police dog sunk his teeth into Gossman’s arm
and brought him to the ground. According to Officer Jones, Gossman
was holding a black handgun pointed at another officer and Bane.
Officer Jones fired sixteen rounds at Gossman, who died from gunshot
wounds. The Linn County Attorney and the Iowa Department of
Criminal Investigation reviewed the incident, and Officer Jones was not
charged with any crime.
The defendants produced in Mitchell’s civil action the police
department’s training, policy, and operational manuals without a
protective order. They also agreed to produce the requested reports to
the Mitchells subject to their proposed protective order modeled after the
stipulated protective order entered early in the case in a federal lawsuit
arising from another highly publicized police shooting. See Steele v. City
of Burlington, 334 F. Supp. 3d 972, 975 (S.D. Iowa 2018). The Mitchells
offered to stipulate to a narrower protective order requiring redaction of
witness names, addresses, dates of birth, and social security numbers.
The parties failed to agree on the terms of a protective order. In July
2017, Officer Jones and the City filed a motion for a protective order
under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.504. The defendants sought to
prevent public disclosure of confidential documents including the police
6
investigative reports. See Iowa Code § 22.7(5). The Mitchells filed a
resistance, arguing that the protective order proposed by the defendants
would permit them to determine unilaterally which documents are
confidential and require the Mitchells to challenge the confidentiality of
each document requested.
After a hearing, the district court ordered the City and Officer
Jones to produce
any requested law enforcement investigative reports,
including electronic recordings or telephone communications
generated by or in the possession of a defendant or a police
officer acting in the scope of his or her duties that were
compiled as a result of the reporter’s own observation or
investigation, including interviews or conversations with law
enforcement at the scene of the incident that resulted in the
injuries to Plaintiff Jerime Mitchell or lay witnesses to that
event. The order covers any investigative reports or
electronic communication generated or filed within 96 hours
of the incident, but does not apply to reports or
memorandum generated solely for purposes of a police
internal review of the incident.
The court relied on the three-part balancing test in Hawk Eye v. Jackson,
521 N.W.2d 750, 753 (Iowa 1994), to determine that the reports should
be disclosed under Iowa Code sections 22.7 and 622.11. The district
court did not compel the production of the personnel records, medical
records, the internal police investigation records, or other documents.
Instead, the court directed the parties to attempt to reach an agreement
as to those records. If the negotiations were unsuccessful, the court
would resolve the dispute.
The defendants filed a motion to reconsider the ruling in light of
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Iowa, Inc. v. Records
Custodian, Atlantic Community School District, 818 N.W.2d 231 (Iowa
2012), in which we held that a balancing test was unnecessary when “the
plain language of the statute supports the exemption.” Id. at 236. The
7
district court denied the motion, determining that Atlantic Community
School District was limited to its facts. The district court further stated,
The Court concludes there is some ambiguity in
§ 22.7(5). The Court construes the statute as providing that
peace officers’ investigative reports, privileged records or
information specified in Iowa Code § 80G.2 are to be kept
confidential, but then goes on to set forth its own sort of
“balancing test” language to certain information. The section
creates its own exception to confidentiality, by stating that
“the date, time, specific location, and immediate facts and
circumstances surrounding a crime or incident shall not be
kept confidential under this section, except in those unusual
circumstances where disclosure would plainly and seriously
jeopardize an investigation or pose a clear and present
danger to the safety of an individual.” Iowa Code § 22.7(5)
(2017). In this case, there is no apparent ongoing
investigation with respect to the records at issue, and there
has been no allegation that any individual’s safety will be
impaired as a result of disclosure of the records. The Court
finds that the temporal limits of its order allows disclosure of
what the Court finds [to be] documents concerning,
“immediate facts and circumstances surrounding a crime or
incident.”
Officer Jones and the City filed an application for interlocutory
appeal, which we granted. We retained the appeal.
II. Scope of Review.
We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s discovery
ruling on a motion for protective order. Sioux Pharm, Inc. v. Eagle Labs.,
Inc., 865 N.W.2d 528, 535–36 (Iowa 2015). “A district court abuses its
discretion ‘when the grounds underlying . . . [the] order are clearly
untenable or unreasonable.’ ” Id. at 535 (quoting Mediacom Iowa, L.L.C.
v. Inc. City of Spencer, 682 N.W.2d 62, 66 (Iowa 2004)). “A ruling based
on an erroneous interpretation of a discovery rule can constitute an
abuse of discretion.” Mediacom, 682 N.W.2d at 66 (quoting Shook v. City
of Davenport, 497 N.W.2d 883, 885 (Iowa 1993), abrogated on other
grounds by Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Am. Indus. Refrigeration, Inc., 690 N.W.2d
38, 44–48 (Iowa 2004)).
8
“We review the district court’s interpretation of chapter 22 for
correction of errors at law.” Iowa Film Prod. Servs. v. Iowa Dep’t of Econ.
Dev., 818 N.W.2d 207, 217 (Iowa 2012).
III. Analysis.
We must determine whether the district court abused its discretion
by denying the defendants’ motion for a protective order. The defendants
agreed to produce the reports to the Mitchells for use in this lawsuit
subject to a protective order preventing them from disseminating the
reports to the media or other nonparties. The defendants argue that the
reports at issue are confidential within the meaning of Iowa Code section
22.7(5) and that they established good cause for a protective order. The
Mitchells contend the reports are not confidential and the defendants
failed to meet their burden to show good cause for a protective order in
light of the high public interest in this officer-involved shooting. We are
mindful that “[p]eople in an open society do not demand infallibility from
their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are
prohibited from observing.” Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555, 572, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2825 (1980).
We begin our analysis with the interplay between our discovery
rules and Iowa Code chapter 22 governing access to public records.
Because litigants’ access to confidential records may be subject to a
protective order, we must decide whether the records at issue are
confidential. We set forth an overview of chapter 22 to provide context
before we interpret section 22.7(5), the specific exemption applying to
police investigative reports. Finally, we address whether the district
court properly balanced the competing goals of confidentiality and
transparency in denying defendants’ motion for a protective order for the
police reports.
9
A. The Interplay Between Iowa’s Open Records Act and the
Discovery Rules. “[T]he philosophy underlying our discovery rules is
that ‘litigants are entitled to every person’s evidence, and the law favors
full access to relevant information.’ ” Mediacom, 682 N.W.2d at 66
(quoting State ex rel. Miller v. Nat’l Dietary Research, Inc., 454 N.W.2d
820, 822–23 (Iowa 1990)). For that reason, “the district court should
liberally construe our discovery rules.” Id. “Upon motion by a party . . .
and for good cause shown,” however, a court may enter a protective order
“to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.504(1).
The Mitchells sought the police investigative reports under the
discovery rules as litigants suing Officer Jones and his employer, the City
of Cedar Rapids. We have previously addressed the tension between our
discovery rules and the confidentiality provisions in Iowa Code section
22.7. In Mediacom, we observed, “Iowa Code chapter 22 pertains to
parties seeking access to government documents and ordinarily has no
application to discovery of such information in litigation.” 682 N.W.2d at
69. Iowa Code section 22.7 does not create a “true privilege against
discovery of . . . confidential information.” See id. at 66. “[T]here is
nothing in section 22.7 that suggests the legislature intended to limit the
discovery rights of litigants in cases involving governmental entities.” Id.
at 69. “To the contrary, section 22.7 indicates the opposite because it
allows disclosure upon a court order.” Id. “[S]ection 22.7 does not
trump our discovery rules.” Id. Nevertheless, the confidentiality the
legislature prescribed for certain government records can be safeguarded
through a protective order allowing the litigants use of the records in the
lawsuit while preventing disclosure to the public. See id. at 67 (noting
10
“rule 1.504, regarding protective orders, comes into play” to shield
confidential information from disclosure to nonparties). 5
B. An Overview of Iowa’s Freedom of Information Act. Iowa
Code chapter 22, the Open Records Act, is also known as the Iowa
Freedom of Information Act. City of Riverdale v. Diercks, 806 N.W.2d
643, 645 (Iowa 2011). “The general assembly made the decision to open
Iowa’s public records.” Atlantic Cmty. Sch. Dist., 818 N.W.2d at 232.
“The Act essentially gives all persons the right to examine public records
. . . [but] then lists specific categories of records that must be kept
confidential . . . .” Id. at 233. “The general assembly [thereby] created
and fixed the limitations on disclosure.” Id. at 232.
“The purpose of [chapter 22] is ‘to open the doors of government to
public scrutiny [and] to prevent government from secreting its decision-
making activities from the public, on whose behalf it is its duty to act.’ ”
Diercks, 806 N.W.2d at 652 (alteration in original) (quoting Rathmann v.
Bd. of Dirs., 580 N.W.2d 773, 777 (Iowa 1998)). “There is a presumption
in favor of disclosure” and “a liberal policy in favor of access to public
records.” Hall v. Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 811 N.W.2d 478, 485 (Iowa
2012). “Disclosure is the rule, and one seeking the protection of one of
the statute’s exemptions bears the burden of demonstrating the
5Federal authorities likewise recognize that statutory confidentiality provisions
do not generally create privileges against civil discovery but may warrant judicial
protective orders to prevent public disclosure of confidential information produced to a
litigant. See, e.g., Laxalt v. McClatchy, 809 F.2d 885, 889–91 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (vacating
order denying production of FBI investigative files and remanding for consideration of
protective order); Cienfuegos v. Office of the Architect of the Capitol, 34 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2
(D.D.C. 2014) (holding that statutory confidentiality for congressional employee dispute
resolution procedures “does not give rise to an evidentiary privilege[,]” and “permit[ting]
disclosure subject to a protective order”); see also People ex rel. Birkett v. City of
Chicago, 705 N.E.2d 48, 51–52 (Ill. 1998) (surveying federal cases declining to equate
FOIA exemptions with discovery privileges while noting “there are safeguards inherent
in the discovery process, such as the use of protective orders, which serve to shield the
government’s interest in maintaining confidentiality”).
11
exemption’s applicability.” Diercks, 806 N.W.2d at 652 (quoting Clymer
v. City of Cedar Rapids, 601 N.W.2d 42, 45 (Iowa 1999)).
Iowa Code section 22.7 currently has seventy-three enumerated
exemptions from the disclosure requirements. “Although we should not
thwart legislative intent, the specific exemptions contained in freedom of
information statutes are to be construed narrowly.” Iowa Film Prod.
Servs., 818 N.W.2d at 219 (quoting Hall, 811 N.W.2d at 485). “We have
also stated, however, that ‘where the legislature has used broadly
inclusive language in the exception, we do not mechanically apply the
narrow-construction rule.’ ” Atlantic Cmty. Sch. Dist., 818 N.W.2d at 233
(quoting DeLaMater v. Marion Civil Serv. Comm’n, 554 N.W.2d 875, 878
(Iowa 1996)). Against that backdrop, we turn to Iowa Code section
22.7(5).
C. The Protection Afforded Police Investigative Reports Under
Iowa Code Section 22.7(5). Neither the district court nor our court has
had the opportunity to review in camera the police reports at issue. The
documents at the heart of this appeal are not in the court record. We
proceed categorically by addressing the interpretation of the operative
statutory language.
The defendants rely on section 22.7(5) together with section
622.11, which provides, “A public officer cannot be examined as to
communications made to the public officer in official confidence, when
the public interests would suffer by the disclosure.” Iowa Code § 622.11;
see id. § 22.7(5). Although we have held other privileges codified in
chapter 622 are testimonial only, 6 “the privilege [in section 622.11] may
6See, e.g., Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 355 (Iowa
1986) (“The physician–patient rule provided in section 622.10 is an evidentiary rule
rather than a substantive right.”).
12
be invoked at any stage of proceedings where confidential
communications would otherwise be disclosed.” State ex rel. Shanahan
v. Iowa Dist. Court, 356 N.W.2d 523, 528 (Iowa 1984). Taken together
Iowa Code section 22.7(5) and section 622.11 provide “assurance to all
persons upon whom law enforcement officials rely that ‘official
confidentiality attends their conversations and may protect from public
access the officers’ reports of what they have said.’ ” Hawk Eye, 521
N.W.2d at 753 (quoting Shanahan, 356 N.W.2d at 528). “The privilege
cloaking these communications, however, is qualified, not absolute.” Id.
The Mitchells argue that police investigative reports that may be
confidential during an “ongoing investigation” lose that status when the
investigation is closed. The defendants contend otherwise. To decide
this question, we begin with the text of the exemption. Section 22.7
provides,
The following public records shall be kept confidential,
unless otherwise ordered by a court, by the lawful custodian
of the records, or by another person duly authorized to
release such information:
....
5. Peace officers’ investigative reports, privileged
records or information specified in section 80G.2, and
specific portions of electronic mail and telephone billing
records of law enforcement agencies if that information is
part of an ongoing investigation, except where disclosure is
authorized elsewhere in this Code. 7 However, the date, time,
specific location, and immediate facts and circumstances
surrounding a crime or incident shall not be kept
confidential under this section, except in those unusual
circumstances where disclosure would plainly and seriously
7Other provisions of the Iowa Code govern certain types of reports made to law
enforcement. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 321.271 (discussing confidentiality of motor vehicle
accident reports and access to those reports by the drivers and their attorneys); see also
Shannon by Shannon v. Hansen, 469 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Iowa 1991) (discussing interplay
among Iowa Code sections 22.7(5), 321.271, and 622.11 and affirming discovery order
in civil dramshop action allowing disclosure of witness statements taken during motor
vehicle accident investigation).
13
jeopardize an investigation or pose a clear and present
danger to the safety of an individual. Specific portions of
electronic mail and telephone billing records may only be
kept confidential under this subsection if the length of time
prescribed for commencement of prosecution or the finding
of an indictment or information under the statute of
limitations applicable to the crime that is under investigation
has not expired.
Iowa Code § 22.7(5).
The Mitchells argue the term “ongoing investigation” in the first
sentence of section 22.7(5) modifies “investigative reports” such that the
report’s confidential status ends when the police investigation closes.
The defendants argue investigative reports remain confidential at all
times and the term “ongoing investigation” refers only to email and phone
records. The legislative history is instructive.
Section 22.7(5) was most recently amended in 2017 to add the
language, “privileged records or information specified in section 80G.2,” a
phrase separated by commas from other language in the first sentence.
2017 Iowa Acts ch. 122, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 22.7(5) (2018)). The
same bill enacted Iowa Code chapter 80G effective July 1, 2017. Id.
§§ 3–6 (codified at Iowa Code §§ 80G.1–.4). 8
The 2006 amendment to Iowa Code section 22.7(5) sheds more
light. 2006 Iowa Acts ch. 1122, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 22.7(5)
(2007)). 9 The 2006 amendment added this language to the first
sentence: “and specific portions of electronic mail and telephone billing
8Iowa Code section 80G.2 enumerates certain matters that a police officer may
not be compelled to disclose when testifying in a criminal proceeding, such as personal
identifying information of the officer or the officer’s family or the identity of a
confidential informant. Section 80G.2 provides for a balancing of interests if a criminal
defendant argues nondisclosure of this information would hinder his or her ability to
present a defense. Id. § 80G.2(2). The defendants are not relying on chapter 80G in
this appeal.
9Anearlier bill amending section 22.7(5) placed the same language about
electronic mail and telephone billing records in a separate subsection 22.7(5A). See
H.F. 2316, 81 G.A., 2d Sess. § 1 (Iowa 2006) (withdrawn).
14
records of law enforcement agencies if that information is part of an
ongoing investigation.” Id. Again, as with the phrase added in 2017, the
language added to the first sentence in 2006 is separated by a comma
from the preceding language about police investigative reports. Id. The
2006 amendment also added the final sentence of section 22.7(5) timing
out the confidentiality of email and phone records upon the expiration of
the statute of limitations. Id. The final sentence only addresses email
and phone records and does not mention police investigative reports—
another indication that email and phone records are treated differently
than police investigative reports. See id.
Defendants rely on this legislative history and on a canon of
construction, the “last preceding antecedent.”
Under the doctrine of last preceding antecedent,
qualifying words and phrases refer only to the immediately
preceding antecedent, unless a contrary legislative intent
appears. Evidence of a contrary legislative intent can arise
when a comma separates the qualifying phrase from the
antecedent. In this circumstance, the qualifying phrase
generally applies to all antecedents.
Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v.
Shell Oil Co., 606 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Iowa 2000) (citations omitted); see
also Bearinger v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 844 N.W.2d 104, 109 (Iowa
2014); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 144–46 (2012) (discussing last antecedent
canon). A clear indication of legislative intent can override this canon.
Shell Oil Co., 606 N.W.2d at 380.
We agree with the defendants that the legislative history of Iowa
Code section 22.7(5) (2018) and the last antecedent canon taken together
indicate that “ongoing investigation” in the first sentence refers to email
and phone records, not “police investigative reports.” The placement of
15
commas supports our conclusion. The 2006 amendment added
language with no comma separating the phrase about email and phone
records from the limiting term “ongoing investigation” while a comma
sets off the preceding language, including “police investigative reports.”
The last sentence reinforces our conclusion. If police investigative
reports were in the same category as email and phone records, with
confidentiality requiring an open investigation and ending with the
expiration of the statute of limitations, we would see “police investigative
reports” included in the last sentence. We hold that police investigative
reports do not lose their confidential status under section 22.7(5) when
the investigation closes.
Our resolution of this interpretive issue does not end our analysis.
In denying the defendants’ motion for protective order, the district court
relied on the second sentence of section 22.7(5):
[T]he date, time, specific location, and immediate facts and
circumstances surrounding a crime or incident shall not be
kept confidential under this section, except in those unusual
circumstances where disclosure would plainly and seriously
jeopardize an investigation or pose a clear and present
danger to the safety of an individual.
Iowa Code § 22.7(5). The district court applied the balancing test we
used in Hawk Eye to adjudicate confidentiality claims based on both
section 22.7(5) and section 622.11. We must decide whether Hawk Eye
or Atlantic Community School District governs this dispute over access to
the police investigative reports.
1. Which case applies—Hawk Eye or Atlantic Community School
District? In Hawk Eye, a case involving a similar controversy, a
Burlington newspaper reporter “wrote a series of articles aimed at local
reaction to the highly publicized beating of Rodney King by Los Angeles
police officers.” 521 N.W.2d at 751. The reporter learned of a civil suit
16
against a Burlington police officer. Id. The reporter approached the
police chief and asked for comment. Id. The chief was unaware of the
allegations and immediately requested an independent investigation by
the Iowa Department of Criminal Investigations (DCI) “to determine
whether [the officer] had engaged in criminal conduct or had violated
departmental rules and regulations.” Id. at 751–52. The DCI
investigated and provided a confidential report to the county attorney
and police chief. The chief concluded the officer had not breached any
department rules or regulations, and the county attorney concluded
there was not enough evidence to prosecute the officer for assault. Id. at
752.
The publisher of the newspaper requested a copy of the DCI report
from the county attorney, who refused. Id. The newspaper sought a writ
of mandamus to compel release of the report. Id. Meanwhile, the tort
case against the officer went to trial. Id. The same witnesses interviewed
by the DCI investigator also testified at the jury trial. Id. The jury
returned a verdict for damages against the officer and the city. Id. The
city later settled a second lawsuit alleging excessive force against the
same officer over a separate incident. Id.
The newspaper argued the public interest required disclosure of
the DCI report to evaluate a possible cover-up by the officials who had
declined to prosecute or discipline the officer. Id. The county attorney
argued disclosure would impede future investigations. Id. The district
court ordered disclosure of the DCI report with some redactions of
criminal history. Id.
On appeal, the county attorney argued that the report was
confidential under Iowa Code section 22.7(5) and section 622.11. Id. We
stated, “An official claiming the privilege must satisfy a three-part test:
17
(1) a public officer is being examined, (2) the communication was made
in official confidence, and (3) the public interest would suffer by
disclosure.” Id. at 753; see also Shanahan, 356 N.W.2d at 527–31
(adopting this “sensitive weighing process,” the same three-part test,
under a prior version of section 22.7(5) and section 622.11 to determine
that litigants were not entitled to DCI files for two unsolved homicides).
Hawk Eye addressed the same arguments the defendants make
today—that public disclosure of the investigative reports would have a
chilling effect on police investigations.
Determining where the line falls between public harm and
public good requires weighing the relative merits of the
interests at stake. We have long recognized that
confidentiality encourages persons to come forward with
information, whether substantiated or not, that might be
used to solve crimes and deter criminal activity. Secrecy is
especially vital where reports are based on confidential
informants, persons indispensable to successful police work
but who frequently fear intimidation and reprisal.
Furthermore, nondisclosure permits law enforcement
officials the necessary privacy to discuss findings and
theories about cases under investigation.
Hawk Eye, 521 N.W.2d at 753 (citations omitted). But we continued by
noting “[o]ther case-specific factors, such as the nature of the
investigation and whether it is completed or ongoing, may tip the balance
in favor of public disclosure.” Id.
In affirming the order compelling release of the DCI report in 1994,
we noted factors also present in today’s case: the absence of any
confidential informants or “named but innocent suspects,” or any
ongoing police investigation, and the presence of a heightened public
interest in police use of force. See id. at 753–54. We stated, “There can
be little doubt that allegations of leniency or cover-up with respect to the
disciplining of those sworn to enforce the law are matters of great public
18
concern.” Id. at 754. We concluded based on the factual record that
“any public harm created by the disclosure of the DCI investigatory
report is far outweighed by the public harm accruing from its
nondisclosure.” Id. The Mitchells urge us to make the same
determination here.
The defendants contend the Hawk Eye balancing test has been
superseded by Atlantic Community School District. See 818 N.W.2d 235–
36. In Atlantic Community School District, we clarified our approach to
section 22.7’s exemptions.
[T]he courts will usually first examine the specific statutory
provision involved to see if the statute delineates exactly
what types of records or other information are considered
private and thus subject to the public disclosure exemption.
If, however, the particular record, report, or other
information sought to be disclosed is not specifically listed
. . . the courts most often will apply general privacy
principles, which examination involves a balancing of
conflicting interests—the interest of the individual in privacy
on the one hand against the interest of the public’s need to
know on the other.
Id. at 234 (quoting DeLaMater, 554 N.W.2d at 879). We elaborated that if
“by looking at the language of the statute, our prior caselaw, and caselaw
from other states” we determine the information requested fits into the
categorical exemption of Iowa Code section 22.7(11), “then our inquiry
ends. If it does not, we will then apply the balancing test under our
present analytical framework.” Id. at 235.
In Atlantic Community School District, the ACLU sought records
relating to the identities and specific disciplinary consequences of two
school employees who had conducted a strip search of five female high
school students after a theft. Id. at 232. The school district named the
employees but refused to disclose the discipline imposed, arguing it was
confidential and exempt from disclosure under section 22.7(11), which
19
protects “[p]ersonal information in confidential personnel records.” Id. at
233 (emphasis added) (quoting Iowa Code § 22.7(11) (2009)). The ACLU
made an open records request under chapter 22 and then sought an
injunction ordering the district to comply with the request. Id. at 232.
We concluded that the employee disciplinary information was
confidential under section 22.7(11). Id. at 236. Noting that numerous
cases have upheld the confidentiality of performance evaluations in
personnel files, we determined that using a balancing test would
undermine the legislature’s intent in categorically removing these
documents from public view. Id. at 235–36.
We can easily harmonize Hawk Eye and Atlantic Community School
District. Atlantic Community School District controls when the records at
issue fall within a categorical exemption in section 22.7, such as the
“confidential personnel records” in section 22.7(11). See id. No
balancing of interests is necessary for such an exemption. Id. at 236.
The legislature has performed its own balancing and made the policy
choice to protect such records categorically. Atlantic Community School
District did not overrule or even cite Hawk Eye, which remains good law
for disputes over access to police investigative reports under section
22.7(5), a provision with its own legislatively prescribed balancing test in
the second sentence.
We conclude that the legislature has acquiesced in our
interpretation of section 22.7(5). We first used the three-part balancing
test thirty-five years ago in Shanahan, 356 N.W.2d at 527, and then
again in 1994 in Hawk Eye, 521 N.W.2d at 753. We have not retreated
from that approach in any subsequent case applying Iowa Code section
22.7(5). The legislature has twice amended section 22.7(5) since
Hawk Eye. Neither amendment overruled Hawk Eye’s balancing test for
20
police investigative reports involving no confidential informant. See
Ackelson v. Manley Toy Direct, L.L.C., 832 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Iowa 2013)
(discussing the doctrine of legislative acquiescence). We hold that
Hawk Eye remains the controlling precedent for disputes over access to
police investigative reports.
2. Application of the Hawk Eye balancing test in this case. We
conclude the district court properly applied Hawk Eye. In both cases,
the police investigation had been completed without any confidential
informant or unidentified suspect. In both cases, one officer injured or
killed a civilian in separate incidents. Then and now, the dispute arose
against the backdrop of a national debate over the use of force by police
on unarmed African-Americans—Rodney King in 1991 and Michael
Brown in 2014. The defendants in both cases advanced cogent
arguments that disclosure of the police investigatory reports would
impede future investigations. Then and now, on balance, the public
interest favors disclosure.
The record in this case is devoid of evidence that disclosure would
harm any specific individual. More generally, the district court noted,
To the extent that law enforcement officer communications
with other officers might initially be made in confidence,
there is still an expectation that the communicating officer
might be expected to testify in a public proceeding especially
if it involves something the officer personally witnessed.
The same can be said of civilian witnesses.
The defendants contend they have already provided the “date, time,
specific location and immediate facts and circumstances surrounding”
the incident. In our view, the district court acted within its discretion
under Hawk Eye, consistent with the second sentence of Iowa Code
section 22.7(5), by limiting the order compelling disclosure to
21
“investigative reports or electronic communications generated or filed
within 96 hours of the incident.” The court directed the parties to handle
remaining confidentiality issues as to specific records by redaction or
further proceedings.
The defendants argue that disclosure would have a chilling effect
on the candor expected for internal investigations. The district court
addressed that concern by excluding from the order compelling
production those “reports or memorandum generated solely for purposes
of a police internal review of the incident.”
The defendants also argue that further disclosure and the resulting
publicity could taint the jury pool. We believe that concern can be
addressed during jury selection. The district court noted, “The alleged
facts of the incident have been the subject of wide media coverage and
broad public discussion.” The court continued, “Public disclosure of
these reports in a county of over 200,000 people may enhance the public
discussion but should not jeopardize any party’s right to a fair trial.” We
agree. We also note that the attorneys must comply with Iowa Rule of
Professional Conduct 32:3.6, which prohibits an attorney from making
extrajudicial statements that “will have a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.”
Throughout the United States, highly publicized police shootings
have sparked debates nationally about race, policing, and community
relations. “[I]t goes without saying that police misconduct is a matter of
public concern.” Martinez v. Hooper, 148 F.3d 856, 859 (7th Cir. 1998).
As we previously noted,
The image presented by police personnel to the general
public “is vitally important to the police mission.”
Additionally, such image “also permeates other aspects of
the criminal justice system and impacts its overall success.”
22
For these reasons, “police officers must earn and maintain
the public trust at all times by conducting themselves with
good judgment and sound discretion.”
Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Johnson, 653 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Iowa 2002) (quoting
City of Fort Dodge v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 562 N.W.2d 438, 440 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1997)). 10 We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion
in applying the Hawk Eye balancing test.
D. Whether the Defendants Showed Good Cause for a
Protective Order. The defendants argue the district court abused its
discretion by denying their motion for a protective order. They note the
Mitchells are obtaining the police investigative reports for their use in the
litigation, and the proposed protective order simply prevents disclosure
to the news media and other nonparties. The Mitchells have failed to
show how such a protective order would impede their ability to prove
their claims.
But it is the defendants’ burden to establish good cause through “a
particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from
stereotyped and conclusory statements.” Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 775
N.W.2d 302, 305 (Iowa 2009) (quoting Nat’l Dietary Research, 454
N.W.2d at 823); see also Iowa Film Prod. Servs., 818 N.W.2d at 230
(rejecting argument against disclosure that “was presented entirely at an
abstract level” without evidentiary proof).
A district court should consider three criteria when
evaluating the factual showing establishing good cause:
(1) whether the harm posed by dissemination will be
substantial and serious; (2) whether the protective order is
precisely and narrowly drawn; and (3) whether any
alternative means of protecting the public interest is
available that would intrude less directly on expression.
10TheMitchells’ tort claims are pending, and there has been no adjudication of
misconduct by Officer Jones.
23
Comes, 775 N.W.2d at 305–06. “[T]hese criteria strike a balance between
the policy favoring discovery and free expression on one side and a
party’s interest in avoiding commercial damage and preventing an abuse
of discovery on the other.” Id. at 306 (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l
Dietary Research, 454 N.W.2d at 823).
The parties’ arguments for and against the protective order are
addressed in our review of the district court’s application of the
Hawk Eye balancing test. As set forth above, we hold the police
investigative reports at issue are not exempt from public disclosure
under Hawk Eye. A protective order limiting disclosure to third parties
would be pointless here when any member of the public could obtain the
same reports through an Iowa Code chapter 22 open records request.
We determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the defendants’ motion for protective order.
IV. Disposition.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s ruling denying the
defendants’ motion for a protective order.
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Appel, J., who concurs specially.
24
#18–0124, Mitchell v. City of Cedar Rapids
APPEL, Justice (concurring specially).
I write separately to emphasize what I believe is an unstated
assumption in the majority opinion—in determining whether there is
good cause for a protective order, an exemption under the open records
law is merely a factor that may be considered by the district court. That
assumption furthers the legislative intent behind Iowa’s discovery rules
and open records law, and is consistent with our precedent and that of
other jurisdictions.
The open records law, Iowa Code ch. 22 (2018), establishes a
distinct, narrow regime that permits the public access to certain public
records. It provides a conflict resolution mechanism for aggrieved
persons who claim they have been denied access to public records by
governing bodies.
The public records act is generally distinct from our discovery
rules. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.500–.517. In Mediacom Iowa, L.L.C. v.
Incorporated City of Spencer, we explained that our open records law
“ordinarily has no application to discovery of [government documents] in
litigation.” 682 N.W.2d 62, 69 (Iowa 2004). A governmental party
engaged in litigation cannot refuse to produce a document requested in
discovery on the basis that the document would be exempt from
production pursuant to an open records request. See id.
Our view in this regard is similar to federal law. Under federal law,
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) “was not intended to supplement
or displace rules of discovery.” John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493
U.S. 146, 153, 110 S. Ct. 471, 475 (1989). Many federal decisions hold
that a document exempt from production through an open record law
may still be produced in discovery. See, e.g., Kamakana v. City of
25
Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[E]xempt documents
[under FOIA] are not automatically privileged in civil discovery.”);
Friedman v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 738 F.2d 1336, 1344 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (“If information in government documents is exempt from
disclosure to the general public under FOIA, it does not automatically
follow the information is privileged . . . and thus not discoverable in civil
litigation.”); Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 511 F.2d 192, 197 (9th Cir. 1975)
(stating that FOIA exemptions were not intended to create evidentiary
privileges in civil discovery), aff’d, 426 U.S. 394, 96 S. Ct. 2119 (1976);
Pleasant Hill Bank v. United States, 58 F.R.D. 97, 99 (W.D. Mo. 1973)
(“Even if we posit arguendo that the [government] documents are exempt
from disclosure, it does not necessarily follow that they are privileged for
purposes of civil discovery.”).
Other states, too, view their state open records law as separate
from rules of discovery, and therefore, an exemption in the former does
not preclude production pursuant to the latter. See, e.g., Martinelli v.
Dist. Ct., 612 P.2d 1083, 1093–94 (Colo. 1980) (en banc) (“We . . . hold
that the Colorado open records laws . . . do not, ipso facto, exempt the
[government documents] from discovery in civil litigation.”); Fla. House of
Representatives v. Romo, 113 So. 3d 117, 127–28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2013) (stating that a government document exempt from production
under the state open records law must be produced in discovery unless
otherwise privileged or a balancing of the parties’ interests weighs in
favor of keeping the document confidential), quashed on other grounds by
League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Fla. House of Representatives, 132
So. 3d 135, 138 (Fla. 2013); Tighe v. City of Honolulu, 520 P.2d 1345,
1348 (Haw. 1974) (“The very broad discovery specifically granted to
litigants . . . cannot be said to be limited by the terms of a charter
26
provision directed toward regulation of the entirely different situation of
the general exploration of public records by any citizen during general
business hours.”); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 840 N.E.2d 470, 475
(Mass. 2006) (“Discovery, by its nature, is quite broad. The public
records law does not restrict this breadth.” (Citations omitted.)); Truel v.
City of Dearborn, 804 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he
discovery rules and the [state open records law] represent ‘two
independent schemes for obtaining information.’ Therefore, discovery in
a civil action and the [state open records law] are subject to different
procedures and enforcement mechanisms.” (quoting Cent. Mich. Univ.
Supervisory-Tech. Ass’n, MEA/NEA v. Bd. of Trs., 567 N.W.2d 696, 698
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (Holbrook, J., concurring))). For instance, in
Boston Police Superior Officers Federation v. City of Boston, 608 N.E.2d
1023, 1027 (Mass. 1993), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
held that a trial judge properly required the City of Boston to produce, in
discovery, logs of the internal affairs division that may be exempt from
production through the state open records law. The court explained that
“the public record law and its exceptions do not restrict the . . . power to
subpoena documents.” Id.
The rationales for those decisions are based on “the essential
differences between the discovery process and the FOIA request.” Janice
Toran, Information Disclosure in Civil Actions: The Freedom of Information
Act and the Federal Discovery Rules, 49 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 843, 851
(1981) [hereinafter Toran]. While a litigant can obtain discovery of things
“relate[d] to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party” so long as the things are “reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,” Iowa R. Civ. P.
1.503(1); see Toran, 49 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 851, the relevance of
27
materials to litigation or other matters is irrelevant to disclosure under
open records laws, see Toran, 49 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 852. That
difference requires the court to look beyond the mere presence of an open
records exemption in determining whether to allow discovery. Id.; see,
e.g., Jupiter Painting Contracting Co. v. United States, 87 F.R.D. 593, 597
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (“[A] FOIA exemption cannot even indirectly delimit
claims of privilege since it does not take into account the degree of need
for the information exhibited by the claimant.”). Further, open records
law exemptions do not limit civil discovery because of “the distinction
between open disclosure to the public at large under FOIA and the much
more restricted disclosure which occurs under the discovery rules.”
Mark S. Wallace, Discovery of Government Documents and the Official
Information Privilege, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 142, 153–54 (1976).
The latter consideration bears further consideration because it is
arguably germane to the issue in the case before us. Some courts have
allowed discovery of documents exempt from open records requests
because open records laws apply to disclosure to the public generally as
opposed to private litigants. See, e.g., Denny v. Carey, 78 F.R.D. 370,
373 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (“Exemption from the Freedom of Information Act . . .
does not create independently any evidentiary privilege; the effect of such
exclusion, rather, is only to permit the withholding of these categories of
information from the public generally.”); Douglas v. Windham Super. Ct.,
597 A.2d 774, 776 n.2 (Vt. 1991) (“Petitioner has noted that the Vermont
Access to Public Records Act, 1 V.S.A. § 317(b)(5), has an exception from
public disclosure for ‘disciplinary investigation’ records of a ‘professional
licensing agency.’ This exception deals with disclosure to the public
generally, not disclosure in response to discovery in litigation. It does
not create a privilege.”); Maclay v. Jones, 542 S.E.2d 83, 89 (W. Va. 2000)
28
(“[W]e hold that the provisions of this state’s FOIA, which address
confidentiality as to the public generally, were not intended to shield law
enforcement investigatory materials from a legitimate discovery request
when such information is otherwise subject to discovery in the course of
civil proceedings.”).
The open records law may inform a district court’s decision on a
protective order, but it “does not trump our discovery rules.” Mediacom,
682 N.W.2d at 69. This is because
there is nothing in [Iowa Code] section 22.7 that suggests the
legislature intended to limit the discovery rights of litigants
in cases involving governmental entities. To the contrary,
section 22.7 indicates the opposite because it allows
disclosure upon a court order.
Id.; see also Laxalt v. McClatchy, 809 F.2d 885, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(refusing to infer qualified discovery privilege from congressional silence,
especially where Congress expressly permitted court-ordered disclosure).
Moreover, “[i]f a[] FOIA exemption is the prime determinant in the
balancing process, the needs of one party—the non-governmental party—
are effectively disregarded,” Toran, 49 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 853, even
though our discovery rules permit consideration of the requesting party’s
need for discovery in decisions allowing or limiting discovery, see Iowa R.
Civ. P. 1.504(1) (stating that a protective order should be granted only
where “justice requires” and “for good cause shown”); see also Iowa R.
Civ. P. 1.503(1) (providing for discovery so long as “the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence”); Mediacom, 682 N.W.2d at 66 (“[T]he philosophy
underlying our discovery rules is that ‘litigants are entitled to every
person’s evidence, and the law favors full access to relevant
information.’ ” (quoting State ex rel. Miller v. Nat’l Dietary Research, Inc.,
29
454 N.W.2d 820, 822–23 (Iowa 1990))). Therefore, giving conclusive
weight to an open records exemption in deciding on a protective order
would thwart legislative intent.
Other courts have considered an open records exemption as
influencing, but not controlling, a decision on whether to issue a
protective order preventing public dissemination of materials produced in
discovery. In Henry v. Centeno, No. 10 C 6364, 2011 WL 3796749, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2011), the court said that a state FOIA exemption does
not necessarily mean that documents obtained through discovery cannot
be disseminated to the public, but it may provide guidance. The court
explained,
The question before the court in ruling on this
proposed protective order . . . is not the FOIA-conferred right
of “merely curious members of the public” to access certain
information, but rather a litigant’s (albeit limited) First
Amendment right to disseminate information properly
obtained through pre-trial discovery. The court must take
care not to conflate rules regarding a universal “public right
to know” with rules regarding a litigant’s right to
disseminate. “Such conflation, like any other Pavlovian-type
generalization, is likely to generate an overly simplistic
answer to the more precise question posed in a particular
case.” That a FOIA exemption may curtail the general right
of access to information that FOIA otherwise bestows upon
the public does not necessarily restrain an individual’s right
to share the same information obtained by other means.
FOIA can, nevertheless, provide guidance as to
whether good cause exists for a proposed protective order, as
well as guidance as to the nature of the public’s interest.
Therefore, having rejected as a matter of law defendants
assertion that IFOIA “requires” a protective order to be
entered, the court will next consider what guidance IFOIA
offers as to whether a protective order should be entered.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Brown v. City of Chicago, No. 09 C 6506,
2011 WL 222840, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2011)). In Laxalt, the D.C.
Circuit explained that while a statutory ban on publication by a
30
government agency does not delimit the ability to obtain a government
document through discovery,
[t]he fact that a document is subject to the Privacy Act is not,
however, irrelevant to the manner in which discovery should
proceed. Although discovery standards . . . permit access to
relevant documents protected by the Act, those
same . . . standards give the District Court ample discretion
to fashion appropriate protective orders upon a showing of
“good cause.” . . .
....
. . . [A]s is true with respect to other statutory
publication bans, the applicability of the Privacy Act to the
materials requested is a relevant factor for the District Court
to consider in determining the appropriate scope and
manner of discovery in a given case.
809 F.2d at 889 (citation omitted). The court then suggested that, in
fashioning a protective order, a court could consider a party’s ability to
make documents public. Id. at 890 n.23. Another decision viewing an
open records exemption as influential but not controlling is In re National
Prescription Opiate Litigation, 325 F. Supp. 3d 833, 838–40 (N.D. Ohio
2018).
Similarly, courts considering the converse situation find an open
records law persuasive but not controlling. In Pansy v. Borough of
Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 1994), a group of newspapers
sought access to a settlement agreement made confidential by a
protective order. The court said,
[W]e hold that where it is likely that information is accessible
under a relevant freedom of information law, a strong
presumption exists against granting or maintaining an order
of confidentiality whose scope would prevent disclosure of
that information pursuant to the relevant freedom of
information law. In the good cause balancing test, this
strong presumption tilts the scales heavily against entering
or maintaining an order of confidentiality.
Id. at 791.
 31
Viewing the open records law as informing—but not controlling—a
district court’s decision on a protective order is, I think, implicit in the
majority opinion. The majority opinion explains that “[l]itigants suing the
government ordinarily may obtain relevant records through discovery
notwithstanding confidentiality provisions in Iowa Code section 22.7, but
a protective order may be required precluding disclosure to nonparties,”
(emphasis added), “litigants’ access to confidential records may be
subject to a protective order,” (second emphasis added), and “[f]ederal
authorities likewise recognize that statutory confidentiality provisions do
not generally create privileges against civil discovery but may warrant
judicial protective orders” (second emphasis added). The majority
concludes that “[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the requested protective order . . . [and] balanc[ing] the
competing interests in confidentiality and transparency.” The majority’s
reasoning, it seems to me, provides that an exemption from the open
records law does not control the decision on a protective order.
Accordingly, I specially concur.